Killing for Coal

America's Deadliest Labor War

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less lowered slowly back into the ground on a little rise above the Slate River not far from the bodies of their comrades buried by fraternal orders in separate ceremonies, and almost within sight of the Jokerville mine in which they had perished. The earthly remains of at least sixteen others had already been taken to the little frame depot on Elk Avenue. From there, they retraced the star-crossed paths that had brought the miners to Crested Butte from other parts of Colorado, as well as Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.[71]

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Out of the Depths and on to the March

Even in an era marked by populist insurgency, convulsed by economic crisis, racked by strikes, and patrolled by so-called industrial armies led by Jacob Coxey and other self-styled generals of the unemployed, the march was an unexpected sight. In late May 1894 some two thousand striking colliers and a few dozen coal camp women descended on Rouse, a mining town tucked into the Rocky Mountain foothills south of Walsenburg. "The north and the south have met," one witness declared, "and their meeting was like the convergence of two murmuring streams." One stream of marching strikers had set out on foot from Fremont County, more than eighty miles away; the other had trekked from the coal camps of Las Animas County, thirty-five to fifty miles distant. As for Rouse, the miners had chosen it as their rendezvous because they had come to believe that their collective fate hinged on this particular piece of ground. The strikers' aim was first to advance into the streets of the town, then to persuade the men still working there to come out of the mine and join the march.[1]

Knowledgeable observers expected that the remarkable marching strike of 1894 was nearing a decisive moment. Much more hinged on Rouse, however, than the fate of the largest miners' strike yet organized in southern Colorado. The shift from migration to mass mobilization as a strategy for betterment, the translation of underground tensions into surface conflicts, the coales-

cence of local disputes into regional and national strikes, the union of fragmented identities and narrowly defined interests in collective movements championing the rights of coalfield migrants as workers, citizens, and human beings—these and other trends seemed at the tipping point.

This was, of course, neither the first nor the last time southern Colorado mineworkers would strike. The southern coalfields' catalogue of labor woes stretched back to 1873, when colliers at Coal Creek had walked out of the mines in an unsuccessful bid to reverse William Palmer's effort to cut their wages from $1.50 to $1.25 per ton. Organized miners had scored their inaugural victory in December 1879. Amid a "general advance in wages, and in cost of supplies," Colorado Coal and Iron miners in Fremont County and Walsenburg had secured wage increases, though at Engleville "the strike was successfully resisted by the prompt employment of Mexican labor." Two years later, as we have seen, Engleville's *nuevomexicanos* had silenced company machines by refusing to work during Holy Week, and in June 1882 miners struck again at the mine in a fruitless effort to resist the imposition of new work rules at the property.[2]

These early disputes tended to be highly localized affairs, sometimes spontaneous, sometimes initiated by committees drawn from the miners' ranks or from the camp lodges of a national union called the Miners' National Association. The strike of 1884–1885, which affected Colorado's southern and northern coalfields, as well as the Wyoming collieries, set a much clearer precedent for the marching strikes and coalfield wars to follow. The strike was organized by the Knights of Labor, the first national labor organization to recruit workers without regard to craft or ethnic group. When Colorado Coal and Iron followed a Santa Fe Railway subsidiary in slashing wages and rates in the Fremont County mines, "an immediate strike" erupted. Though colliers managed to cripple production of domestic fuel during the winter heating season, the companies nonetheless derived a "great benefit" from the strike, for it enabled them "to introduce in[to] the various channels of consumption, where Canon coal only was known," fuel from Huerfano County. This "benefit" evaporated in October, however, as miners from Huerfano and Las Animas counties joined the dispute and demanded "that the miners at Canon be reinstated at old prices." When the companies sought to arbitrate with their workmen, Colorado Coal and Iron explained in its annual report to shareholders, they discovered the miners to be "controlled by an

association called the 'Knights of Labor,' who demanded that before work be resumed the Company should recognize their body." Believing that the Knights were "assuming unwarranted power" and preventing the company "from enjoying its natural advantages," CC&I allied with its competitors to crush the strike. The company imported strikebreakers (mostly Italians and African Americans), discharged alleged troublemakers, and imposed wage cuts on workmen, who found themselves pushed to "'the eve of starvation.'" With the Knights of Labor forced to retrench and the region entering a boom cycle, seven relatively quiet years ensued; labor-management relations in Colorado were aptly described in the *United Mine Workers' Journal* as "'not friendly, but peaceable.'" Beneath the surface, though, trouble was brewing—trouble that would lead hundreds and eventually thousands of men to walk off the job, join together, and embark with a few dozen women on one of the most remarkable mass mobilizations in the history of the American West. In ways these miners could not have predicted, what Jacob Coxey called "a petition in boots" would lead the southern coalfields away from the harmonious relations that both operators and miners desired, and toward the all-out labor wars of the twentieth century.[3]

The Madness of Markets

Markets and workscapes lay behind this long history of labor-management conflict in the southern coalfields. Mineral-intensive industrialization transformed the Western economy in ways that made it virtually impossible for colliers and coal companies to find common ground. Annihilating Western isolation, coal and railroads made it cheaper and easier for work-seeking migrants to reach Colorado. Labor, scarce and thus richly remunerated on the Rocky Mountain frontier, became plentiful by the 1880s. Prevailing wages throughout the region plunged accordingly.[4]

Railroads imported coal as well as people. Shipments of fuel into Colorado from Wyoming, Utah, and other states exacerbated the often cutthroat competition that pertained in Denver and other markets served by multiple rail lines. Imports also jeopardized the ability of Colorado coal miners to force concessions from operators through strikes, since the worst effects of even an all-out work stoppage could now be averted by supplies of fuel hauled in by railcar from coalfields beyond the state borders.[5]

The fossil-fuel-driven regional economy, like the organically fueled economy that had preceded and still sustained it, also ebbed and flowed from season to season and year to year. Complicated interactions of coalfield geology, Western ecology, and the international economy subjected industrializing Colorado to both regular rhythms and unpredictable crises; together, the variations had troubling consequences for mineworkers. The home heating market, for instance, picked up by late summer, as dealers stocked up on domestic coal, and then collapsed between January and April, depending on the severity of the winter. So even as men who worked the coking- and steam coal seams of Huerfano and Las Animas counties were enjoying regular employment, their comrades in the domestic coal mines of Fremont County were enduring months of slack work or layoffs. The high plains droughts of the early 1890s also caused a downturn in coal consumption in eastern Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, and adjacent areas, as farmers undertook "forced economies" that "greatly curtailed their winter consumption of coal."[6]

Business cycles wrought still greater havoc than climatic cycles. Demand for coal increased exponentially between the 1870s and the 1910s, yet industry fortunes nonetheless declined whenever hard-rock mining, railroad construction, and urban expansion veered from boom to bust. Coal companies reduced output and cut prices during economic downturns such as the panic of 1883–1884. Strikes ensued as operators, pressed by financial challenges of their own and emboldened by the ready availability of workers discharged from other industries, tried to cut labor costs.[7]

The companies' efforts to reduce tonnage rates (for miners at the face) and wages (for the other underground and surface workers, collectively known as company men) owed as much to the structure of the coal industry as to the vicissitudes of the Western economy. William Jackson Palmer had assailed the "hot competition of American business life" for preventing employers from treating their workers properly; however valid this notion, the general's failure to secure a coal monopoly boded ill for Colorado colliers. Competition and increased production together pushed retail energy prices steadily downward from the 1870s on. Profit margins in the industry declined apace, from nearly three dollars per ton of coal in 1880 to perhaps ten to forty cents in the 1900s. Already in 1890 one large firm, the Colorado Fuel Company (which merged with CC&I two years later to form CF&I), was warning its stockholders: "Competition has reduced the profit on a ton of coal or coke to

so low a figure that no considerable reduction [in prices] can be made in the future." Since rates and wages accounted for perhaps 60 to 80 percent of the cost of producing each ton of coal, and since mechanization and other strategies for rendering extraction more efficient made only halting headway, operators chose to accommodate consumers' cries for cheaper coal—not to mention their own desire for profit—by cutting mineworkers' pay. Strikes, though troublesome, provided operators with a golden opportunity to slash labor costs by replacing militant craft miners with inexperienced newcomers, as well as a fighting chance to impose a victor's peace on miners reduced to hunger and despair by weeks or months without pay.[8]

No wonder southern Colorado's coal companies earned a reputation as inveterate foes of the unions. And though executives often resorted to ideologies of free labor or social Darwinism to justify their opposition to labor organization, their intransigence remained at heart a practical strategy for controlling mining costs. Elevating collective interest above selfish individualism, mineowners in the southern coalfields cooperated during strikes with even more gusto than they competed during peacetime. Unionization in the collieries also presaged higher fuel costs for other industries, while offering a precedent that might inspire other workers to organize. And so during colliers' strikes the small clique of men who controlled the railroads, streetcars, smelters, hard-rock mines, factories, and banks of the Rocky Mountain West hastened to lend moral, financial, and strategic support to the coal barons. Supremely conscious of the stake their own class had in the outcome of the coalfield struggles, the overlords of the fossil-fuel-driven economy closed ranks to present a united and formidable front.[9]

William Palmer's vision of Colorado as a "newer and grander and happier Columbia," a utopia of labor harmony and natural balance, vanished well before the marching strike of 1894 erupted. In place of his dream of coal-fired benevolence, the harsh reality confronting miners was one of a regional economy that was at once wildly erratic, brutally competitive, and closely controlled by the few dozen industrial oligarchs on whose actions the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of women, men, and children turned.

From the Welshmen who represented the driving force behind the strike of 1884 to the Italians and Austrians who were so eager to march a decade later, mineworkers of every nationality, race, and ethnicity suffered from irregular

employment, wage cutting, and union busting. But just as mine air exploded only when fuel, oxygen, and an ignition source combined within a confined space, so too did colliers' strikes erupt only when miners could come together in spite of the social divisions that tended to pit various migrants against one another.

Colliery work cultures characterized by craft pride, inclusiveness, autonomy, and solidarity exacerbated the madness of markets. Interactions between miners and mine workscapes—the uneven topographies of risk and reward underground, the devil's bargains posed by tonnage rates and dead work, the potential of mine disasters to kindle unrest in the camps above, and so forth—did much to generate and sustain militancy in the southern fields. Still, it would be foolish to explain industrial struggle in Colorado as a simple or direct consequence of shifting earth and explosive air. Nor should we underestimate the depth or force of the factors setting mineworkers against each other. Though some British commentators likened colliers to "Nature's noblemen," a diverse, far from angelic assortment of boys and men labored within the buried swamplands of the Mountain West. Distrust and dissension, fomented on many occasions by the companies, pervaded the mines. Discrimination and interethnic violence were rampant in the camps above. In the context of the economic segmentation, legal and extralegal discrimination, and racial violence that characterized the North American West during this era, however, the more interesting phenomenon is not that miners often had trouble banding together, but that they periodically managed to overcome their differences and to carry out mass mobilizations, such as the marching strike of 1894.[10]

Pride and Practice

Despite the widespread perception of coal mining as menial labor, most men who toiled underground took immense pride in their work. They knew what we tend to forget: that mine labor imparted a deep knowledge of underground nature. Since very few sources exist to document the contours of this knowledge in the years leading up to the marching strike of 1894, we have little choice but to extrapolate from later sources. Oral histories gathered in the 1970s offer particularly rich insights into how aging mineworkers remembered their careers during the 1900s to the 1930s. Since basic mining methods remained relatively unchanged through the late 1920s, the interviews offer evidence about the connections between underground work cultures and mineworker militancy in the late nineteenth century, while illuminating the deep roots of coalfield violence in the early twentieth century.[11]

It is useful to recall that even as coal liberated city and country from the Malthusian constraints of organic energy regimes, the extraction of fossil fuel continued to depend on the embodied knowledge of mineworkers and mules. The colliers' craft endured, even as most coal-powered industries replaced animals and skilled workers with machines and unskilled machine tenders. Miners honed, then passed on, their craft as they ascended an informal occupational ladder.

Though at least a few craft colliers first entered the mines as young boys or even as toddlers, most began to learn their trade well before puberty as "trappers." Former Colorado miner Bill Lloyd described trapping as "a job that kids always done. That was where they started in the mines, when their dinner bucket drug the ground." British American miners often started working underground at eight or ten; the deaths of two twelve-year-olds in the Jokerville explosion suggest that in this as in so many other respects, the Colorado mining industry replicated old-country practice. As they opened and closed underground doors so that mule trips could pass, trappers faced a lonely initiation into the hazardous and alien environment of the mines. In the process, boys learned from older males how to act like men. A miner related his father's experience as a boy of thirteen entering the mines; he was young enough that "if a piece of coal fell on his toe or he suffered some other minor injury . . . he would cry and my grandfather would tell him to pick up his bucket and go home and send one of his sisters in to help my grandfather work." Trappers' work, though mundane and poorly paid, brought grave responsibilities. In places where leaving a single door ajar for just a few minutes could short-circuit the flow of good air and enable firedamp to reach dangerous concentrations, one boy's negligence could cost dozens of lives.[12]

Boys who survived this introduction to mine workscapes were usually promoted to driving, the next rung on the ladder, by the time they reached their late teens. As they distributed empty mine cars and collected full ones, drivers embarked on fraught relationships with their animal co-workers. As

they grappled with their mulish charges, the colliers whose rooms drivers served educated them in the culture of manly labor that prevailed underground. Miners depended on drivers to maintain the "turn," a custom through which colliers sought to control output and equalize earning opportunities by ensuring that each miner would receive the same number of cars during a workday. As drivers conversed with more experienced men and learned to read signs of danger underground, their knowledge of colliery workscapes and work cultures expanded.[13]

Although some men continued to drive for the rest of their lives, most eventually exchanged their reins for picks, augurs, shovels, and powder. The room-and-pillar system of mining was well suited to educating newcomers in the ways of the collieries. Pairs of miners generally worked together in each of the work rooms that made up the city blocks of the mine grid; often, one man (known variously as a helper, buddy, or partner) was serving an informal apprenticeship beneath a more experienced relative, countryman, or stranger. Helpers were primarily responsible for loading coal that the master collier loosed from the face. Loading was physically challenging, but men soon developed the calluses, muscles, and discernment needed to shovel many tons of coal a day. As they sweated through this grunt work, they were also learning the miners' trade through observation. "I see them working," Pete Aiello explained, "and I done the same." Craft miners taught "green" men how to "read" important workscape signs such as the visible pattern of cleavage on the mine face, which suggested where to place powder charges; the various sounds rock made when tapped with a pick, which provided clues about the soundness of the roof overhead; and the distinctive effects produced on the flames of a miner's lamp by various mine gases, which warned of the presence of poisonous or explosive "damps."[14]

The knowledge that craft colliers imparted to their apprentices was at once physical, mental, and cultural. During lunch breaks and other slow points in the day, "there was a good deal of visiting back and forth," the union leader John Brophy later recalled. Master miners sometimes took advantage of the opportunity to instruct less experienced men in the lore and customs of the pits. Mineworkers, like other people surrounded by capricious forces of tremendous power and mystery, had a healthy appetite for stories that seemed to explain the inexplicable. Collieries, saloons, and boardinghouses

5.1. Partners at the Face, Western Colorado, 1915. Photograph by L. C. McClure. Denver Public Library, Western History Collection, MCC-2228.

echoed with cautionary tales about how to avoid death underground. Interwoven with the humorous stories and fanciful lore—Don't set foot in any mine visited by women or white rabbits; lay off work for at least a day when a dream of muddy water wakes you—were deep and bitter memories of past injustices. "From earliest childhood," Utah collier Walter Morgan Donaldson recalled, "we were steeped in the lore" of the mines. "We learned at an early age," Donaldson recalled, about the "tragedy of the mine disasters" and "what the word scab meant."[15]

In the classic British American scenario, mineworkers had generally trapped, driven, and "helped" by their late teens or early twenties. Such men were said to have "grown up" in the collieries, a phrase that reflected how men and mine workscapes shaped each other's development. Bodies and minds, personalities and identities—all matured through a peculiar education carried out in constant contact with the underground environment.[16]

Miners schooled not only sons and younger relatives in the craft and customs of mining, but also older countrymen and complete strangers. "You took your son in," recalled Henry "Welchie" Mathias, "or you took your neighbor, or whatever, and they didn't work in the mine before, they'd put in with an experienced miner. I'd been in the mine 30, 40 years, well you'd get this new guy to come with you, see, to work. Show him many things—you got to detect gas, know the working conditions about the roof and that kind of stuff, you know, and a man wouldn't know it till he's worked." Adults who arrived in the coalfields lacking underground experience sometimes started as trappers. Victor Bazanele, born in Italy but raised in Germany, recalled the scorn that miners heaped on the immigrant men who performed this boys' job; the treatment was "terrible. We were called dago, mackerel snapper, all kinds of words." Many newcomers began with driving to avoid such epithets and insults, others jumped straight into helping, but in either case such "green men" eventually served apprenticeships that lasted for months or even years. Working day after day with the same master collier, they learned the skills, traditions, and even the politics first carried to the southern fields by British American miners. A single workman's inexperience could kill off an entire shift, but self-interest alone could not fully account for the unusually inclusive attitudes skilled miners expressed. "I had to work a lot of overtime, you know," Laurence Amicarella recalled. "Green men, huh. I stayed with them, worked with them. I didn't want to. I stayed with them to show them how to, you know, not to get hurt. Cause at the Columbine, I'd seen 17 or 18 of them get killed while I was in the mine." At least some colliers, Amicarella's comments suggest, felt a moral duty to instruct incoming migrants about the perils of the mine workscape.[17]

In time, both green men and migrants who had grown up in the pits became "full miners," men competent to work alone. Most had to hone their skills for at least another decade or two before earning the esteem of their fellow workmen as "practical miners," an honorific reserved for expert colliers of broad experience who often played an important role in developing new collieries and spearheading mine rescue work. Oral histories and accident reports filed by the state mine inspector—an office invariably filled by a British American practical miner—offer ample evidence that some Hispanos, Austrians, African Americans, Japanese, Italians such as Amicarella,

and other migrant newcomers eventually won the regard of their fellows as "practical" or "experienced" miners.[18]

Local supervisory positions, by contrast, remained the preserve of British American men well into the 1920s. Several factors combined to bar other migrants from the positions of fire boss, mine boss, and superintendent: simple discrimination, the superior craft knowledge of men raised in the mines, and the English-language and arithmetical skills needed to pass the required correspondence school courses and state certifying exams. Decades after college-educated engineers and managers had taken the helm of most gold and silver mines in Colorado, coal companies continued to draw virtually every local mine official in the southern fields from the ranks of practical miners. At a 1916 convention, former state mine inspector John McNeil—lauded by the *Denver Times* as "perhaps the best posted man in the West on coal"—explained the advantages men such as himself enjoyed over parvenus. Let those "who entered the mines in their early boyhood days remember," McNeil declared, "that they have already graduated in an important branch of coal mining that cannot be acquired in colleges, and in this you excel over college-bred engineers who enter the coal mines later in life. It is difficult for me to define what this is; that something which enters in by the tips of the fingers, as it were; something that is mirrored on the retina of the eye; an innate consciousness to feel the throbbing, practical pulsations of a coal mine."[19]

Such embodied knowledge—a "consciousness" that seemed innate but was actually acquired through years of on-the-job education—could not be learned from books or theoreticians. "Lots of people tell you that you never get warned in these accidents," former collier Tony Hungaro explained, "but you always get warned, but the only thing is you got to be awake and listening." The practical experience that trained "the tips of the fingers" and "the retina of the eye" vastly improved an expert miner's chances of being "awake and listening" when danger threatened.[20]

Colliery work cultures resided more in the body than in the mind, more in practice than in symbolic systems of language. Those who have earned their bread in other ways have consequently tended to look down on mineworkers in Colorado and elsewhere with what E. P. Thompson once denounced as "the enormous condescension of posterity." Colliers, however, saw their

work as a "challenging and . . . an honorable occupation." The collier Joe Crump declared, "Once anybody start working at the mine, they won't do anything else. They just fall in love with it somehow, they just like to work there." Welchie Mathias phrased the same sentiment somewhat differently. "Boy, I'm telling ya, that goddam mine, it put something in you, see, that's what it does." Other colliers joined Mathias in characterizing their craft as the outcome of a process that seemed almost biological. "I don't know how to put it," said Amicarella, "just that it grows on you, just grows on you, being a coal miner."[21]

Miners' Freedoms

Together, craft pride and the inclusive occupational ladder through which it was transmitted inspired a third core characteristic of colliery work cultures: a fierce sense of independence that stimulated and sustained decades of conflict in the southern fields. What Carter Goodrich called the miners' freedom, in his 1925 study by that name of the American coal industry, took root in Western soil because coal companies and British American colliers largely re-created the physical, economic, and moral structures that had long underlain craft miners' independence. Other migrants to the coalfields subsequently joined their own traditions of autonomy to the independent traditions imparted by master colliers. Laurence Amicarella bluntly expressed the close connections between experience, craft knowledge, and industrial struggle. "I worked the mine 50 years," he told an interviewer. "Each day I worked I learned something. I learned to tell the boss to kiss it." For Amicarella and many other miners in the southern fields, occupational cultures easily metamorphosed into oppositional cultures.[22]

A collier's time, to begin with, was his and his alone. Operators tried to establish shifts of nine hours or longer. Yet although drivers, tracklayers, and other company men had to abide by company time, colliers usually set their own hours. "Everybody," Victor Bazanele recalled, "could go in every time he wanted to in the mine." Some arrived early, to get a jump on their work; others straggled in later. But most arrived more or less in around the same time, as the victims of the Jokerville explosion had on that fateful January morning in 1884. Colliers also decided for themselves when to knock off,

take a break, or skip work altogether. Funerals, fishing trips, sickness, religious and national holidays, ill portents and rumors of portents, elevated workscape hazards, especially fierce hangovers—each offered the occasion to lay off work for a day or more.[23]

Operators, though they surely bristled at the control miners had over their own hours, possessed neither the will nor the means to reform such customs. The tonnage system placed the opportunity cost for slacking or skipping work squarely on colliers' shoulders, thus removing employers' main financial incentive for mandating rigid schedules. Moreover, since the vast majority of Colorado mineworkers used their own tools, not their employers', coal executives could not enlist machines in their attempt to control workers or the labor process.[24]

The freedom of the miner resided not simply in his command over time and tools, but also in the power he exerted over the room or "place" in which he worked. His place constituted both the object of his labor and the focus of his most thorough workscape knowledge. A collier generally labored in a single room until he and his partner had removed all the coal it contained. Miners asserted quasi-proprietary claims over the places they had hewn from the earth. Such claims lacked legal standing, but mine officials often honored them nonetheless. Ill and injured miners, as well as colliers who decided to lay off work, expected to return to the same room and to find it unmolested, no matter how long they had been absent. Strikes were even known to end with miners' resuming work in their old places.[25]

It is little wonder that workmen who labored according to their own schedule and with their own tools, in places they considered their own, bristled at authority. As the Jokerville disaster demonstrated, mineworkers sometimes defied fire bosses such as Luke Richardson, who warned Peterson the Swede not to start working in his room before clearing out the firedamp that had accumulated inside. Mine bosses and superintendents rarely visited a collier's place more than once a week. Even these occasional visits, though, were greeted with indifference or hostility; some colliers even laid down their tools and refused to work in the presence of their ostensible superiors. Mineworkers who flouted their bosses' orders probably had a greater chance of being crushed to death or blasted to bits than they did of being dismissed for insubordination.[26]

Two brief comparisons with other mining cultures of the American West illustrate the unexpected degree of independence colliers enjoyed. Gold and silver miners started and ended their workdays on fixed schedules determined by their employers and announced by steam whistle; worked for a daily wage unrelated to their output; performed most of their work using machines that ran on fossil fuel and constituted not their own property, but the owners'; and frequently toiled under direct supervision by engineers and managers. The hard-rock miners' craft, once the warp and woof of labor in the gold and silver districts, had unraveled. Only through drilling competitions and other nostalgic, largely symbolic demonstrations of obsolescent skills could gold and silver miners fleetingly reclaim their old manly independence.[27]

The longwall system of coal mining offered an even more direct contrast with the room-and-pillar system used in all but a few Colorado collieries. Although the basic tasks of picking, blasting, and loading remained identical in the two systems, longwall miners worked in groups of a dozen or more to advance in unison along the single face or "longwall" of a very large room. The aptly named mining expert Thomas Collier explained the interdependence that resulted: "A good Longwall miner," Collier claimed, "realizes more than any one else the importance of being regularly at his place every working day." For even a single "day lost causes his place to fall behind the others which makes his work harder and his daily output is further reduced by the amount of small [and hence unmarketable] coal that is liable to result from the excessive pressure where the face falls behind"; worse still, "the bad results are also felt by" his neighbors, who had to work harder in his absence because "the coal does not break as well as when the face is kept in a uniform line." So different were the demands of the two systems that Collier claimed that "a good room and pillar man may not be successful in Longwall work."[28]

Hard-rock mining transplanted many of the fundamental characteristics of industrial production to mineral extraction. Longwall mining depended on coordinated group effort, time discipline, and direct supervision. Room-and-pillar mining, by contrast, was a throwback to an earlier age. Coal mine workscapes remained a refuge of muscle power and craft autonomy, at the same time as they propelled a regional economy characterized by the dilu-

tion of skill, the triumph of machines, and the domination of production by capitalists instead of workers.

Mining and Militancy

Much as mineworkers prized their independence, colliery work cultures were hardly anarchical. Colliers acknowledged extensive obligations toward their fellows. The mutualism and solidarity that prevailed in mine workscapes drew men together underground, even as the culture of camp life on the surface above pushed them apart.[29]

Consider the capacity of colliery labor to turn "white" skins black, and thus to undermine the distinctions of color on which American notions of race depended. "When you see me come out of the mine," Italian-born collier Dan DeSantis joked, "you see the nigger come out." An African American collier, Alfred Owens, made a similar point more delicately when he asserted, "Practically everybody's the same in the mines." Owens recalled how he and his white partner would josh each other at day's end. "When we'd come out I'd look at him and his face would be all dirty, we didn't see nothing but white, with his teeth, and I'd laugh at him. . . . He'd say, what are [you] laughing at? I'd say, you're so black. He'd say, well, what do you think about yourself?" In the collieries, Owens recalled, "We didn't have no Jim Crow stuff like that. Everybody was just what you are, that's what you was."[30]

The sense of common identity and of common cause that Owens expressed resulted from the conjunction of migrant traditions, subterranean conditions, and coalfield realities. British American colliers arrived in Colorado bearing strong traditions of mutualism. We have already encountered three key strands of this heritage: the duty to throw oneself into rescuing fellow mineworkers when disaster struck, the obligation to "educate" unskilled boys and inexperienced migrants, and "the turn" by which drivers equitably distributed mine cars to enforce a moral economy in which each collier "got to . . . make a living like the other guy."[31]

Other distributive practices shored up the underground commonwealth. When work became scarce because of warm weather or economic depression, colliers allocated shifts among themselves. And when a man missed

work because of sickness or injury, his comrades helped him out. Tony Hungaro recalled that even during the machine-mining era, "Guys [would] donate their time and donate their money" when their buddies were injured, to "get the guys through. . . . If one guy don[']t feel too good everybody else picks up the slack. . . . You get him through so he could have some groceries for his family." Pete Gerglich recalled, "I see guys go down in the mine, he can't carry a pick. We had to help him. The guys help him take his tools down to the mine. . . . He had to go, he had to work if he want to eat."[32]

Such practices fostered intense feelings of camaraderie. "Once you were down in the pit," as one miner succinctly put it, "you worked together, you helped one another and that was it." Workscape hazards cemented such bonds. In the process, they helped transform mutualism—cooperation for the common good—into solidarity—what the nineteenth-century philologist Archbishop Richard Trench once called "a fellowship in gain and loss, in honor and dishonor, in victory and defeat, a being, so to speak, all in the same boat." Like the coal dust that blackened white and brown skins alike, workscape dangers held the power to overcome race, ethnicity, and other distinctions.[33]

Boys and men realized not long after they first set foot underground that their lives and livelihoods depended not only on their own skill and luck, but also upon their co-workers' actions and abilities. Every miner's room occupied just one part of a larger matrix. An accident anywhere in the pit could have sudden, often deadly, ramifications throughout the pit. Bonding across cultural divides offered some protection against such hazards. "It didn't make any difference whether you were a Mexican or—see, the Mexicans were the last ones to come in there. Italians and Bohunks [Slavs] and the Welsh and the English," Henry Mathias claimed. "They come in in swarms, in bunches at different times down thru the mining career. And he drinks outa your bucket, you drink outa his bucket. If your bucket is closer to him when he wants a drunk, why he goes and takes a drink out your bucket. . . . And that's the way you are; down below there. . . . When you get down there, you're a family."[34]

Kinship, of course, can adopt a number of forms and serve a variety of

functions. Here Mathias seemed to use "family" to mean relationships formed between relatively equal, autonomous, yet interdependent men and cemented together in the face of great peril—a "band of brothers," similar to those often found among soldiers and sailors. John Tomsic seconded the contrast Mathias drew between "down there" and the surface. "The guys that you work with in the mine," Tomsic reflected, "they are so close together in the mine. . . . One was watching the other one, protecting the other guy all the time you know and any danger that would come up or anything else. It ain't like outside. But in there it just seemed like it just drawed the men right together. You just couldn't imagine how guys get in there."[35]

Laboring together in spaces where a danger to one could instantaneously erupt and become a danger to all, men began to lay a foundation for collective action. Entries, air courses, and other realms of company authority and responsibility stood between the miners' places. Explosions and other dangers that traveled through those channels and into the colliers' rooms revealed the limits of the miners' independence. If "continuing struggle," as a former collier, Bill Davis, put it, "created a common bond that lasted forever," no small part of that struggle consisted of pressing companies to ventilate mine air, mitigate coal dust, maintain haulageway roofs, and otherwise prevent disaster from spreading into the colliers' places via the areas where corporate control prevailed.[36]

Notions of manliness were interwoven with the miners' occupational culture of solidarity, independence, and craft pride: the rugged masculinity one collier celebrated when he called a miner "a goddamned good man," the respectable masculinity epitomized by "practical miners," the paranoid masculinity for which the mere presence of women underground tempted fate, even the stupid masculinity that led some mineworkers to risk their lives simply to silence their co-workers' taunts. The mineworkers' diffuse yet ever-present perception of themselves as men became more focused and pugnacious when threatened. Unions—first the Knights of Labor, then the Western Federation of Miners and the United Mine Workers—succeeded in organizing the southern colliers only insofar as they could build on the pride, independence, solidarity, and understanding of masculinity forged in the daily struggles between mineworkers and their workscapes.[37]

The World Above

The interrelationship among regional fuel markets, volatile mine workscapes, and colliery work cultures fostered chronic tension and instability in the Colorado collieries. Fortunately for employers, the mineworkers' capacity to build effective social movements on the promising foundations laid underground was often hampered by internal dissension, social dysfunction, the quest for upward mobility, and coalfield migrants' resumption of the wandering ways that had brought them to the southern fields in the first place.

Though Colorado never yielded a *Sons and Lovers* or a *Germinal,* the desperation and familial discord evoked by Lawrence and Zola permeated coal camp life in the Rockies. Mining fostered pride, but it also caused pain, frustration, and fear. When "everything go wrong in the mine," Josephine Bazanele told an interviewer, miners would "come out and they take it out on the woman you know, or the kids. My old man used to do [so].... Something was wrong in the mine and [he] got to let the steam go someplace else."[38]

Anger sometimes resulted in deadly violence. Between 1880 and 1920, Las Animas County's homicide rate—thirty-four murders per year per hundred thousand people—exceeded that of Omaha, New York, and Boston by five, eight, and twelve times, respectively. Men perpetrated 99 percent of these murders, and though women and children numbered among the victims, most of those killed were other men. Quarrels, which frequently had an interethnic dimension, started most of these incidents; others were connected with strikes, domestic disputes, police violence, or vendettas.[39]

Alcohol did much to fuel the mayhem. Colorado's mineworkers, like their relatives in most migrant source regions, were a notoriously hard-drinking lot. Many colliers flouted company policies and state laws by drinking on the job. Some brought wine underground in their lunch pails; others slipped bottles of liquor into their pockets. After work, an estimated 90 to 95 percent of miners headed to saloons, most of which catered to a particular ethnic, national, or racial clientele. Any coal camp worth its salt provided miners with a remarkable range of drinking opportunities. Enterprising camp residents, most of whom seem to have been former colliers or women widowed by the mines, established seven watering holes to serve Rockvale's force of a few hundred, and Sopris, a somewhat larger town, once boasted nineteen

saloons. Miners sidled up to the bars of these establishments thirsting not simply for refreshment, but also for release from the anxiety, loneliness, and anger that mine work tended to inflict on them. "They gather," a coke oven worker, Emilio Ferraro, later recalled, "lots of people down [at] the saloon.... That was their life of the miner, anyplace you go." Drinking often served to solidify bonds developed underground, yet it also bore at least some responsibility for the exceptional level of violence among colliers. The overwhelming majority of murders documented in Las Animas County occurred in or near saloons and bars; a still higher percentage involved victims or assailants who had been drinking.[40]

Like internal dissension, mobility was an obstacle for mineworkers who tried to organize collective movements. The quest for individual, family, or community betterment that had brought most migrants to the Rockies led some to pursue economic advancement for themselves at the expense of others. Practical miners who were promoted to boss or superintendent often turned their backs on the miners they ostensibly managed, their former fellows. In the camps above, meanwhile, company patronage elevated John Aiello, the Tarabinos, and other coalfield padrones to positions of power that reinforced preexisting divisions within migrant groups.[41]

The vast majority of people who came to the southern fields, however, were more likely to move out than to move up. Coal miners in Colorado probably moved as often as any workers in the industrializing world. Some found what they sought, then returned home flush with cash and brimming with stories. Most arrived in the Rockies after extensive migrations; few had any intention of staying a day longer than it suited them. If the work was too hard, the mine too gassy, the pay too low, the housing too squalid—"if you didn't want to stay with it" for any reason, as Laurence Amicarella put it—"you moved." The father of Bill Lloyd, to give a dramatic example, brought his family to the northern field camp of Lafayette from Monmouthshire, Wales, by way of Pennsylvania. "When the work slacked off up there," the Lloyds headed to Rouse, then to Rugby, where Mrs. Lloyd opened a boardinghouse. After the senior Lloyd was transferred from Hastings to Delagua "to open up them mines," Bill Junior began his mining career. Father and son soon quit and moved to Piedmont, then to Cokedale, to Bowen, and finally to Lester. In little more than a decade the Lloyds moved at least ten times.[42]

Such mobility was not uncommon. Of some 2,500 coal miners working in Las Animas County in 1900, only 750 remained anywhere in the county just three years later, and earlier generations of mineworkers may have been more transient still. Far more than upward mobility or collective mobilization, migration constituted mineworkers' default strategy for dealing with the many difficulties they faced. As a union miner lamented in March 1894, "'Tis bad to find a place where there are so many men going into and out of a camp, as those of Southern Colorado."[43]

The mineworkers' pragmatic assessment of their chances against the operators also helped ensure that what happened underground usually stayed underground. The solidarity and militancy engendered by mine workscapes tended to be highly localized. Any struggle waged by men from a single colliery was doomed to fail, but organizing several mines at once required more time and effort than hard-working miners could usually spare. Could the colliers at the next pit be trusted? Would the mine operators concede, or would they push back? If the companies did fight, how were miners to survive weeks or even months without pay, and what was to be done if employers punished strikers with layoffs, blacklists, or worse? Such dilemmas were liable to haunt any collier weighing the costs and benefits of united action.

What Triggered the Miners' March

Mass mobilizations such as the marching strike of 1894 resulted from a complex mixture of causes. The groundwork for decades of industrial struggle had been laid by an oppositional work culture and by fuel market conditions that constantly drove down mineworkers' wages. Among the factors keeping the volatility in check were internal divisions within the mining population, drinking, various forms of mobility, and the grim calculations men made as they contemplated what it might take to organize an effective challenge to the companies' power. By the spring of 1894, however, a deep depression and the expansion of the recently formed United Mine Workers of America into Colorado combined to ignite the powder keg of discontent.

In summer 1893 the revocation of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act devastated a Rocky Mountain economy already weakened by trouble in the crucial agricultural, railroad, and banking sectors. "Our people are in debt," William



5.2. Coxeyites in Camp, March 1894. Copyright Colorado Historical Society, Harry H. Buckwalter Collection, 20030902.

Palmer anxiously exclaimed. "Wages are being reduced, incomes stopped or diminished, men being discharged, while many of the 'well-to-do,' who formerly could have assisted their neighbors or the unemployed to tide over a season of disappointment or misfortune, are now uncertain whether they will themselves come out 'even with the world.'" Banks suspended business or failed outright, leaving depositors empty-handed. Real estate, vigorous since the mid-1880s, crashed down like a high-country avalanche to wipe out fortunes large and small. Silver mines throughout the mountains, Denver's smelters, Pueblo's steelworks, and other firms halted production. By winter more than 20 percent of the workers in the region had lost their jobs, including more than 90 percent of its hard-rock miners.[44]

Few coal miners numbered among the throngs of unemployed massing in the Front Range cities in search of relief. Though most collieries remained open, the broad crisis suffered by coal-consuming industries and households

led to many canceled or scaled-back orders. Mine managers, needing to limit production, responded by imposing shortened work weeks. Colliers, as was consistent with their ethos of mutualism, distributed the shifts remaining, while complaining that the mines were "'overcrowded'" and the "'turn at times slow.'" Though wages and rates remained unchanged despite the crisis, pay envelopes grew thinner and children's cheeks hollower.[45]

Coal companies precipitated the marching strike by making those already-trying times worse for their employees. Bank panics in Denver and Pueblo had made cash so scarce that it became difficult to make payroll. Claiming financial necessity, Colorado Fuel and Iron, Victor Coal and Coke, and others started compensating workers with paper certificates known as scrip, redeemable only at company stores. By the spring of 1894, miners throughout the southern coalfields had endured several months without pay; those in Fremont County had particular cause for concern, as demand for the county's peerless domestic fuel melted away along with the winter snow. Investigations by State Coal Mine Inspector Reed "proved conclusively that the irregular payment of miners, and the scrip system of payment, were the mainsprings that precipitated the strike."[46]

Equally significant, however, was the expansion of the United Mine Workers of America onto Western soil. Founded in 1890 with the amalgamation of Knights of Labor Assembly 135 and the Ohio-based National Miners' Federation, the United Mine Workers quickly became the most important organization of American colliers. The preamble to the union's constitution asserted: "There is no fact more generally known, nor more widely believed, than that without coal there would not have been any such grand achievements, privileges and blessings as those which characterize the nineteenth century civilization. . . . Those whose lot it is to daily toil in the recesses of the earth, mining and putting out this coal which makes these blessings possible," the organization resolved, "are entitled to a fair and equitable share of the same." In battle the United Mine Workers evinced all the toughness of its rough-and-ready membership. During periods of peace the organization was businesslike and pragmatic. United Mine Workers leaders realized that the best way to ensure the survival of their union and the prosperity of its members was to incorporate every mineworker in the United States and Canada into the union fold. And though the organization retained many of the racial

and ethnic prejudices of the British American colliers who represented its driving force, it probably made greater strides toward interethnic and interracial solidarity than any other major union prior to the New Deal. United Mine Workers leaders developed an organizational structure designed to channel the local grievances of mineworkers dispersed across the continent into one cohesive international movement. Organizers drawn from backgrounds almost as varied as the nation's coal-mining populations used their language skills and access to migrant networks, along with their knowledge of particular workscapes and familiarity with local conditions in the coal camps, to enlist miners of many races and nationalities.[47]

This peculiar combination of inclusiveness, militancy, and expansionism soon made the United Mine Workers one of the biggest and strongest labor organizations on the continent. It also set the organization on a collision course with southern Colorado's adamantly antiunion mine operators.

Taking on King Coal

When the union prepared to launch a massive strike in 1894 to push for new contracts in the core fuel-producing states from Pennsylvania to Iowa, it requested Colorado's colliers to stop work, too. If Western miners continued to labor, union leaders reasoned, the coal they dug could undercut the union's campaign in the East and Midwest. When 125,000 to 150,000 mineworkers from bituminous collieries around the country walked off the job on April 21, 1894, the *Denver Republican* confidently remarked, "There is little probability of the coal strike reaching Colorado." The United Mine Workers, however, had organized the Western colliers much more effectively than the *Republican* and most observers recognized.[48]

Not long after the union's creation in 1890, a group of British American miners from Erie, in the northern fields, had founded the first local of the union in Colorado. Two years later, the United Mine Workers dispatched its international vice president, P. H. Penna, to organize in the Rockies; within five months Penna reported that eight hundred Colorado miners had joined the union, including many Knights of Labor transferring from such colorfully named lodges as Anti-Monopoly in Walsen, Australian Ballot in Trinidad, and Star of Hope in Coal Creek.[49]



5.1. The Marching Strike of 1894.

Fremont County quickly became the center of United Mine Workers' organizing in the southern fields, and it was there that colliers shocked Colorado's coal-consuming public by joining the nationwide mineworkers' strike of 1894. Feelings of solidarity with the national cause combined with such local grievances as nonpayment of wages to ensure that "when the whistle sounded" on April 24 to call the men to work, "there were but few responded, and those who did respond were not allowed to go to work" by their peers.[50]

The next day, mineworkers from Coal Creek, Rockvale, Williamsburg, and other camps gathered at McDonald's Grove for the first of several mass meetings. After extensive deliberation, the assembled colliers voted "to follow their brothers in other districts and abandon the mines" and further resolved to "stay out for one week to ascertain the feeling of miners elsewhere in the state." Traveling delegations fanned out to Las Animas and Huerfano counties, Colorado's western and northern fields, and the coal camps of northern New Mexico. The marching strike had begun.[51]

A week later, six hundred Fremont miners learned in the course of a second "mass meeting" at McDonald's Grove that "they had not received any encouragement to strike from any source." Their brethren in New Castle, recently forced by Colorado Fuel and Iron to accept a humiliating 30 percent wage cut after a three-month strike, "advised the Fremont county miners not to strike. The same advice came from the northern camps." Worse, "nothing" had been "heard from the south," the all-important pits of Huerfano and Las Animas counties, "where the miners were all working."[52]

Nor did the operators seem concerned. When a reporter asked J. A. Kebler, head of Colorado Fuel and Iron's Fuel Department, to detail the miners' demands, he dismissively replied that "the strike is simply a sympathy one and intended to encourage their cause elsewhere. They say they have only gone out for a week, but it will prove to be an expensive week." Anxious to unburden his firm of obligations that a predecessor company had undertaken in a contract signed with colliers in the late 1880s, Kebler relished the opportunity to inflict the same punishment on the Fremont County miners as he had imposed on their New Castle counterparts: a 10 percent cut in wages and rates for every month they remained on strike.[53]

Kebler's stance drew on Colorado Fuel and Iron's established customs of

wage cutting and union busting. One of the largest industrial corporations in the nation, CF&I had been created by the 1892 merger of John C. Osgood's Colorado Fuel Company with the Colorado Coal and Iron Company, established by William Palmer in 1881 to consolidate the various coal, town, and steel-making operations that the general had founded to realize his utopian visions. Osgood, who had been born in Brooklyn and orphaned at the age of twelve, was just the sort of leader Colorado Coal and Iron had so painfully lacked following Palmer's 1884 ouster by Wall Street investors.[54]

After quitting school at fourteen, Osgood worked briefly as an office boy at a Rhode Island cotton mill, then returned to New York. Supporting himself as an errand boy and clerk, he acquired "an excellent knowledge of bookkeeping and accounting," thanks to night classes at Cooper Institute. When a friend offered him a job in the offices of the Union Coal Company in Ottumwa, Iowa, the nineteen-year-old turned his sights westward. Osgood began working soon thereafter for the White Breast Mining Company, a close ally of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad.[55]

The Burlington dispatched Osgood on his first visit to Colorado around 1882. The seemingly boundless potential of the state's coal seams evidently appealed to the young entrepreneur, for he moved to Denver and incorporated the Colorado Fuel Company in 1884. Colorado Fuel initially functioned as a broker, reselling northern Colorado coal to the Burlington at a healthy profit. By the late 1880s, though, Osgood and his inner circle had begun to buy up existing mines, as well as to launch collieries in Rouse and elsewhere.[56]

Soon after overtaking Colorado Coal and Iron as the state's largest coal producer, Colorado Fuel engulfed Palmer's old company to form one of the most powerful corporations in the nation. Numbers convey some sense of CF&I's size: over $13 million in authorized capital, 7,050 employees, in excess of 77,000 acres of farming, town-building, grazing, iron-mining, and oil-bearing land, 71,837 acres of coal land containing an estimated four hundred million tons of fuel, fourteen operating coal mines, and a share in fuel and steel markets that sprawled from Kansas to the Pacific and from Canada to Mexico.[57]

Osgood, Colorado's combative King Coal, shared Palmer's disdain for unions. The labor organizations of Osgood's mind—unwieldy, antiquated

bureaucracies commanded by self-interested parasites and utopian radicals—obliterated the individual worker's drive for personal advancement, challenged the company's control over property and production, and jeopardized the operators' profitability. Worst of all from Osgood's perspective, these organizations threatened to unleash the savage propensities of the inferior races that manned the mines.[58]

Few miners among the crowd at the second meeting at McDonald's Grove would have taken lightly the threats Kebler made on behalf of Colorado Fuel and Iron. "The older miners and married men" reportedly "cautioned the meeting against hasty action in declaring a strike." To no one's surprise, "at one stage of the meeting" a journalist found "the sentiment was strongly against continuing the strike." Collective doubt neared its apogee. Then younger, more militant colliers astutely called a fifteen-minute recess. When the meeting resumed, "the feeling took another turn," for reasons that no paper bothered to specify. Before filing out into the crisp spring night, the men passed a resolution that "'the miners of Fremont county abstain from work until ordered in by the president of the United Mine Workers of America.'"[59]

The *Denver Republican* prophesied doom. "Before the miners of Fremont county resume there will be want and suffering, as this is the dull season for selling coal and, as all the other mines are working, there will not be much need of coal." But what if "all the other mines" stopped working? Then there would be "much need of coal," the colliers reasoned—enough to force even the mighty John Osgood to bend to the miners' collective will.[60]

Particularly encouraging was the favorable reception enjoyed by the traveling delegations dispatched after the first meeting at McDonald's Grove to Las Animas County. Colliers at Engleville, where workers had helped thwart CC&I's mechanization campaign thirteen years earlier, joined the strike on May 2. Their comrades from Sopris and Starkville took their tools out of the pits a few days later, then dispatched delegates of their own to New Mexico, who "waited on the miners . . . to induce them to lay down their picks." Soon, between three hundred and four hundred New Mexican miners had struck "in s[y]mpathy with their Eastern brethren and the grand effort which they are making to secure living wages and to free themselves from a condition which is little, if any, better than the condition of the black man previous to the 'late unpleasantness.'"[61]

The failure of the Fremont colliers to make headway in Huerfano County, though, augured ill for the strike. On May 7 "a large congregation of miners" meeting at Stanley's Hill, "midway between Walsenburg and Rouse," voted down three separate strike provisions. In a region laid low by hard times and haunted by hunger, it seemed the miners agreed with a local correspondent that during the throes of a regional depression "half a loaf is better than none." As they also recalled, "About ten years ago representatives from Coal Creek induced the miners here to go out on a strike and then deserted them in their hour of need. The result of that strike is felt to this day. The men who have been trying to get our miners to strike at this time are from Coal Creek, and remembering their former experience our miners are a little shy at listening to their advice." Nine days later, with many "Mexicans," Slavs, and others returning to work, the *Pueblo Daily Chieftain* claimed, "the backbone of the strike seems to be broken."[62]

Instead of giving up, however, the union miners made a momentous change in tactics, by abandoning traveling delegations for mass mobilizations. The marches that culminated in the great convergence of miners on Rouse began around midnight on Friday, May 18, as several hundred Las Animas County miners formed themselves "into armed companies." Parading behind American flags and brass bands, the miners stomped from Engleville, Starkville, and Sopris north "through Trinidad," past the future site of the Ludlow Massacre "to Berwind and Hastings to compel the miners there to cease work." In one of the injunction suits that CF&I filed against the marchers, company counsel singled out Italians and Tyroleans—Chris Passevento, John Brazio, Luca Previs, and Giacomo Toller—as the leaders of the six-hundred-man-strong "crowd." The company alleged that the strikers had "urged and endeavored to persuade the Coal miners" at Berwind "to quit work and strike," thus placing "the safety of the lives" of its miners "in imminent peril from the defendants and those whom they might induce to join with them, and participate in their unlawful and evil designs . . . [of] riot and blood-shed." Meanwhile, coal company toughs were beating up and firing on strikers at Sopris. They crippled one, in addition to throwing "men, women and children out of their houses, on only five days' notice," though the families in question owned their homes and had occupied them for

"months and years." They even blew up the Sopris home built and inhabited by a Swiss-German collier named Oberosler and his family; Emma Zanetell, Oberosler's daughter, later recalled that her family "lost everything" in the blast.[63]

As a U.S. marshal charged with enforcing the injunction against the Las Animas strikers rode the train back to Denver with a flag—"red and blue stripes and five stars painted on one side of a white banner while on the reverse side were printed in large letters 'HOBO'"—"taken from the miners . . . as a trophy," the coordinated mobilization of the Fremont County colliers set the stage for the dramatic descent of around two thousand strikers on Rouse. On May 19, over six hundred miners, most from Coal Creek, gathered in the railroad town of Florence. "Having no money," one report alleged, they planned to commandeer a train. The Denver & Rio Grande tried to sabotage this plan by ordering its trainmen to bypass the town. Yet just as Baldwin's colliers had subverted a similar move by the railroad by snowshoeing through the high mountains in the wake of the Jokerville tragedy, several hundred Fremont County colliers began "footing it" to Bessemer, a steelworks suburb just south of Pueblo. Twelve hours and thirty miles later, the miners reached their destination, having kept up a remarkable pace that illustrated both their resolve and the stamina they had developed mining coal. "Under the favoring shade of a few cottonwood trees they sat down to rest," while George Edwards, one of the strike leaders, explained their goal to a reporter: "to get to Walsenburg to confer with the working miners, whom they believed they could get to strike simply through the persuasive power of argument."[64]

It took just one night waiting for a train to no avail, then lying "down on the bare ground to sleep," to convince the Fremont miners that if they wanted to get to Huerfano, they would have to do so under their own steam. One contingent started walking directly. The remainder caught a train back to Florence and melted into the group of "seven hundred miners with flags and preceded by the Coal Creek brass band" that had commenced marching "overland to Rouse" by way of Walsenburg. A Pueblo paper remarked, "Some of the best citizens in the camps are going with the army," before noting that "the majority seem to be Italians and Austrians." The group decided that "owing to the extreme old age of some of their number," they would

break their journey into four day-long marches of fifteen miles each. A Pueblo paper soon reported that the marchers had been seen "striking across the country at a lively rate [and] apparently in the best of spirits."[65]

While these columns of Las Animas and Fremont County miners were "tramping along over the hills," the colliers from two large Huerfano County properties, Pictou and Walsen, were anxiously looking toward the nearby camp of Rouse. The men there, they believed, "hold the key to the coal strike situation. . . . Toward the miners [t]here all strikers have been bending their efforts . . . , for they feel, it is said, that if Rouse strikes they gain a big point; if not, the movement lacks much of unanimity."[66]

Paternalism, Place, and Power

As we have seen, outdoor meeting places such as McDonald's Grove had played a vital role in the strike's inception, as had the marchers' strategy of rallying by the hundreds in the camps outside the mines to plead with—and probably threaten—the men still at work. Colliers' amorphous local grievances, once coordinated with the United Mine Workers' national strategy, had developed into a coherent coalfield-wide movement that had spread throughout several thousand square miles of territory. Now the fate of a strike that had germinated in mine workscapes and sprouted quickly in outdoor meeting places and workers' communities turned on the miners' ability to take Rouse—not only the most productive colliery still in operation, but also the prototype for a new kind of company town, expressly designed to contain militancy and exclude unionism.[67]

Over the preceding four weeks, the strike had gained ground wherever miners had successfully built communities of their own during the preceding years. Yet marchers made little progress in places where operators owned most of the housing and land. This messy geography of power was a legacy of the half-hearted paternalism that had characterized coal company policy during the industry's first two decades in the southern fields. During the strikes of the twentieth century, coal company officials would claim that "natural" conditions of geographic isolation and social hierarchy gave them no choice but to build and operate their own camps. The first two decades of company policy in southern Colorado coal camps, however, paint a more

complex and contradictory picture of the coalfield landscape, revealing the arrangements of place and power that gave rise to the marching strike of 1894 and helped shape its course.

Colorado Coal and Iron's hospital plan represented the only vestige of William Palmer's utopian vision that ever extended to coal-mining employees. There is little evidence that southern Colorado's coal companies spent money during the 1870s and '80s on schools, churches, workmen's clubs, or other focal points of corporate paternalism common in other coal-mining regions of the world. Nor had company stores taken hold as forcefully as they later would. Colorado Coal and Iron ran stores in a few camps, as did Osgood's Colorado Supply Company, but mining companies generally preferred to contract with independent merchants to provide store services.[68]

Particularly ambivalent were the companies' housing policies. Operators usually viewed the construction of houses and boardinghouses as a necessary adjunct to mine development. Once built, though, worker dwellings presented managers with a choice: rent or sell?

Leasing promised two principal advantages. First, it helped companies recoup some of the wages they disbursed. "At Rouse," the Colorado Fuel Company's 1892 annual report explained, "it was thought advisable to erect additional miners' houses," because such accommodations would "return a good revenue in rentals as well as facilitate the securing of additional miners." Second, leasing provided a measure of control over the cost of living—a particularly important concern, given the companies' need to drive wages downward. From Crested Butte, for example, where "the Company have . . . no accomodations [*sic*] whatsoever," consultant Joseph Simons proclaimed the excessively high rates colliers charged to be "the best evidence what bad influences missing facilities upon the scale of wages exert."[69]

Renting afforded the companies revenue and a mechanism for controlling labor costs, yet coal company officials revealed themselves to be reluctant paternalists. Simons, for instance, noted approvingly that wages remained low at Coal Creek, "owing mainly to the fact that most of the laborers live in their own houses, and through irrigation near Canon City living there has become cheap and pleasant." Even at Engleville, a camp that anticipated some elements of the later company town system, manager George Ramsay, who argued "that it would be better for us to let the miners build their own houses,"

explained "that miners who own their own homes will always be on hand when the busy season opens up, while the miners who have no particular place to call home will go wherever they can get the best work for the time being." Executives sometimes found such arguments for worker-owned housing persuasive. In 1888, for instance, Colorado Coal and Iron's real estate committee authorized the sale of lots in its two primary company towns, Engleville and Walsen; the next year, the Colorado Fuel Company board of directors passed a similar measure regarding company-owned houses at Rouse and Sopris.[70]

Whatever the impact of these policies—Rouse, at the very least, remained largely company-owned—they paled in significance to the widespread practice on the part of local mine officials of tolerating and perhaps even encouraging employees to build their own homes on company land. Photographs capture the fascinating architectural heterogeneity that developed as colliers constructed hundreds of dwellings according to their own notions: log cabins resembling those built by miners in gold and silver camps; shacks and boxcar dwellings similar to those erected by industrial workers in the Front Range cities, and even architecture in vernacular styles, such as Hispano adobes or Tyrolean chalets, that evoked migrant homelands.[71]

The companies' reluctance to assume paternalistic obligations combined with mineworker initiatives and the pragmatism of local mining officials to map a spectrum of power relations onto the coalfields. A few camps, such as Walsen, constituted little more than extensions of preexisting Hispano and Anglo settlements. Free-standing open camps such as Coal Creek consisted, in turn, mostly or entirely of houses that miners built or owned themselves. Such places met the great landscape scholar J. B. Jackson's definition of a "vernacular landscape" because they were "identified with local custom, pragmatic adaptation to circumstances, and unpredictable mobility." So-called closed camps, such as Rouse and Berwind, by contrast, matched Jackson's description of "political landscapes." Built by companies in response to strikes and other labor woes, these company-owned, company-controlled towns consisted of "spaces and structures designed to impose or preserve a unity and order on the land."[72]

In the towns and camps, as in the workscape below, the boundaries between zones of corporate control and labor autonomy were unstable and



5.3. Little Italy, Sopris: A Vernacular Landscape. Copyright Colorado Historical Society, Jesse F. Welborn Collection, 20004991.

hotly contested, as the first month of the marching strike had demonstrated. The conflict, born of workscape militancy and the United Mine Workers' expansion, flourished in vernacular landscapes but foundered in political landscapes. Strike leaders recognized this pattern. Fearing that their efforts were doomed to fail unless they could open up the closed camps, they marched en masse, with the intention of encircling and neutralizing Rouse, which was at the same time a symbol of the coal companies' desire to "impose . . . unity and order" on the land and a material threat to the colliers' campaign to halt the flow of fuel into Western markets.

Making Their Move

With the miners of Fremont and Las Animas counties heading their way, colliers from the Huerfano County pits at Walsen and Pictou decided to lay off work. After another meeting, hundreds of colliers signed a public statement. "We feel that we would do anything for the benefit of our Eastern brethren, for we know they are trying to better their conditions." Careful to portray the

strike as more than a matter of sympathy, the miners assured the public that they also had "many grievances of their own, and God knows we need to have our condition bettered in this place. The citizens all know that we have worked half time for the last twelve months and have endured much hardship, and the time has arrived when we must and will make an able stand to demand our rights."[73]

The following day, May 25, a vanguard of seventy-five colliers arrived from Fremont County and made "their headquarters at Tony Bartolero's saloon." No institution posed a greater threat to the companies' power than places like Bartolero's. For despite the dissension that alcohol fueled, saloons served to galvanize the culture of opposition fostered underground. Bars gave mineworkers room to socialize, obtain news from back home, celebrate their national and racial identities, borrow money, eat free food, bond with other men, and cultivate their reputation for generosity, toughness, humor, and other valued traits. Because alcohol loosened men's tongues, watering holes were also important places for mineworkers to share complaints about bosses, wages, and conditions. Saloons, as one historian puts it, provided "the gateway to comradeship." Tony Bartolero and other saloonkeepers even allowed unions to meet in their rooms, a practice that in the wake of the strike did much to generate unprecedented concern about temperance in the minds of John C. Osgood and other hard-drinking coal barons.[74]

The main contingent of the Fremont marchers arrived in Walsenburg a few hours after the vanguard had filed into Bartolero's. Some had turned back, but more than four hundred men had stuck it out, "some . . . armed with shot guns, which they had taken, they said, merely to hunt with." Accompanying them were sixteen women and "several well loaded commissary wagons" stocked with a ton of flour and "a large quantity of salt meats, potatoes, and other provisions," as well as "numerous four-wheeled and two-wheeled vehicles." Once this procession reached Walsenburg, it turned the corner onto Main Street, where the marchers "gave a cheer. Two horsemen led, followed by 115 Walsen miners who had gone out to meet" their Fremont brethren. A band played "a lively air" as strikers walked four abreast, "without regard to step or time," carrying blankets and "little grub bag[s]" on short sticks. After passing down streets "lined with people eager to see the strange procession about which so much has been said and which they have looked

for with some misgivings," the Fremont miners made camp in "a beautiful little grove."[75]

The next day, a group of fifty "prominent Pueblo business men" called on the strikers. Sharing the marchers' belief that if Rouse joined the strike, the miners still working elsewhere in southern Colorado would swiftly cast their lot with the union, the businessmen planned "to encourage the Rouse men in their determination to continue at work and . . . if possible dissuade the Coal Creekers from trying to get the Rouse men out." But the miners stood resolute. When one of the visitors beseeched the miners to consider the impact of an all-out colliers' strike on the people who labored in Pueblo's smelters, steel mills, and other coal-burning factories, the union organizer Sam Chambers replied that the strikers "could not help the crippling of other industries." Rebuffed, the "Pueblo gentlemen boarded their train and watched the miners headed by their band march and countermarch for the amusement of the visitors."[76]

Hundreds of miners from all over Las Animas County were even then nearing Walsenburg, buoyed up on their march by the rallying cry "Rouse miners must come out." As word of the southern strikers' approach reached Walsenburg on May 28, the Fremont miners mustered together with the colliers of Pictou and Walsen. "The whole army was formed into line and, 900 strong, started for Rouse." Flanked by horsemen and accompanied by "wagons and buggies," the miners made brisk time. Two and a half hours and seven miles later, they mounted a hill and "looked across the valley to the south and beheld a long column coming down the hill in the direction of Rouse. They were their friends from Las Animas county, who had camped near that place during the night, and who had been watching for their arrival."[77]

Half an hour later, "the two columns met near the station and only a short distance from the offices of the company." A great roar filled the air, for the joining together of between 1,700 and 2,200 colliers constituted "a great occasion for the miner, and he gave his lung free action." Parading "amidst continuous cheering and waving of flags," the allied forces "marched back through Rouse to a place adjoining the lands of the coal company where they struck camp." An already diverse mixture of migrants from throughout Europe and North America had joined together not simply to show their alle-

giance to a vision of American promise, but also to defy Colorado Fuel and Iron to displace them. Meanwhile, back in Las Animas County, women of Tyrolean, Italian, and Swiss-German descent "all got out of their homes while their husbands was all away on this march up there." With few miners left to defend them against company guards and sheriffs' deputies, Emma Zanetell recalled eight decades later, they "felt braver all together."[78]

Endgames

Newspaper reports are oddly mute on what happened next. All we know is that two hundred Rouse miners "quit work" the next day "and joined the body of strikers." Perhaps two hundred others, however, remained on the job. The "pivot" of the struggle had refused to tip in the colliers' favor.[79]

So southward to the closed camps of Las Animas County the strikers headed, once again on foot. Delaying their departure by a day was "one of Colorado's celebrated out-pourings that reaches the roots of all vegetation." Miners bivouacked in their fellow workers' houses in Walsenburg and the surrounding camps. While miner-built, worker-owned dwellings sheltered them from the storm, their longtime connections with small businessmen and agriculturists throughout southern Colorado kept them "well fed. Trinidad sent up 1100 loaves of bread and other edibles," while the small towns of La Veta and Cuchara had "donated largely" and "given liberally." Seven cattlemen had "each offered a fat steer and Leonidas Valdez [had] given them forty sheep and a ton of flour." Last but hardly least, the colliers "sent out committees to forage and the Mexican people, though poor, done well by us." All told, Anglos, Hispanos, and other folks had "shown their liberality and large-heartedness." A week after having "marched up there," as Emma Zanetell recalled, the strikers "all come back" to Las Animas County, together with their comrades from Huerfano and most of the Fremont miners.[80]

A week after converging on Rouse, some 1,275 marchers arrived in Trinidad. There they marched through the streets to a large clearing, "when a circle was formed around a platform" near a brickyard, so that the miners could listen to a series of rousing speeches from supportive local politicians and labor leaders. Speaker after speaker celebrated the miners' movement as a patriotic struggle in which workingmen of many nations and races had joined together to defend fundamental American rights—to earn a living wage, to move about freely, to assemble peaceably—against oppressive corporations and the "private armies" of deputies and guards who did their bidding. "More than one hundred years ago, gentlemen," one orator intoned,

> when there was not a white man in all this land, when these mountains which pass through this state were a theory, so far as human knowledge went, the people of England attempted to oppress those colonies over on the Atlantic coast; patriots assembled on the Boston Commons, and in other places, and dared those men to oppress them longer, and I say to you that they were men from every civilized land, men who claimed as their mother tongue that of every civilized nation of Europe, and they raised that flag and said "under that flag we will be free men or under that flag you may bury our dead bodies." That flag, gentlemen, waves still. In this valley, under the shadow of the grandest mountain that traverses the United States, preserved to us by those men, the cradle of liberty is being rocked by men speaking almost every tongue. Men have assembled to state their grievances, and from different sources the resistance comes. These men demand a right, and they will express their views.

Another speaker reminded the miners that when "the Red Coats called upon the Minute Men upon the field to 'desperse [*sic*], you rebels, or we will fire upon you' . . . America, with her little 13 colonies, came out victorious in that great struggle. And I predict, gentlemen, that the miners of Las Animas county and Southern Colorado will come out victorious in this struggle against the oppression that has been brought against them."[81]

Having drunk deeply from the well of republicanism, the marchers proceeded from camp to camp, enjoying a great deal of public support and some success in persuading those who were still at work in the mines to join the struggle. Colorado Fuel and Iron and its competitors fought back with injunctions. Sheriffs' deputies also did the companies' bidding, "interfering with individuals on public highways," blocking the marchers' movements,

and allegedly "insulting [their] wives." When "a couple of hundred men and women" trekked to Sopris, they were "met at the company's grounds by 300 deputies." A day after the strikers were turned away, the Sopris colliers voted to remain at work, and similar defeats ensued.[82]

By mid-June, the marchers seemed unable to reach their fellow miners except through deception. "While ostensibly holding a meeting at Sopris," the *Pueblo Daily Chieftain* reported of the strikers, "many were slipping away, and last night at quitting time several hundred appeared ten miles away in Gray Creek with no deputies to oppose them, and as a consequence that camp has joined the strikers in a body." The ruse was carried out "so quietly . . . that the band playing in front of the company's store was the first intimation the company had that strikers were within ten miles." Whenever the marchers moved openly to confront colliers laboring in company-owned camps, however, they ran up against court orders and officers of the law.[83]

In the end, strikers failed to secure the "unanimity" on which their movement depended, for their marches stalled at the borders of closed camps. In Fremont County, union miners made sure that "not a pound of coal [was] produced." Farther south, though, the operators replaced strikers with "anybody that [would] work, whether he [had] ever been in a coal mine or not," including a "well known one-armed deputy of Sopris." Strikebreakers ensured that Colorado's "coal supply," as the *Colorado Springs Gazette* reported, "continue[d] ample in spite of the troubles throughout the state." John Osgood bragged, "'There is no possibility of a coal famine and the strike leaders are deceiving their followers in leading them to suppose that the employers will be forced to accede to their demands to avoid such an unfortunate condition of affairs.'" In many other parts of the nation, by contrast, striking coal miners proved much more successful at shutting off the flow of fossil fuel. Reports from Chicago declared that "never was there a time in the history of the city where the coal bins were so nearly cleaned up of bituminous coal as at present."[84]

As mineworkers in most of the Northeast and Midwest managed to secure a compromise settlement with the operators, their counterparts in Colorado faced a less certain future. Yet even as many marchers returned home, the strike endured and, for a time, grew more intense. Crested Butte colliers joined in, and the Trinidad Coal and Coke Company posted notices at Starkville permanently discharging all strikers. In late June a state convention of the United Mine Workers issued the so-called Pueblo Manifesto. Blaming the strike on "the greed and selfishness of employers to become richer and make the poor, but honest workingmen poorer," the striking miners demanded uniform weights and rates, semimonthly pay in cash, elected checkweighmen, "the abolishment of the scrip and truck store system," the restoration of prestrike wages to New Castle's colliers, the creation of pit committees to prevent discrimination against union miners, and "recogni[tion] by our employers as an organized body of craftsmen brought together with the object of mutual protection for social comfort and education."[85]

Following the convention, the miners gathered in a vacant lot in downtown Pueblo. After Frank Lloyd expatiated on his "hope and belief that the negro miners of the south would refuse to come here and take the places of the Colorado men," William Howells, state organizer for the United Mine Workers, rebuked the operators for "having taken from [the colliers] their best blood and their American privilege of earning an honest livelihood. . . . They were human beings and stood by the Declaration of Independence" and its guarantee of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." He implored the operators "to confer with us that uneven conditions may be made right. . . . We ask to be a party to the deal that affects our very existence. The 340,000 miners ask to have equal rights with the 7,000 men who invest their money."[86]

A month later, the miners held a second and more desperate convention in Pueblo. Any hope of precipitating a fuel famine was shattered, the fall rush of coal orders was looming, and hunger was spreading through the camps. Many strikers were anxious to settle. Union leaders met with several large coal operators to work out a truce. On August 3, 1894, four hundred Fremont County colliers congregated one last time at McDonald's Grove to vote "on the question of returning to work at the same basis they were working on when they quit." By a slim majority, they decided to go back to work at the rates before the strike, provided that the companies promise to pay their employees regularly and in cash. Miners elsewhere in southern Colorado and

northern New Mexico also approved the settlement. A few days later, local union officials announced, "The great strike of the western United Mine workers . . . has been declared off by the executive board."[87]

In retrospect, the marching strike of 1894 foreshadowed both the collective might that unionization promised and the growing importance of spatial and social control in the efforts of Colorado Fuel and Iron and its competitors to cut labor costs and prevent labor organization. The operators had successfully repulsed the miners' mobilization, without granting the United Mine Workers any of its demands. Yet they were hardly sitting pretty. Defeating a sympathetic movement launched during the slackest season of a deep regional depression had cost the companies tens of thousands of dollars in deputies' wages, and hundreds of thousands more in lost revenue. John C. Osgood and his counterparts realized that they might easily have lost the strike. No less important, they noted the decisive role that closed camps had played in the companies' victory. When the marchers could move freely and talk openly, after all, they succeeded. But when they tried to take Rouse, Sopris, and other closed camps, the miners' mobilization stalled, and the strike was denied the critical mass it needed to prevail. Thus it was that Colorado mine operators came to embrace industrial paternalism during the same summer that a fierce nationwide strike by Eugene Debs's American Railway Union was discrediting George Pullman's grand experiment in paternalistic town-building on the industrial outskirts of Chicago.[88]

Yet still opposition flourished in the depths below and in the increasingly circumscribed vernacular landscapes above, awaiting only the right conditions to erupt. "'Liberty crushed to earth,'" an orator had declared to the marchers in Trinidad back in early June, "'will rise again.'" And indeed, the next time so many miners took up the march through these same foothills, they would carry high-powered rifles instead of shotguns, and they would use them not to hunt game but to wage war.[89]

6

The Quest for Containment

The marching strike demonstrated the potential of company towns to stop miners' protests in their tracks. In the process, it inspired southern Colorado's largest coal corporations to depart from the ambivalent paternalism of early decades. Company leaders surmised that the vernacular landscape—the open, informal arrangements of space and power that took shape outside the mines in the 1870s and '80s—had played a crucial role in the 1894 conflict, by giving the militancy engendered in the mine workscape room to surface and spread. The best way to contain union activism, executives and managers decided, was to transform the coalfield landscape. First Colorado Fuel and Iron, then the other large operators, built paternalistic company towns whose every feature was carefully designed to inculcate subservience and loyalty in an increasingly diverse, persistently militant workforce.

With the return of economic prosperity to the Mountain West during the mid-1890s, demand for fossil fuels skyrocketed; as the coal industry expanded and intensified production, mine operators enlisted a range of experts—doctors, engineers, architects, educators, and sociologists—to replace the vernacular landscapes of southern Colorado with company-controlled landscapes. Like their counterparts who were spearheading the contemporaneous campaigns to assimilate Native Americans and "new" immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and tightening Jim Crow's grasp on the South,

builders of company towns in Colorado sought to control the threats that workers and ethnic "others" posed. Drawing on a long tradition in Anglo-American reform, mine bosses attributed the record of labor unrest in the southern fields neither to the inferiority of mineworkers nor to the irrepressibility of class conflict. Instead, the operators drew an analogy between unionism and the spread of contagious disease. "The line of education we have selected," Dr. Richard Corwin of Colorado Fuel and Iron explained, "has been that of prophylaxis—prophylaxis as it pertains to the health and good of our people." Corwin, like many other company town builders, thought of human society as an organism besieged by threats. In the thinking of Corwin and his counterparts, unions and strikes loomed large, joining typhoid, squalor, and hunger as ills jeopardizing the "good of our people." By eradicating environments in which the militancy fostered down in the mines could gain ground on the surface, and then quarantining coal camps against infection from without, advocates of company towns thought they could bring lasting peace to the coalfields. Yet in their zeal to contain the independence and craft pride, the solidarity and pugnacious masculinity, that periodically united miners of many backgrounds, coal companies were producing a landscape of woe destined to become both a cause and a setting for the deadly coalfield war of 1913–1914.[1]

Starting at least a century earlier, European coal mine operators had pioneered exploitative company towns in which mineowners held the title to all the houses, compensated colliers in scrip, and forced mining families to trade at a company store. This system then crossed the Atlantic, to take hold in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, alongside the customary relations of production that shaped coal mine workscapes and colliery work cultures. Operators in the Colorado southern fields had seldom adopted this system during the 1870s and '80s. In the wake of the marching strike of 1894, however, the coal companies' quest for containment intersected with the emergence of a movement known to contemporaries as social welfare work, and to historians as welfare capitalism or industrial paternalism. Manufacturers such as the National Cash Register Company, International Harvester, and the H. W. Heinz Company were the first to embrace this "business of benevolence"; coal companies in many parts of the nation followed suit in the 1890s and 1900s. John Osgood's Colorado Fuel and Iron Company proved particularly receptive, going so far as to establish a Sociological Department under Dr. Corwin's direction in the spring of 1901, to coordinate its paternalist project. Other large operators in the southern fields, particularly Victor-American (which had come under Osgood's control by 1901) and the American Smelting and Refining Company, also adopted elements of welfare capitalism, though their efforts generated little public scrutiny and remain virtually undocumented.[2]

Welfare capitalists, despite the spectacular failure of George Pullman's model company town outside Chicago to contain labor unrest among railroad car makers, remained insistent that company towns could serve as a beacon of enlightened modernity; such expertly planned environments, Dr. Corwin and others believed, could turn disgruntled migrants from all over the world into "better citizens" who were "more contented with their work." By the 1900s the new company town campaign undoubtedly provided many workers and their families with houses that were larger, cleaner, and more modern than most other coalfield dwellings; at a monthly rent of two dollars per room, even a large six-room house cost an average mining family less than a quarter of its monthly income. Medical facilities also improved. An esteemed professor from Northwestern University Medical School declared Colorado Fuel and Iron's new Minnequa Hospital "the most perfect in the world," and a multipronged public health campaign in the camps resulted in cleaner coal camp environments and healthier workers. Perhaps most important of all were educational advancements that created possibilities beyond those company executives had anticipated. Night classes imparted the English language skills some mineworkers used to become union organizers or leave the coalfields for better work; camp schools enabled some colliers' sons to avoid a life of labor in the mines, and a few coal miners' daughters to escape the drudgery that had been their mothers' lot.[3]

Company towns were hardly an unmitigated evil, yet they utterly failed to contain militancy or suppress unionism. Far from making mining families more contented, company stores, camp guards, the corruption exercised on local political and legal systems, company housing, and other elements of the new paternalism further fanned the flames of unrest. In the process, the company town system armed mining families and their union with a powerful rhetoric of opposition in which the republican idiom of opportunity, liberty,

and justice reinforced the craft arcana of turns, damps, and dead work. Even before the cement had set or the paint had dried on the new closed camps, colliers began to attack these places as un-American, despotic throwbacks to old-world feudalism that were entirely out of place in a New West that promised opportunity and upward mobility for all. Because of the companies' efforts to reform space and society, working people increasingly made common cause with regard not only to workscape travails, but also to the trials of life outside the mines. Thus did a landscape designed to contain conflict in the mines sow the seeds of its own destruction.[4]

Lord Osgood's Domain

Aspen is today synonymous with glamour, wealth, and serenity, but this twenty-first-century haven for the global glitterati was once a smoking, churning hub of coal-powered industrialism. In its late nineteenth-century heyday Aspen was a silver camp. As elsewhere, though, coal provided the energy that powered mining, smelting, and much else in town. Suppose we take a trip to retrace the route along which some of this fuel traveled. Heading north through the Roaring Fork Valley, we turn west and up the valley of the Crystal River. After passing Carbondale, we notice ochre cliffs begin to narrow into miles of zigzagging canyon walls, which eventually part to reveal a bank of ruined beehive ovens. Veering left, we find ourselves on the boutique-lined main street of Redstone, a model industrial community once designed to embody the spirit of progressive paternalism.

Coal baron John C. Osgood, the callous archindustrialist who engineered the merger of Colorado Fuel and Iron and gained a well-deserved reputation as one of the most determined union busters in the Rockies, envisaged Redstone as a showplace. Here Osgood and his inner circle could retreat from the busyness and grime of the Front Range cities that served as headquarters to Colorado Fuel and Iron's far-flung industrial empire; here they would demonstrate their success at reconciling the ostensibly incompatible imperatives of coal extraction and labor concord. The marching strike of 1894 had prompted Osgood and his allies to rethink their longstanding ambivalence toward company towns, company stores, scrip payment, and similar policies of labor control long used in European and eastern American coalfields.

Reform-minded businessmen on both sides of the Atlantic increasingly believed that they could achieve labor peace by assuming greater responsibility for the conditions in which their employees lived and labored. The welfare capitalists who inspired Osgood blended humanitarian, "almost utopian" concern for their workers with a selfish desire to avoid costly labor disputes.[5]

Redstone was Colorado Fuel and Iron's most elaborate and expensive effort to eliminate labor unrest through planning and social control. Holding vernacular landscapes responsible for giving unionism and strikes room to flourish, Osgood and his subordinates set about creating new living spaces intended to foster allegiance to home, country, and company. Yet these paternalists, even as they looked ahead to a progressive future in which contented mining families would abandon their militancy to advance the mutual interests of the laboring classes and their employers, also looked back fondly to an imagined feudal past. Redstone, designed by Theodore Davis Boal, an Iowa-born architect trained at the École des Beaux Arts in Paris, became the material embodiment of this double vision. The town's layout, landscape, and architecture turned a stretch of riparian ranchland into a modern fiefdom for Lord Osgood. On this stage Osgood hoped to enact a grand drama of transformation.[6]

Tucked into the western end of this domain, Osgood built Cleveholm, a forty-two-room Tudor manor house whose name compounded the first syllable of the executive's middle name, Cleveland, with a suffix suggesting genteel domesticity. Osgood lavished $2.5 million—a sum equivalent to the yearly earnings of four thousand to six thousand coal miners—on this twenty-four-thousand-square-foot manse. As Italian and Austrian stonemasons crafted the building's exterior, other tradesmen were busy fitting the rooms out with all sorts of regal flourishes imported by steamship and rail from around the world: "ruby red velvet" for the dining room, Honduran mahogany for the tea room, hand-stenciled linen in the reception room, "green Spanish leather" below the library's inlaid ceiling of gold and silver, and the pièce de resistance, an ensemble of two "huge" Tiffany chandeliers that cast their gemlike reflections the length of the immense living room. A worthy riposte to Andrew Carnegie's castle in Scotland, George Vanderbilt's Biltmore estate in western North Carolina, and Jay Gould's Lyndhurst in the

Hudson Valley, Cleveholm affirmed the orphan industrialist's ascension to the upper echelons of American society.[7]

Osgood's luxurious manor house lay nestled in a forty-two-hundred-acre estate described by one journalist as "a great natural park made more attractive by the landscape gardener's art." Known as Crystal Park, the tract was enclosed by fences and guarded by a gamekeeper. Elk, bighorn sheep, antelope, and deer soon sought refuge there, and the stretch of the Crystal River flowing through the estate teemed with trout, "thanks to the addition to its waters from the hatcheries and the watchfulness that has been exerted over" it. Closer to the manor, Osgood built a sort of hobby ranch to house fancy breeds of livestock. Prize-winning Polanjus bulls and "the finest horses" grazed in Crystal Park's lush pastures; nearby, a barn and eighteen other outbuildings sheltered common cattle, horses, and poultry. With its manor house, game park, manicured lawn, and stable of prize cattle and thoroughbreds, Cleveholm lacked only a local peasantry to complete Osgood's neofeudal domain. And so the company laid out a large "village garden" downstream from Osgood's ranch, on bottomlands cleared of the "huts" erected to provide shelter for the workers who had built Redstone. The irrigated garden plots and buildings for stock and poultry, paternalists hoped, would encourage coke plant workers to spend their off-work hours laboring on the land.[8]

As for the workers' town, Osgood wanted its eighty-five cottages to reconcile past and present, employer and employee. Boasting a unique floor plan, a pseudo-Swiss facade, and Arts and Crafts elements, each dwelling celebrated artisanship and individuality. "Beauty," *Camp and Plant* crowed, "has been the guiding principle in the building up of our little town. We do not have monotonous rows of box-car houses . . . but tasteful little cottages in different styles, prettily ornamented, . . . and painted in every variety of restful color." Each of these structures was "finished with good wood work" inside, with "lath and plaster walls, proper provision for good draught in chimneys and opportunities for baths. Many of the houses are papered, have curtains on the windows as well as roller shades and are fitted up with substantial furniture."[9]

Redstone's laborers, once they were assigned to houses by the mine superintendent, enjoyed homes that a craftsman or clerk in Denver or New York might have envied; an array of services would sweeten the deal. Osgood

6.1. Redstone. Photograph by L. C. McClure. Denver Public Library, Western History Collection, MCC-2507.

wanted his householders to enjoy the same urban comforts enjoyed by middle- and upper-class residents of Front Range cities and larger mining towns. The construction of two reservoirs and a small hydroelectric plant to supply Redstone with power and clean water prompted one journalist to announce that the town was "assuming metropolitan airs." To one observer, it all "seem[ed] simply wonderful—the transformation. On this spot but a few short years ago the wolf howled and the coyote skulked. . . . Now . . . all is activity, and the modern electric light turns night into day." The company also built a well-stocked store, a model school building, and a clubhouse, the last of which featured rooms for billiards, games, and reading, as well as "a commodious lounging and drinking room" equipped with "a large Regina music box and a graphophone," not to mention a theater "provided with a full set of stage scenery, electric stage lights and other up-to-date features." These venues for diversion, education, and consumption were intended to create what

Camp and Plant called "an ideal community"—a place where "the temptations of life are reduced to a minimum" and every inhabitant, "from the humblest unskilled workman upwards," were "all . . . afforded opportunity for pleasant and comfortable homes, and an ideal livelihood."[10]

Osgood expected that workers would repay the company's largesse by exchanging worker solidarity and militancy for company loyalty and industrial harmony. And that is more or less how it turned out: the scene shaped the drama, or so the praise that Redstone garnered from social-reform periodicals would suggest. "The sense of responsibility . . . shown by this Western mining company in seeking to ameliorate the condition of its employees and to beautify their surroundings," the *Outlook* declared, "furnishes an example which Eastern operators might well emulate." Though "some stockholders might criticise the using of company funds for humanizing purposes," Osgood averred that he was "simply carrying out good business principles in promoting the welfare of his employees."[11]

Fighting organized labor had proved expensive, but giving in to it threatened to be costlier still. Colorado Fuel and Iron thus saw new company towns as a promising investment. And indeed, Osgood's neofeudal experiment paid dividends in the summer of 1903, when workers at Redstone and Coalbasin, the mining camp that supplied coal to Redstone's ovens, were among the few groups of Colorado mineworkers refusing to join a United Mine Workers strike. "Business is moving along here and at the basin," a source reported at the height of this nasty conflict, "as if there were no strike at all in the State." If Redstone had tamed the union, however, it could not ride herd on the industrial economy. Though Osgood continued to retreat to Cleveholm until his death in the 1920s, his model workers' town remained fully operational for less than a decade. High mining costs, excessive freight rates, and the continuing decline of silver mining together forced Colorado Fuel and Iron to shut down its Redstone operations in 1909.[12]

Expansion and Erosion

Only a small percentage of the hundreds of coal cars rolling along the rail corridors of the mountains and plains hauled fuel from Osgood's feudal utopia along the Crystal River. The southern fields, not Redstone, yielded most of the coal and coke on which consumers throughout this energy-hungry region were growing to depend. Coal companies simultaneously whetted this appetite and struggled to satisfy existing demand by extending their hold over labor, resources, and markets in Fremont, Huerfano, and Las Animas counties.

As Redstone generated positive attention as a model of industrial benevolence, new towns of quite a different character were taking shape along the main salients of coal industry expansion in the southern fields. Generally envisioned as mineworker enclaves, not mineowner retreats, set amid semiarid scrub instead of high-country splendor, planned by engineers instead of architects, built by contractors instead of craftsmen, and intended to promote efficiency instead of beauty, the new company towns of the southern fields bore scant resemblance to Redstone.

Osgood sought to transform the languishing, technologically obsolete steel mills he had inherited from William Palmer's Colorado Coal and Iron Company into paragons of modern efficiency. But for the renamed Minnequa Mills to succeed, Osgood's firm needed to secure both a better supply of iron ore and more extensive reserves of coking coal. The immense agglomeration of fixed capital at the steelworks could perform economically only if it ran continuously. Since colliers held the power to shut the works down, preventing militancy among mineworkers became more important than ever.

By the late 1890s, Colorado Fuel and Iron had purchased or leased 20,000 acres of additional coal lands in Colorado and New Mexico from subsidiaries of two railroads, the Colorado Midland and the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe. Dwarfing these transactions, however, was the $750,000 purchase of the Colorado portion of the Maxwell Land Grant. Hundreds of Hispano and Anglo farmers and ranchers had settled on the grant in the preceding decades. The absentee Maxwell Land Grant Company called them squatters, and made this label stick through the so-called Stonewall Valley War of 1888 and a succession of legal wrangles that culminated in an 1894 court decision declaring the company to be sole owner of the entire grant. Despite these bitter disputes, Colorado Fuel and Iron had long coveted the coal beds beneath this 258,000-acre tract stretching south from the Purgatoire to the New Mexico border. Osgood's radical expansion of the Pueblo steelworks revived this old dream. As a consequence, a community of small farmers and truck gardeners living along a bend in the Purgatoire, like many farmers and herders on the grant itself, faced a fight they could not win.[13]

The Colorado & Wyoming Railway, built to transport the energy trapped beneath the Maxwell tract to furnaces, boilers, stoves, hearths, and generating stations throughout the region, hugged the banks of the Purgatoire. The river, like the railroad, though, followed its own logic. In the first years of the twentieth century track and stream collided with especially unfortunate consequences near a fertile stretch of bottomland cultivated by dozens of star-crossed Italian, Hispano, and Anglo agriculturists.

Court records document the variety and value of the bounty these smallholders had harvested from the bottomland soil. One family, the Cesarios, grew "corn, beans, pepper, turnips, celery, pumpkins, squashes, lettuce, parsnips, cabbage and other plants." Another, the Gagliardis, submitted this accounting of what the expansion of King Coal had cost them:

3,565 plants of celery at 3c per plant
One acre of Cabbages, 3000 plants injured at 5c each
1/4 acre Beets, 25 sacks, 50c per sack
1/8 acre Turnips, 22 sacks, 75c per sack
50 square feet Parsnips, 15 sacks at $1.00 each
1/2 acre Sugar Corn, 250 doz. at 10c
1/2 acre winter onions, 40 sacks at $1.00 per sack
355 Plants of Tomatoes, 10c each
175 hills of Hubbard Squash, 25c each
75 hills Pumpkins at 25c per hill
200 hills of Cucumbers at 25c[14]

Mine work often offered an industrial means to an agricultural end, and coal had surely lured at least some of the plaintiffs to southern Colorado. Read in this light, the Gagliardis' inventory was not just a tally of lost produce, but a catalogue of dashed hope.

The farmers' troubles began around 1900, when Colorado Fuel and Iron's railway subsidiary started the first of several efforts to "cut a new channel across a bend or curve made by the natural bed" of the river. This action, claimed the Cesarios, "changed the course" of the river, so that it was "continually caving" off large chunks of their best land. A freshet caused by a misguided effort by railroad engineers to shore up the river bank "destroyed a

cutting of Alfalfa . . . standing in shocks or small stacks," as well as "the vegetables at that time growing." The railway had forced "incanculable [*sic*], irreparable and continuing" losses, Manuelita Abeyta alleged, in a suit seeking to enjoin the Colorado & Wyoming (C&W) from further damaging her crops and those of twenty-three other families along the Lopez ditch.[15]

Abeyta's complaint charged the railroad with denying her and her neighbors "a bountiful harvest," an injustice that had legal, ecological, and moral dimensions. Company counsel acknowledged the damage but attributed it to forces beyond the company's control. The "unprecedented and extraordinary floods and freshets" that destroyed the crops of Abeyta, the Cesarios, and others, they declared, "were the acts of God and inevitable accidents which no human foresight could guard against or prevent."[16]

This argument may have swayed the pliant local jury that heard the case, but there was nothing inevitable about the Purgatoire farmers' predicament. John Osgood, not the Almighty, had set in motion the chain of events that had caused the river to inundate the plaintiffs' land. To sell more steel, Osgood had to unearth more coal. If in the course of bridging the gap between mine and mill, the tomatoes and Hubbard squashes planted by "Mexicans" and Italians got in the way, then that was just too bad.[17]

Such dislocations came with the territory as Colorado Fuel and Iron expanded its operations on the Maxwell Grant. Soon after the company purchased the grant, CF&I lawyers initiated ejectment proceedings against the remaining settlers. Many, though, proved reluctant to abandon their homes. Dozens of Hispanos from El Valle de los Rancheros, for example, relocated to a company farm, where they grew feed for mine mules on shares. Others served not as tenants on the company domain, but as coke oven laborers and coal miners in the new workscapes rising along the Purgatoire. A third group, extending older patterns of migration and mobility, supplemented work in the ovens and mines by cutting mine timbers, farming, gardening, or herding, in some cases as contract laborers, in others as proprietors.[18]

The Menace of the Open Camp

As coal companies expanded, they also sought to increase production at many of their existing properties. The work culture and vernacular land-

scape that had developed over the previous decades in the open camps of the southern fields threatened this effort. As a consequence, companies sought to rationalize these messy spaces by attacking independent stores, saloons, and worker-owned housing.

Companies had long tolerated the colliers' hard-drinking ways; they even collected license fees from saloons on company land. By the 1900s, though, Colorado Fuel and Iron proclaimed alcohol the "greatest shortcoming" of its employees. In addition to sparking violence, the company claimed, drinking sapped the miners' productivity, squandered their wages, and gave them a safe place in which to air their grievances. The company therefore declared its intention to make its camps, or at least those parts "under the control of the management, as orderly and decent a place for men, women and children to live as can be found in the United States." Some working people surely benefited from the company's prohibition campaign; miners' wives, for example, lost little love on an addictive depressant that encouraged profligacy, illness, and abuse. Yet saloon closures also curtailed opportunities for interethnic socializing and labor organizing.[19]

Independent stores were also facing elimination. Colorado Fuel and Iron and Victor Coal and Coke, having refused to renew a batch of store contracts in the 1890s and 1900s, concentrated the retail trade in their camps under the Colorado Supply Company, which Osgood had initially organized in 1888 to operate boardinghouses and general stores. Although stock in both Colorado Fuel and Iron and Victor floundered in those years, the tight clique of majority stockholders enjoyed a compensatory perquisite that made up for the poor performance of their coal company shares: exclusive control over stock in the store company, which paid dividends of 20–27 percent *annually* during the early 1900s. As the store company mushroomed into one of the largest retail and wholesale establishments in southern Colorado, Osgood and his insiders profited handsomely, while reducing the risk that independent merchants would extend credit to strikers during labor disputes.[20]

Companies attacked worker-built structures still more zealously. Many of the shacks and adobes that mineworkers had built in years previous suffered the same fate as saloons, independent merchants, and Purgatoire Valley farmsteads, all casualties of the coal companies' twin goals of expanding production and neutralizing mineworker militancy. On occasion, companies simply

bought miners out. Many coalfield families, though, turned a cold shoulder to company agents bearing cash. When a 1907 fire destroyed a neighborhood in the open camp of Coal Creek, the birthplace of the marching strike of 1894 as well as a more successful miners' strike in 1901, Colorado Fuel and Iron offered to buy up lots from all whose houses had been destroyed. Not a single family would sell. Through their refusal, the people of Coal Creek blocked the company's attempt to take over this crucial incubator for labor organization and mass mobilization.[21]

Corporations exercised greater leverage in camps where local mine managers had previously tolerated or even encouraged workers to build homes on company land. Executives bent on erasing vernacular landscapes from the face of the coalfields worked with company counsel to enact new procedures that presented householders with a Hobson's choice: Sign a ground lease or suffer dismissal and ejectment. These leases, while enabling alleged squatters to remain in their homes for a nominal rent, often a dollar a year, also allowed companies to revoke the contracts on just three days' notice. Disobey the mine boss? Join the union? Then take out your pay, head back over the threshold of the home you built or bought with the sweat of your brow. Tell family and friends what you've done, then pack up and begone. In this manner the coal companies turned leases into instruments of control.[22]

On other occasions the operators employed even nastier tactics. In Victor's Chandler camp, for instance, the company ordered miners who had built homes on land purchased from the company "to move or leave their houses." In its infinite generosity, Osgood's firm "offer[ed] to liquidate the purchase price." Several miners asked that the company also reimburse the taxes they had paid on "their" property. Victor refused the request and even fired several of the men who made it. "Being out of work," the *Cripple Creek Times* lamented, "they were either compelled to leave their families and seek employment elsewhere, or remain there and starve." In this manner Chandler changed from a workers' community into a company town.[23]

Colorado Fuel and Iron executives were sensitive to the damage that its enclosure movement might inflict on the already questionable public image of the company. They determined to use *Camp and Plant*—which was published by the company twice a month and circulated to an extensive list of managers, clerks, steelworkers, mineworkers, progressive reformers, and



One of the Recently Constructed Company Houses at Rouse.



A House in the Mexican Plaza, Rouse.

6.2a and b. Company Housing as Progress. "Rouse and Hezron: Two Picturesque Coal Camps in Huerfano County," *Camp and Plant* 1 (March 8, 1902): 198–199, Denver Public Library, Western History Collection.

journalists—to depict worker-built homes as uniformly primitive, crowded, and unclean. One of the many photographs published in the course of the company efforts to redirect public opinion contrasted a neat frame structure—"The Style of House That the Company Builds"—with a decrepit adobe cellar improbably twisted around a tree trunk—"The House a Mexican Laborer Built for Himself." Another contrasted a large white Victorian dwelling "recently constructed" by the company at Rouse with an aging adobe "House in the Mexican Plaza" adjoining the same camp. "There are but few 'shacks,' 'dug-outs,' 'shanties' or 'adobes' left in [Primero]," another article boasted, "and these the company is having demolished as rapidly as the owners' consent can be obtained. Such as remain," *Camp and Plant* reasoned, "serve but to mark the violent contrast in point of healthfulness and comfort between the dwellings erected by the former residents of this region and those put up by The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for its men." The moral of such stories was clear: The onward march of progress and benevolence demanded that operators replace the older arrangements of space and property responsible for incubating disease and disorder with tidy towns composed of modern American workmen's homes.[24]

Putting Paternalism into Place

Whether new company towns took shape on land freshly incorporated into the company's domain or atop earlier mining camps, the purpose of these new places was to increase the efficiency of mining and coke making, restrict worker mobility, and eradicate the labor militancy that had erupted with such force in the marching strike of 1894. Whereas early coal camps had developed gradually and without any central plan, the closed camps built from the mid-1890s onward took shape with startling dispatch. "Little more than two years ago," a *Camp and Plant* article on one of the new Maxwell Grant camps exclaimed,

> the solitude of Smith Canon was unbroken except by the straying ranch horse, the coyote and the wandering goat-herder and his charges. Today, nestling among the hills, is Primero, an exceedingly pretty and thrifty village of about 1,500 inhabitants, and instead of the ranch horse

we see the mine mule, we hear the locomotive whistle instead of the howl of the wolf, and where the goat-herder, wrapped in his many scarfs, slumbered, the electric motor is moving thousands of tons of coal. Solitude is displaced by the hum of industry.[25]

Effecting so complete a metamorphosis, of course, required imagination, organization, resources, and a great deal of work.

Coal companies subordinated all else to the "hum of industry"; town planning was no exception. The engineering departments that supervised new mine development also designed most of the towns. One of their first challenges involved locating rail facilities, mine tunnels, surface structures, and various technological systems to streamline the way in which air, mules, men, timber, and of course coal moved between the subterranean workscape and the surface. Engineers also tried to secure a steady, sanitary supply of water for the camps by devising an extensive system of dams, tanks, pumps, pipes, and hydrants. Self-consciously "modern" camps such as Colorado Fuel and Iron's Primero and the American Smelting and Refining Company's Cokedale even featured electric streetlights, "an invaluable ally to morality" in the coalfields, just as in the Front Range cities they fueled.[26]

Pipes and power lines ran along streets generally laid out on gently sloping sites in rectilinear grids, an uncommonly efficient and economical way to order space. After surveying and staking out the town site, engineers began to fill the cells of the grid with structures. They often chose high ground near the mine mouth as a site for the town's central political and economic institutions: mine offices, the company store, and housing for the superintendent and other mine officials.[27]

Engineers laid out workers' housing on the surrounding tracts. Company houses, as *Camp and Plant* spilled a lot of ink in pointing out, were indeed more commodious than most of the shacks, shanties, and adobes they superseded. Adapted from common patterns and built of cement and wood, the three-to-six-room dwellings were often laid out in homogeneous rows, each house replicating its neighbor, though in a few new towns built to model the benefits of industrial paternalism, the operators added some variety by mixing shapes and finishes. Segundo had been "laid out in regular streets," for instance, but its houses featured "porches and projecting eaves . . . painted in

6.3. New Rouse: A Political Landscape. Copyright Colorado Historical Society, 20004310.

different pleasing colors." At a time when "monotonous uniformity" prevailed in many coal camps, Colorado Fuel and Iron dreamed that Segundo would evoke "the streets of a village of freeholders." Company aspirations to put up such facades, of course, did little to change the fact that mining families differed from freeholders in two fundamental ways: they neither owned their own dwellings nor governed their own communities.[28]

Mineworkers and their families began to migrate to the new towns even before contractors, tradesmen, and laborers had translated the blueprints into physical reality. First on the scene were the development workers who would drill tunnels and sink mine shafts. Once these practical miners had established the basic features of the mine workscape, other workers began to arrive. There was an unmistakably Western American cast to the mix of inhabitants: Hispano families displaced from the Maxwell Grant; Welshmen tempted by rumors of beautiful coal; Pennsylvanians whose restless energy impelled them to abandon overcrowded coal patches for wide-open spaces; African Americans seeking refuge from Jim Crow laws; wives and children rejoining their menfolk—these and other migrants began to find jobs and make new homes in the new company towns.

The companies knew that this ragtag gathering in an age-old borderland presented both a problem and a possibility. Two decades of industrial struggle in the southern fields had revealed the power of mine workscapes and work cultures to inculcate a strong sense of shared grievance among mining families of disparate backgrounds. The future, by contrast, still held the promise of harmony, but only if companies could compel coalfield migrants to join together as loyal employees and tractable "Americans" instead of as militant unionists. The deliberate destruction that striker-soldiers would unleash on the company town landscape during the Ten Days' War of 1914 would thus represent a reaction not merely to the killings at Ludlow, but also to the campaign Colorado Fuel and Iron and its competitors had embarked on to impose spatial and social order after the marching strike of 1894.

Commanding Space

C. E. Smith was neither a unionist nor a striker, yet he would experience the companies' quest for control just the same. Smith worked as a physician at Colorado Fuel and Iron's Minnequa Hospital, built in the late 1890s to accommodate the company's lengthening roster of steelworkers and miners. Smith's boss, Richard Corwin, was a busy man—director of the hospital, head of Colorado Fuel and Iron's Medical and Sociological Departments, an amateur Egyptologist and occasional member of the American School of Archaeology. Corwin expected the physicians under his command to take an active role in what he called prophylaxis—in both the literal and figurative meanings of the word. And so in January 1904 C. E. Smith set out on a southbound train from Pueblo at the height of the first coalfield-wide strike since 1894. After transferring to the Colorado & Wyoming in Trinidad, Smith traveled up the Purgatoire. Passing what remained of the truck farms planted by the Cesarios, the Abeytas, and their neighbors, he soon came to Primero. Spanish for "first," the town's name, like those of other camps—Segundo, Tercio, Cuarto, Quinto, and Sexto—belied the efforts of Colorado Fuel and Iron's leaders to shroud an empire based on numbers in Spanish romance.

C. E. Smith had a different sort of number on his mind, however, as his train pulled into Primero's new frame depot. The doctor had come to perform in the clubroom of the A. C. Cass School, named for a "close business

associate and intimate friend" of Osgood. "Several of the Japanese miners" the company had imported to break the strike would later upstage Smith by appearing "in costume and graphically illustrat[ing] the sword dance and war songs . . . as danced and sung during the late Japanese-Chinese war." But the good doctor's troubles began the moment he "alighted from his train." Something about "his appearance excited the suspicions" of the camp guards entrusted with executing Colorado Fuel and Iron's quarantine campaign. After seizing the doctor, they "escorted him down the track," *Camp and Plant* reported with perverse amusement, and began "to search him for concealed weapons and for the purpose of conducting a quiet little general investigation as to his fitness to enter Primero." Had it not been "for the opportune appearance of one of the doctor's old patients matters would have gone hard with him."[29]

The company magazine found Smith's predicament humorous, but Colorado Fuel and Iron and its counterparts were deadly serious in their efforts to erect and enforce cordons sanitaires at Primero and other new company towns. Miners called such bounded and tightly supervised spaces closed camps, and for good reason. Designed to isolate workers from the ills of colliery work culture and the United Mine Workers, these camps were usually encircled by barbed wire fences. Camp marshals and mine guards patrolled the periphery, manned the gates that coal companies placed on public highways, and monitored the railroad tracks that connected the coal towns of southern Colorado with the outside world. Migrants who had traveled thousands of miles and crossed many national frontiers seeking work now had to cross one final border. Those allowed inside soon learned about "a rule observed in all the camps": any "'undesirable citizen' [was] eliminated as soon as possible." The companies' expansive definition of "undesirable" types included union agitators, suspected union members, editors of labor-friendly newspapers and journals, peddlers, politicians of the wrong persuasion (Republicans and Populists in the 1890s, Democrats in the 1900s), state labor officials, and, on one occasion, even the governor of Colorado himself. And should colliers ever strike again, closed camps could be militarized, just as they had been in 1894, when guards and deputies stopped marchers in their tracks and kept fossil fuel flowing into Western markets.[30]

The coal companies' campaign to enclose and police space extended from

highway and hillside to courtroom and polling place. Such political and legal machinations dated back to William Palmer's day, but the operators' interference in local government reached new heights in the early twentieth century, as the egregious general election of 1906 showed. Horton Pope of Osgood's Victor-American Fuel later confessed that he and the Colorado Fuel and Iron attorney, Cass Herrington, had conspired to secure a U.S. Senate seat for Simon Guggenheim, scion of the smelter-monopolists who had recently built a model coal-mining and coke-making town at Cokedale, a few miles west of Trinidad. Company executives were seeking not simply to place a friend in high office, but also to solidify and extend their control over underground and surface space by corrupting local governments. Since the state legislature still chose Colorado's senators, coal company lawyers were interested not in "bribing individual voters directly," Pope explained, "so much as in controlling every situation and position." Spending half a million dollars, and focusing their efforts on Huerfano and Las Animas counties, "they began with the county judge, the district attorney, the sheriffs and county officers."[31]

Guggenheim prevailed in his Senate bid; no less important, the friendly officials and unscrupulous jurists elected in this and other races proved important allies in the new company town campaign. Such men enabled operators to escape liability for mine accidents. Civil courts and coroners' juries in the southern fields earned a reputation for exonerating the coal companies, even in clear-cut instances of negligence. Corruption also made it easier for companies to evade responsibility for the damage their expansion inflicted. The Purgatoire truck farmer Cesario Abeyta, for instance, complained to no avail about the empanelment of a mine guard on the jury trying his wife's case. Coal companies "could get convictions where they wanted them," as Pope put it, "and exemptions from convictions where they wanted them." As "far as law" in the camps was concerned, recalled one old miner, "the company was law."[32]

As the companies solidified their control over "every situation and position," they co-opted public power and used it to advance private ambition. In the process, they essentially guaranteed that they "could readily free themselves" of virtually anyone "they wished to get rid of because he was an organizer or for any other reason." The Huerfano County sheriff Jefferson Farr, a

former "stock man and Butcher," became the most feared enforcer of the operators' will. "I am the king of this county," Farr allegedly proclaimed to the union organizer Mike Livoda. So aggressive was Farr that the state legislator Casimiro Barela portrayed Farr's long tenure as a "reign of terror," and indeed Livoda, John Lawson, and other union men complained about the charges Farr trumped up and the beatings the sheriff ordered his lackeys to dispense.[33]

Coal companies pulled few punches in their campaign to contain militancy and halt the spread of unionization. The main challenge to their efforts came, not surprisingly, from the United Mine Workers. When the union tried to return to the southern fields in 1907 following a crushing defeat in the 1903–1904 miners' strike, Las Animas County sheriffs' deputies raided the union's Trinidad office and arrested union activists. The organizers were eventually released with a parting threat: "If he would leave Trinidad," one organizer was told, "he would not in future be molested." If he stayed in King Coal's growing dominion, however, he was taking his life into his hands.[34]

The prophylactic campaign, however, involved much more than asserting control over vernacular landscapes. If coal camps functioned like organisms, then their well-being depended not simply on isolation from sources of infection, but also on the strengthening of their ability to fight contagion. Colorado Fuel and Iron and its competitors thus extended their energies from the quest for expansion and enclosure to the reengineering of all the communities under company control. Store, school, home, and club each had its own role to play in the operators' efforts to eradicate the underlying causes of industrial conflict.

Consuming Designs

By the early twentieth century, Osgood's Colorado Supply Company had begun to launch new stores with lavish opening galas that drew hundreds, even thousands, of shoppers. The 1909 debut of the Morley store, just north of the New Mexico line in the rugged Raton Mesa country, presented a particularly arresting sight. Swastikas—a common motif in Southwestern Indian art—graced "yellow wagons, the paper bags, wrapping paper, stationary and every other representative portion of the store's paraphanalia [*sic*]." Why



6.4. Colorado Supply Company Store, Primero, 1916. Copyright Colorado Historical Society, 10038066.

would a company whose stores served coal miners and steelworkers appropriate a symbol from Native Americans? Why would it build the Morley store and other structures in Mission Revival styles? And why would it stock newly opened company stores with Navajo blankets, "Zuni bows and arrows, Zuni blankets, Navajo rings, bracelets, breastpins, buttons, spoons, belts and sashines," and other Indian handicrafts? Such questions hint at some of the complexities of the retail business in King Coal's expanding realm.[35]

Colorado Fuel and Iron had displaced Hispanic and Italian truck farms along the Purgatoire bottomlands, leveled adobes throughout older coal camps, and enclosed the Maxwell Grant and other Hispano homelands. Its store company added insult to injury when it borrowed a page from the Santa Fe Railroad and the other Southwestern corporations responsible for creating what Carey McWilliams, perhaps the most perceptive social critic of the Western scene during the mid-twentieth century, denounced as a "Spanish fantasy past." Company officials described Morley's architecture as "really

very appropriate to this region," an "artistic reproduction of an old Spanish fort," but local Hispanos probably saw little honor in the reference. In southern Colorado as in other parts of the Southwest, cultural appropriation reinforced material dispossession.[36]

Once customers passed beyond the pseudo-Spanish facade of the Morley store, they found displays of plenty that called to mind not colonial Santa Fe or the Hopi mesas but rather the commercial districts of Denver or Chicago. "There is scarcely an article that could be thought of that is not found in their stores," one Colorado Supply Company booster proclaimed. And indeed, photographs of Supply Company stores show surprisingly large and varied stocks of branded consumer products. Larger facilities had departments not only for meat, groceries, and dry goods, but also for furniture, Italian foodstuffs, Indian arts and crafts, and other items.[37]

That company stores generally did not look much different from mercantile establishments beyond the coal barons' purview—and tried so hard to forge an image out of imagined Southwestern yesterdays—seems odd, given the accusations leveled against the Colorado Supply Company and its competitors. "For a miner to escape being plucked by one of the Company's stores," a typical lament began, "is equal to subjecting himself to every mean, little, annoying, discrimination that the management can inflict upon him. It may not at once result in his dismissal from the mine if he buys anything outside of the store, but there will be a number of small, sneaking, underhanded ways"—short weights, bad room assignments—"in which he will be made to feel that he is being discriminated against." Should these tactics fail "to convince him that he must not buy his goods where he can buy them the cheapest then he is told by the superintendent that he is no longer needed in the company's service." Such grievances ensured that the eradication of company stores would figure among the demands that southern Colorado's colliers made whenever they went out on strike.[38]

Yet beneath the "pluck-me store" stereotype was a more complex reality. Coalfield migrants exercised considerable autonomy as shoppers. LaMont Montgomery Bowers, the crotchety executive dispatched by the Rockefeller interests to represent the family at Colorado Fuel and Iron, expressed a determination "to prevent our employes being swindled by unscrupulous Jews, Italians and other cut-throat dealers who would control the business if

we should withdraw and leave the field open," yet peddlers continued to tout their wares throughout the camps of the southern coalfields. Sears, Montgomery Ward's, and other firms also did "an immense amount of mail order business in the camps." John Osgood, who claimed that "from one to a half dozen traders wagons" traveled from Trinidad to nearby coal-mining communities "delivering goods," admitted that these traders could "do on some things better than we owing to the assortment that they can get." Lest one doubt the coal king's word, a letter from a Sopris miner to the *United Mine Workers' Journal* on the eve of the marching strike took pains to point out that the Colorado Supply Company store was "not a pluck-me any more than the private dealer's store. In many instances it is cheapest," and in others "not any higher in price than private stores." Trinidad and Walsenburg bustled on Saturday evenings with men, women, and children who poured down from the surrounding camps to socialize and shop; after mine paydays, the towns even took on a "circus day appearance." Miners, one old collier remembered, "traded at the company store although it was their privilege to buy elsewhere." Even people with no connection to coal mining sometimes traded at the Supply Company. All told, company stores treated mining camp residents not as captive customers who could be forced into buying a limited stock of overpriced necessities, but rather as consumers who could be tempted into purchasing items ranging from the essential to the frivolous.[39]

In the competition for mining family custom, company stores possessed many advantages. With more than a dozen locations, the Colorado Supply Company wielded immense wholesale purchasing power. Company stores also profited from their close association with mining companies. Certainly claims that superintendents and mine bosses harassed miners into trading at company stores are too widespread to dismiss. The companies' efforts to enclose town space both excluded many rival retailers and peddlers from the camps and made it easier for company officials to monitor the purchases of mining families.

The scrip system reinforced these advantages. Payday came to most coal camps just once a month. Many households had difficulty making ends meet from pay envelope to pay envelope. Companies therefore offered employees

scrip, paper certificates deducted from the next month's pay envelope. These certificates offered miners what one called "just an advanced payment"—or, in other words, a credit against future earnings. Not only did scrip run miners into debt, but it could be redeemed only for its full value at company stores. Mining families who wished to use scrip at other retailers' could still do so—they could even try to hawk it for cash—but only at a discount, which eroded their purchasing power. Moreover, the vicissitudes of mine workscapes and coal markets made it impossible for families to predict future wages in advance. A bad room assignment, an early spring, a falling roof, or any number of other common occurrences could transform short-term credit into long-term debt, leaving a worker little recourse but to remain on his current job.[40]

Ultimately, legalized debt peonage and other forms of coercion worked in tandem with shining storerooms to strengthen the power that mining companies exercised over their employees. As superintendents leaned on mineworkers to shop only at company stores, storekeepers were marketing an inclusive American identity based on consumption of "the newest and latest of everything," so that coalfield migrants would spend their earnings—and perhaps a little more—on a "constantly changing" array of stock. When mining families found they could not afford the bill of goods the companies had sold them, they lashed out at the employers, whom they blamed for tempting the migrants with consumer desires few miners could fulfill—and hence into the emasculating trap of debt and dependence.[41]

Helping the Foreigner Help Himself

Though stores and company houses might help breed loyalty, industrial paternalists largely entrusted the cultivation of citizenship and contentment among current and future employees to institutions whose charter was more explicitly educational. "The work done in co-operation with the schools in the several camps," *Camp and Plant* declared, "has been by far the most important and has consumed by far the largest proportion of the very considerable sums which The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company has spent for the betterment of its men." Companies devoted these "considerable sums" not

to property taxes, which they shirked shamelessly, but instead to initiatives they could control more closely: school construction, adult education, and kindergartens.[42]

The schools that Colorado Fuel and Iron built reflected romantic commonplaces about native peoples and their inevitable corollary, nature. Dr. Richard Corwin credited an *Indian School Journal* article with the inspiration for naming a new camp Katcina. The word, he explained, "comes to us from the Hopi Indians. It is the title of a song sung by the lonely night traveler to drive away the evil spirits that are supposed to be abroad in the darkness, and something of a prayer to the Great Spirit to shield one from harm and danger." Corwin found it "fitting that in this new and model town, whose very name implies the banishment of the spirits of darkness, the newest and most modern type of school house is to stand as the white man's 'Katcina,' driving away the spirits of ignorance and shielding the young from harm and danger."[43]

Though the company soon renamed this camp Morley after the nearest rail stop, it continued to perceive schools as a crucial shield against unions and other "spirits of darkness." And so while many American children learned their ABC's inside buildings named after national heroes, the corporate patriarchy that ruled the southern fields eschewed the usual short list of school namesakes—George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Horace Mann—in favor of John C. Osgood, Richard Corwin, A. C. Cass, and other company fathers. Conceiving of schools as "real social centers for the young and old," company educators also made these facilities available for church and club meetings and adult education.[44]

"We truly help the foreigner to help himself," the company asserted. As part of this self-help campaign, male teachers gave English lessons to miners for a monthly fee of three to five dollars. A company bulletin explained, "In enabling [the foreigner] to understand our language by opening to him our schools, our settlements, and kindred institutions, we pave the way to good American citizenship." The oppositional Americanism that miners had celebrated during the marching strike of 1894 with republican orations and American flags was, of course, precisely what the coal companies sought to contain in their quest to reconstitute William J. Palmer's vision of Colorado as an "inner temple of Americanism." Adult education programs in the coal

camps defined "good" citizenship in terms the general could have approved: respect for constituted authority, loyalty to the company, and compliance with white middle-class prescriptions regarding gender roles and consumer tastes. While men and boys learned English, coalfield women received instruction from female teachers in the hallowed duties of wifedom and motherhood. Domestic demonstrations on cooking, home decoration, sanitation, and other topics prepared migrant women to adapt the ways of middle-class white matrons in Pueblo and Peoria.[45]

Men and women in the new camps sometimes embraced domestic and linguistic instruction. Since they did so for their own reasons and on their own terms, though, welfare paternalists questioned the efficacy of adult education. "It is difficult to change the ways and manners of adults," as one reformer complained. "Their habits are formed and are not easily altered. With age comes indifference, a desire to be let alone and a loss of ambition." Company educators increasingly concentrated their efforts on children, in the belief that they were "tractable, easily managed and molded," lacking "set ways to correct and recast."[46]

Salvaging the innate potential of coal camp youth constituted an end in itself for industrial paternalists, but it also promised further rewards. By checking the spread of deviance and militancy from one generation to the next, companies aspired to eliminate these ills from the new company towns, and thus to inoculate these spaces against the contagion of unionism. Hoping that kindergartens would make potential strikers into loyal worker-citizens, Colorado Fuel and Iron executives invested a great deal of money and hope in these programs. Camp children, unlike their refractory parents, afforded "excellent material on which to work," one reformer declared, "and it is marvelous how soon the spirit of Americanism is imbibed." The walls of Palmer's "inner temple of Americanism" may have crumbled, but paternalist educators felt confident that they could enlist the children of the coal camps to put them back together again.[47]

Welfare reformers endeavored to assimilate the polyglot children of the coalfields into the American nation and the company family through a combination of methods. Since most coalfield children began kindergarten unable to understand English, the curriculum steered away from academic work and toward "physical culture," "construction work," and "rhythm

work." Nature study and school gardens were particularly popular. Company educators believed that by silently "watching germinating seeds and growing plants," students would absorb "an effective sermon teaching the miracles of nature and the wisdom of practicing what nature teaches"—hardly a neutral lesson, given welfare reformers' habit of seeing labor militancy as a horrible mutation of the natural order.[48]

Once they had learned enough English to begin reading, "the children are surrounded by the best influences," explained the Colorado Fuel and Iron kindergarten head Mrs. M. G. Grabill. From this beginning, they could be "brought in touch with the best literature, and taught to spend their leisure hours in useful reading or harmless amusement, instead of wasting their time idly on the streets. The result undoubtedly will be higher citizenship." To Grabill and other educators, "the streets" embodied the hazards of the vernacular landscape. Such heterogeneous and public spaces facilitated the sociability, mobility, and disorder that seemed to define "lower" citizenship. In the process, they offered conduits for the spread of opposition and labor unrest.

Carefully supervised kindergartens offered an antidote to the unruly thoroughfares outside. Children reared in spaces of domestic order and restraint, welfare capitalists believed, would become dutiful citizens schooled to live out the rest of their lives in productive labor and "harmless amusement." Kindergartens, like other elements of the company schools, thus reflected the combined spatial and social power to which the coal company attorney Horton Pope had referred when he spoke of "controlling every situation and position."[49]

Home Safe Home

Social welfare reformers trusted schools not simply with molding the next coalfield generation, but also with wedging company paternalism into the ostensibly private space of workers' homes. As one kindergarten advocate explained, the company "recognized that this institution not only takes the child in hand at its most impressionable period, but that it furnishes a center from which to radiate influences that affect the whole social betterment situation." Another declared, "The kindergarten is not only a link between the

home and the school, but it is also a very simple and persuasive interpreter of the school to the home and of the teaching function of the home to mothers and fathers." In this context, a kindergarten teacher could be "more than an instructor of children. . . . She is a social settlement worker co-operating with and seeking to stimulate every broadly educational work in the community in which she lives."[50]

Welfare reformers in the coalfields, like their progressive colleagues in industrial cities and on Indian reservations, sought to enlist the "restraining and refining influences" of the home as a prophylactic against actual and figurative contagion. In this campaign, miners' cottages were not just dwellings: they were also repositories of moral virtue. Through exterior landscaping and interior design, welfare capitalists sought to turn company houses into sanctuaries where mining families could lead orderly middle-class lives, protected from the temptations of street, saloon, and workscape.[51]

An ideal company home, like the closed camp that contained it, began with a fence to delimit the private realm within. Welfare reformers urged coalfield families to plant the ground between picket fence and cottage wall. "Give to a house a few vines," one reformer effused, "surround it with a yard of green grass in which are a few beds of flowers and two or three trees and you have transformed it entirely. You have changed it from a mere house and lot into a home, . . . a spot whereon the eye rests with satisfaction and enjoyment and in which the whole family may take especial pride." Yards, gardens, and the pride they fostered, company officials hoped, might root a workforce of mobile migrants in company ground, while yielding food to fuel the miners' labors and blunt their demands for higher wages.[52]

As fences and gardens performed their magic outside the workers' homes, other tactics would cultivate respectability within. Attacking miner-built homes for offering "no inducement for anything above bare animal subsistance [*sic*]," *Camp and Plant* waxed eloquent on the subject of interior decorating. "A home must show the traces of sympathy and of love," an article dripping with middle-class values declared. "A true mother will strive earnestly to make her home not only as attractive and lovely as possible, but she will also try to combine comfort with beauty." Potted plants offered a simple start. Better still, though, were "vines, flowers, a canary bird and sunshine." Indulgent though such "luxuries" might have seemed to hard-pressed min-

ing families, reformers blithely asserted that "nearly everyone can afford them. Indeed, a home cannot afford to be without them."[53]

Coalfield paternalists urged workers to complement the introduction of plants and pets with touches of cultural refinement. *Camp and Plant* published full-page reproductions of great artworks. One issue featured Van Dyck's *Baby Stuart,* Millet's *Angelus,* and "a list of good frescoes and paintings, reproductions of which may safely be recommended for household decoration." Another included Raphael's *Sistine Madonna* above a caption that urged mothers to take advantage of the "wonderful reproducing processes" that made it possible to "beautify and dignify" homes by hanging "noble pictures which our children will learn to love and understand, and by which their lives and characters may be enobled [*sic*] *and* refined." Once "photographed on the sensitive nature of childhood," these wholesome images could "never be lost or eradicated."[54]

The emphasis *Camp and Plant* placed on mechanical reproductions echoed a deeper concern with the crucial role of camp homes in reproducing the mine workforce. Welfare paternalists endeavored to ease the difficult lives of coal camp women and improve the health of the mining population by making women's work more orderly, efficient, and scientific. "The time has passed," *Camp and Plant* warned, "when a cook can depend upon instinct, intuition and luck. No longer does one care to risk his life in the hands of a person who is ignorant of the chemical properties of food material and the chemical changes wrought by the processes of cooking." A spate of articles, lectures, and courses aimed to change women's drudgery into modern work. The sacred task of making company houses into homes, it seemed, was too important to entrust to amateurs.[55]

Through these efforts, mining companies endeavored to mold domestic environments, so that "harmful tendencies" would not inhibit the development of boys who would soon begin to work underground or of girls destined in most instances to become colliers' wives. Colorado Fuel and Iron assured housekeepers that "the results" of filling their homes with "good books" and "the best periodicals" would "show up in the making of a finer man or woman." The company's taste, of course, was decidedly conservative. Paternalists favored respectable newspapers, wholesome classics, and mainstream magazines. Redstone's clubhouse, for instance, subscribed to

Harper's, Scribner's, Youth's Companion, St. Nicholas, Outing, Ladies' Home Journal, and the *Craftsman;* while its library featured "full sets" of such authors as Washington Irving, James Fenimore Cooper, Rudyard Kipling, and Charles Dickens. The same arbiters of taste denounced detective, adventure, and Western stories as "unhealthful" and "abnormal." Such "yellow-backed" dime novels endangered "susceptible" young minds. More perilous still were "'Yellow' Periodicals" with their sensationalist critiques of corporate perfidy and capitalist excess. Industrialists saw the worker's home, in short, as at once a site of reproduction and an ideological space capable of "surround-[ing] these brothers"—and sisters—"of alien birth with an environment that shall represent all that is best in the political, intellectual and spiritual life of our state."[56]

Company Culture

Coalfield executives intended company clubs, like company houses, schools, and stores, to reorient the loyalties of mining families, from production to consumption, from mutualism at work to individualism in the market, from old-country chauvinism to what would later be called 100 percent Americanism. The belief that boredom begat drinking at best—and unionization at worst—had already inspired many companies to eliminate saloons from their property. To fill this gap, companies introduced clubs. These organizations met either in the multiple-use rooms of the new schoolhouses or in dedicated clubhouses featuring a large room for meetings, as well as in smaller reading rooms and parlors equipped with billiards and card tables. John Osgood, a whiskey connoisseur, declared, "My own opinions are not such that I want to prevent anyone from drinking." Instead, Osgood introduced the idea of serving alcohol in company clubs under "certain well-defined regulations" enacted to prevent the "rioting and disorder" that so troubled executives. Colorado Fuel and Iron banned women from club bars; it also limited the hours during which liquor could be served and forbade the workingmen's hallowed practice of "treating" fellow miners to rounds.[57]

Having eliminated or restricted drinking, coal companies proceeded to redirect their workers' attention to a range of programs intended to brighten the "serious and solemn" life of the camps, as David Griffiths—practical

miner, former state mine inspector, and Colorado Fuel and Iron official—sympathetically described it. In addition to musical programs such as Dr. C. E. Smith's performance at Primero, clubs offered lectures on topics such as European art, the discovery of America, and public health. Speakers brought in by the company educated workers about germ theory and disease transmission and also sought to indoctrinate them in bourgeois conceptions of environmental and social order. In addition to entertaining audiences, minstrelsy shows offered a crash course in American ideas of blackness and whiteness. Film screenings also combined diversion and didacticism. Griffiths perceptively called film "the silent pedagogue of the age": it communicated a range of powerful ideas about American social, economic, and cultural life in a visual medium easily understood by the many coal camp residents who could neither read nor understand English.[58]

Through such activities, the companies hoped to counteract the solidarity and militancy that had developed underground. At the dedication ceremony for Starkville's Harmony Hall, men, women, and children crowded into every corner of a brand-new forty-foot by seventy-foot structure on a winter evening in 1902. There they listened to a cleric implore them to remember that "during these last twent[y]-five years of Starkville's history, 'harmony of heart' has been on the whole the leading spirit of the place." This singular force, he claimed, had "held the miners united among themselves and united with their patrons. . . . It was to harmony, realized and persevered in," he asserted, "that Starkville owes the secret of her past success."[59]

The minister invoked the same dreams of classlessness and industrial peace that had permeated William Jackson Palmer's visions three decades before. Yet the very setting for his speech was a direct product of the turbulent history of labor-management struggle in the southern fields. Colorado Fuel and Iron had built Harmony Hall, after all, not to memorialize a preexisting condition of peace, but to contain the mobility and militancy that had erupted with such force in 1894 and in previous conflicts.

Anyone who set foot in this carefully controlled space, the minister suggested, consented to join a united and contented corporate family protected by vigilant company fathers from the scourges lurking outside. "Whenever in the future you enter this hall," the minister admonished his audience, "look upon it" and "let it remind you that it was harmony that wrought your

past success; let it convince you that in harmony lies the best guarantee of coming prosperity and finally let no one come in or go out of Harmony Hall without the clear consciousness that all his relations with his fellow men are friendly and harmonious."[60]

When the mining families of Starkville joined together some eighteen months later, they did so not in harmony with the company, but in solidarity with each other. In the process, they illustrated just how seriously the coal companies had misjudged the extent of workers' discontent. Stores, schools, homes, and clubhouses, like the militarization of camp perimeters, the corrupting of local governments, and the expansion of company control over vernacular landscapes, had failed to prevent solidarity and unionism from asserting themselves again. In truth, the new company towns left the southern coalfields more susceptible than ever to the ills they had been designed to eradicate.

What the Workers Wanted

Frank Hearne shared at least two traits with the minister who christened Harmony Hall in Starkville: a desire for harmony and a shocking ignorance of the contentious history of labor-management relations in the southern fields. After the Rockefellers acquired a controlling interest in Colorado Fuel and Iron in a series of transactions culminating in summer 1903, they offered Hearne, the former National Tube Company vice president, a five-year contract paying him fifty thousand dollars a year to replace Osgood at the helm of CF&I. Hearne arrived in Colorado in September 1903 to find the gold miners of Cripple Creek and Telluride, the silver miners of Lake City, the smelter workers of Colorado City and Durango, and the coal miners of the southern fields all up in arms. And though these disputes were spearheaded by different organizations—the more radical Western Federation of Miners in the hard-rock mines and smelters, the more moderate United Mine Workers in the collieries—all were part of a larger push by Colorado workers for an eight-hour day. Southern Colorado's coal miners also sought fair weights, better ventilation, a 20 percent increase in tonnage rates, twice-monthly paydays, and nondiscrimination against union members.[61]

In a published interview, Hearne complained: "This labor situation is

puzzling. I don't know what grievances the men have. Why, I don't believe there is a corporation in the world that treats its employes as the Colorado Fuel and Iron company does. We have mighty near solved all the sociological problems in our towns in the southern part of the state. It is an object [lesson] just to see how things are handled down there. We have club rooms and public baths for the employes. They have the cleanest streets and the best sanitary arrangements of any town in Colorado." Mine workers, Hearne had been told, "get good pay, too, and they have short hours. I don't see what more they want."[62]

What had Hearne overlooked? He recognized that coal companies had spent large sums over the previous decade to reform the way they did business. The executives who had envisioned the new company towns saw them as showpieces for progressive paternalism. And yet if these experiments in welfare capitalism had in all likelihood improved the quality of housing, schooling, health care, and entertainment for many mining families, darker realities nonetheless lurked beneath the freshly painted facades of the new company towns. Mining companies had planned, designed, built, and operated closed camps because they believed that by refashioning coalfield environments, they could prevent rebellions like the marching strike of 1894. Rather than the physical manifestations of corporate omnipotence, new company towns were actually the embodiment of the long and still unfolding struggle between workers and companies.[63]

Even after the majority of miners and mining families in the southern coalfields inhabited closed camps, workers nonetheless retained more than enough power and autonomy to upset the companies' plans. Despite the company drive to destroy miner-built dwellings and vernacular landscapes, most open camps remained vital, and workers continued to occupy houses and settlements of their own even on the edge of new company towns such as Segundo. Despite the destruction of the Purgatoire truck gardens and the enclosure of the Maxwell Grant, connections between mining camps and the surrounding countryside remained strong. Despite the coal companies' temperance campaign, saloons beyond company control still did a brisk business by offering men space in which to vent, fight, and bond. Despite efforts to "Americanize" the mine workforce, old-country ties endured, as the rapid return of hundreds of Colorado miners to the Balkans following the outbreak

of war there in 1912 attested. And despite the comprehensive campaign to remake the environments in which unionism flourished, the United Mine Workers remained intent on expanding into the southern fields. It waged a small but successful strike in Fremont County in 1901 and an all-out organization drive culminating in the 1903 declaration of a crippling strike (the very one Hearne found so difficult to understand).[64]

What Colorado Fuel and Iron's new leader failed to grasp, then, was that miners continued to want the same things they had always wanted: safety, fellowship, a higher quality of life, autonomy, dignity, and basic freedoms. The paradox of prophylaxis was that instead of confining the struggle over such issues to the workplace, closed camps actually exacerbated conflicts between miners and managers. By making home, community, and electoral politics the key battlefields in the struggle for control of the coalfields, companies unwittingly transformed disputes rooted in subterranean workscapes into an all-out struggle in which the very meaning and fate of America seemed to hang in the balance.

In "The Economic Struggle in Colorado," a treatise published serially by the reformist journal *Arena* in 1905–1906, the respected attorney and progressive gadfly J. Warner Mills advanced a passionate, systematic critique of Colorado's labor woes. A firm believer in "the supreme value of the economic measure in judging of men and of motives and of events and of institutions," Mills credited the industrial transformations of the previous decades with remaking an arid, isolated land into "a great empire" whose inhabitants held "the key to a vast vault, filled full and running over with precious treasures, and to a still vaster land, 'flowing with milk and honey.'" Evenly distributed, this bounty could have provided plenty for all. That was not the case, he wrote: "The stakes to fight for are so vast and extraordinary, that, under the present economy, it is unreasonable to expect there can be anything approaching an equitable division of the products of labor without dispute, turmoil and friction."

In the decades since William Palmer's hopeful visions, a clique of "throne-powers"—the railroads and the smelter trust, the gold and silver operators, Denver's public utility corporations and the large coal corporations—had managed to wrap "their distended maws" around "the choicest franchises,

lands and opportunities . . . to be found in the West." Mills blamed "inequalities before the law" for reinforcing "inequalities in the enjoyment of special privileges, natural opportunities, and resources." The "barons of privilege" who controlled the mineral-intensive industrial economy did not simply usurp the people's patrimony by turning energy, ore, federal lands, urban space, and other public goods toward private gain; they also tried to disguise their ill-gotten privilege behind law-abiding respectability. The determination of right and wrong in the region, Mills lamented, had become "so grounded in the existing economy that it gives no word of condemnation for such inequality in the domain of force and violence."

Mills singled out the coal barons for particular scorn, assailing them for acting as if they had "acquired a right from God / To rule this coal and land and sod." And though he disparaged colliers as a mere "residuum"—"slow to comprehend the peonage" created by the new company town campaign of the previous decade, "and still slower to resort to the remedies of self-protection"—Mills surely knew that southern Colorado's mineworkers had already waged three general strikes and dozens of local disputes by the time "The Economic Struggle in Colorado" appeared in print. It would take seven long years for the working people of the coalfields to rise up again. When the next strike inevitably came, opposition to company towns and the "peonage" they represented would fan the flames first of resistance, then of rebellion.[65]

7

Shouting the Battle Cry of Union

Ten years after Frank Hearne expressed puzzlement over what the miners of the southern fields wanted, and almost two decades after the mass mobilizations of 1894, an even larger procession of mineworkers, women, and children was wending its way through the streets of Trinidad. The mood on this late-summer day in 1913 was tense, the mineworkers, in one observer's estimation, were "in a fighting mood, determined to wring the rights they [had] been denied so long from the Standard Oil–owned mine owners by force."[1]

Men, women, and children had traveled a long, winding road to reach this precipice; many years of struggle and suffering seemed to drive them toward the abyss before them. Nearly half a century earlier, William Jackson Palmer had ridden through these same streets before espying the coal seams in which many of the men and boys in this procession labored. The general dreamed of using the energy buried beneath the arid soil of this prematurely stagnant frontier to fulfill the region's latent promise. Palmer's enterprises and those of his competitors had indeed transformed these Western lands, but not in the manner the general had intended. They had failed to avoid the social and environmental destruction that the young American had witnessed on his tour of Britain in the 1850s; instead, the darker traits of industrialism had crossed the Atlantic and the Appalachians, the Mississippi and the Great Plains, intact. The classless utopia that Palmer had imagined was Colorado's

destiny had yet to materialize. Instead, the Rocky Mountain region became an industrial society dependent on fossil fuel: exploitative, corrupt, unequal, rife with violence and excess.[2]

Those who marched through the streets of Trinidad on this September day had come from every corner of the earth to mine for coal, the humble rock without which this brave new world would not have come into being. Driven from their old homes by poverty or repression, drawn by the promise of good pay and safe conditions, and brought to Colorado by padrones, steam-powered technology, and the migrant grapevine, they had left the worlds they had known to build this new one.

An Italian brass band led the procession of marchers. A Welsh choir trailed just behind, followed by more than 250 delegates and more than 3,000 "sympathizers" drawn from almost every camp in the southern fields. Signs of the work these men did would have been visible in the coal tattoos, missing fingers, and wooden limbs of many marchers. Also in evidence were the craft values of pride, solidarity, and militancy, reinforced by less-evident memories of the old country, workscape disasters, fallen partners or family members, and hopes forsaken.[3]

The roads the marchers followed to Trinidad not only stretched back to the subterranean natural world in which miners labored, but also led down from the company towns that coal corporations had constructed in response to the marching strike of 1894. The hundreds of women and children who joined in the 1913 procession, though they still marched behind an all-male group of delegates, far outnumbered the dozens directly involved in the 1894 marches—an indication of just how completely the new company towns had failed. The cause for which the marchers were fighting had changed, too, expanding from workplace grievances and economic issues to encompass demands for the eradication of the company town system and for the overthrow of company tyranny.

This procession built on a bedrock of grievance and struggle, but it had taken more than unrest to make a movement. The United Mine Workers had provided the impetus for the march; the union had also fixed the destination, Castle Hall, the venue for a state mineworkers' convention.

The United Mine Workers had returned to the southern fields in 1912. Already embroiled in a two-year-long strike in Colorado's northern fields,

the union sought to shut off the flow of strikebreakers and strikebreaking coal from the southern fields. Using the so-called inside-outside technique, the UMW methodically set about organizing the mineworkers of Fremont, Huerfano, and Las Animas counties. One organizer—the outside man—sought work in a closed camp, where he secretly began to recruit potential union sympathizers, often through clandestine meetings underground or in the hills above the camps. The inside man, meanwhile, ingratiated himself with mine officials. Having won their trust, he then volunteered to help root out suspected unionists. Instead of turning in card-carrying United Mine Workers members, however, he handed over the names of nonunion men. Thanks to this method, credulous managers discharged and evicted hundreds of loyal workers, leaving behind a growing percentage of union members and sympathizers.[4]

The "big three" companies—Colorado Fuel and Iron, Victor-American, and Rocky Mountain Fuel—responded by stepping up their repression and refusing to meet with union leaders. By late summer 1913, the companies' intransigence left little hope for a peaceable settlement, and the mid-August murder of union organizer Gerald Lippiatt in the streets of Trinidad by two agents of the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency had set everyone on edge. The people of the coalfields now steeled themselves for a showdown that had been nearly half a century in the making.[5]

The workers entered this battle as many had entered past conflicts: joined in song. In the long, bloody fight to come, the song they sang would serve as a dirge and a lament. For now, though, they roared out "The Colorado Strike Song." The "great parade" of people all "took up the swelling chorus of the song," more than three thousand voices joining together to defy servitude by belting out lyrics of liberation penned by the youthful Frank Hayes, the UMW's Socialist vice president, and set to the rousing Civil War tune "The Battle Cry of Freedom."

> We will win the fight today, boys,
> We'll win the fight today,
> Shouting the battle cry of union;
> We will rally from the coal mines,
> We'll battle to the end,

Shouting the battle cry of union.
The union forever, Hurrah! boys, hurrah!
Down with the Baldwins, up with the law;
For we're coming, Colorado, we're coming all the way,
Shouting the battle cry of union.
We have fought them here for years, boys,
We'll fight them in the end,
Shouting the battle cry of union.
We have fought them in the North, now we'll fight them in the South,
Shouting the battle cry of union.
We are fighting for our rights, boys,
We're fighting for our homes,
Shouting the battle cry of union.
Men have died to win the struggle, they've died to set us free,
Shouting the battle cry of union.

As the men, women, and children of the coalfields voiced their readiness to fight for justice, freedom, and home, "all Trinidad throbbed with the song."[6]

When the parade reached its destination, the delegates peeled away from the brass band, choir, and "sympathizers" and filed into Castle Hall. Once inside, they again began singing "The Colorado Strike Song." Soon "the full-throated roar of it was taken up by the miners outside." For several minutes, "the thunder of strong men's voices" reverberated through the summer air, then died down as the Trinidad Convention was called to order.[7]

John McLennan, president of the Colorado State Federation of Labor and a United Mine Workers member, inaugurated this historic meeting by declaring: "'If a strike is called the strike will be carried on with all the characteristic vigor of the organization and every coal miner in America will be in back of us.'" After this promise of whole-hearted support from the four-hundred-thousand-member-strong mineworkers' union, the work of the convention began. "Reports of delegates concerning working conditions in their respective mines" dominated the program for the first two days. A succession of several dozen mineworkers took the podium, many accompanied by interpreters. Speaking of the workscapes in which they labored, the towns in which they lived, they recalled the state's horrible record of mine explosions and accidents; during 1913 alone, 104 men would die in Colorado's mines,

and 6 in the mine workings on the surface, in accidents that widowed 51 and left 108 children fatherless. The speakers told of watching partners and friends die in falls of rock and coal—about bad air and short weights, pit bosses who demanded bribes for good places, incompetent superintendents, bullying mine guards, and rapacious company stores. They complained about government of the companies, by the companies, for the companies. "Every man," Tony Lamont of Cokedale complained, "is closely watched and if the guards suspect him of belonging to the organization, he is discharged." Charles Goold of Rockvale complained that he and his fellows were earning "a bare existence" only. "Every morning that I went into the mine," Joe Morzox of Tabasco declared, "I thought I would never come out alive."[8]

In "recitals of alleged wrongs dating back many years," the delegates told the history of the southern coalfields as they had experienced it. Fremont County delegate T. X. Evans, an irascible old collier whose voice of protest we will hear again, recalled the profound impact these speeches had on him:

> When I went to that convention, . . . I was never looking for a strike; I did not believe it would come to that; I thought we would be able to come together. . . . but the evidence that was given by the delegates representing the different camps was heart-breaking. . . . Men gave evidence of how they were treated; it was something fierce. There was one man there who spoke pretty fair English. He said he had a partner and the boss told him, "Now, you have got to take this mule to-day and drive." The fellow said, "I cannot drive; I never drove a mule in my life." The boss told him he had to do it and he went to take that mule and the mule balked on him and in fighting with the mule he was catched between the car and the ribs, and it squeezed him and broke something on his inside and he lay there, I guess, four hours, and he died. I thought that was fierce. I got that man's word for it. I did not see why it should occur. . . . It is a fact I never heard anything so heartbreaking as was said there that night.

The litany of death and suffering by colliers from throughout the southern fields extinguished any lingering doubts or misgivings among the delegates and convinced every last man in Castle Hall that a strike was necessary and just.[9]

After the last delegate had stepped down from the podium, "the closing hours of the convention," reported the *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* "were marked by dramatic scenes and by demonstrations of enthusiasm never witnessed before in this city." John Lawson, the United Mine Workers international board member from Colorado and one of the leading figures in the coalfield war that was about to commence, began by reading a report from the policy and scale committee that included the following strike demands:

First—We demand recognition of the Union.
Second—We demand a ten per cent advance in wages on the tonnage rates and the . . . day wage scale. . . . We also demand a ten per cent advance on the wages paid coke oven workers, and on all other classes of labor not specified herein.
Third—We demand an eight-hour work day for all classes of labor in and around the coal mines and at coke ovens.
Fourth—We demand pay for all narrow work and dead work, which includes brushing, timbering, removing falls, handling impurities, etc.
Fifth—We demand checkweighmen at all mines to be elected by the miners without any interference by Company officials in said election.
Sixth—We demand the right to trade in any store we please, and the right to choose our own boarding place and our own doctor.
Seventh—We demand the enforcement of the Colorado Mining Laws and the abolition of the notorious and criminal guard system which has prevailed in the mining camps of Colorado for many years.

The delegates quickly and unanimously approved this program to reform mine workscapes and company town conditions and set September 23—just six days away—as the strike date.[10]

The announcement of the strike vote prompted "wild cheers." Then the irascible Mother Jones—the white-haired, foul-mouthed "angel of the miners" aptly described by one collier as a woman who "may not have done no dirty dishes, but she sure done a lot of good work for the union"—marched to the front of the hall and "threw down the gauntlet to the operators." As usual, she did not mince words. "'Rise up and strike,' she yelled. 'If you are too cowardly,'" she taunted the miners, "'there are enough women in this

country to come in here and beat h— out of you.'" By impugning the miners' manhood, Jones brought the assembly inside Castle Hall to fever pitch. "'If it is to be slavery or strike,' Mother Jones exclaimed, 'then I say strike—strike—until the last one of you drop into your graves.'"[11]

Frank Hayes then took the platform to orchestrate "the psychological moment" of the convention. "'I know we cannot lose in this great industrial struggle,' he said, 'because our demands are just.'" The union had "'taken every honorable means to bring about an adjustment [but had] failed.'" With "'no other alternative left but to strike,'" Hayes reassured the delegates: "'When we strike, we strike to win.'" The union vice president stood ready to "'pledge . . . all the wealth and all the power of our great union.'" The United Mine Workers, he vowed, would "'never leave this field until [they had] stricken the shackles from every mine worker.'" The miners responded to Hayes's rhetoric of emancipation and his promise of victory with "wild demonstration."[12]

It took several minutes for delegates to absorb the seriousness of what they had done. "Suddenly, silence fell over the hall," the reporter for the *Denver Express* wrote. "The delegates realized they had said the word that would throw 9000 men out of work. They were awed by the greatness of the approaching struggle. Their faces became grave and stern." Fear and foreboding descended on the delegates, only to be pierced by "a man's voice from the rear of the hall . . . chanting the Colorado strike song." One row of hard-pressed miners took up the song, then the next. Italians and Austrians, Welshmen and Hispanos, Swedes, Slovaks, and others all "rocked in their seats as they sang it. The thunder of it shook the hall. And so the convention adjourned." Within no time, news of the strike vote was "traveling like wildfire" up the hardscrabble canyons of the southern fields. The defiant lyrics and rousing melody of "The Colorado Strike Song," the "battle cry of union," echoed through every coal camp in the state.[13]

Prelude: The 1903–1904 Strike

The Trinidad Convention decreed that the strike would commence on September 23, thus giving mining families, mine operators, and coal consumers less than a week to prepare for the impending struggle. Though coal com-

pany managers declared themselves "'ready at any time to meet men actually in their employ, singly or in groups, to consider and adjust grievances,'" they refused to negotiate with the United Mine Workers. Instead, they laid plans for a fight that LaMont Bowers warned John D. Rockefeller, Jr., "would be serious indeed."[14]

These plans borrowed heavily from the victorious strategies the companies had pursued in the bitter colliers' strike of 1903–1904. The stark inequities and hazardous workscapes of the mineral-intensive industrial economy, its erosion of such crafts as hard-rock mining through the introduction of machines, and the ongoing recruitment of new migrants in the effort to lower wages and combat solidarity—all these factors had ensured that the bitter class conflict that had erupted in the Cripple Creek and Pullman strikes and in the colliers' marching strike of 1894 would continue to fester. The Leadville mine war of 1896–1897, the Front Range smelter dispute of 1899, and dozens of other strikes had turned Colorado into what one contemporary regarded as "a storm-center in labor troubles." Serious as Colorado's "troubles" of the 1890s had been, however, they paled in comparison to the industrial wars of 1903–1904. First, the Western Federation of Miners declared another strike at Cripple Creek, in sympathy with the smelter workers of Colorado City, Denver, Durango, and Pueblo; hard-rock miners at Idaho Springs and Telluride then joined the struggle. "Everything seems to be on Strike in Colorado," griped William Jackson Palmer from a summer camping trip in the mountains; "Big" Bill Haywood declared that "the entire state was in conflagration"; and the progressive *Outlook* ominously declared of Colorado, "Class lines are now drawn with a more dangerous sharpness in that commonwealth than in any other."[15]

Coal mine workers throughout Colorado walked off the job in the fall of 1903. Operators in northern Colorado hastened to confer with the union and offered to grant the miners every demand but the eight-hour day, which they claimed would make it impossible for them to compete with the southern operators. The northern colliers walked off the job anyway, steadfast in their support for the eight-hour day and wary about betraying their southern brethren by signing a separate peace. After the miners rejected further operator concessions, however, the United Mine Workers' accommodationist

president John Mitchell took the unusual step of calling for a second vote. By a margin of 228 to 165, the northern colliers elected to return to work.[16]

Mitchell's machinations undercut the southern Colorado miners' chances of success and reinforced the operators' resolve to crush the union. John C. Osgood, the mastermind behind the new company town system, devised a strategy comprising four components: dirty tricks, co-optation of state power for private purposes, neutralization of strikers' mobility, and control of information. When miners went out on strike a decade later, the operators would dust off the array of tactics that had carried them to victory in 1903–1904.

Dirty tricks, the first of the tactics operators used in the 1903–1904 dispute, encompassed bribes, espionage, and violence. Companies lured turncoats and stool pigeons with large payouts. They also retained detective agencies to keep tabs on union organizers and officials, as well as to recruit gunslingers for jobs as mine guards. A report from one of private detective William Reno's men shows how coal company hirelings used violence to combat the strike. "Nic Oddo refused to vacate" one of Victor-American's camps, the goon R. L. Martel claimed, "so I told Thompson to arrest him on the charge of vagrancy." Then he ordered four men to "wait for [Oddo] down by the bridge and they 'Kangarooded' [beat] him and the last I heard of him he was in the hospital, and he will not attempt to come back to Hastings. It seems that the only way to get these agitators out of the camp," the agent mused, "is to 'Kangaroo' them and when they are all gone, I am satisfied the boys will go to work." Meanwhile, in the western coalfields, John Lawson and his family narrowly escaped death when the henchmen of a mineowner, Perry Coryell, dynamited their home.[17]

When such tactics failed to produce the desired result, the companies brought in National Guardsmen to reinforce the detectives. Four hundred militiamen, fresh from battling the Western Federation of Miners in Telluride, marched into Trinidad on March 24, 1904, bearing orders from the conservative Governor James Peabody. As it happened, union miners from throughout the southern fields were convening in Trinidad at that very moment. And though reports claimed that the colliers had entered the meeting intending to call off the strike, the delegates "were so incensed at the unwarranted and uncalled for action of the governor," John Mitchell later claimed,

"that instead of calmly considering the status of the strike and declaring it off, as they undoubtedly would have done had the troops not been there, they decided that while the civil laws had been suspended, a resumption of work would be regarded not as a recognition of their defeat by the coal companies, but as a cowardly surrender to Peabody." Major Zeph Hill's forces, bankrolled largely by mineowners and the reactionary "citizens' alliances" formed by conservative elites in response to more than a decade of labor insurgency, disarmed strikers but not mine guards. They further outraged union miners by stationing themselves between strikers and strikebreakers, a move that turned any attempt to prevent the importation of scabs into an act of "insurrection and rebellion against the state."[18]

By enlisting detectives and the state militia to do their dirty work, coal companies intensified the campaign of control over workers' living space and movement so fundamental to the company town system. They closed coal camp saloons, forced strikers to register with military authorities, and forbade union men to drive on public roads or enter the new company towns. Operators also evicted miners from many of the remaining dwellings they had built on company land, some of which were subsequently demolished. The militia even used public health as a pretext for relocating tent colonies away from railroad tracks and depots, thus making it much harder for strikers to confront strikebreakers. Most troubling of all to coalfield migrants, though, was the use of militia to deport strikers. Governor Peabody, interpreting union sympathies as a priori evidence of nonresident status, ordered guardsmen to round up and deport all "nonresident" strike leaders from Las Animas County. By June 1904, more than 180 strikers had been jailed, often without formal charges' having been filed. State troops subsequently forced 97 men, as well as Mother Jones, to leave the state. Some they dumped on the high plains of Kansas, others in the New Mexico desert. Many deportees never returned to the southern coalfields, but at least one contingent straggled back on foot, sustaining themselves on their homeward journey by hunting jackrabbits.[19]

The final component of the operators' 1903–1904 strike strategy consisted of a far-reaching effort to keep the sordid story of repression in the southern coalfields from reaching the general public. Major Hill began to censor the press the instant he arrived in southern Colorado, threatened to expel from

the strike zone reporters who filed negative stories about the militia, concealed the deportation of sixteen men, and effectively shut down the union's Italian-language newspaper, *Il Lavatore Italiano,* by arresting the editor and a contributor. Hill even ordered his signal corps to monitor every telegraph message and telephone call out of Trinidad; communications that were deemed suspicious were diverted to Hill's headquarters. As the militia did everything it could to prevent damaging information from leaking out of the southern coalfields, the coal companies were doing all they could to cultivate a positive public image: offering sympathetic reporters privileged access to their company towns, providing newspapers with spurious articles supposedly written by nonunion colliers, and issuing detailed press releases presenting their spin on events to copy-hungry newspapers.[20]

Whatever the medium, the companies stuck to the same message: Before union agitators had whipped Colorado's mineworkers into a frenzy, miners had been laboring contentedly, enjoying high wages, good working conditions, and prosperous home lives in progressive company towns. But then, silver-tongued careerists and demagogues—men whom the Colorado Fuel and Iron counsel D. C. Beaman caricatured as agitators "who flourish in controversy and starve in peace"—incited ignorant foreigners to wage an all-out war against private property, the rule of law, and other hallowed American institutions. A letter attributed to a "Trinidad District Miner," but almost certainly written by a company apologist, proclaimed scrip "one of the greatest blessings the miners enjoy, for it carries with it many conveniences which none but the miner can appreciate.... Had it not been for the men Mr. Mitchell sent out here to talk to the poor unfortunate[s] who could not understand and yet who control the vote because of their number," he continued, "I dare say no one working in the south would have talked strike, let along come out." But once these "men drawing fancy salaries for agitating worked upon the men who could not understand," the benighted migrants came out. Soon, "the rest followed, believing it would be wrong for Americans to stay at work and let the poor foreigner fight for him [*sic*]." Through such false or tendentious interpretations, coal companies denied the long history of struggle boiling up from the mines and erupting from the new company towns. In their eyes, the union bore sole responsibility for the strike.[21]

The strategies of dirty war, state co-optation, restriction of movement,

imposition of surveillance, and propaganda proved effective—so effective, in fact, that by summer 1904, the companies were shipping coal at 80 percent of prestrike capacity. Mitchell and other union leaders, as critics would point out in the months and years to come, deserved some of the blame for the strikers' increasingly untenable position. By cajoling northern Colorado colliers into signing a separate peace, Mitchell neutralized the miners' greatest advantage: the fossil-fuel dependency of Western consumers. Once the economic lifeblood of the region was again flowing freely, John Mitchell urged the southern colliers to call off the strike. When the rank and file defied the union leadership in June 1904 by voting to prolong the strike—a move that directly contradicted the companies' portrayal of the strike as rooted in United Mine Workers demagoguery, not southern colliers' militancy—the international board retaliated by cutting off the relief payments on which strikers depended for food and other necessities. Delegates, facing penury and starvation, called off the strike soon thereafter. Some returned to work by late summer. Many others, however, found themselves blacklisted, and hence forced either to leave Colorado or enter another line of work.[22]

Nine years later, with the United Mine Workers again bent on organizing the southern fields and rumors of a strike on every tongue, coal company executives trotted out the same formula that had served them so well in 1903–1904. They stepped up assaults against union organizers, in the process killing at least one man; planted moles within the United Mine Workers; and expelled hundreds, even thousands, of suspected union miners from the camps (many of whom turned out to be antiunionists targeted by the "inside-outside" system). Once the Trinidad Convention had voted to strike, W. H. Reno, now head of Colorado Fuel and Iron's in-house detective service, and Albert Felts, whose Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency had recently played an instrumental role in defeating United Mine Workers strikes in West Virginia, began in the summer of 1913 to hire dozens of thugs from Cripple Creek, Denver, Salt Lake City, Kansas City, Chicago, and beyond. The companies also proceeded to enlist sympathetic newspapers willing to portray the strikers by using the same rhetoric perfected a decade earlier, as well as to lay the groundwork for National Guard intervention. In the meantime, private

armies and law officers from local governments beholden to King Coal would do their best to hold the miners at bay.[23]

Meanwhile, in New York, one of the richest families in the world embarked on a course identical to the one it had charted without reproach in 1903–1904. In that strike, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., whose father had recently acquired a controlling interest in Colorado Fuel and Iron, had expressed unqualified faith in Frank Hearne, the Rockefeller family's man in Colorado.

> We agree fully with the attitude which you have taken regarding the labor situation and with your statement as to general policy. We are prepared to stand by [you] in this fight and see the thing out, not yielding an inch. Recognition of any kind of either the labor leaders or union, much more a conference such as they request, would be a sign of evident weakness on our part. We have dealt fairly and generously with our men up to date and intend to do so in the future, and we do not believe it is for their interests, as we know it is not for the interests of the company to allow any interference on the part of the union.

Ten years later, staff members at the Rockefeller headquarters at 26 Broadway ignored initial reports of impending labor strife. Beside a passage in a letter warning that a strike was about to erupt in the southern fields, John Junior penciled the word "irrelevant." More concerned with financial results than labor relations, he deferred to the crotchety LaMont Bowers, Hearne's successor as the Rockefellers' man at Colorado Fuel and Iron. Bowers, meanwhile, fed the family just-so stories of the sort operators had long used to explain away their workers' militancy. The Trinidad Convention, Bowers informed Rockefeller's office, "was made up principally of union men brought into Trinidad . . . together with paid healers." Bowers implausibly declared, "There was none from any of our mines who had been sent there as a representative of the miners. The five or six of our men who were there, dropped in as men drop into a political convention, not as delegates, with one or two exceptions. . . . We mention this," Bowers concluded, "to show you to what extremes these men will go in order to carry their point." Bowers elaborated on similar themes in another letter. "We have the good will of our men and

are perfectly satisfied," he stated. "Not more than 10 percent belong to unions." Many of the rest, particularly "these foreigners," were afraid that United Mine Workers members would intimidate and even assault them. Though Bowers "hope[d] to be able to keep a large number of our men," he predicted, "Many of those who do go out will, after a few days when they find we are able to protect them, return to their work."[24]

When John D. Rockefeller, Jr., first acknowledged the strike two weeks after it commenced, he expressed unqualified support for Bowers and his lieutenants. "You gentlemen cannot be more earnest in your desire for the best interests of the employes of your Company than we are," Rockefeller assured Bowers. "We feel that what you have done is right and fair. . . . Whatever the outcome may be," John Jr. promised, "we will stand by you to the end."[25]

To the denizens of boardrooms and clubhouses in New York and Denver alike, the causes of the strike remained all too clear: outside agitators had invaded Colorado, then alternately intimidated and misled the state's previously contented and well-paid miners. Having inflamed these gullible foreigners to the point of savage rage, the union stood poised to unleash a reign of anarchy that threatened both the rights of capital and the workers' true self-interest.[26]

Thus with singing and storytelling did miners and mineowners steel themselves for battle.

Exodus

September mornings in southern Colorado ordinarily dawn crisp and bright. Imagine the miners' dismay, then, when they and their families awoke to near-freezing temperatures and driving rains on the morning slated for the strike's commencement. The dirt roads of the southern coalfields quickly turned to mud; "a driving, searching wind" added to the strikers' woes, confronting the thousands of men, women, and children evicted from company housing with an exodus of the most trying sort.[27]

Over the preceding days, miners and mining families had been busy preparing for the coming fight. Meanwhile, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., ignored the news from Colorado, and LaMont Bowers joined John C. Osgood and other executives to set in motion a plan similar to the one that had delivered the

operators from the last major colliers' strike. Union rules permitted engineers, boilermen, and pumpmen to stay on the job during labor conflicts, thus protecting mine workscapes from irreparable harm. Rock would continue to fall, water and gas to flow, but miners, superintendents, and company men did what they could to minimize the damage. While other workmen shored up haulageway roofs, inspected ventilation circuits, and led mules out of the pits to pasture outside, colliers took care to leave their rooms in good order, hoping, after all, soon to return victorious to their old places. Once miners had prepared their places, they "drew," or "took out," their tools. This vernacular expression for going out on strike reflected the miners' status as craftsmen who owned the tools of their trade—as free men empowered to deny employers access to these tools, as well as to the skills and energies needed to wield them effectively.[28]

Leaving work even before the Trinidad Convention had authorized the strike, the miners of Delagua and Valdez drew their tools first. Next to come out were the Huerfano County colliers, perhaps 70 percent of whom had left the mines by Saturday, September 21. Two days later, virtually every mineworker in Fremont County—and an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the mine labor force in Las Animas and Huerfano counties—had joined the struggle, as had most of Crested Butte's workforce, a few hundred colliers from the outskirts of Colorado Springs, four hundred miners from the newly opened Routt County collieries near Steamboat Springs, and over a thousand nonunion miners in northern Colorado, where hundreds of union miners had been on strike since 1910.[29]

The coalfield war involved women and children, too, of course. A second tributary of the September exodus began with them. "Preparations for a long siege," one account reported, "led to busy scenes of household migrations." Coal camp homes often comprised women's workscapes. As women in the closed camps packed up and prepared to leave, they, too, were taking out their tools, but with one crucial difference: their work would hardly cease once male family members walked off the job.[30]

Few strikers had as much time to move as they would have liked. After the strike began at Tabasco, one account alleged, "mine guards hastened to the little huts where miners lived and threw their families and furniture into the street. Little children so ejected were hurt and several fights resulted."

Fearing the knock of company thugs on their door, mining families gathered up the things they had carried to the coalfields as well as the scanty possessions they had acquired since their arrival. Once they had packed, many coalfield migrants took to the road again (in fact, many hundreds had already left the coalfields in advance of the strike). Hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of miners returned to their old countries; recent arrivals were particularly likely to head home. At least a few thousand other Colorado colliers took jobs offered by the union in Wyoming, Pennsylvania, or West Virginia; others secured work through relatives, compatriots, and padrones, while a few melted back into the army of tramps riding rails.[31]

The strike prompted thousands to elaborate on and accelerate the patterns of migration they had established over the decades, but more than twenty thousand men, women, and children chose to stay in Colorado. Some undoubtedly expected the strike to end soon; others had no place else to go. The simplest explanation for why so many stayed behind, however, might also be the most powerful: as "The Colorado Strike Song" declared, strikers were "fighting for [their] homes." Despite the dangers of the mines, despite the repression and indignity imposed on them by company towns, tens of thousands of migrants from all around the world had come to feel that they belonged to the southern Colorado coalfields, and the coalfields to them. They had hacked productive mines out of lifeless earth, contributed to the transformation of the Mountain West from an arid, isolated frontier periphery into an industrial core, and made homes for themselves in the gritty coal camps.[32]

The fortunate minority who owned their homes or who rented accommodations from someone other than the mining companies generally stayed put. The rest found themselves homeless when companies evicted them from closed-camp dwellings. Some joined relatives, compatriots, and friends on ranches, farms, and truck gardens established by fellow migrants over the preceding decades. Several Tyrolean miners and ex-miners, to give just one example, had homesteaded in Huerfano County. Though Emma Pazar's father owned his own house at Rouse, Colorado Fuel and Iron guards forced him to leave when the strike began. So the Pazars loaded their belongings into a covered wagon and headed for the Bernelli Ranch on Bear Creek, then filed a homestead claim on a 160-acre farm on the other side of the river.

7.1. Strikers in Ludlow. Denver Public Library, Western History Collection, X-60461.

Strikers also "swarmed into" open camps and independent towns, such as Trinidad, where "small vacant houses" were reportedly "filling up." Still others rented land in the countryside and moved onto plots outside Segundo and Valdez for the duration of the dispute. One resourceful contingent even reoccupied the abandoned camp of Engleville.[33]

Probably the largest contingent, however, moved into union tent colonies

located at Aguilar, Rugby, Piedmont, Sopris, Old Segundo, Tercio, Walsenburg, Forbes, Pictou, and of course Ludlow. Don McGregor of the *Denver Express* provided the most vivid reporting on "the exodus" from closed camps to tent colonies. "Miners and wives and children crouched pitifully on top of high-piled little wagons, bending low in futile effort to avoid the rain. The faces of the men were set heavy with foreboding; the faces of the women stolid with the memory of suffering that had gone before and the sure knowledge of more to come; the faces of the children were twisted in misery." Each of the fifty-seven wagons McGregor passed on his drive from Trinidad to Ludlow carried a bewildered, woebegone family perched atop its worldly belongings. "What a mockery of the state's boasted riches!" McGregor lamented. "What a commentary on the prosperity of the miners of Colorado! Prosperity! Little piles of rickety chairs! Little piles of miserable looking straw bedding! Little piles of kitchen utensils! And all so worn and badly used they would have been the scorn of any second-hand dealer." McGregor could find not "a single article even approaching luxury, save, once in a score of wagons, a cheap, gaily painted gramophone! With never a bookcase! With never a book! With never a single article that even the owners thought worth while trying to protect from the driving rain! And these were the contents of the homes of the miners whom the mine owners have called prosperous and contented!"[34]

Only those who had witnessed the evacuation, McGregor claimed, could "imagine its pathos. The exodus from Egypt was a triumph, the going forth of a people set free." The mass departure of strikers, by contrast, winding "its bowed, weary way between the coal hills on the one side and the far-stretching prairie on the other . . . was an exodus of woe, of people leaving fears for new terrors, a hopeless people seeking new hope, a people born suffering going forth to certain new suffering."[35]

Tent Colony Community

Union tent colonies, despite considerable differences in their population and layout, had in common the arrangement of tents around a central communal space. Ludlow, the largest of the camps, featured a large parade ground on which strikers assembled almost every day to listen to speeches. The adja-

cent "Big Tent" served as the local union headquarters as well as a workplace, where women (and some children and men) together did the work required to sustain the colony. These communal spaces also hosted dances, festivities on national holidays, religious festivals, and parades. For the sake of sanitation and economy, the union laid out camps on well-drained grids with privies at a safe remove from water sources and tents. Drinking water from wells or barrels, coal for heating and cooking, lumber to frame floors and walls—the union supplied these, too. As for housing, the union supplemented a large order of canvas wall tents from a Pueblo dealer with hundreds of tents vacated after the union's recent defeat in the West Virginia coalfields.[36]

Tent colony living left much to be desired. The bad weather that attended the exodus from the company towns kicked off one of the worst winters in living memory. Union-supplied coal helped mining families cook food and keep warm, but canvas offered scant protection against wind and precipitation; some tents even collapsed in blizzards, such as the early-December storm that dumped several feet of snow on the colonies, while setting records throughout Colorado.[37]

As for food, strikers had little luck bagging any game other than jackrabbits, which they hunted with guns, picks, shovels, and wire snares. Fish from the few streams in the area provided some additional protein, as did the chickens and other domesticated animals that women kept in and around the colonies. Far and away the largest source of food, however, was groceries purchased with weekly union relief payments, disbursed according to a formula based on the male-breadwinner ideal: three dollars per man, one dollar per woman, and fifty cents per child. Strikers patronized stores in adjacent towns, or tent colony commissaries whose business was contracted out to independent merchants; families also purchased eggs, dairy products, and meat from farmwives and ranchwomen, as well as vegetables from truck-garden peddlers. Through a combination of frugality, resourcefulness, and grit, strikers managed to ward off hunger—no mean achievement, when a family of six received just six dollars a week, less than half what an average miner might have made in the same period.[38]

Despite these physical hardships—and perhaps because of them, too—colonies sometimes took on an almost utopian cast. Loosely organized, thor-

oughly egalitarian, committed not to containing mineworkers' militancy but rather to channeling it toward the union's purposes, Ludlow and its counterparts presented a stark contrast with the new company towns. In time, the strikers grew "real close," one participant recalled, "just like a big family."[39]

This family, like the households that composed it, remained rigidly patriarchal. Women and girls experienced little liberation from their labors, though they now worked collectively in the Big Tent and other communal spaces instead of isolated within their own homes. Nationalism and ethnic ties also retained their salience. Men such as the Greek martyr of Ludlow, Louis Tikas, served as "captains," mediating between British American union leaders and the more than twenty nationalities represented in the colony. On the whole, though, strikers upheld a vision of Americanism best summarized by the old republican motto, *E pluribus unum*. "We had everything there," former driver Alex Bisulco recalled of Ludlow, "Greeks, Italians, Slavs and all, the League of Nations was there, you might say." In the camps, these diverse peoples "all stuck together," in Bisulco's words, forging a whole that transcended the sum of its parts.[40]

One visitor proclaimed Ludlow "the true melting pot," and indeed tent colonies reinforced the interethnic sociability facilitated by mine workscapes and vernacular landscapes. In the process, they buttressed the growing sense of conviction that led migrants from radically different backgrounds to embrace a common identity and a common interest in the success of the strike. "In the evening," the union organizer Mike Livoda later recalled, "I used to get out there a little ways from the camp, you know, and listen to music in those camps. They'd be singing in every language in the world in that tent colony, how those miners were unified together and stuck together." This concordance of diverse lyrics, instruments, and musical styles offered an apt metaphor for the solidarity that generally prevailed in the camps.[41]

Tent colonies functioned as military encampments as well as refugee camps and incubators of group identity. From the start, Ludlow was undoubtedly the most martial of the camps. Strategically located, like many of the other colonies, the camp was protected by rifle pits and guarded by sentries. On the central parade ground strikers held rallies and planned picket lines against incoming trains carrying scabs; there they sang "The Colorado Strike Song" pretty much every night, sometimes belting out the lines, one

7.2. Lending a Hand at the Ludlow Commissary. Denver Public Library, Western History Collection, Z-215.

miner recalled, until their "tonsils hurt"; there they steeled themselves for the coming storm, for it seemed likely from the time the union set up the Ludlow camp that this stretch of ground, like Rouse two decades before, would become the fulcrum on which the strike of 1913–1914 would pivot.[42]

Bringing the State Back In

The Trinidad Convention called the strike, the 1903–1904 prelude had supplied the script that the companies would follow, and the exodus created the tent colonies. A little over a month after the strike began, on October 28, the Colorado National Guard would enter the strike zone. Some were already predicting, though, that what started as a peacekeeping mission would end in what Don McGregor of the *Express* called "civil war, red and bloody."[43]

Governor Elias Ammons had entered the statehouse the same way Woodrow Wilson reached the White House: through a side door opened when Progressives split off from the Republican Party in 1912. Though many Colo-

rado labor leaders had supported the Progressive candidate for governor, Edward Costigan, a contingent led by the United Mine Workers' John Lawson put its considerable weight behind Ammons. Not only had the ranchman's Democratic predecessor appointed staunch unionists as secretary of state and deputy labor commissioner, but he had refused to dispatch the militia to put down the colliers' strike in the northern fields. Sealing many union miners' support for the Democrats was a party platform calling for "legislation empowering the governor, the attorney general and the courts to destroy" the coal companies' dominion over Huerfano and Las Animas counties "and restore to the people of these counties their right of self-government."[44]

Like so many politicians, though, Ammons changed his tune once he took his office. He might have responded to the strike of the southern miners as Theodore Roosevelt had to the Pennsylvania anthracite miners' strike of 1902: by forcing employers and employees to arbitrate. Instead, Ammons—a man elected in no small part thanks to the support of labor—stuck his head in the sand, extracting it only to utter bland pronouncements urging both sides to comply with state laws addressing twice-monthly paydays, the importation of strikebreakers, and other points of contention. The governor's noninterventionist stance frustrated the operators' plan to enlist the state militia to suppress the strike. "We have here a pin-head governor," Bowers carped, "who could put the troops into the territory and end the strike in twenty-four hours."[45]

The reassurances of key elected officials in the coalfields gave the governor the pretext he needed to keep the militia in its barracks. Assaults, murders, and gun battles had marred the strike even before its formal declaration. Even so, Trinidad's Democratic mayor M. T. Dunlavy assured the governor, "'We can handle the situation as far as Trinidad is concerned.'"[46]

Dunlavy's confidence, however, did not extend to Ludlow. There, "where the strikers [were] gathering in a great camp," Dunlavy warned Ammons just a week after the strike began, "I fear there may be trouble." And indeed, it was the volatility and violence that centered on Ludlow that finally forced the governor's hand. "There is probably no camp in the district affected by the strike," the *Walsenburg Independent* claimed, "where stronger animosity is displayed between the company employees and the miners." A federal investigator concurred, reporting: "The strikers at the Ludlow tents are in a highly nervous condition." The miners, he alleged on October 9, "expect trouble and are apparently ready to create a very grave situation on slight provocation." Mine guards proved even more eager to fight. After numerous gun battles erupted around the colony in late October, Ammons made the fateful decision to bring state troops back into Colorado's labor wars for the first time since Peabody's ignominious tenure.[47]

The Colorado National Guard received deployment orders from the governor on October 28, after the strike had already claimed more than two dozen lives, including those of several strikers, strikebreakers, mine guards, and innocent bystanders around Ludlow. Ammons ordered the militia "to obtain a speedy return of law and order in the disturbed districts." In hopes of preventing further bloodshed, the governor "directed" National Guard commandant John Chase:

> To disarm everybody, unless authorized to bear arms,
> To close up saloons wherever there is any disturbance.
> To require that all persons employed as guards in the protection of property shall stay on the property guarded.
> To see that no deputy sheriffs or constables be employed, except citizens of the county they serve, and only such numbers as may be deemed necessary for the conduct of public business.
> To see that all persons desiring to return to work shall be permitted to do so and come when they will without molestation or interference of any kind whatsoever; and during the restoration of order or until further orders no strike-breakers shall be shipped in.[48]

Ammons's move worried many Coloradans. "The whole state," the *Florence Daily Citizen* explained, "trembled in the thought of armed conflict and consequent bloodshed, of terrors to humanity, suffering and heavy expense. . . . The people of Colorado," the *Citizen* believed, "have not yet recovered, or rather their state hasn't, from the strike troubles during the Peabody administration." Some strikers also expressed alarm at the return of the militia. "The wildest excitement prevailed in the tent colonies of the striking miners," the *Citizen* reported. "The hot heads among the strikers, principally

7.3. Striking Mining Families in Front of the Zanetell Tent, Forbes Colony. Denver Public Library, Western History Collection, X-60448.

Greeks, were uncontrollable. They suggested to their countrymen that the troops be fired upon and offered to lead a mob to blow up the mines."[49]

Many strikers, however, welcomed the National Guard, reasoning that it would provide a neutral buffer that would protect them from mine guards and company detectives. Moreover, Ammons's order that "no strike-breakers shall be shipped in" assuaged fears that state troops would intervene to sabotage the strikers' efforts to orchestrate a fuel famine. Paradoxically, militiamen may have received their warmest greeting at Ludlow. As troops paraded around the tent colony, "'little children in white'" burst out singing "The Colorado Strike Song," while waving the Stars and Stripes in an impromptu parade. Even the irascible General Chase found the scene "memorable." Captain Nickerson seconded the guardsmen's commander, by observing that "every diplomatic profession of good faith" attended this initial encounter between strikers and militiamen in the camp that guardsmen would destroy six months later.[50]

Whatever "good faith" Nickerson detected, however, soon began to dissi-

pate. The National Guard enforced the governor's disarmament order unevenly. Militiamen confiscated all the weapons they could find in the tent colonies, even as company guards retained most of their arsenal. The guardsmen soon shifted from neutrality to partisanship in other ways, too. Militia officers drawn largely from the state's professional class naturally gravitated toward coal company executives who shared their WASP heritage, bourgeois manners, and conservative worldview—and away from coalfield migrants and union leaders. Institutional connections reinforced such private sympathies. The state auditor, Roady Kenehan, a staunch union supporter, sought to hamstring the militia by delaying or refusing to pay the National Guard's mounting bills. The auditor's well-intentioned move qualifies as perhaps the most misguided maneuver in the Great Coalfield War, for coal companies and their store subsidiaries astutely stepped in to fill the financial vacuum that Kenehan had left. Working with Denver's largest bankers, Colorado Fuel and Iron and its allies arranged to foot the bill for the troops' food, fuel, and other supplies. In time, they even paid the guardsmen's salaries.[51]

When Chase issued new orders in early November that replaced company guards at several mines with militiamen, he set in motion the most ominous trend of all: the growing practice of mustering former sheriff's deputies, mine guards, and detectives into the National Guard. Thereafter, a militia composed of troops possessing little or no direct connection with the strike was transmuted into a force of men boasting a checkered history as criminals, counterinsurgents, and union busters. As company rule and the armed power of the state became more and more difficult to disentangle, the strikers' attitude toward the militia changed from welcome to wariness to outright hostility.[52]

The guardsmen's shifting sympathies undercut the peace their arrival in the strike zone had temporarily instituted. Petty violence resumed in November, renewing widespread fears that the strike might erupt into all-out war. Yet still Ammons grasped at the naive hope that peace lay just a simple conversation away.[53]

Kenneling the Dogs of Industrial War

It must have been a curious sight: three striking miners—Archie Allison, David Hamman, and T. X. Evans—arrived at Colorado's gold-domed capitol

building shortly before 10 A.M., probably clothed in their Sunday best. A few minutes later, three coal company executives—Jesse Welborn of CF&I, John Osgood of Victor-American, and David Brown of Rocky Mountain Fuel—strode in, dressed in business suits. Ammons, fed up with the withering criticism that operators, strikers, and the public were heaping on him, ushered the six men into a conference room and forbade reporters to enter. The governor was trying against all odds, after all, to resolve perhaps the biggest strike in Colorado history by staging a "man-to-man talk."[54]

The executives spoke for their particular companies, while Evans, Allison, and Hamman ostensibly represented not the United Mine Workers, but the strikers of Fremont, Huerfano, and Las Animas counties, respectively. This odd conceit signaled the governor's uncritical acceptance of the pledge Colorado Fuel and Iron president Jesse Welborn had made in a letter of November 5, which declared the companies' willingness to uphold state laws guaranteeing six of the seven demands of the Trinidad Convention if the strikers agreed to drop the seventh demand, recognition of the UMW.

The "joint conference" held in late November 1913 constituted the last, best hope for settling the strike. Ammons expected that by studiously avoiding any discussion of union recognition, miners and operators could make peace in less than twenty-four hours. Instead, the fundamental differences in experience, perspective, and goals that leap out from the previously unstudied transcripts of these proceedings—oddly overlooked by every previous historian of the coalfield war—reveal that miners and operators found it impossible to agree on even the most minor points. The gulf between operators and strikers illustrated the depth of the rupture between them; meanwhile, the impasse that resulted from the joint conference provided the coal companies with the leverage they needed to trick Elias Ammons into shifting his stance, thus placing the weight of the state of Colorado behind the operators.[55]

Denver's *Rocky Mountain News* implored the conferees to remember "that the eyes of Colorado [were] set hungrily" on the proceedings: "It should be no secret to them that from every angle and corner of this sorely-tried commonwealth hope waits for the word of their deliberations that will tell them the story of promise or defeat. . . . Do not disappoint this people," the paper pleaded. "Forget the passions, the bitterness and the promptings of retaliation that have disfigured this splended [*sic*] state since the first raucous note of class warfare went hurtling through the chain of coal-seamed hills of the south. . . . Send the dogs of industrial war back to their kennels, and 800,000 people will bless and thank you with their most expressive gratitude."[56]

Only by forgetting, it seemed, could the two sides settle their differences. The three miners, however, had no intention of denying the histories that had brought them into battle with their employers. Evans had migrated from Wales by way of Iowa, Allison seems to have been English, and Hamman was probably American-born. All three were practical miners whose superior skills enabled them to earn much more than the state average. None was a stranger to labor conflict; Allison, to give the most illuminating example, had petitioned Governor Peabody during the 1903–1904 strike, beseeching him to "line out a measure of free speach, to guide the Law Officers and peoples leaders, directing the Mayor of Walsenburg to advise the law officers as to what freedom of speach the people are intitled to." He was particularly keen that strikers be permitted to "meet on the public highways and public grounds and exchange views with our fellow creatures without being interfered with by the law Officers." Allison closed his protest against the companies' enclosure of public spaces with verse that might have been taken straight from a broadside in Revolutionary Boston or William Palmer's Philadelphia:

> In the spirit of truth we'l put our trust,
> Our laws t'ween man and man be just,
> And let our National moto be
> Emblem of truth and liberty.
> Then should power threaten to invade,
> To spoil our homesteads law or trade,
> We'l hurl them from our land and sea
> With Arms of truth and liberty.[57]

Before Allison and his fellows could resuscitate such working-class republican worldviews at the governor's conference in 1913, however, Osgood nearly derailed the talks. The old union-buster suggested that the conferees could "save a lot of time" by tackling union recognition first. The "meat of

the whole thing is right there," he claimed. "The strike would not have been called—at least not at this time—if there had not been a desire on the part of the United Mine Workers of America officials to organize the state." The governor rejoined: "It may not be necessary to discuss that feature at all." Yet despite Ammons's best efforts, the governor could not divert the conversation from the divisive issue of unionization. "We have very strong opinions in regard to this organization," Osgood explained. "We insist on the right of men to join a Union if they so desire; we recognize that they have the same right that we have to join capital in corporations in order to put business in shape." Osgood claimed to have no quarrel with unionization in *principle;* what he opposed was the United Mine Workers' *practice.* "There are unions and unions," he intoned, "just as there are men and men, and corporations and corporations." The United Mine Workers had "called this strike and attempted to force us to do business, and we do not care [to] continue meeting these officials. . . . They have no business with us nor we with them. . . . The day will come," Osgood foresaw, "when there will be Unions that we would be mighty glad to see you join, but their purposes would be to build men up and not break them down, as is the case today. A man who can make more money in mining coal," the owner claimed, "is quietly told not to exert himself, as by his superior skill he will injure some other fellow, and that the cause of one is the cause of all, and that he should hold himself back a little."[58]

The colliers' mutualism troubled Osgood no end. "We will never be able to build up the civilization that we want," he declared, "until those ideals are abolished." "The Union . . . is the thing that is checking [the miners' advancement]," he announced. "The biggest men in the United States," he claimed, "worked their way up from the ranks" instead of "by joining organizations where they could not, by their merit or skill, advance." Osgood knew; "I started as poor as you," he reminded the miners; "I had to leave school and earn my own living at fourteen years of age." Osgood's main critique of the United Mine Workers boiled down to this: the union institutionalized a mutualism that challenged company authority over the mine workscape and thwarted honest workmen in their efforts to exercise their sacrosanct right to upward mobility.

Osgood's tirade placed the miners on the defensive. Adding to their discomfort was the peculiarity of sitting across the table from some of the richest, mightiest men in the state. "You understand gentlemen," Allison stammered, "that we are just simple miners. We are bit a bit [*sic*] awkward and we have not got the same expression and we would like a little consideration on account of that." After Allison's initial gesture of humility, though, the colliers proceeded to mount a case that was neither awkward nor simple. For more than twelve remarkable hours, three colliers drawn from the strikers' ranks spoke their truth to the assembled representatives of King Coal and the state of Colorado.

The miners derived this truth from experience—their own and that of their fellow strikers. Largely avoiding ideological abstractions and legal technicalities, the colliers returned time and again to the subject they knew best: mining coal. The operators could talk until they were blue in the face about "outside agitators" fomenting trouble among "contented" miners, but they could not convince Evans, Allison, and Hamman that the miners' strike had started with the union instead of the mine workscape. Only through the reform of working conditions underground, the miners believed, could any meaningful agreement emerge.

The colliers repeatedly brought the discussion back to their home ground. Evans proudly claimed that he did "not have to bow [his] head to any man in Colorado as far as mining [was] concerned." He and his mates did not hesitate to tell the operators how they should be running their mines. Hamman asked Osgood if he had a blueprint of one of his company's mines. "What is the point about that?" Osgood wondered. "That the mine is drove wrong," Hamman replied. All three colliers related numerous conversations in which they had challenged the judgment of their superiors, and several in which they had pointedly confronted bosses and superintendents.

Such assertions of craft pride and independence echoed three broad complaints miners had with the management of the collieries. First, the miners attributed Colorado's horrible record of accidents and disasters to company negligence. Evans, the best storyteller among the three, interrupted Osgood's opening antiunion diatribe to recount the tale of the 1896 Vulcan Mine disaster. "I went to New Castle," he began—"thought it was the only place on earth; such a beautiful coal field." But once Evans started working in this gassy property, his admiration was eclipsed by anxiety. Managers asked Evans for safety advice but ignored his recommendations. "The condition did

not improve." One morning, a peculiar fog hung low over the mine. "'So . . . I told the woman I said, "that mine is going to go up today, I do not think I ought to go to work" and she said, "no you are not going to go to work, if she is going to go up."'" Evans walked to the mine mouth and told the shaft man that "I would not go down. He said, 'ain't you going down?' I said, 'No she is going to go up.' . . . He said, 'They watered the place good Saturday night' I said, 'They might have thought so, but when I left the place Saturday night they had not watered it.'" As Evans predicted, the mine exploded. "It would not have gone up," Evans concluded, "if they had watered it."

Because of the Colorado coal industry's grim safety record—the worst of any major coal-mining state—Evans believed that "it would be to the best interests [of the miners] to have an organization." Brown retorted, "When we have an explosion we pay dearly for it." "Yes, and we pay dear too," Evans shot back, *"with our lives."*

The miners also voiced discontent with so-called dead, or deficiency, work: essential but uncompensated tasks like timbering, laying track, and brushing down loose roof. "There is a good deal of advantage taken on deficiency work," Evans complained. "If a boss takes exception to a man, don't want him, he will put him up against deficient places, and it will cripple him probably a dollar or two dollars a day and he has no way in the world to get out of it only to quit and get out, and if he quits the same thing will happen somewhere else."

Beyond complaining about dead work and unsafe conditions, the miners challenged the tyranny of bosses and the companies that employed them. The colliers complained of short weights and corrupt mine officials who expected miners to "pay taxes" (bribes) in exchange for good places. Evans claimed that he had worked in New Castle with a man "abler than I was in body and he would lie down and I would get after this fellow time and time again. I would say to him, 'You are paid as much as I am paid; get a move on you' and he told me plainly he did not have to, that . . . 'I pay so much a month for my job.'" When Evans complained to the mine superintendent (the recipient of this man's "taxes"), he "put me on the bum. I was not wanted and for ten years," Evans claimed, "I travelled the state. . . . Simply because I was declaring myself and tried to show them where they were lacking." Allison went further, to draw intriguing connections between work relations underground and company corruption above. "We all know," he boldly asserted, "that politics have been very unsatisfactory in the country as well as in the mines. The conditions that prevailed here for the last twenty years . . . have got the youth, the young rising generation, into a state of corruption," the ardent republican declared in an argument reminiscent of his letter to Governor Peabody, "and they have thought they could not get along unless they fell in with the way. . . . The result was that there were a good many people getting connected with the mines that were unscrupulous."

The operators replied that they hired bosses and superintendents from the ranks of practical colliers. Hamman retorted that such "men who were raised up from the mine, they have changed a whole lot since they were working; since they got in this position it seems that they do not take interest . . . in the *work,* just take an interest in the *job.*" To value the work, Hamman implied, was to uphold the colliers' craft; to value the job, by contrast, was to become a company toady. Honest practical miners, Allison claimed, "always come in the way of the boss. . . . The supers get jealous of a good man or intelligent men and what we think is that you people have not got that; *you don't really know what is going on.*" Here Allison hit on the core of the colliers' critique. "You people don't know what is going on," Hamman seconded, "and if you people were in closer touch with what is going on at these mines I believe you would change your minds yourself."

The striking colliers criticized company misrule, but they also offered a program of reform. Replace corporate hierarchy, they urged, with workers' democracy. To Ammons's chagrin, the three miners proved incapable of discussing strike demands, the workscape environment, or work relations underground without constantly returning to the subject of unionization.

The colliers attributed two primary benefits to the union. The first was educational. Evans believed that the United Mine Workers could provide the operators with "a better class of people"—better not because of their race or nationality, but because of the mechanism that unionization proposed to put in place for practical miners to train green men. "This foreign element," Allison complained, "are illiterate and do not understand the customs very well and down in the mines . . . the intelligent miner has a great deal to contend with from them." But instead of arguing that inexperienced miners should be excluded from the pits, Allison instead believed that new migrants "have to

be educated, not only to read and write, but to do their work; they have to be taught that . . . they must do it right."

The union also afforded protection to "pit committees"—the representative but essentially ad hoc bodies that British American colliers had traditionally formed to present their grievances and demands to operators. William Palmer had been put off by the talk of striking he had overheard when visiting one such committee back during his British tour in 1855. Such committees and their Colorado offshoots embodied deep-seated traditions of local power and workers' control. "We used to have a committee without an organization in years gone by," Evans claimed. "The people would pull together and they would even elect an organization, locally, in the mines." Such committees, the miners believed, could "settle any grievance that may arise in the mine." To Evans and his comrades, the United Mine Workers constituted an extension of these bodies. Far from placing the collieries under the command of a massive international labor organization directed by demagogues and careerists, unionization would actually give colliers and their employers a way to settle grievances quickly and equitably without enlisting distant corporate and union hierarchies. "Suppose that he was boss and I had some deficiency," Evans postulated. "If you were reasonable and I was reasonable we could settle the question between us both; but if I was unreasonable and as a rule an old, experienced miner is very unreasonable, they would have to call the committee and . . . they would step in between the two parties."[59]

Pit committees, Evans believed, could counterbalance the power of corrupt local officials and ill-informed executives; in the process, they could protect what the colliers intriguingly called "the miners' law." Asked by Brown whether he believed that "the Union can enforce the law better than the Governor or the officials in power," Allison replied, "It is the law of the mines that I am speaking about, not the State laws; *the laws that the mines ought to be ruled by.*" When Osgood inquired, "What is the nature of the laws of the miners outside of the State laws?" Hamman replied simply: "To have the mines safe." Here, again, the miners equated workscape safety and workers' control, self-governance and craft autonomy, thus predicating their cause on the same dynamics that had underpinned coalfield conflict since the inception of the industry.[60]

The operators, like Palmer before them, categorically refused to accept the

miners' vision of industrial democracy. "It is human nature that you would want to settle your own grievances," Osgood granted, "and the next thing to doing it yourself would be to have some one who may have the same grievance the next day; but," he pleaded, "is that just to the operators? It does not seem to me that it is . . . and I think we might as well fight this proposition out, with the consent of the Governor, right now. That the proper man to settle grievances is the superintendent of the mines and not a committee of the men."

Ammons chose instead to direct the conversation back toward the enforcement of state law. He even asked the operators to guarantee striking miners their old places unless they had been convicted of a crime. But it was all for naught. Both miners and operators resolutely returned to the intractable issue of union recognition, with the operators restating their opposition to the United Mine Workers and the colliers reiterating their belief that only through a union could they educate green men, settle grievances, and uphold the miners' self-determined laws of safety and mutualism.

As the talks dragged on past midnight, the governor foolishly convinced himself that he had brokered a settlement on every count but union recognition. Late in the talks, Ammons asked the three colliers what they would advise their fellow strikers back in the southern fields to do. "In going back to the mine," Allison responded, "we, as the men, want the Union to begin with, the pit committees, and the recognition of the Union, *you may call it the United Mine Workers of America,* but we want the recognition of the Union." Brown's instant, unequivocal response summed up the sentiments of every major mining corporation in the southern field: "And that you will never get."[61]

Evans was loath to let the matter rest there. "You gentlemen seem to be so fair and, if you are sincere, what objection would you have to drawing a contract so we could go on in peace?" "You have had ten years of peace," Welborn shot back, "at very good wages." The miners surely disagreed on both counts: their wages were certainly competitive, but hardly "very good." As for Welborn's "ten years of peace," most mining families had probably experienced it as a decade of almost ceaseless worry, danger, and repression. "We are in no position without an organization to defend ourselves," Evans tried to explain to the governor. "We are at the mercy of them."

With the talks once again nearing collapse, Ammons desperately tried

to save the day. "After listening to this conference," the governor declared, "there are still less differences than I imagined; there appears to be only one question apparently insurmountable." The governor's optimistic declaration betrayed his utter inability to grasp why this "one question" of unionization mattered to mineworkers. "Let's forget that there has been a past," the uncomprehending governor had pleaded earlier in the day, "and say that you have a lot of mines that you want to operate and here are some men that want to work in them; now, then on what terms can we make an arrangement to take up that work?" The strikers, however, refused to forget the histories that had carried them into this conflict, nor would they forsake unionism, which offered a counterweight to danger and disaster belowground and the operators' campaign of prophylaxis on the surface.

The joint conference represented the first and last time strikers and mine operators would face each other across the negotiating table. The colliers had articulated their discontent and traced its roots to decades of pent-up frustration. The operators, though conceding many of the facts and some of the logic on which the strikers' case rested, still refused to give a single inch. Ammons, meanwhile, seemed to have ignored or misunderstood practically every point the miners had tried to make. Following the talks, he drafted a settlement proposal taken almost entirely from Welborn's letter of November 5—a proposal that obligated the coal companies only to follow existing state laws.

When miners at mass meetings in the southern fields refused to approve the governor's settlement, the real tragedy of the joint conference became apparent. In a letter to the Rockefellers, Welborn revealed the operators' ruse. "We reached no direct understanding," Welborn wrote of the conference. "In fact we wanted none. . . . Nevertheless, the conference accomplished a great deal of good as it convinced the Governor that the grievance [*sic*] of the men were of a trivial character and that we had already granted, even before demanded and before the strike was called, everything that the men had a right to ask or strike for."[62]

The companies had fooled the gullible governor. Ammons, vexed by the miners' rejection of his proposed settlement, issued new orders to the National Guard. At the governor's behest, General Chase stepped up arrests of strike leaders and held most without formal civil charges until special military tribunals could interrogate and try them. He also issued a new directive, General Order 17, that made it easier for coal companies to import strikebreakers. "Those acquainted with inside conditions in the strike zone," the *Denver Post* reported, "say that many of the soldiers sympathize with the strikers. For this reason, in some districts, it is said, the strikers have been given material assistance in the way of keeping non-union men out of the mines. In other districts, it is equally certain that the mine owners have been favored to the extent that men who desired to go to the mines to work were afforded protection." Ammons's order "clarified the military atmosphere materially." "All men who desire to work in the mines," it directed, "shall be afforded protection provided they have knowledge that a strike is in progress and are familiar with working conditions."[63]

The new policy proved decisive. Back in September, a Denver newspaper had carried a headline that must have sent a chill down many readers' spines: "Coal Famine Is Near Because of Strike." Yet despite the crucial winter upsurge in demand for domestic coal, no fuel famine developed. Railroads hauled in supplies from other coalfields in Colorado and neighboring states, as well as from a few unionized mines in the southern fields; coal companies and railroads also diverted shipments from industrial users to domestic consumers. Far more ominously for the strikers, Ammons's new orders to the militia brought an influx of strikebreakers into the mines. In a portent of things to come, National Guardsmen at Ludlow enacted the new policy by dispersing "a crowd of more than 100 women and children, armed with clubs and stones gathered at the station" to attack a trainload of scabs. As state troops helped coal companies escape the labor shortage—and hence the fuel blockade—on which the strikers' cause turned, the operators gained the upper hand. By early December, U.S. courts were indicting union leaders for conspiracy to restrain trade, while Welborn was reporting that Colorado Fuel and Iron had "fair forces" at work in some mines and "all of the men that they can now employ" in others. Later that month, Bowers informed Rockefeller in New York: "We now have in the southern fields all the miners that we can use to supply the mills, coke ovens, railroads and the probable limited demand for domestic and other purposes from now on."[64]

The operators may not have known "what was going on" in the mines they owned. But they were astute enough to take advantage of a governor who had

ridden the labor vote to the statehouse. And so far from answering the *Rocky Mountain News*'s plea to return the dogs of industrial war to their kennels, the joint conference instead unleashed them.

In Dubious Battle

The strikers felt the tide turning against them—felt it pulling them back out from the hopeful shore into a sea of despair. If the ebb of events seemed to have them in its grip, however, this did not necessarily foreclose the possibility that things might turn again. The mood of defiance in the tent colonies and open towns dissipated as winter descended.

The cautious welcome extended to state militiamen in late October had become but a faint memory; hostility now governed virtually any encounter between guardsmen and strikers. Especially outrageous in the eyes of miners and their many sympathizers around the nation was Chase's order in early January that Mother Jones, now in her eighties, be escorted past the state line. The militia also arrested dozens of other strikers and union leaders and held them without trial or even formal charges until a special military commission could hear their cases. No pretense of neutrality remained. Colorado Fuel and Iron automobiles were frequently seen parked outside the adjutant general's headquarters at the Columbian Hotel in Trinidad. Company officials openly participated in the militia's interrogations of strikers, while elsewhere in the strike zone regular militiamen, who were more interested in returning home than in serving as the mailed fist of corporate power, elected to muster out of the National Guard, only to be replaced by company gunmen.[65]

Once capital and the state had joined forces against them, union leaders lost faith that they could win the strike without carrying the fight beyond Colorado. Sympathetic congressmen such as Colorado's Edward Keating, a stanch supporter of organized labor, and Maryland's David Lewis, a Welsh-born former collier whose moving oration on the miners' "privations" silenced all opposition, authorized a federal investigation. The resulting inquiry, which was conducted by the House Subcommittee on Mines and Mining and entailed four weeks of hearings in Denver, Walsenburg, and

7.4. Speakers at Ludlow. Denver Public Library, Western History Collection, X-60372.

Trinidad between February and March 1914, was widely covered in the national press, as was the testimony by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., before the subcommittee in Washington, D.C., in early April. His ability to express "the views which I entertain, and which have been drilled into him from his earliest childhood," said John D. Rockefeller, Sr., so pleased him that he promptly gave his son ten thousand shares in Colorado Fuel and Iron. In truth, though, neither the union nor the operators emerged from the hearings looking very good. The complexity and violence of the conflict, combined with the subcommittee's lack of real power, stymied the union's efforts to enlist federal authority to intervene on the strikers' behalf.[66]

As the investigations unfolded, peace, strangely enough, seemed to be in the ascendant. Militiamen and strikers had engaged in many heated exchanges in December and January. After Chase and his men attacked a women's march in Trinidad, however, the violence began to abate. By late February, the budget-conscious Governor Ammons tried to stanch the hemorrhaging of funds from the state treasury by withdrawing all but two hun-

dred militiamen from the strike zone. A few weeks later, the governor announced that the state would soon pull out of the coalfields altogether and return authority to civil officials.[67]

In retrospect, of course, these outward signs of calm portended a storm—the open warfare so long feared. The first sign of renewed trouble occurred at the union tent colony erected outside Forbes. Chase reported to Woodrow Wilson that on March 8, "a non-union miner was atrociously murdered near" there. Two days later, Chase's men rode through the colony, rounding up and imprisoning all sixteen men in the camp and destroying every tent, "to forestall further outlawry." Emma Zanetell, whose home had been dynamited by antiunion men in 1894 after her father joined the men marching from Sopris to Rouse, was turned out of her tent-home into the sleet and snow, where her newborn twin babies sickened and died. In response to such outrages, the president of the Globe Detective Agency informed the governor, union men were assembling revolvers, rifles, and ammunition, while many "Baldwin-Felts men [had] been recruited into the [militia] service." He reckoned, "Unless all signs fail, a reign of terror can be expected." By early April, a militia officer reported from the strike zone, "Things are in an awful mess here." As Kenehan blocked funds and the coal companies scrambled to pay the militia's tab, soldiers were left "ragged, dirty an[d] with only a few nickels left after paying their bills, or as much of them as they could. It is a terrible disgrace to the state of Colorado."[68]

Hardly one to notice which way the wind was blowing, Governor Ammons ignored all evidence of the impending crisis and withdrew most of the remaining militiamen from the strike zone. By April 17 the only troops remaining on active duty in the southern fields comprised thirty-four members of Lieutenant Karl Linderfelt's Company B (organized just three days earlier and heavily manned by "mine guards, pit bosses, clerks, engineers, and foremen employed by the CFI and Victor-American"), along with Company E (a somewhat larger contingent from Walsenburg whose members were virtually all "employed in and about the mines").[69]

While Bowers assured the Rockefellers that the strike was "wearing itself out," strikers in the tent colonies and open towns were growing restive. Many strikers interpreted the withdrawal of the regular militia and the mustering in of mine guards as ominous. They had long dreaded a concerted campaign

by companies and the state to wipe Ludlow and its fellow tent colonies from the southern Colorado landscape. Meanwhile, company officials and the skeleton force of state troops that remained in the strike zone looked to the future with a corresponding and equally intense fear that the strikers would soon try to capitalize on the withdrawal of the National Guard. The strikers not only vastly outnumbered the militiamen but were widely known to count among them many combat veterans. If they launched an all-out offensive, it could leave both the collieries and the closed camps in ruins.[70]

It was a formula for disaster: two armies preparing for a battle that both had come to perceive as inevitable. In this context of pervasive paranoia, threat and counterthreat, any enemy movement seemed to presage a full-blown assault. Both sides had carried out beatings and murders over the previous seven months and exchanged tit for tat in the frequent skirmishing around Ludlow, Forbes, and other colonies. By mid-April the death toll for the strike had edged toward thirty. As the spring sun dawned at Ludlow on April 20, the actions of the Colorado National Guard and the strikers' armies alike triggered mutual suspicion. The day of reckoning was at hand, virtually everyone concluded. All it took was one gunshot to ignite the powder keg.[71]

The details of what happened next are in dispute. The confusion that characterizes any battle, the irregular makeup of both fighting contingents, the weak chain of command in each, the absence of neutral witnesses, the partisan worldviews of two sides staring past each other, the yawning gulf of hatred and misunderstanding that separated them—these and other complications make it foolish to think that we can know with any certainty what actually occurred on April 20.

This admission does not imply, however, that all stories about Ludlow deserve equal credence. Few major events in American history seem so shrouded in misconceptions, harbored not only by the general public but even by esteemed scholars. And so the lack of clarity in the historical record notwithstanding, it behooves us to review the broad outlines of the fighting. Militia officers met with Louis Tikas in the morning. In John Lawson's absence, Tikas was in command of the colony; the National Guard turned to him when a woman made the claim that her husband was being held against his will in the colony. As Tikas talked with Major Patrick Hamrock, strikers began to mill about in a manner that Hamrock found worrisome. At the same

juncture, other militiamen were moving into positions that raised the strikers' fears. A single mysterious shot then sent the entire southern fields into chaos.[72]

Within an instant, a morning that had begun like many others dissolved into disaster. Several hours of fighting ensued, during which both sides brought in reinforcements. Male strikers headed down the arroyo leading away from the colony, seeking to draw the guardsmen's fire away from Ludlow. This tragically ill-conceived effort to protect the women and children still remaining in the colony instead left the camp at the National Guard's mercy.[73]

Miners alleged that their opponents were using exploding bullets; whatever the ammunition, state troops raked the colony with machine-gun and rifle fire. Militiamen claimed that John Lawson had unloaded cases of weapons when he reached the colony by automobile around eleven in the morning; wherever they had procured their guns, the strikers certainly brought plenty of firepower to bear—more than might have been expected, given the repeated complaints unionists had made over the preceding months regarding the National Guard's uneven application of the governor's disarmament order.[74]

Several men and boys died over the course of the day: Frank Snyder, the twelve-year-old who emerged from his family's hiding place; Private Alfred Martin, the sole militiaman to die that day, whose body strikers allegedly mutilated; Primo Larese, an unfortunate onlooker; and a few others. But there is little reason Ludlow would have achieved such infamy if not for a turn of events no one could have anticipated. As militiamen descended on the colony in the late afternoon, the tent city erupted in flames. The cause of the fire, like the identity of the first shooter, remains a matter of speculation. In one story, militiamen descended upon Ludlow and put it to the torch; in another, bullets—in some versions, the strikers', in others the guardsmen's—ignited stores of ammunition and explosives that union leaders had cached in the colony. There is little doubt, though, about the culpability of Karl Linderfelt and other militiamen in the death of Louis Tikas: they shot him in the back after Linderfelt smashed a rifle butt over his head.[75]

With the colony in ruins, Ludlow's leader slain, its inhabitants driven

from their homes for the second time in seven months, and the dead on the strikers' side outnumbering those of their foes eighteen to one, it appeared to be a decisive victory for the state and its corporate allies. But it was hardly the end of the road for the strikers. They had an immense advantage in numbers and superior knowledge of both the coalfield landscape and guerrilla tactics. Most important of all, the desire for revenge now burned as fearsomely as the flames that had reduced the tent colony to ash. Ludlow was a massacre, but it was also a battle—the opening battle in a war the strikers had every intention of winning.

The Power of the Match

The designation "massacre" would appear to refer to a horrible but finite act of violence, yet the fighting at Ludlow unleashed further fusillades of words and weapons. "The flame of war which was lighted at Ludlow," a *Rocky Mountain News* editorial lamented, "has not stopped there." A journalist, Clara Ruth Mozzer, reported from the coalfields five days after the outbreak of fighting at Ludlow, "In this country, where the grim spirit of death stalks and prowls, there is nothing unbiased, nothing impartial. Everyone is sitting on one side of the fence or the other, there is no straddling."[76]

Company executives and militia officers explained Ludlow's destruction in time-tested rhetoric: a small group of National Guardsmen, they claimed, had occupied a vulnerable position, surrounded by a much larger force. Overwhelmingly composed of "ignorant foreigners," particularly Greek veterans of the Balkan Wars, this bloodthirsty throng had set out on the morning of April 20 to launch a full-fledged union offensive. Guardsmen had returned fire to protect their own lives and those of their fellows, killing some of the attackers and a few unfortunate bystanders. After many hours of shooting, a guardsman's bullet had accidentally ignited ammunition that strikers were keeping in the colony against the governor's order (another version of the story maintained that a stove had exploded). After the dry canvas tents of Ludlow had gone up in flames, the valiant men of the National Guard risked their lives to save any strikers who remained in the colony. As for the dead women and children later found lying in what journalists melodramatically



7.1. The Great Coalfield War.

called the Black Hole of Ludlow, they had died well before the fire began, victims of the careless miners responsible for packing them into a tiny, unventilated cellar.[77]

Major Edward Boughton, a Cripple Creek mining attorney and counsel for the Colorado National Guard, become the most ardent proponent of such stories. With the Rockefeller family's assistance, Boughton—whom strikers described as "insane" and his fellow officers as "incompetent and dead beat"—embarked on a speaking tour that took him to Boston, Chicago, New York, and elsewhere. The major summarized the view from his side of the fence before the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations on May 27: "There was no such thing as the Ludlow massacre," he declared. "Nobody was massacred at Ludlow. Nobody was killed at Ludlow in the tent colony or burned, with the one exception of a small child by the name of Snyder, who during the day . . . had faced toward the arroyo for a private purpose, and was shot in the forehead from the direction of the position of the tent colonist combatants."[78]

The miners and their allies saw the attack on Ludlow from a very different perspective. In their eyes, it represented the outcome of a deliberate plan to strike at the heart of their movement, the colony that John C. Osgood had termed "the center of devilment." It was many days before the strikers could come up with an accurate body count, for the militia cordoned off the site and forbade unauthorized people to survey the scene. Through their field glasses, though, strikers believed they could make out several contorted bodies among the ruins of the colony. Union officials estimated that the militia had killed between forty-five and sixty-six strikers; union leaders even accused militiamen of incinerating dozens of bodies on pyres at the tent colony as well as in the coke ovens of Tabasco, Hastings, and other closed camps in the canyons above Ludlow.[79]

A gunfight that strikers might have perceived as a battle became something altogether different: "'the most terrible massacre in American industrial history,'" as a United Mine Workers circular dated April 22 proclaimed. The *Denver Times* asserted: "The entire state, sympathizers and non-sympathizers alike, is aroused as never before at the slaughter of innocent children and defenseless women."[80]

For many colliers, the striking miners' failure to protect the women and

children of the Ludlow colony called into question their masculinity. "The fact that women and children were killed in the Ludlow tent colony," declared the *Florence Daily Citizen,* "has caused the greatest indignity." The deaths of fellow workmen in mine accidents and strike-related violence had already done much to fuel the miners' ire; that a still-unknown number of "women and children were made the targets," as a Denver journalist phrased it, "of modern warfare" only deepened the miners' need to reclaim their sense of manhood.[81]

Strike leaders and tent colony captains sought to channel the mood among the rank and file of mourning, anger, and injured masculinity into a concerted military response. The result was a campaign of retributive violence, in which seven months of civil unrest and almost half a century of labor-management tumult at last came to a head. For ten days, the mineworkers of southern Colorado engaged in the fiercest, deadliest labor uprising since the Civil War.

From the moment the fighting began, the guerrillas' first priority was to safeguard the women and children in the homes of sympathetic ranch families and townspeople, at Camp San Rafael (a tent colony founded for Ludlow refugees), and in other places of refuge. Despite the significant role that women and children had assumed throughout the strike—attacking scabs, marching in union parades, and so forth—the miners now viewed the strike as a man-to-man struggle to be waged in a combat zone where women and children no longer had any place. The strikers, reinforced by local men from "all walks of life . . . : bartenders, saloonkeepers, storekeepers, businessmen, carpenters," organized themselves into battalions of between one hundred and five hundred men, then used their superior knowledge of the southern Colorado landscape to launch swift, stealthy, effective attacks.[82]

By the morning after the massacre, striking miners were already wreaking havoc throughout the strike zone. "The hills in every direction suddenly seemed to be alive with men," one witness reported. In the days ahead, miners besieged Hastings, Tabasco, Delagua, Berwind, and other camps, destroyed mine buildings and tunnels at the Empire, Royal, Green Cañon, and Primrose mines, blew up several railroad bridges, and even dynamited the retaining dam that impounded drinking water for the company towns above Ludlow. As small forces waged guerrilla war, other contingents secured arms and ammunition by breaking into company stores. One twenty-man brigade

even captured a D&RG locomotive at El Moro and took it to a junction one mile east of Ludlow, where they unloaded troops and ammunition for tent colony refugees hiding in the Black Hills. Three days after the Ludlow Massacre, the *Denver Times* proclaimed the miners to be "engaged in a war to death." As a result, "ruin lay on every hand." Clara Ruth Mozzer wrote: "Many of the strikers are in the hills without knowing whether all or some of their family are among the dead. Like animals at bay they are wild with dread."[83]

In Denver, meanwhile, a fierce debate was raging among labor leaders. A coal company spy who had infiltrated United Mine Workers headquarters reportedly overheard one Western Federation of Miners leader threatening: "These employers will be made to feel [the] potent power of the match unless they come through clean and recognize the Union, as we intend to win even if we have to reduce this State to ashes." "They fully expect," the detective alleged, "that there will be a prolonged war with Mexico [President Wilson had launched an attack on Veracruz, Mexico, on April 21, 1914] and that organized labor will make itself felt in a way never experienced before in the United States. . . . The Unions in this country will be practically united in one body and no time is to be lost in solidifying the ranks of labor." Whether such reports were apocryphal or not, the "Call to Arms" issued by the federation, the United Mine Workers, and the Colorado State Federation of Labor suggested that revolution was in the air. There is no telling what might have happened had moderate unionists failed in urging restraint.[84]

Even after United Mine Workers attorney Horace Hawkins worked out a truce with state officials, however, telegrams, telephone calls, and even personal visits from union leaders to the fighting miners failed to bring peace to the strike zone. "'We made every effort to send word to every district in Colorado that a truce was on,'" John McLennan of the Colorado State Federation of Labor told reporters shortly after his release from jail on April 25, "'and I am at a loss to understand the reported outbreaks.'" McLennan and his counterparts underestimated the challenges of communicating with scattered, highly mobile brigades without any apparent central command structure that were engaging in guerrilla campaigns, nor did strikers have any reason to believe that the militia would keep to its side of the peace agreement. Far more important, however, was the fact that the miners' armies were em-

7.5. Colorado National Guardsmen Mustering for Inspection, Las Animas County. Denver Public Library, Western History Collection, X-60565.

phatically not waging war for either the abstract principle of unionism or the United Mine Workers. Instead, they were fighting for themselves and for their families, for one another and for the dead. No agreement made in Denver could convince the strikers to lay down their arms before they had redeemed themselves and reclaimed the coalfields.[85]

"'Remember Ludlow,'" a journalist discovered, served as "the battle cry of the men who lost wives and children in Monday's slaughter of the innocents, and of their fellows whose sympathies have been stirred and who are fearful for the safety of their own loved ones. These men declare they are fighting for liberty, for freedom from oppression, and not for revenge alone." Waging what they considered the good fight, fearing with ample reason that they might be arrested, deported, or even massacred if they laid down their arms, the strikers tore through the coalfields. Rumors located improbable numbers of them seemingly everywhere, but the devastation they wrought was real enough. By the time the fighting stopped after the destruction of the closed camp at Forbes and other skirmishes in several parts of the strike zone, the strikers had killed more than thirty strikebreakers, mine guards, and militia-



7.6. Funeral Procession for Louis Tikas, April 27, 1914. Photograph by Lewis R. Dold. Denver Public Library, Western History Collection, X-60441.

men, destroyed six mines, and laid Forbes and parts of other company properties to waste, all while suffering only a handful of casualties.[86]

Let Us Forget for Once That We Are Ladies

Peace came only because of the intercession of two outside forces. The first, a "silent army of 1,000 women"—"women with babes in arms, white haired women whose eyes were dimmed by age, working women, women from Capitol hill, women of all classes and all ages"—marched on the Colorado capitol on April 25, beseeching the governor, "as mothers and citizens of the state, that he end the warfare raging in the southern coal fields before more innocent blood is shed." March organizer and Denver socialite Dora Phelps Buell explained the women's strategy to a reporter. "This is not a time to be ladylike. For heaven's sake, let us forget for once that we are ladies. Let us be women. If militancy is needed to compel the governor to accede to our de-

mands, let us then resort to militancy. Women should not be ashamed to be militant if that is the only way they can stop so uncivilized a condition of affairs as that which prevails in the strike district." Buell planned to compel the governor to "remember the women and children of Ludlow." She added, "Remember that the people of the state are aroused. Remember you are their servant and they have the power to command you to do their will." She intended to warn Ammons: "Unless the morning's gathering of women receive satisfactory assurances . . . his office may be crowded night and day with women who will constantly repeat their demands to him. They will pester him to death and defy him or anyone else to remove them."[87]

Once Buell and the others had reached the capitol, Alma Lafferty, president of the Women's Peace Organization, "mounted the stairway and called the meeting to order. 'We are here on a very serious business,' she shouted above the commotion which came from the shuffling of feet. 'We will wait on the governor and see that he put a stop to this warfare.'" Lafferty proclaimed: "'We are not going to abuse the governor, but we do not want civil war in Colorado. . . . Be dignified and quiet and show the people of this country that we are in earnest.'" Ammons sent his doorman to inform the women that the governor could not meet with them because his chambers were not sufficiently spacious to accommodate them all. Shrugging off his lame excuse, the women decided that if Ammons's rooms would not fit them, the house legislative chambers certainly could. Then they "turned and began to surge up the stairway toward the house."[88]

The governor tried to ignore and outlast the women. Far from losing heart, though, they "kept their vigil," launching into "'the Battle Hymn of the Republic,' 'John Brown's Body,' 'Onward Christian Soldiers' and 'Nearer, My God, to Thee'" whenever their resolve began to flag. Speeches by march leaders did even more to rally the crowd's spirits. "'Women, we are making history,'" Buell declared, "'Stay on.' 'We will!' they cried back." The entire day passed. Nonplussed, Lafferty's committee remained "on the job, tired-eyed but cheerful. All day it had followed [Ammons] like a Nemesis." In response to Lieutenant Governor Fitzgarrald's efforts to persuade the women that they would do better to leave Ammons alone, Evangeline Heartz, another prominent member of the committee, "pointed her finger at Fitzgarrald" and implored him to remember that "'the women of Denver are gathered upstairs. They want to see Governor Ammons and they will see him. Do you hear?'"[89]

What happened next, one newspaper proclaimed, would surely "go down in history as one of the most remarkable demonstrations by women which ever took place in this country." In "an assemblage that gave equal suffrage a new meaning," a delegation of marchers led by Lafferty met with Ammons in his office and "demanded" that he "at once dictate a telegram to President Wilson calling for federal intervention in Colorado's industrial strife." Ammons then entered the assembly chambers, to the applause of the women gathered there. Lafferty assured him, "We, representing the women of Denver, are here today on a peaceful mission. We do not intend to take sides in this terrible strife in Colorado. All we want is for this warfare in our state to cease, and we are here in the name of the women and children to demand that you end it."[90]

Ammons, his face "drawn and haggard from worry and loss of sleep" and "every muscle in his body twitch[ing]," spoke next. The governor said that he had been in touch with Washington. But the White House, he claimed, was preoccupied with Mexican affairs: Wilson's attack on Veracruz earlier in the week had prompted a diplomatic crisis. Spurred on by the women's entreaties, though, Ammons decided to send another plea to Wilson. "Where men had failed," the *Denver Times* approvingly concluded, women "succeeded," a triumph that "did more to prove the worth of women as voters and as citizens—did more to prove their right to equal suffrage with men—than any movement heretofore chronicled in history. . . . They, the women, decided to act and to let their actions speak for themselves. The women wanted something and, quite after the fashion of women, they ACTED and GOT WHAT THEY DEMANDED."[91]

The president responded on April 28 by dispatching a second major agent of peace, the U.S. Army. As federal troops rushed to the coalfields in compliance with Wilson's orders, the final spasms of unrest shook the region. The deadliest attack was the assault on Forbes (with which this book began), but the strikers' battalions were busy elsewhere, too, trying to inflict as much damage as they could before the U.S. Army interceded. Why the miners balked at taking on federal troops is not entirely clear—indeed, army officers

remained watchful for signs of further trouble—but war weariness and the commonsense calculation that they had nothing to gain and everything to lose by fighting the regular army were probably the decisive factors. And so nine days after gunfire erupted at Ludlow, dispatches from the strike zone at last reported, "Everything quiet."[92]

Requiem

Most strikers probably welcomed the peace. Yet as a war of annihilation turned into a war of attrition, the miners watched their prospect of victory slip away. Already out of work for eight months and barely scraping by on strike relief, mineworkers lacked the financial wherewithal to outlast deep-pocketed coal companies. Colorado Fuel and Iron alone could boast that it had $5.6 million cash on hand, massive reserves that it had skimmed from the bounty of the earth and the sweat of miners' brows.[93]

Secretary of War Lindley Garrison explained the army's approach: "What we wish to do is to preserve as nearly as we possibly can an impartial attitude." When compared with the Colorado militia, the army did indeed remain largely neutral—with one big exception: they paved the way for hundreds, then thousands, of nonunion men to enter the mines, and therefore to break the strike. "Of course, our first duty is to maintain public order," Garrison declared. "Our second purpose should be to restore conditions as nearly as possible to those of normality"—in other words, to the prestrike situation of corporate control over mine workscapes and the new company towns. Federal troops prohibited the importation of strikebreakers, but they refused to intervene when men arrived at the mines seeking work. To exploit this enormous loophole, the operators not only began in mid-May to place want ads listing job openings in the mines, but probably offered prospective mineworkers train fare to the collieries. Though army officers refused to permit hundreds of workers secured in this manner to start working, production figures nonetheless demonstrate the companies' ability to reman most of their mines. By July, output at Colorado Fuel and Iron pits had returned to roughly 70 percent of their prestrike levels.[94]

Meanwhile, out-of-work miners and their families began to feel the pinch of poverty. "The strikers are about out of money," one officer wrote from Williamsburg, "and cannot much longer maintain the present status. They want to go to work. If any way could be opened to them, of letting them down easy, they might possibly take advantage of it." Jesse Welborn informed Rockefeller headquarters in August, "All of the reports that have come to us from confidential sources during the past few weeks indicate a growing dissatisfaction on the part of all the strikers, and threats have been made by many (some of which have been put into execution) to return to work." He believed it "not improbable" that strike benefits would be "withdrawn or materially reduced," a move that would leave most mining families with little choice but to abandon the strike. As the executive suspected, the union's finances were faltering. Increasingly skeptical that the Colorado strike had any prospect of success, the United Mine Workers' national leadership sought an honorable conclusion to the conflict. But the operators, unyielding to the end, remained as insistent as ever that they would not negotiate with the union.[95]

With the strike in shambles and the strikers in despair, Colorado's coal mine workers held another convention in early December 1914. This time, no brass band or chorus preceded the delegates into the hall; no army of "sympathizers" marched behind. Instead, two hundred representatives, exhausted from fifteen months on strike, straggled into a Denver meeting place. After brief speeches by Frank Hayes, Mother Jones, John Lawson, and others, they considered a proposal from the international board. The proposal emphasized the hardships the strikers were enduring, the sacrifices they had made, and the organization's conviction that Woodrow Wilson's labor-friendly administration would use federal power to force the operators to settle the dispute fairly.

The president's plan to appoint a commission charged with resolving the Colorado coalfield war had precipitated the Pueblo convention and gave the United Mine Workers leadership the opening it needed to seek an end to a costly struggle it could no longer win. "'In view of this urgent request,'" read the union's recommendation to the Denver delegates, "'we deem it the part of wisdom to accept his suggestion and to terminate the strike.'" In a carefully worded statement, the union declared that it was

> doing the best thing possible for the men on strike who have suffered so long in order that justice might be done. We have spent an enormous

amount of money in waging this struggle for justice and fair play in the mining fields of Colorado, but have felt that it was spent in as noble a cause as it was ever given to man to espouse. We are not unmindful of the heroic struggle waged by the miners of Colorado since the strike began. It is with feelings of pain and sorrow that we recall the massacre of our men, women and children at Ludlow.

Making no mention of the Ten Days' War that followed, the union pronounced "the sacrifices made, the privations endured" over the past fifteen months "without a parallel in the history of the labor struggles of America. Only those who have suffered grievous wrongs," the proposal concluded, "could endure such a prolonged conflict. All lovers of liberty and believers in fair play between man and man must admire the heroic struggle of the Colorado miners against the great wealth and influence of Rockefeller and his associations." Union leaders asserted their own belief: "Our people have not died in vain and . . . the battle they have waged against such tremendous odds has aroused the conscience of the nation." They also made a prediction: "Out of the martyrdom of our people will come the dawn of a better day for the suffering miners and their families in the coal fields of Colorado."

Studiously avoiding any mention of the forty or so lives the strikers had taken in the course of the coalfield war, the union asserted that it had made "every overture for peace since the beginning of this conflict . . . only to be ridiculed, and in the end thirty-five of our men, women and children were murdered before the people of the nation came to understand that the coal strike in Colorado was not a local or a state issue, but a national issue of vital importance, involving civic as well as industrial rights." President Wilson's "appointment of a permanent presidential commission of fair-minded men" would ensure a new order:

that the old-time oppression and tyranny will be no more and that public opinion will compel the large operators of Colorado to deal justly with our people. We recognize no surrender and shall continue to propagate the principles of our humanitarian movement thruout the coal fields of Colorado. We advise all men to seek their former places in the mines and those who are refused employment we shall render assistance to the best of our ability, and shall provide every legal protection to those of our members who are being persecuted by the hirelings of organized greed.[96]

With this proposal to call off the strike, the debate began. Miners from the northern fields favored continuing the struggle; those from the south "were a unit in standing by the executive board which had made the startling and unlooked-for proposition to call off the fight." After twelve hours of discussion, the northern delegates decided to relent. Like the vote that had authorized the southern colliers' strike fifteen months earlier, this vote was unanimous.[97]

"The first intimation the outside world had of the settlement of this most titanic of labor struggles," the *Denver News* reported, "came when a burst of song floated thru the closed door of the convention hall." The newspaper correspondents waiting outside "straightened up and listened. The music was 'Shouting the Battle Cry of Freedom.'" The words, of course, were those of "The Colorado Strike Song." The very tune that had fortified the miners' resolve at Castle Hall back in September 1913 now echoed mournfully. "The delegates were all singing lustily. Men from the northern and southern fields stood up and joined hands and sang, and the tears rolled down the faces of some of them. Verse after verse of the song, with words written by miners themselves, peeled [*sic*] forth." From the dais, "the officers of the executive board and of the district union joined in the song, tho plainly they were almost breaking under the nervous strain." The strike was over.[98]

The fifteen-month struggle had proved costly, by any measure. In addition to the property destroyed in the course of Ludlow and the Ten Days' War and the dozens of lives lost, the principal adversaries had poured huge sums into the conflict. The Associated Press estimated the total financial toll of the strike as "approximately $18,000,000," and though this figure seems inflated, Colorado Fuel and Iron had lost over $1.6 million in the course of the strike, the United Mine Workers had spent $870,000, and many millions more were lost by other coal companies, the state and federal governments, striking mining families, and steelworkers laid off at the Pueblo mills because of a lack of fuel. Other losses defy easy accounting. The strike and massacre had sullied reputations, displaced thousands from their longtime homes, bit-

terly divided coal-mining communities, shut hundreds of miners out of the hard jobs they nonetheless cherished, and created gaping voids in the lives of all those who had lost loved ones.[99]

All these losses notwithstanding, the workers' movement that momentarily threatened to assume revolutionary dimensions had failed to reform either the mine workscapes or the company towns, which together bore responsibility for fomenting decades of industrial struggle in the southern coalfields. The Rockefeller Plan, a company union subsequently created by William Lyon Mackenzie King at the behest of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., enabled Colorado Fuel and Iron mineworkers to present grievances to local officials. The Rockefellers also tried to rectify some of the worst excesses of the closed camps. Yet like John Osgood and William Palmer before them, the Rockefellers held to a vision of Western industrialism that left workers no real place on the land.[100]

Epilogue

When the southern Colorado colliers went on strike in 1919, 1921, and 1922 under the United Mine Workers, and again in 1927 in a dispute involving the more radical Industrial Workers of the World, they ensured that the Great Coalfield War would mark not the endpoint of class conflict in the region, but rather the most dramatic moment in an ongoing history of struggle that carried on through the New Deal. Memories of the massacre continued to loom large, informing the Rockefeller Plan, inspiring the state to create a board of labor arbitration, and steeling the American labor movement in its fight to secure the rights for which the martyrs of Ludlow had given their lives. In different ways and to varying degrees, each of these uses of the past—enlisting the history of the coalfield war in the politics that corporations, unions, and the state adopted to champion their respective interests—cut the events of April 20, 1914, off both from their deep context of nearly half a century of contentious relationships between workers, capitalists, and the natural world and from the ensuing workers' uprising, which still remains the most violent American labor rebellion of the postemancipation era.[1]

As acts of remembering and forgetting were continually reshaping the meaning of Ludlow, the mineral-intensive energy economy was changing in ways that would have ominous consequences for mining families and mining companies alike. Coal production peaked during World War I, then went

tancy was made by William Palmer in undated notes under heading "Coal Mining," c. 1856, folder 222, box 3, WJPP-CHS; and W. J. P., "Underground Walks in England, No. 6," *Miners' Journal,* Oct. 27, 1855.

55. *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Jan. 15, 1910; unidentified clipping, Nov. 23, 1910, scrapbook 87, JFW Papers; *Denver Republican,* Nov. 25, 1910; *Third Biennial Report of the State Inspector of Coal Mines of the State of Colorado, for the Years of 1887–88* (Denver: Collier and Cleaveland, 1889), 43–56.

56. *Third Biennial Report of the State Inspector of Coal Mines,* 28–31.

57. *Eleventh Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines,* 108–109; Dr. L. G. Clark, testimony in Sunshine Mine inquest, 29; *Tenth Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines,* 66; 108; *Seventh Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines,* 57; *Twelfth Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines,* 10, 84–87, 109; *Thirteenth Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines,* 84–87.

58. Harry Bailey, testimony in Sunshine Mine inquest, 28; *Denver News,* May 21, 1907.

59. On rescue cars and crews, see *Report of the Medical & Sociological Departments of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company 1909–1910* (n.p.: n.p., 1910); president's remarks, Dec. 2, 1910, Minutes of Executive Committee Meetings; *Report of the Medical & Sociological Departments of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company 1913–1914* (Pueblo, Colo.: Franklin, 1914), 31, 33–35, 39.

60. *Eleventh Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines,* 108. On afterdamp and rescuers, see Feb. 15, 1911, "In the matter of the bodies of Joe Malich, Jon Freish, Ludwig Klapach, Karl Francis, Andy Kanovski, and eleven other miners," coroner's inquest, LACC; National Funeral Register, 1:578–579, Trinidad City Library, Trinidad, Colo.

61. Pete Gerglich interview, Feb. 7, 1978, transcript in box 10, EM, p. 17. Four weeks after the Primero disaster, only sixty-eight of seventy-five bodies had been recovered. *Denver Post,* Feb. 28, 1910. On another disaster in which one body was believed to have been buried in the mine, see *Denver Times,* Mar. 1, 1906.

62. Glen Aultman interview, June 26, 1978, transcript in box 7, EM, tape 2, p. 2.

63. For antiworker allegations, see LaMont Montgomery Bowers to Fred T. Gates, Feb. 1 and Oct. 10, 1910, folder 190, box 21, CF&I-RAC; LaMont Montgomery Bowers to Starr Murphy, Nov. 7. 1910, folder 84, box 27, LMB Papers, University of Binghamton Special Collections, Binghamton, N.Y. For union accusations, see *Denver Post,* Feb. 21 and 28, 1910, and Feb. 17, 1911; *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Nov. 21, 1910. For a mixed decision, see *Eleventh Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines,* 112–113. For a finding of company neglect, see *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Dec. 1, 1910. On assumption of risk, see *Thirteenth Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines,* 91.

64. *Seventh Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines,* 52–53; B. L. Davis testimony, Sunshine Mine inquest, 16 (emphasis added); *Thirteenth Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines,* 86.

65. Quoted in *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Nov. 23, 1910. The jury remained unconvinced and found the company at fault for gross negligence. *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Dec. 1, 1910. On New Castle, see *Third Biennial Report of the State Inspector of Coal Mines,* 32. By the 1880s William Galloway had demonstrated coal dust's explosive qualities through a series of experiments in Britain. The Colorado mine inspector in 1893 criticized those who still doubted these findings. A Western coal miner declared in 1901, "It has proven time and again that coal dust will explode without the aid of gas or carbonic hydrogen." Moss, *Gases, Dust and Heat in Mines,* 72–74; "Report of Coal Mine Accident, King, Park County, Colorado, Jan. 10, 1893," folder 14, box 26693, Governor Alva Adams Papers, CSA; "Black Diamond" (pseud.), "Coal Mining and Explosions in Mines of Western States," *United Mine Workers Journal,* Mar. 14, 1901. Officials of the CF&I might have turned to Beard's 1908 textbook, which shows that doubt persisted. Beard, *Mine Gases and Explosions,* 162–174.

66. *Denver Tribune,* Jan. 26, 1884, p. 1; *White Pine (Colo.) Cone,* Feb. 1, 1884, quoting the *Gunnison News-Democrat,* Jan. 27, 1884, extra ed.

67. *Denver Tribune,* Jan. 26 and 28, 1884; *Gunnison Review-Press,* Jan. 25, 1884.

68. *Gunnison Review-Press,* Jan. 25, 1884; *Denver Tribune,* Jan. 27 and 28, 1884; *Leadville Herald,* Jan. 29, 1884. For more, on other colliers seen as suspect, see *Denver Tribune,* Jan. 29, 1884.

69. *Leadville Herald,* Jan. 26, 1884; *Denver Tribune,* Jan. 27, 1884. Reporters took pains to point out that the Mollies' dispute with Gibson antedated the disaster. On the demise of the Mollies, see Kevin Kenny, *Making Sense of the Molly Maguires* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). David Wolff argues that Denver newspapers had started labeling strike violence Molly Maguirism in the 1870s because they were "unwilling to accept the notion that local miners could do such damage." David A. Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies: Growth, Competition, and Turmoil in the Coalfields of Colorado and Wyoming, 1868–1914* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2003), 43.

70. *Denver Tribune,* Jan. 26 and 28, 1884; *Leadville Herald,* Jan. 27, 1884; Gunnison County coroner's inquest.

71. *Gunnison Review-Press,* Jan. 26 and 29, 1884; *Denver Tribune,* Jan. 28 and 30, 1884; *Colorado Springs Weekly Gazette,* Feb. 2, 1884; *Leadville Herald,* Jan. 27 and 30, 1884. Though many of the dead were foreign-born, there is no record of any bodies being sent back across the Atlantic. A plaque erected in recent years at the Jokerville mass grave lists fifty-eight of the fifty-nine dead; the fifty-ninth and unlisted name is that of Peterson the Swede, the man judged responsible for causing the disaster.

5. Out of the Depths and on to the March

1. *Rocky Mountain News,* May 29, 1894.
2. Unidentified newspaper clipping, Feb. 25, 1871, in E. O. Davis, *The First Five*

Years of the Railroad Era in Colorado (Golden, Colo.: Sage, 1948), 135; *First Report of the Colorado Coal and Iron Co.: Comprising the Sixth Report of the Central Colorado Improvement Co. and the Second Report of the Southern Colorado Coal and Town Co.* (Colorado Springs: Daily Gazette, 1880), 5–6; *Fourth Annual Report of the Colorado Coal and Iron Co.* (Colorado Springs: Daily Gazette, 1883), 9–10; David A. Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies: Growth, Competition, and Turmoil in the Coalfields of Colorado and Wyoming, 1868–1914* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2003), 24–25.

3. Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies,* 74, 88–95; *United Mine Workers Journal,* quoted ibid., 130; *Sixth Annual Report of the Colorado Coal and Iron Co. for the Year Ending December 31, 1884* (New York: Mann, [1885]), 8–11; *First Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of Colorado, 1887–1888* (Denver: Collier and Cleaveland, 1888), 118–127, 139–140; Jacob Coxey, quoted in Shelton Stromquist, "The Crisis of 1894 and the Legacies of Producerism," in Richard Schneirov, Shelton Stromquist, and Nick Salvatore, eds., *The Pullman Strike and the Crisis of the 1890s: Essays on Labor and Politics* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 186.

4. Mentions of high wages during the 1850s and 1860s are legion; see Edward Bliss, *A Brief History of the New Gold Regions of Colorado Territory, together with Hints and Suggestions to Intending Emigrants* (New York: John W. Amerman, 1864), 18. For a nostalgic look back that implied that wages had subsequently dropped, see W. B. Vickers, "History of Colorado," in *History of Clear Creek and Boulder Valleys, Colorado . . .* (Chicago: O. L. Baskin, 1880).

5. Advertisement for J. G. Bearsley, *Colorado Miner* (Georgetown), Jan. 12, 1878; Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies.*

6. *Fifth Annual Report of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for the Year Ending June 30, 1897* (Denver: n.p., 1897), 9. Jesse Floyd Welborn explained to stockholders one warm January, "The weather conditions have been unfavorable for a large consumption of coal." Overly severe winter weather, however, also posed problems because it halted the flow of empty railcars to the mines. Minutes of Executive Committee, Feb. 21, 1910, and Jan. 23, 1911, box 58, JFW Papers.

7. *Sixth Annual Report of the Colorado Coal and Iron Co.,* 8–9; Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies,* 86, 149.

8. Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies,* 86; *Annual Report of the Colorado Fuel Company, for the Year Ending June 30th, 1890* (New York: n.p., 1890), 4, 9. For a defense of wage cutting in depressed times, see *Sixth Annual Report of the Colorado Coal and Iron Co.,* 8–11. Railroad freight charges constituted another sizable chunk of the retail price of coal, but mining companies faced great difficulty in trying to reduce these charges.

9. Illustrative of this closing of ranks were the advertisements for railroads, banks, mining corporations, and ASARCO, which helped foot the bill for an antiunion history of the Cripple Creek strike published just weeks after the climax of the struggle: *The Story of the World's Greatest Gold Camp: The Labor Troubles of 1903–04, Told in Prose, Poetry and Pictures by the* Cripple Creek Times (Denver: Smith-Brooks, 1904). On the railroad officials' concern over coal strikes, see [Victor Morawetz] to E. P. Ripley, Aug. 3, 1904, file 25–1, box RR 45, New York Executive Department Files, ATSF. Of John Osgood's antiunion stance, Ripley of the Santa Fe Railroad explained that though "his efforts . . . have cost us as well as him a great deal of money, . . . I am not yet prepared to say that it was not well spent." Ripley to A. F. Walker, Mar. 1, 1901, file 1–1, box RR 8.3, ibid. Labor leaders and progressives expressed harsh criticism of such collaborations; perhaps the fullest exposé is J. Warner Mills, "The Economic Struggle in Colorado," published serially in *Arena* 34 (1905), 1–10, 119–128, 248–264, 379–399, 485–495, 605–619; *Arena* 35 (1906), 150–158, 243–252, 467–476; and *Arena* 36 (1906), 375–390. For a relevant study of "bourgeois" class formation in opposition to labor, see Sven Beckert, *The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850–1896* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

10. Herbert Gutman, "The Negro and the United Mine Workers: The Career and Letters of Richard L. Davis and Something of Their Meaning, 1890–1900," in *Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America* (New York: Knopf, 1976), 173; John H. M. Laslett, *Nature's Noblemen: The Fortunes of the Independent Collier in Scotland and the American Midwest, 1855–1889* (Los Angeles: UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations, 1987). The literature on Western workers is vast; recent works that emphasize segmentation in hard-rock mining are Elizabeth Jameson, *All That Glitters: Class, Conflict, and Community in Cripple Creek* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1998); Linda Gordon, *The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); Susan Johnson, *Roaring Camp: The Social World of the California Gold Rush* (New York: Norton, 1999); Katherine A. Benton-Cohen, *Borderline Americans* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

11. For more on "knowing nature through labor," see Richard White, "Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living? Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., *Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature* (New York: Norton, 1995), 171–185; and Richard White, *The Organic Machine* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). On workers and oral history, a relevant discussion is Warren D. Anderson, "Oral History and Migrant Wage Labor: Sources of Narrative Distortion," *Oral History Review* 28 (2001): 1–20. For more on the particular interviews I draw on later, see Eric Margolis, "Western Coal Mining as a Way of Life," *Journal of the West* 24 (1985): 1–115. I also use oral histories of mineworkers in eastern Utah, a region that was geologically and culturally similar to southern Colorado; moreover, mining families moved from one of these areas to the other with some frequency.

12. Bill Lloyd interview, May 18, 1978, transcript in box 10, EM; Walter Morgan Donaldson interview, July 18, 1993, transcript in folder 13, box 1, Carbon County Oral Histories, UU, p. 4. On boys entering mines, see Alex Bisulco interview, June 27, 1978, box 8, EM, pp. 30–31; Tally Evans interview, n.d., transcript in folder 15, box 1, Carbon County

Oral Histories, UU, p. 2; Frank and Caroline Tomsic interview, June 27, 1973, transcript in South Slavs Oral History Collection, ibid., p. 3; Irma Menghini interview, n.d., transcript in HCEHP, p. 6; and *Owen Conway v. Colorado Coal & Iron Company,* filed Feb. 23, 1888, case 1322, LADC. On colliers' entering the mines in their teens, see Claude and Laurence Amicarella interview, Feb. 21, 1978, box 7, EM, vol. 1, p. 113; Tom and Susie Somsky interview, box 13, Feb. 2, 1984, n.p. See also Robert McIntosh, *Boys in the Pits: Child Labour in Coal Mines* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000).

13. On the turn, see Dan DeSantis interview, Jan. 19, 1978, EM, p. 20; Victor Bazanele interview, n.d., box 7, ibid., n.p.

14. Pete Aiello interview, Nov. 23, 1979, transcript in Carbon County Oral Histories, p. 6; White, "Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?" 179; Alex Bisulco interview, p. 10a; Don Mitchell interview, transcript in HCEHP, p. 4; International Correspondence Schools, *The Coal Miner's Handbook: A Handy Reference Book for Coal Miners, Pit Bosses, Fire Bosses, Foremen, Superintendents, Managers, Engineers, and All Persons Interested in the Subject of Coal Mining* (Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook, 1913), 203–204.

15. Walter Morgan Donaldson interview, p. 5; John Brophy, *A Miner's Life* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press), 49; Marianne Fraser, "Warm Winters and White Rabbits: Folklore of Welsh and English Coal Miners," *Utah Historical Quarterly* 51 (1983): 246–258. See also George Korson's body of work: *Black Rock: Mining Folklore of the Pennsylvania Dutch* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960); *Coal Dust on the Fiddle: Songs and Stories of the Bituminous Industry* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943); and *Minstrels of the Mine Patch: Songs and Stories of the Anthracite Industry* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938).

16. John P. Thomas, for instance, "grew to young manhood in the mines." "To the Boys John P. and Old Dave of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Co.," Apr. 8, 1922, box 3, JFW Papers.

17. Henry "Welchie" Mathias interview, July 2, 1975, transcript in box 11, EM, p. 8; Claude and Laurence Amicarella interview, vol. 2, p. 15; Tony Hungaro interview, Mar. 8, 1978, transcript in box 10, EM, p. 11.

18. The state coal inspector stated, for instance, that the Italian Joseph Vietta and the Austrian F. F. Sippe were "experienced" and "practical" miners, respectively. *Seventh Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines of the State of Colorado, 1895–1896* (Denver: Smith-Brooks, 1897), 15; *Ninth Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines of the State of Colorado, 1897–1898* (Denver: Smith-Brooks, 1901), 61.

19. *Denver Times,* Jan. 19, 1906; John McNeil, "Address to Young Men Engaged in Coal Mining," in *Proceedings of the Rocky Mountain Coal Mining Institute Fifth Semi-Annual Meeting* (n.p.: [1916]), 92; "Alumni Personals," *Colorado School of Mines Technical and Engineering Society Bulletin* 2 (1904): 54–55; L. S. Bigelow, untitled typescript report [1915?], box 25, CF&I-RAC, 66–73.

20. Tony Hungaro interview, pp. 11–13; Brophy, *Miner's Life,* 40; Tim Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (London: Routledge, 2000).

21. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage, 1966), 13; Claude and Laurence Amicarella interview, vol. 1, p. 83; Tony Hungaro interview, p. 17; Henry "Welchie" Mathias interview, p. 25; Joe Crump interview, n.d., transcript in HCEHP, p. 11; Pete Gerglich interview, Feb. 7, 1978, transcript in box 10, EM, pp. 14, 28.

22. Carter Goodrich, *The Miner's Freedom: A Study of the Working Life in a Changing Industry* (Boston: Marshall Jones, 1925); Claude and Laurence Amicarella interview, vol. 1, p. 84. For a critical assessment of the British industry, see Royden Harrison, *Independent Collier: The Coal Miner as Archetypal Proletarian* (New York: St. Martin's, 1978).

23. Victor Bazanele interview, n.p.; Dan DeSantis interview, p. 36; C. L. Baum testimony, *CCMC,* 579; *Camp and Plant* 3 (Apr. 18, 1903): 350; George Engle, "Record of Coal Cutting Machinery," Apr. 14, 1881, folder 30, box 2, CF&I-CHS. On miners' vacations, see *Camp and Plant* 4 (Aug. 1, 1903): 67. Perhaps the practice of miners' setting their hours explains why Jesse Floyd Welborn rightly anticipated little or no decrease in production when CF&I switched to an eight-hour day in 1913: Executive Committee Minutes, Feb. 24 and Apr. 21, 1913, folder 58, JFW Papers.

24. David Montgomery, *Workers' Control in America: Studies in the History of Work, Technology, and Labor Struggles* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980). On tool ownership, see Joe Perko testimony, "In the Matter of the Explosion Which Occurred at the Sunshine Mine on the Evening of Sept. 3, 1897: Testimony of Witnesses Taken at Coroner's Inquest, Held Sept. 6 and 7, 1897," folder 13, box 26948, Governor Alva Adams Papers, CSA, p. 31; *Tenth Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines of the State of Colorado, 1901–1902* (Denver: Smith-Brooks, 1903), 151.

25. Claude and Laurence Amicarella interview, vol. 1, p. 56; *Denver News,* Mar. 28, 1901; Fred Herrington to Ivy Lee, Sept. 26, 1914, folder 20, box 22, CF&I-RAC; Jesse Floyd Welborn to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Apr. 10, 1915, folder 18, JFW Papers; Victor Bazanele interview, n.p.; Alex Bisulco interview, June 27, 1978, p. 31.

26. For one of many examples in which a miner who defied orders died, see *Ninth Biennial Report of the Inspector,* 52. Whereas dozens of photographs depict hard-rock miners posing with managers and engineers in their rooms, I have not identified a single photograph of a coal mine that shows a boss or superintendent with a miner underground.

27. Mark Wyman, *Hard Rock Epic: Western Miners and the Industrial Revolution, 1860–1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 90; Nancy Quam-Wickham, "Rereading Man's Conquest of Nature: Skill, Myths, and Historical Constructions of Masculinity in Western Extractive Industries," *Men and Masculinities* 2 (1999): 135–151.

28. Thomas Collier, "Longwall Coal Mining," *Proceedings of the Rocky Mountain Coal Mining Institute Thirteenth Semi-Annual Meeting* (n.p.: [1921?]), 163–164. See also John H. M. Laslett, *Colliers across the Sea: A Comparative Study of Class Formation in Scotland and the American Midwest, 1830–1924* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2000).

29. Here I follow David Montgomery, who argues that "mutualism was the ethical seedbed for both the efforts of some workers to reform capitalism and the proposals of others to overthrow it." Montgomery, *Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865–1925* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 4.

30. Dan DeSantis, interview, n.d., transcript in Black Lung Interviews, box 8, EM, p. 5; Alfred Owens interview, Feb. 2, 1978, transcript in box 12, EM, pp. 12–13. Brophy, *Miner's Life,* 48.

31. Dan DeSantis interview, p. 20.

32. Tony Hungaro interview, pp. 10–11; Peter Gerglich interview, p. 11.

33. Claude and Laurence Amicarella interview, vol. 1, p. 98; "Mutualism" and "Solidarity," *Oxford English Dictionary,* 2nd ed., at http://www.oed.com; "Solidarity," *Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary* (1913), online at http://machaut.uchicago.edu/websters (accessed Mar. 30, 2008).

34. Henry "Welchie" Mathias interview, p. 24.

35. John and Caroline Tomsic interview, n.d., box 13, EM, pp. 32–33. A "miner's life," one UMWA song began, "is like a sailor's." "The Miner's Lifeguard," in Alan Singer, "Using Songs to Teach Labor History," *OAH Magazine of History* 11 (1997): 13–16. See also Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (New York: Verso, 2001); and though problematic in many regards, Stephen E. Ambrose, *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest,* 2nd ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), and other works by Ambrose. Neither oral histories nor contemporary documents address the possibility of male-male sexual encounters underground.

36. Davis is quoted in "A Look Back into History," *Cañon City Daily Record,* Apr. 5, 1971. "Loyalty to his fellow workers," according to Brophy, "required a very alert awareness of danger every minute that [a miner] spent in the mine. Careless or selfish actions that endangered lives were unthinkable, and any miner who broke the safety rules was quickly made aware of the other men's disapproval." Maintaining "good manners" involved considerable "policing" by miners of their fellow workers. Brophy, *Miner's Life,* 41–42. The importance of safety provisions in the strike demands for 1894, 1903–1904, and 1913–1914 will be discussed later.

37. Tony Hungaro interview, p. 17. On rough and respectable masculinities, see Steven Maynard, "Rough Work and Rugged Men: The Social Construction of Masculinity

in Working Class History," *Labour/Le Travail* 23 (Spring 1989): 159–169; and Steve Meyer, "Rough Manhood: The Aggressive and Confrontational Shop Culture of U.S. Auto Workers during World War II," *Journal of Social History* 36 (2002): 125–147. For an important argument linking the all-male environment underground with the embrace of interracial unionism in the Alabama collieries, see Daniel Letwin, *The Challenge of Interracial Unionism: Alabama Coal Miners, 1878–1921* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

38. Josephine Bazanele interview, Aug. 23, 1978, transcript in box 7, EM, p. 23.

39. Clare V. McKanna, Jr., *Homicide, Race, and Justice in the American West, 1880–1920* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 17, 23, 39, 41. For more on homicide rates, see Eric H. Monkkonen, *The Dangerous Class: Crime and Poverty in Columbus, Ohio, 1860–1885* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Roger Lane, *Violent Death in the City: Suicide, Accident, and Murder in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979); and Roger Land, *Murder in America: A History* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1997).

40. Clare V. McKanna, Jr., "Alcohol, Handguns, and Homicide in the American West: A Tale of Three Counties, 1880–1920," *Western Historical Quarterly* 26 (1995): 470; McKanna, *Homicide, Race, and Justice in the American West,* 21; Emilio and Gertrude Ferraro interview, May 22, 1978, transcript in box 9, EM, p. 26; Isaac Williams is quoted in Eleanor Fry, "Large Operations and Half Dozen Major Camps Marked Peak Years of County's Coal Industry," clipping in Harold Smith Scrapbook, LHC; Norman Sams, Paul Butero, and Ernie Lira interview, Aug. 9, 1970, transcript in Penrose Public Library, Colorado Springs, p. 13; Lynn Abrams, *Workers' Culture in Imperial Germany: Leisure and Recreation in the Rhineland and Westphalia* (London: Routledge, 1992), 70; *Camp and Plant* 2 (July 19, 1902): 63; *Camp and Plant* 3 (Mar. 7, 1903): 213; Peter Roberts, W. S. Hopkins, and John A. Goodell, "Report upon the Possible Service by the Young Men's Christian Association in the Mining Communities of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company Based upon a Survey, . . . " folder 156, box 18, CF&I-RAC (hereafter YMCA Report), 11, 32. Coal camp saloons in many ways resembled the urban drinking places analyzed in Madelon Powers, *Faces along the Bar: Lore and Order in the Workingman's Saloon, 1870–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

41. See "Proceedings of Joint Conference: Held in the State Capitol, Denver, Colorado, at 10 o'clock A.M., November 26, 1913," box 23, CF&I-RAC, p. 77.

42. Claude and Laurence Amicarella interview, vol. 2, p. 32; Bill Lloyd interview, book 2, 1–8; John Skerl interview, Jan. 12, 1973, folder 8, box 1, South Slavs Oral History Collection, pp. 23–24.

43. Stephen Burnett Brier, "'The Most Persistent Unionists': Class Formation and Class Conflict in the Coal Fields and the Emergence of Interracial and Interethnic Unionism, 1880–1904" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1992), 235–238; "Bonne Bouche" (pseud.), "Colorado News," *United Mine Workers Journal,*

Mar. 1, 1894. Compare this persistence rate of around 30 percent over four years with the rates of around 30 percent *per decade* for Mexicans in Los Angeles in the early twentieth century, and upwards of 50 percent for white Angelenos and residents of Boston, Omaha, San Francisco, and other cities during the same period. George J. Sánchez, *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 70.

44. William Jackson Palmer to editor, *Colorado Springs Gazette* (not sent), Oct. 18, 1893, folder 724, box 9, WJPP-CHS; Mark Carlson, "Causes of Bank Suspensions in the Panic of 1893," *Explorations in Economic History* 42 (2005): 56–80; *United Mine Workers Journal,* Dec. 14, 1893.

45. "Bonne Bouche," "Colorado News"; Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies,* 150.

46. *Sixth Biennial Report of the State Inspector of Coal Mines of the State of Colorado for the Years of 1893–94* (Denver: Smith-Brooks, 1895), 5–6; *El Moro Monitor,* Aug. 8, 1893; *Denver Republican,* Apr. 23, 1894.

47. Preamble reprinted in *United Mine Workers Journal,* Dec. 14, 1893. More generally, see Victor R. Greene, "A Study in Slavs, Strikes, and Unions: The Anthracite Strike of 1897," *Pennsylvania History* 31 (1964): 199–215; Harold W. Aurand, *From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers: The Social Ecology of an Industrial Union, 1867–1897* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1969); Daniel Nelson, *Shifting Fortunes: The Rise and Decline of American Labor, from the 1820s to the Present* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997), 37; Andrew Roy, *A History of the Coal Miners of the United States . . .* (Columbus: J. L. Trauger, 1907); Maier B. Fox, *United We Stand: The United Mine Workers of America, 1890–1990* (Washington, D.C.: UMWA, 1990); William Hard, "The Western Federation of Miners," *Outlook* 83 (1906): 125; Letwin, *Challenge of Interracial Unionism;* Craig Phelan, "John Mitchell and the Politics of the Trade Agreement, 1898–1908," in Laslett, *United Mine Workers of America,* 72–103. As UMWA president John McBride phrased it: "The strength of our general movement for higher prices had to be measured by the strength of our weakest competitive districts." John McBride speech in *United Mine Workers Journal,* Feb. 14, 1895, p. 1.

48. *Denver Republican,* Apr. 22, 1894. No comprehensive history of the nationwide miners' strike of 1894 exists.

49. Donald Joseph McClurg, "Labor Organization in the Coal Mines of Colorado, 1878–1933" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1959), 58–104; Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies,* 137–138; *Third Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of Colorado 1891–1892* (Colorado Springs: Gazette Printing, 1892), 59, 63.

50. *Denver Republican,* Apr. 24, 1894.

51. Ibid.; *Colorado Springs Gazette,* Apr. 25, 1894; *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 25, 1894; and *Pueblo Chieftain,* Apr. 25, 1894.

52. *Rocky Mountain News,* May 1, 1894; *Denver Republican,* May 1, 1894.

53. Interview with J. Kebler, *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 25, 1894.

54. CF&I seems a precocious example of Naomi Lamoreaux's portrait of mergers resulting from cutthroat competition after rapid expansion. Lamoreaux, *The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); H. Lee Scamehorn, *Pioneer Steelmaker in the West: The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, 1872–1903* (Boulder, Colo.: Pruett, 1976).

55. Sylvia Ruland, *Lion of Redstone* (Boulder, Colo: Johnson, 1981), 9–16; Scamehorn, *Pioneer Steelmaker,* 81–83; Pat R. Zollinger and Charles E. Osgood, *The Story of Redstone, Colorado* (Denver: Viking Enterprises, 1964); John L. Jerome, "Statement of Business and Personal Relations, John C. Osgood and John L. Jerome, August 1882 to August 1903," n.d., folder 2, John Lathrop Jerome Papers, CHS; Vaughn Mechau, "Redstone on the Crystal," paper read before the Denver Posse of Westerners, 1947, folder 133, CF&I Steel Corporation Papers, CHS.

56. Zollinger and Osgood, *The Story of Redstone;* Peter D. Vroom, "John Cleveland Osgood: Characteristics of the Dominant Colorado Financier," *New York Times,* Sept. 7, 1903.

57. Memorandum of agreement, Aug. 25, 1892, Minute Book, directors, Colorado Coal & Iron Company, folder 41, box 2, CF&I-CHS, 277–286. Of these coal lands, 68,187 were owned by the company and 3,670 were leased. *Prospectus: The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, General Mortgage (50 Years) 5% Sinking Fund Gold Bonds,* Feb. 1, 1893, box 5, ibid., p. 2. By 1909, CF&I had become the seventeenth-largest industrial corporation in the United States, as measured by assets. Alfred Chandler, "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American Industry," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., *The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays toward a Historical Theory of Big Business* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988), 50.

58. See Osgood's claims before the Joint Conference of November, 1913, as quoted in Chapter 7.

59. *Rocky Mountain News,* May 1, 1894; *Denver Republican,* May 1, 1894; *Florence Oil Refiner,* May 3, 1894. The last source noted: "A great difficulty in getting at a true sentiment of the 600 miners was the necessity of interpreters for the Italians and Austrians, who numbered more than one-third of those present."

60. *Denver Republican,* May 1, 1894.

61. *Rocky Mountain News,* May 3 and 4, 1894; *Denver Republican,* May 3 and 4, 1894; Executive Committee, "New Mexico: In Line in the National Organization," *United Mine Workers Journal,* May 17, 1894, p. 2.

62. *Rocky Mountain News,* May 8, 1894; *Denver Republican,* May 8 and 10, 1894; *Pueblo Chieftain,* May 6 and 16, 1894.

63. *Victor Coal and Coke Company v. John Doe et al.,* May 18, 1894, case 2763, LADC; *Colorado Fuel & Iron Company vs. Chris Passevento et al.,* May 18, 1894, case 2764, ibid.; *Trinidad Advertiser,* May 17 and 24, 1894; *Rocky Mountain News,* May 20 and 26, 1894;

New Castle News, May 26, 1894; Emma Zanetell interview, June 27, 1978, transcript in box 14, EM, pp. 35–36. An interview with State Mine Inspector Reed suggested that the eviction order may have been rescinded: *Trinidad Advertiser,* May 31, 1894.

64. *Trinidad Advertiser,* May 24, 1894; *Rocky Mountain News,* May 20, 1894; *Pueblo Chieftain,* May 19 and 21, 1894.

65. *Pueblo Chieftain,* May 23 and 25, 1894; *New Castle News,* June 2, 1894.

66. *Rocky Mountain News,* May 21, 1894.

67. On the connection between mineworker militancy and the building of company towns, see Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies,* 137; Thomas G. Andrews, "The Road to Ludlow: Work, Environment, and Industrialization in Southern Colorado, 1870–1915" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2003), chap. 6.

68. "Proposition of Miners at Walsen, El Moro and Coal Creek," noted in *Secretary's Record G: Miscellaneous Papers,* 1985, CF&I-CHS, p. 82; agreement with A. H. Prescott, Apr. 3, 1882, in Minute Book, directors, Colorado Coal and Iron Company, folder 40, box 2, CF&I-CHS, 152; Contract with John Oiello [Aiello], Dec. 22, 1892, *Secretary's Record F: Contracts & Leases,* CF&I-CHS, p. 5; Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies,* 63. On paternalism in Britain and Pennsylvania, see James Alan Jaffe, *The Struggle for Market Power: Industrial Relations in the British Coal Industry, 1800–1840* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 70–99; Gutman, *Work, Culture, and Society,* 327–328.

69. *Annual Report of the Colorado Fuel Company,* 6; Joseph Simons to H. E. Sprague, n.d. [1886?], folder 16, box 1, CF&I-CHS.

70. Simons to Sprague, n.d.; George Ramsay to E. M. Steck, folder 28, box 1, CF&I-CHS; minutes, May 9, 1888, Minute Book, directors, Colorado Coal and Iron Company, folder 41, box 2, ibid., 11; minutes, Apr. 3, 1889 in Minutes, Directors, Colorado Fuel Co., CF&I-CHS, p. 54. Wolff points out that Simons overlooked the main cause of low wages at Coal Creek: CC&I's success at crushing the 1884 miners' strike and the fury with which the company punished the miners' temerity. Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies,* 97.

71. On vernacular architecture, see J. A. Kebler to J. C. Osgood, May 21, 1892, folder 66, box 4, CF&I-CHS; and Chapter 6.

72. John Brinckerhoff Jackson, *Discovering the Vernacular Landscape* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), xii, 150.

73. *Colorado Springs Gazette,* May 24, 1894; *Rocky Mountain News,* May 21 and 25, 1894; *Pueblo Chieftain,* May 23 and 25, 1894.

74. *Rocky Mountain News,* May 25, 1894; Powers, *Faces along the Bar,* 70, 228–236. The Italian Alex Bisulco remembered meeting Japanese miners in the saloon at Rugby and even learning some words in Japanese from them. On ethnic mixing in saloons, see Alex Bisulco interview, pp. 32–33; Dan DeSantis interview, pp. 62–63. Confirming these informative oral histories, McKanna found high rates of murders by blacks, whites, and Hispanos of members of other "racial" groups; since so many murders were committed

in saloons, we can infer that many saloons were interracial, as well as interethnic. McKanna, *Homicide, Race, and Justice in the American West,* 157. Women, though they were welcome in the front rooms of saloons, which were called wine rooms, were generally not allowed in the back barrooms. Mike Livoda interview, Nov. 8, 1968, transcript in box 10, EM, p. 22.

75. *Rocky Mountain News,* May 26, 1894; *New Castle News,* June 2, 1894.

76. *Pueblo Chieftain,* May 26 and 27, 1894; *Trinidad Advertiser,* May 31, 1894. The newspaper did not provide a first name, but see *United Mine Workers Journal,* May 31, 1894, p. 8.

77. *Rocky Mountain News,* May 29, 1894; *Trinidad Advertiser,* May 31, 1894.

78. *Trinidad Advertiser,* May 31, 1894; Emma Zanetell interview, pp. 34–36.

79. *Rocky Mountain News,* May 29, 1894.

80. The rest had returned home, "as there was such a long body of men and so many to feed . . . and they had traveled so far." *Pueblo Chieftain,* May 30, 1894; *Rocky Mountain News,* May 31, 1894; Emma Zanetell interview, p. 35; "R. B. Rile Bagging" (pseud.), "News from Colorado," *United Mine Workers Journal,* Sept. 6, 1894.

81. Bo Sweeney and J. J. Hendrick speeches, *Trinidad Advertiser,* June 7, 1894. Other speakers echoed much the same themes. Sweeney was listed elsewhere in the same source as a defense attorney in a habeas corpus case resulting from the strike.

82. *Pueblo Chieftain,* June 6 and 7, 1894; *Trinidad Advertiser,* June 14, 1894.

83. *Pueblo Chieftain,* June 9, 1894; *Trinidad Advertiser,* June 14, 1894. On the success of company tactics at Hastings, see, for instance, *New Castle News,* June 9, 1894. For a firsthand account, see Henry Long affidavit, June 14, 1894, folder 117, box 2, Michael Beshoar Papers, DPL. For CF&I's version of events, see *Second Annual Report of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for the Year Ending June 30, 1894* (Denver: n.p., 1894), 10–11.

84. *Trinidad Advertiser,* May 10 and 17, 1894; *Pueblo Chieftain,* June 7 and July 1, 1894; *Florence Oil Refiner,* June 12, 1894; *Colorado Springs Gazette,* June 14, 1894; Caroline Waldron Merithew and James R. Barret, "'We Are Brothers in the Face of Starvation': Forging an Interethnic Working Class Movement in the 1894 Bituminous Coal Strike," *Mid-America* 83 (2001): 121–154. Smaller markets, such as Aspen, however, were more vulnerable. *New Castle News,* June 16, 1894.

85. *Pueblo Chieftain,* June 27 and 28, 1894; *United Mine Workers Journal,* June 14, 1894. "Striking miners" allegedly burned down a "forty-eight-foot trestle bridge" on the D&RG branch to Engleville. *Trinidad Advertiser,* Aug. 2, 1894. For a critical interpretation of the strike's resolution in one Pennsylvania district, see Mildred Allen Beik, *The Miners of Windber: The Struggles of New Immigrants for Unionization, 1890s–1930s* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 152–153.

86. *Pueblo Chieftain,* June 24, 1894.

87. *Pueblo Chieftain,* Aug. 3, 6, 8, and 10, 1894; *Colorado Springs Gazette,* Aug. 11, 1894; *Trinidad Advertiser,* Aug. 9, 1894.

88. For an example of the recriminations that followed the strike, see *New Castle News,* July 7, 1894. Wolff argues that the Pullman strike actually hurt the coal miners, because the cessation of train traffic destroyed whatever incentive the operators might have had to settle the dispute earlier. He also demonstrates that Osgood later conflated the marching strike with the Pullman strike. Wolff, *Industrializing the Rockies,* 153–154.

89. Bo Sweeney speech, *Trinidad Advertiser,* June 7, 1894.

6. The Quest for Containment

1. *Annual Report of the Sociological Department of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for 1907–1908* (Denver: Merchants, 1908), 7.

2. Kenneth Warren, *Wealth, Waste, and Alienation: Growth and Decline in the Connellsville Coke Industry* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 210; Stuart D. Brandes, *American Welfare Capitalism, 1880–1940* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Andrea Tone, *The Business of Benevolence: Industrial Paternalism in Progressive America* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Gerald Zahavi, *Workers, Managers, and Welfare Capitalism: The Shoeworkers and Tanners of Endicott Johnson, 1890–1950* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1988); Howard Gitelman, "Welfare Capitalism Reconsidered," *Labor History* 33 (Winter 1992): 5–31; Gwendolyn Wright, *Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America* (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 184.

3. *Camp and Plant* 1 (Jan. 16, 1902): 80–81, 86; *Camp and Plant* 3 (Mar. 21): 262; *Camp and Plant* 3 (Apr. 25, 1903): 363–368.

4. "Involving as its major issue the demand of the miners for a voice in determining the conditions under which they worked," George P. West wrote in an influential report on the 1913–1914 coalfield war, "the Colorado conflict was also a struggle for a voice in determining political and social conditions in the communities where they and their families lived." The strike, West concluded, involved both "industrial rights" and "political rights." George P. West, *Report on the Colorado Strike* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, 1915), reprinted in Leon Stein and Philip Taft, eds., *Massacre at Ludlow: Four Reports* (New York: Arno and New York Times, 1971), 5–6.

5. Brandes, *American Welfare Capitalism,* 20–37; William H. Tolman, *Social Engineering: A Record of Things Done by American Industrialists Employing Upwards of One and One-Half Million of People* (New York: McGraw, 1909), 3; Tone, *Business of Benevolence;* Gwendolyn Wright, *Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America* (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 184. On the welfare provisions of European coal mining companies, see *The Housing of the Working People,* Eighth Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1895), 356.

6. For the best map of Redstone, see Colorado Fuel and Iron Co. Chief Engineer's Office, "The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, Redstone," Nov. 10, 1903, roll 90, BHS.

7. Pat R. Zollinger and Charles E. Osgood, The Story of Redstone, Colorado (Denver: Viking Enterprises, 1964), 3, 6; Vaughn Mechau, "Redstone on the Crystal," paper read before the Denver Posse of Westerners, 1947, folder 133, CF&I Steel Corporation Papers, CHS, p. 10; "Historic Resources of Redstone, Colorado, and Vicinity," National Register of Historic Places Multiple Property Documentation Form, Mar. 1989, ibid.; Thomas J. Noel, Buildings of Colorado (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 499–500; and Catherine Clarke Fox, "Colorado Castle Seeks White Knight" (Mar. 4, 2005), online at http://www2.preservationnation.org/magazine/archives (updated Apr. 8, 2008). Surprisingly, scholars of welfare capitalism and model company towns have entirely overlooked Redstone.

8. *Denver Times,* May 18, 1902; Zollinger and Osgood, *Story of Redstone,* 6; *Camp and Plant* 1 (Apr. 5, 1902): 284; *Camp and Plant* 1 (May 3, 1902): 379; *Camp and Plant* 1 (June 14, 1902): 520; *Camp and Plant* 4 (July 25, 1903): 44; "Osgood Gamekeeper's Lodge," National Register of Historic Places registration form, Mar. 1989, folder 133, CF&I Steel Corporation Papers, CHS; *Carbondale Item,* Aug. 28, 1902; Mechau, "Redstone on the Crystal," 11, 16.

9. Mechau, "Redstone on the Crystal," 11; *Camp and Plant* 1 (Dec. 14, 1901): 8; Noel, *Buildings of Colorado,* 499–500; "Houses and Towns," *Camp and Plant* 5 (Dec. 26, 1904): 313; L. M. Bowers, "The Great Strike in Colorado," *Leslie's Illustrated Weekly Newspaper,* Feb. 5, 1914, p. 127; Tolman, *Social Engineering,* 247.

10. *Denver Times,* Feb. 2, 1901; Tolman, *Social Engineering,* 306; *Camp and Plant* 1 (June 28, 1902): 572.

11. "A Western Mining Company's Sociological Work," *Outlook* 72 (1902): 149–150.

12. *Camp and Plant* 5 (Jan. 16, 1904): 15; Francis B. Rizzari, "Railroads of the Crystal River Valley," *Denver Westerners Brand Book* 20 (1964), 389; Mechau, "Redstone on the Crystal," 17; Zollinger and Osbood, *Story of Redstone,* 7.

13. *Fourth Annual Report of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for the Year Ending June 30, 1896* (Denver: n.p., 1896), 8; Osgood to Cass, Aug. 20, 1896, folder 1, CF&I Steel Corporation Papers, CHS; and Julian Kennedy to Messrs. Blair & Company, Aug. 6, 1901, folder 35–9, microfilm roll E, ibid.; María E. Montoya, *Translating Property: The Maxwell Land Grant and the Conflict over Land in the American West, 1840–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

14. *Dominic Cesario v. Colorado & Wyoming Railway Co.,* case 3970, LADC (filed May 9, 1903), in LACC; *Manuelita Abeyta v. The Colorado & Wyoming Railway Co.,* case 3736, LADC (filed Jan. 4, 1902), in LACC.

15. *Cesario v. Colorado & Wyoming; Abeyta v. Colorado & Wyoming; Thomas A. Thompson v. Colorado & Wyoming Railway Co.,* case 4091, LADC (filed Feb. 2, 1904).

16. *Cesario v. Colorado & Wyoming.*

17. Apparently the C&W "purchased the truck farms at Jansen and constructed the terminal yards," securing rights to the Lopez ditch in the process; it also acquired part of the Varros ditch near Segundo around the same time, eventually paying out a thousand dollars in damages to Leone Bonfadini, Elizabeth Thrower, Teresa Bianchi, and T. A. Thompson. J. M. Madrid, an old Las Animas Hispano settler, would later attribute the precipitate drop in agricultural productivity in the valley to the railroad's seizure of "valuable bottom land for its right of way," the coal companies' dumping of "refuse from the mines . . . in the valley and the river," and lumbering. "The water," claimed Madrid, which "no longer slowed down in its rush to the river, caused soil erosion at a very rapid rate." CF&I Mining Department, "Report on Water Rights," Aug. 9, 1932, box 11, CF&I-CHS, 13–15; "Interview with J. M. Madrid," by A. K. Richeson, CWA, Las Animas County, vol. 1, doc. no. 359/6, pp. 83–84.

18. Montoya, *Translating Property,* 205–208; José M. Romero, *El Valle de los Rancheros* (n.p.: José M. Romero, 1978); "Report of Ira B. Gale," folder 17, box 1, T. A. Schomburg Papers, CHS; "Saw Timber Cut on Vermejo Drainage from 1890 to April 1901," folder 16, ibid.

19. "The Nature and Scope of the Department's Work," *Camp and Plant* 2 (Aug. 23, 1902): 186; "Segundo, Colorado, and the Segundo Coke Ovens," *Camp and Plant* 3 (Apr. 25, 1903): 368; *Camp and Plant* 3 (Mar. 7, 1903): 213; *Annual Report of the Sociological Department of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for 1908–1909* (Denver: Merchants, 1909): 5, 21; Tolman, *Social Engineering,* 38.

20. Director's minutes, Aug. 18, 1897, and Oct. 7, 1903, folder 169, box 8, CF&I-CHS; entries for Aug. 21, 1895, Aug. 16, 1899, Aug. 19, 1903, and Sept. 27, 1906, Record Book A, Colorado Supply Co., ibid.; *Annual Report of the Colorado Supply Company for the Year Ending June 30, 1897* (Denver: n.p., 1897). On one effort to oppose this store monopoly, see *Dunlavy Bros. v. CF&I Co. et al.,* case 3696, LADC (filed Aug. 29, 1901), LACC. On dividends, see Bowers to Frederick Gates, Mar. 23, 1910, folder 188, box 21, CF&I-RAC. One insider placed CSC profits at 25–40 percent around 1900. "Statement of Business and Personal Relations, John C. Osgood and John L. Jerome, August 1882 to August 1903," n.d., section B, folder 14, John Lathrop Jerome Papers, CHS.

21. On outright purchases, see *Cripple Creek Times,* Feb. 14, 1902. On Coal Creek, see *Denver News,* July 7, 1907.

22. J. K. Brewster to J. A. Kebler, Nov. 12, 1895, file 19–9, tape E, CF&I Steel Corporation Papers, CHS; Carroll D. Wright, *A Report on Labor Disturbances in the State of Colorado, from 1880 to 1904, Inclusive, with Correspondence Relating Thereto* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1905), 337.

23. Cripple Creek Times, Feb. 14, 1902; J. T. Kebler to C. E. Herrington, Apr. 16, 1901, Old Land File 74, CF&I-BHS; and other correspondence in this file. Some squatters did manage to maintain their hold on their homes. YMCA Report, 12, 20.

24. "The New Mexico Camps," *Camp and Plant* 1 (Jan. 4, 1902): 49; "Rouse and

Hezron: Two Picturesque Coal Camps in Huerfano County," *Camp and Plant* 1 (Mar. 8, 1902): 193–198; "Primero, Colorado: One of the Three New Camps in the Valley of the Purgatoire," *Camp and Plant* 2 (Oct. 25, 1902): 397.

25. "New Church and Club House, Primero," *Camp and Plant* 4 (Aug. 22, 1903): 136.

26. YMCA Report, 43; *The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company's Tabasco Mine . . .* (n.p.: CF&I, Oct. 11, 1905), Map Collection, Colorado School of Mines, Golden; *The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company's Coal Basin Mine* (n.p.: CF&I, Jan. 1, 1909), ibid.; *The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company: Map of Spring Gulch Mine Pitkin Co. Colo.* (n.p.: CF&I, Oct. 19, 1916), ibid.

27. Frank Harenberg interview, May 21, 1978, box 10, EM, p. 30; John S. Garner, *The Model Company Town: Urban Design through Private Enterprise in Nineteenth-Century New England* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 78.

28. "Segundo, Colorado," 368; "Berwind and Tabasco," *Camp and Plant* 1 (Jan. 11, 1902): 58; *Trinidad Chronicle,* Mar. 27, 1907; *Florence Tribune,* Aug. 8, 1901.

29. *Camp and Plant* 5 (Jan. 16, 1904): 14; "The Late A. C. Cass," *Camp and Plant* 4 (Sept. 5, 1903): 186.

30. YMCA Report, 5; *Thirteenth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of Colorado, 1911–1912* (Denver: Smith-Brooks, 1913), 57–61; Claude W. Fairchild testimony, in *CCMC,* 1: 575; Memorandum, S. J. Donleavy, Mar. 10, 1915, in John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to Jesse Floyd Welborn, Apr. 3, 1915, folder 17, JFW Papers.

31. Horton Pope, quoted in Howard M. Gitelman, *The Legacy of the Ludlow Massacre: A Chapter in American Industrial Relations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 123–126. LaMont Bowers claimed that under the Rockefellers, CF&I abandoned such politicking. LaMont Montgomery Bowers to C. O. Heydt, May 11, 1913, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC.

32. Quoted in Gitelman, *Legacy of the Ludlow Massacre,* 123–126; Appeal, in *Cesario v. Colorado & Wyoming;* Donald Mitchell interview, Feb. 5, 1978, transcript in box 11, EM, p. 12. Given the ready recourse of courts nationwide to common-law defenses against liability, such accusations could be confirmed only by statistical comparison of verdicts from Huerfano and Las Animas counties with those from coal-mining regions where the legal and political systems were not corrupted. Even the *perception* of manipulation, however, could take on its own reality if it prompted injured workers and survivors not to sue mining companies.

33. Gitelman, *Legacy of the Ludlow Massacre,* 123–126; Casimiro Barela to James H. Peabody, undated petition [1904?], folder 16, box 26716, Governor James H. Peabody Papers, CSA; Mike Livoda interview, June 20, 1973, folder 14, box 2, South Slavs Oral History Collection, UU, p. 16; Donald Joseph McClurg, "Labor Organization in the Coal Mines of Colorado, 1878–1933" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1959),

149; Jefferson B. Farr testimony, Feb. 13, 1896, "In Re Italian Massacre Investigation Walsenburg Colo., Feb. 11, 12 and 13 1896," folder 6, box 26694, Governor Jesse McIntyre Papers, CSA. The Farr family benefited from grazing leases and water contracts with Colorado Fuel and Iron and its precursors. *Secretary's Record F, Contracts & Leases, CF&I,* May 15, 1891, Jan. 2, 1896, and Mar. 26, 1907, CF&I-CHS. It was only fitting that *Farr v. Neeley,* the 1915 Colorado Supreme Court case that struck down the company's political dominance of southern Colorado, bears the sheriff's name.

34. *Colorado Springs Gazette,* Sept. 13, 1907.

35. *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Mar. 25, 1906; "The Colorado Supply Company Store at Minnequa," *Camp and Plant* 1 (June 7, 1902): 502.

36. Quotations from "Colorado Supply Co. Stores Have Grown to Present Size from Small Beginning," *CF&I Industrial Bulletin* 13 (Aug. 1928): 9; "The Colorado Supply Co.," *Denver Post,* Dec. 31, 1905; *Camp and Plant* 1 (Dec. 20, 1901): 17. On other store openings, see *Camp and Plant* 1 (Mar. 15, 1902): 218; and *Camp and Plant* 1 (June 21, 1902): 540. See also Charles H. Montgomery, *The Spanish Redemption: Heritage, Power, and Loss on New Mexico's Upper Rio Grande* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); and William Deverell, *Whitewashed Adobe: The Rise of Los Angeles and the Remaking of Its Mexican Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

37. Trinidad Advertiser Sentinel Office, *Descriptive, Historical and Biographical Sketches Relative to Trinidad and Las Animas County . . .* (Trinidad, Colo.: Advertiser-Sentinel, 1899), n.p.; *Camp and Plant* 3 (June 6, 1903): 517; *Camp and Plant* 1 (Apr. 19, 1902): 330; and "Views of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Co.'s Steel Works Hospital and Mining Camps, July 1916," box 12, CF&I-CHS.

38. "How the Scrip System Is Used in Las Animas County," *Pueblo Sunday Opinion,* Jan. 20, 1906.

39. The quotations are drawn, in order of appearance, from LaMont Montgomery Bowers to J. B. McKennan, May 19, 1911, folder 98, box 28, LMB Papers; "Proceedings of Joint Conference," 196–200; "Bonne Bouche," "Colorado News," *United Mine Workers Journal,* Mar. 1, 1894; *Trinidad Advertiser-Sentinel* (Trinidad, Colo.), n.p.; Isaac Williams, quoted in Eleanor Fry, "Large Operations and Half Dozen Major Camps Marked Peak Years of County's Coal Industry," n.d., clipping in Harold Smith scrapbook, LHC. See also Weitzel to Bowers, Mar. 2, 1910, folder 96, box 28, CF&I-RAC; *Trinidad Chronicle,* July 25, 1906. More generally, see Price V. Fishback, "The Miner's Work Environment: Safety and Company Towns in the Early 1900s," in John H. M. Laslett, ed., *The United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity?* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 211; and Price V. Fishback, *Soft Coal, Hard Choices: The Economic Welfare of Bituminous Coal Miners, 1890–1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

40. Frank Harenberg interview, p. 4; *Colorado Democrat,* Jan. 16, 1906; *Denver Times,* Nov. 17, 1902; *Pueblo Star-Journal,* Aug. 7, 1904; *Pueblo Courier,* Nov. 11, 1898. Scrip

dealers discounted the paper at 15–25 percent in Pueblo in 1902; three years later, though, saloons and stores in that city accepted it at face value, as did some stores in Trinidad. T. J. Donohue, letter to the editor, *Pueblo Chieftain,* Dec. 19, 1902; *Pueblo Star-Journal,* June 25, 1905; Victor Bazanele interview, n.d., box 7, EM, n.p. Some CF&I scrip even made it to New York City. *Denver Times,* June 3, 1903.

41. Quotation from *Trinidad Advertiser-Sentinel,* Souvenir Edition, n.p.; W. D. Gilbert, "Colorado Supply: Industrial Retail Stores," typescript dated Sept. 22, 1966, CF&I Steel Corporation Papers, p. 4. On consumption, citizenship, identity, and labor, see William Leach, *Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of an American Culture* (New York: Pantheon, 1993); Lawrence Glickman, "The Strike in the Temple of Consumption: Consumer Activism and Twentieth-Century Political Culture," *Journal of American History* 88 (2001): 99–128; and Lawrence B. Glickman, *A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making of Consumer Society* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), 108–128.

42. "Excellent Public Schools," *Camp and Plant* 4 (Dec. 26, 1903): 557. On property taxes, see Claire C. French, *Rockefeller Welfare Plan in "Camp" Schools, a Farce: Startling Facts Disclosed by Searching Investigation of the Justice League Representative* (Denver: Eastwood-Elwell, 1916); *CF&I v. Board of County Commissioners, Las Animas County,* case no. 3506, LADC (filed Dec. 22, 1898), LACC. For the company justification, see *Annual Report of the Sociological Department of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for 1901–1902* (Denver: Merchants, [1902]), 6.

43. *Annual Report of the Sociological Department of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for 1906–1907* (Denver: Merchants, 1907), 24; *Trinidad Chronicle,* Mar. 25, 1907.

44. Quotation from *Report of the Medical and Sociological Departments of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company 1912–1913* (n.p.: n.p., 1913), 41. See also *Annual Report of the Sociological Department of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for 1906–1907,* 24–25; *Camp and Plant* 1 (Mar. 8, 1902): 193–198; *Camp and Plant* 1 (June 21, 1902): 530; *Camp and Plant* 3 (Jan. 17, 1903): 69, 71; *Camp and Plant* 3 (Apr. 25, 1903): 367. Pueblo architect G. W. Roe designed the Katcina school, while Baird (first name unspecified) designed several other schools. On the tendency of operators to name "their newly founded company towns after themselves or after close relatives," see Mildred Allen Beik, *The Miners of Windber: The Struggles of New Immigrants for Unionization, 1890s–1930s* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), xxiv.

45. Quotation from "Night Schools," *Bulletin, Sanitary and Sociological* 7 (Oct. 1909): n.p. See also *Annual Report of the Sociological Department of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for 1907–1908,* 23; *Annual Report of the Sociological Department of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company for 1906–1907,* 16; "Sociological Work of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company," *Camp and Plant* 2 (Aug. 30, 1902): 207; *Cañon City Clipper,* Aug. 22, 1902.

46. *Annual Report of the Sociological Department of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Com-*

pany for 1901–1902, 5–6. By 1909 CF&I again touted night schools because of worker interest, a change that suggests the continuing power camp residents exerted to shape paternalism.

47. "The Foreigner," *Bulletin, Sanitary and Sociological* 7 (Jan. 1910): n.p.

48. *Camp and Plant* 1 (March 8, 1902): 208; "Kindergartens in the Camps," *Camp and Plant* 5 (Feb. 6, 1904): 80–81; "Growing Things," *Bulletin, Sanitary and Sociological* 4 (Apr. 1907): n.p. This connection between nature and childhood reflected the influence of the suburbanizing middle class. Mary Corbin Sies, "'God's Very Kingdom on Earth': The Design Program for the American Suburban Home, 1877–1917," in Becky M. Nicolaides and Andrew Wiese, eds., *The Suburb Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 189–190.

49. "Starkville, Colorado and the Starkville Mine," *Camp and Plant* 1 (Mar. 3, 1902): 364.

50. Tolman, *Social Engineering,* 259; "The Kindergarten in America," *Camp and Plant* 1 (May 17, 1902): 432; "Kindergartens in the Camps," 79.

51. "Social Science II," *Camp and Plant* 2 (July 12, 1902): 43.

52. "Social Science IV," *Camp and Plant* 2 (July 26, 1902): 86–7; *Report of the Medical & Sociological Departments of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, 1913–1914* (Pueblo, Colo.: Franklin, 1914), 36–38, 40; *Report of the Medical and Sociological Departments of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, 1914–1915* (Pueblo, Colo.: Franklin, 1915), 26.

53. YMCA Report, 42; "Social Science X: Interior Decoration of the Home," *Camp and Plant* 2 (Oct. 11, 1902): 348–349.

54. *Camp and Plant* 2 (Sept. 20, 1902): 286–287; "Social Science V," *Camp and Plant* 2 (Aug. 13, 1902): 141–142; "The Circulating Art Collection," *Camp and Plant* 1 (May 31, 1902): 469.

55. "Hospital Bureau of Information," *Camp and Plant* 2 (July 5, 1902): 7; Sarah Deutsch, *No Separate Refuge: Culture, Class, and Gender in the American Southwest, 1880–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

56. *Camp and Plant* 1 (Dec. 18, 1901): 18; *Camp and Plant* 1 (Jan. 16, 1902): 87; "Social Science XI: Good Books in the Home," *Camp and Plant* 2 (Dec. 13, 1902): 571; "Social Science XII: Good Periodicals in the Home," *Camp and Plant* 3 (Jan. 23, 1903): 91; "The Foreigner," n.p.

57. "Proceedings of Joint Conference," 221, 224 (quoted); Tolman, *Social Engineering,* 38–40. For an incisive analysis of the custom of "treating," see Madelon Powers, *Faces along the Bar: Lore and Order in the Workingman's Saloon, 1870–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 93–118.

58. David Griffiths. "Advantages of Social Welfare," in *Proceedings of the Rocky Mountain Coal Mining Institute, Third Semi-Annual Meeting* (Denver: Wepf, n.d.), 46; "Hints

on Hygiene" series in *Camp and Plant:* "Doctors' Lectures," *Camp and Plant* 2 (Dec. 6, 1902): 550–551; *Camp and Plant* 1 (Dec. 14, 1901): 4; C&P 1 (Feb. 29, 1902): 1902. On minstrelsy, see *Camp and Plant* 2 (Oct. 11, 1902): 361; *Camp and Plant* 3 (Apr. 11, 1903): 330; *Camp and Plant* 3 (May 2, 1903): 403; and photo album, fall 1915, box 12, CF&I-CHS, which seems to show a lone African American player performing with a coal camp minstrel troop. On movies, see the photo "Moving Picture Audience," *Report of the Medical and Sociological Departments of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, 1913–1914;* YMCA Report, 5; and Steven Joseph Ross, *Working-Class Hollywood: Silent Film and the Shaping of Class in America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 11–33.

59. *Camp and Plant* 1 (Mar. 8, 1902): 205–208.

60. Ibid., 208.

61. Herbert N. Casson, *The Romance of Steel: The Story of a Thousand Millionaires* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1907), 315; Agreement, Sept. 2, 1903, folder 204, box 22, CF&I-RAC; "President Hearne of Fuel Company Has Passed Away," *Pueblo Star-Journal,* Feb. 26, 1907; Donald Joseph McClurg, "Labor Organization in the Coal Mines of Colorado, 1878–1933" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1959), 107–108; Emma Langdon, *The Cripple Creek Strike: A History of Industrial Wars in Colorado, 1903–4–5 . . .* (Denver: Great Western, 1904–1905); Wright, *Report on Labor Disturbances in Colorado,* 331.

62. *Denver News,* Sept. 12, 1903.

63. "Welfare capitalism," as Andrea Tone argues, "created an arena of negotiation—not just co-option—where workers made their voices heard." *Business of Benevolence,* 13.

64. Zeph Hill to James Peabody, Nov. 18, 1903, folder 8, box 26716, Peabody Papers, 4; YMCA Report; Minutes, CF&I Executive Committee, Jan. 27, 1913, folder 58, JFW Papers.

65. J. Warner Mills, "The Economic Struggle in Colorado," *Arena* 34 (1905): 1–10; 119–128, 248–264, 379–399, 485–495, 605–619; and *Arena* (1906), 150–158, 243–252, 375–390, 467–476.

7. Shouting the Battle Cry of Union

1. *Denver Express,* Sept. 15, 1913.

2. Intriguingly, an emphasis on energy systems instead of modes of production can perhaps help account for some of the common failings of capitalist and Communist regimes over the course of twentieth-century history.

3. *Denver Express,* Sept. 15, 1913; *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 15, 1913; *Rocky Mountain News,* Sept. 16, 1913.

4. Barron B. Beshoar, *Out of the Depths: The Story of John R. Lawson* (Denver: Col-

orado Labor Historical Committee of the Denver Trades and Labor Assembly, 1942), 49–50; Mike Livoda interview, Nov. 30, 1968, transcript in box 10, EM, pp. 9–10.

5. Adolph Germer to Edgar Wallace, Aug. 18, 1913, box 1, Adolph Germer Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

6. *Denver Express,* Sept. 15, 1913. The official name of "The Colorado Strike Song" was "We're Coming, Colorado."

7. Ibid.

8. *Proceedings: Special Convention of District Fifteen United Mine Workers of America Held in Trinidad, Colorado, 16 September 1913,* env. 10, Edward S. Doyle Papers, DPL; *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 15 and 16, 1913; *Denver Times,* Sept. 16, 1913; *First Annual Report of the State Inspector of Coal Mines, 1913* (Denver: Smith-Brooks, 1914), 1–7.

9. *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 16, 1913; "Proceedings of Joint Conference, Held in the State Capitol, Denver, Colorado, at 10 o'clock A.M., November 26, 1913," box 23, CF&I-RAC, 159–160 (henceforth "Proceedings of Joint Conference").

10. *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 17, 1913; *Denver Express,* Sept. 17, 1913.

11. *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 17, 1913; *Rocky Mountain News,* Sept. 17, 1913; *Denver Times,* Sept. 17, 1913; *New York Times,* Sept. 18, 1913; Bill Lloyd interview, May 18, 1978, transcript in box 10, EM, p. 18.

12. *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 17, 1913. Another account claimed that the delegates "shouted, danced about the room, vowed vengenace [*sic*] on the operators, and pledged themselves to stay with the strike until they won 'or dropped into their graves.'" *Walsenburg World,* Sept. 18, 1913.

13. *Denver Express,* Sept. 16 and 17, 1913; *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 17, 1913; *Florence Citizen,* Sept. 17, 1913.

14. Statement in *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 13, 1913; LaMont Montgomery Bowers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Sept. 4, 1913, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC; Jesse Floyd Welborn to J. H. McClement, Sept. 6, 1913, ibid. On the 1903–1904 strike as a "prelude to Ludlow," see George G. Suggs, Jr., "The Colorado Coal Miners' Strike, 1903–1904: A Prelude to Ludlow?" *Journal of the West* 12 (1973): 36–53.

15. Quotations from William Jackson Palmer to Walter Hinchman, Aug. 31, 1903, folder 545, box 7, WJP-CHS; "The Colorado Coal Strike," *Outlook* 75 (Dec. 5 1903): 763*; William D. Haywood, *The Autobiography of Big Bill Haywood* (1929; repr. New York: International, 1974), 152. For context, see Carroll D. Wright, *A Report on Labor Disturbances in the State of Colorado, from 1880 to 1904, Inclusive, with Correspondence Relating Thereto* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1905); Elizabeth Jameson, *All That Glitters: Class, Conflict, and Community in Cripple Creek* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1998); William Philpott, *The Lessons of Leadville,* Colorado Historical Society Monograph 10 (Denver: Colorado Historical Society, 1994); George G. Suggs, Jr., *Colorado's War on Militant Unionism: James H. Peabody and the Western Federation of Miners* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1972); Melvin Dubofsky, *We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1969).

16. Donald Joseph McClurg, "Labor Organization in the Coal Mines of Colorado, 1878–1933" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1959), 107–108; Emma Langdon, *The Cripple Creek Strike: A History of Industrial Wars in Colorado, 1903–4–5 . . .* (Denver: Great Western, 1904–1905), 264; Wright, *Report on Labor Disturbances in Colorado,* 331, 335–336. Scrip payment and company stores also became issues during the course of the strike. *Denver Post,* Dec. 5, 1903.

17. R. L. Martel to W. H. Reno, Feb. 10, 1904, quoted without attribution in Winnifred Banner, manuscript biography of John Lawson, folder 21, box 3, John R. Lawson Papers, DPL; *New Castle Nonpareil,* Dec. 18, 1903. On Martel's role in other beatings, see Langdon, *Cripple Creek Strike,* 265–267. The use of "kangaroo" here seems unusual; perhaps Martel was drawing on the use of the term "kangaroo court," but clearly no proceedings of any sort were conducted before Oddo was beaten. Alternatively, Martel may have been referring to kangaroos' well-deserved reputation as fine boxers.

18. F. R. Woods to James Peabody, Dec. 2, 1903, folder 8, box 26716, Governor James Peabody Papers, CSA; Zeph Hill to Peabody, Mar. 27, 30, and 31 and Apr. 12, 17, and 19, folder 14, ibid.; Mitchell quoted in *Denver Republican,* Jan. 17, 1905; Suggs, *Colorado's War on Militant Unionism,* 95; *Pueblo Chieftain,* Nov. 14, 1903; "Colorado Coal Strike," 764*.

19. Wright, *Report on Labor Disturbances in Colorado,* 338, 341, 354–355; Alex Bisulco interview, June 27, 1978, transcript in box 8, EM, pp. 23–24; Langdon, *Cripple Creek Strike,* 265; McClurg, "Labor Organization in the Coal Mines of Colorado," 137–138; "List of Prisoners Deported from Camp Trinidad up to and Including April 2nd, 1904," folder 15, box 26716, Peabody Papers; Headquarters, First Provisional Battalion, National Guard of Colorado, Las Animas County Military District, Camp Trinidad, "Record of Prisoners Taken in Las Animas County Military District," folder 16, ibid.; Hill to Peabody, Apr. 11, 1904, folder 15, ibid.; Hill to Peabody, Apr. 27, May 7 and 23, and June 3, 1904, folder 14, ibid.; Victor Bazanele interview, n.d., box 7, EM, n.p. For a convoluted critique, see "The Issue in Colorado," *Outlook* 77 (1904): 395. More broadly, see Katherine Benton-Cohen, "Docile Children and Dangerous Revolutionaries: The Racial Hierarchy of Manliness and the Bisbee Deportation of 1917," *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 24 (2003): 30–50.

20. Stephen Burnett Brier, "'The Most Persistent Unionists'": Class Formation and Class Conflict in the Coal Fields and the Emergence of Interracial and Interethnic Unionism, 1880–1904" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1992), 258–264; *U.S. v. John Simpson, William Howells, and Charles Demolli,* U.S. District Court, Pueblo, case 795 (filed Apr. 9, 1904), box 53, entry 75, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Case Files, 1879–1907, Records of the District Courts of the United States, RG 21, NARA-Denver; Hill to Peabody, May 7, 1904, folder 14, box 26716, Peabody Papers;

Wright, *Report on Labor Disturbances in Colorado,* 348, 350. When strikers nearly ambushed a car carrying company officials at Segundo, for instance, a reporter from Denver's *Polly Pry* weekly was in the car with them. *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Dec. 9, 1903.

21. *Denver News,* Nov. 29, 1903; *Denver Republican,* Dec. 10, 1903. Contrast this suspicious document with a desperate antiunion letter from a miner's wife that bears every evidence of authenticity, [unknown writer] to Governor Peabody, Mar. 25, 1904, folder 16, box 26716, Peabody Papers, CSA.

22. *Eleventh Biennial Report of the Inspector of Coal Mines of the State of Colorado, 1903–1904* (Denver: Smith-Brooks, 1905), 66–92; *Minutes of the Sixteenth Annual Convention of the United Mine Workers of America . . .* (Indianapolis: Cheltenham, 1905), 177–180; *John Mitchell Exposed: His Autocratic and Traitorous Conduct in the Colorado-Utah Strike, and His Nefarious Connection with the National Civic Federation Laid Bare* (New York: New York Labor News, 1905); J. C. Sullivan to the Officers and Members of the CSF of L, July 1, 1904, book 37, CSF of L Papers, Western History Collections, University of Colorado at Boulder; *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* July 24, 1904. On the role of the Colorado strike as "a major turning point for Mitchell," see Craig Phelan, *Divided Loyalties: The Public and Private Life of Labor Leader John Mitchell* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 212–246.

23. Frank Wilson testimony, *CCMC,* 1:672–674; Albert C. Felts testimony, *CCMC,* 1:330–332, *Denver Express,* Sept. 18, 19, and 22; Mike Livoda interview, Nov. 8, 1968, transcript in box 10, EM, p. 21; unidentified clipping dated Sept. 20, 1913, folder 8, box 1, John R. Lawson Papers, DPL.

24. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to Frank Hearne, Nov. 4 and 12, 1903, copy in box 116, Allan Nevins Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Room, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York; Starr Murphy to LaMont Montgomery Bowers, Sept. 16, 1913, box 117, ibid.; handwritten note on LaMont Montgomery Bowers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Sept. 4, 1913, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC; LaMont Montgomery Bowers to Murphy (two letters), Sept. 19, 1913, ibid.

25. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to LaMont Montgomery Bowers, Oct. 6, 1913, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC.

26. During and after the Ten Days' War, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., received dozens of letters articulating this interpretation. See box 20, CF&I-RAC. On such rhetoric more generally, see Carl Smith, *Urban Order and the Shape of Belief: The Great Chicago Fire, the Haymarket Bomb, and the Model Town of Pullman* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 238–246.

27. *Denver Express,* Sept. 24, 1913.

28. Ibid., Sept. 16, 1913; *Florence Citizen,* Sept. 22, 23, and 26, 1913; *Denver News,* Sept. 23, 1913; UMWA Policy Committee, "Special Strike Call to the Miners in the North," Sept. 24, 1913, folder 10, box 1, John R. Lawson Papers, DPL.

29. Of course, estimates of strike participation varied wildly. Operators initially claimed that only 45 percent of miners had taken out their tools, even though their own data showed this to be a lie. The union, meanwhile, declared that 95 percent of miners had joined the strike, a figure that was closer to the mark but nonetheless skewed. Such estimates served political purposes for both the union and the companies, and the public estimates of either should be considered with caution. I base the figure of 80–90 percent on Governor Ammons's estimate, which also tallies with the *Trinidad Chronicle-News* estimate of 85 percent strike participation, which seems surprisingly high, given that paper's allegiance to the operators. *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 23, 1913; *Denver Express,* Sept. 23, 1913; *Florence Citizen,* Sept. 23, 1913; *Denver News,* Sept. 23, 1913; Jesse Floyd Welborn to McClement, Dec. 4, 1913, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC.

30. *Rocky Mountain News,* Sept. 23, 1913; Priscilla Long, "The Women of the C. F. I. Strike, 1913–1914," in Ruth Milkman, ed., *Women, Work, and Protest: A Century of U.S. Women's Labor History* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985).

31. *Denver Express,* Sept. 22 and 25, 1913; *Florence Citizen,* Aug. 28, 1913; journalist quoted in S. J. Dunlevy [or Donlevy] memorandum, Mar. 10, 1915, contained in John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to Jesse Floyd Welborn, Apr. 3, 1915, box 17, JFW Papers.

32. In March 1914 the union was supporting 21,000 people. Edward Doyle to William Green, Mar. 11, 1914, env. 4, Doyle Papers.

33. *Denver News,* Sept. 23, 1913; *Florence Citizen,* Sept. 26, 1913; Alber Pazar, Emma Pazar, Ernest Bellotti, and Virginia Bellotti interview, n.d., transcript in HCEHP, pp. 11–12; Minnie Ugolini and Arthur Bellotti interview, n.d., transcript ibid., pp. 1–3; Ben Marchiori interview, n.d., transcript ibid., p. 4; Dan DeSantis interview, Jan. 19, 1978, transcript in box 9, EM, p. 45; *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 22 and 23, 1913.

34. *Denver Express,* Sept. 24, 1913. Many of these camps endured, yet a listing of tent colonies following the strike's conclusion would differ in several respects from the list just given. Jesse Floyd Welborn to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Jan. 7, 1915, folder 7, JFW Papers; colony locations were also drawn on a copy of "Map of High Transmission Lines Operated by the Trinidad Electric Transmission Railway & Gas Co." (dated Nov. 6, 1913), in box 1, AG File.

35. *Denver Express,* Sept. 24, 1913.

36. Ed Doyle to William Green, Sept. 30, 1913, env. 4, Doyle Papers; Angeline Tonso interview, Oct. 12, 1983, transcript in box 13, EM, p. 41; Alex Bisulco interview, p. 27; Mike and Katie Livoda interview, Sept. 20, 1980, transcript in box 10, EM, p. 54; Beshoar, *Out of the Depths,* 74; Mary Thomas testimony, 7:6357; *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 25, 1913.

37. "Even the good Lord," Mike Livoda recalled, "I think, possibly went against the poor miners." Mike Livoda interview, June 20, 1973, transcript in folder 14, box 2, South Slavs Oral History Collection, UU, p. 29. Welborn believed that the snows would "cause

a good many of the strikers who are living in the tents provided by the organization, to seek the comfortable houses and employment at the mines." Jesse Floyd Welborn to McClement, Dec. 4, 1914.

38. Ed Doyle to John White, Sept. 30 and Oct 6, 1913, env. 4, Doyle Papers; Emma Zanetell interview, June 27, 1978, transcript in box 14, EM, pp. 43–48; Steve Surisky interview, Feb. 7, 1978, transcript in box 13, EM, p. 7; Pearl Jolly testimony, CIR, 7:6351; Angeline Tonso interview, pp. 15–17.

39. John and Caroline Tomsic interview, n.d., box 13, EM, p. 14. See also Angeline Tonso interview, p. 36.

40. Alex Bisulco interview, p. 27; John Lawson testimony, May 28, 1914, Karl E. Linderfelt court-martial, case no. 11, box 2, FF, DPL, 50.

41. Sarah Deutsch, *No Separate Refuge: Culture, Class, and Gender on an Anglo-Hispanic Frontier in the American Southwest, 1880–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 105; Mike Livoda interview, Nov. 30, 1968, pp. 15–16.

42. Alex Bisulco interview, p. 35. Coal companies and army officers alike recognized the strategic value of Ludlow; see complaint in *CF&I v. John P. White, Frank J. Hayes, et al.,* case 6576, LADC (filed Mar. 20, 1914), LACC; James Lockett to Lindley Garrison, May 9, 1914, box 1, AG File.

43. *Denver Express,* Sept. 22, 1913.

44. Charles J. Bayard, "The Colorado Progressive-Republican Split of 1912," *Colorado Magazine* 45 (1968): 61–78; George McGovern and Leonard Guttridge, *The Great Coalfield War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 76; Democratic State Central Committee, "Democratic State Platform: Progress in Every Plank" (n.p., 1912), in folder 168733, box 1581, entry 112, Department of Justice Central Files, Straight Numerical Files, 1908–1922, RG 60, U.S. Department of Justice Records, Archives II, NARA, College Park, Md. (henceforth Justice Dept. Files, Colorado Coal War).

45. LaMont Montgomery Bowers to M. B. Streeter, Oct. 10, 1913, copy in box 9, CF&I Steel Corporation Papers of original in LMB Papers; LaMont Montgomery Bowers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Oct. 21, 1913, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC; *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Sept. 30, 1913.

46. W. P. Dunlavy quoted in *Denver Express,* Sept. 30, 1913.

47. *Walsenburg Independent,* Oct. 4, 1913; Harry Kelly to James Clark McReynolds, Oct. 9, 1913, folder 168733, Justice Dept. Files, Colorado Coal War.

48. Ammons to Chase, Oct. 28, 1913, copy in folder 12, box 1, John R. Lawson Papers, DPL. The *Florence Citizen,* Oct. 28, 1913, estimated the toll at twenty-eight killed, eighteen "battles and skirmishes" fought, forty-one wounded and injured, eleven buildings and bridges wrecked, and $50,000 in property destroyed.

49. *Florence Citizen,* Oct. 28 and 31, 1913.

50. Beshoar, *Out of the Depths;* McGovern and Guttridge, *Great Coalfield War,* 139;

John Nankivell, *History of the Military Organizations of the State of Colorado, 1860–1935* (Denver: W. H. Kistler, 1935).

51. Trinidad Club membership card issued to Hildreth Frost, Oct. 30, 1913, env. 1, Hildreth Frost Papers, DPL; C. A. Conner to Frost, n.d. [Apr. 1914], ibid.; LaMont Montgomery Bowers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Nov. 18, 1913, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC; *Denver Post,* Dec. 16, 1913.

52. Edward Verdeckberg, "Report of the District Commander Camp at Walsenburg from October 28, 1913, to May 5, 1914," box 1, John Chase Papers, DPL, p. 11.

53. *Trinidad Chronicle-News,* Nov. 8, 1913.

54. *Rocky Mountain News,* Nov. 26, 1913.

55. Ibid.

56. *Rocky Mountain News,* Nov. 25, 1913.

57. Draft of Resolution sent by Archibald Allison to Committee, UMWA, and then to James Peabody, Jan. 6, 1904, folder 6, box 26716, Governor James Peabody Papers, CSA (all misspellings appear in the original). For a similar formulation, see CSF of L to "The Unions throughout the State of Colorado," Dec. 30, 1903, book 37, Colorado State Federation of Labor Papers.

58. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations in the account are drawn from "Proceedings of Joint Conference."

59. On pit committees, see *Florence Oil Refiner,* June 3, 1892; *A Statement from the Operators of the Northern Coal Fields to Their Former Employees and Friends* (Denver: Smith-Brooks, 1910).

60. Emphasis added. Apparently, workers throughout the West were articulating their demands in similar terms. See John Enyeart, *By Laws of Their Own Making: Rocky Mountain Workers and American Social Democracy, 1870–1924* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

61. "Proceedings of Joint Conference," 247 (emphasis added).

62. Beshoar, *Out of the Depths,* 109; Welborn to McClement, Dec. 4, 1913, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC. Five months later, after the Ludlow Massacre and the Ten Days' War had shocked the nation, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., "strongly advise[d]" his Colorado officers to remind union leaders, the public, and the chair of the House Subcommittee on Mines and Mining that "the operators had accepted Governor Ammons letter of Nov. 27 . . . but that the unions refused to permit the workers to accept the terms." Rockefeller believed that such a claim would place the operators "in a very strong position before the public in that it would be evident that all disorder since November 27 has been due to the refusal of the unions to accept the settlement." Welborn to McClement, Dec. 4, 1913, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC; John D. Rockefeller, Jr. to LaMont Montgomery Bowers, Apr. 30, 1914, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC, Starr Murphy to LaMont Montgomery Bowers, Apr. 30, 1914, copy in Nevins Papers. The operators did as John D. Rockefeller,

Jr., advised, to no effect, yet Rockefeller remained insistent on this strategy; Coal Operators to M. D. Foster, May 1, 1914, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC; John D. Rockefeller., Jr., to Jesse Floyd Welborn and LaMont Montgomery Bowers, folder 211a, ibid.

63. *Denver Times,* Nov. 28, 1913; *Denver Post,* Nov. 28, 1913.

64. *Denver Express,* Sept. 16, 1913; *Florence Citizen,* Oct. 31, Nov. 2 and 7, and Dec. 1 and 9, 1913; Frank J. Hayes to Mother Jones, Nov. 28, 1913, in Mary Jones, *The Correspondence of Mother Jones,* ed. Edward M. Steel (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 120. On resumption of production, see Jesse Floyd Welborn to McClement, Nov. 11, and Dec. 4 and 29, 1913, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC; LaMont Montgomery Bowers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Nov. 22 and Dec. 22, 1913, ibid. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., responded to Bowers's news with delight: "I note with interest the fact that the miners are rapidly going to Colorado from the South and East. . . . It is most gratifying to feel that this struggle is so rapidly becoming a thing of the past." John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to LaMont Montgomery Bowers, Dec. 26, 1913, ibid.

65. McGovern and Guttridge, *Great Coalfield War,* 171. When Jones returned to Colorado in March, she was arrested and held incommunicado in a Trinidad jail. For her typically irascible letters from jail, see Mother to Terence Powderly, Mar. 22, 1914, and Jones to "the Public," Mar. 31, 1914, in Jones, *Correspondence of Mother Jones,* 122–126.

66. Edward Keating, *The Gentleman from Colorado: A Memoir* (Denver: Sage, 1964), 381–381; McGovern and Guttridge, *Great Coalfield War,* 177–205; Scott Martelle, *Blood Passion: The Ludlow Massacre and Class War in the American West* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 155.

67. On the increasing violence in January, see Minutes of Executive Committee Meetings, Jan. 26, 1914, folder 58, JFW Papers; *Great Coalfield War,* 186.

68. John Chase to Woodrow Wilson, Mar. 12, 1914, folder 168733a, Justice Dept. Files, Colorado Coal War; Chase to Ammons, Mar. 11, 1914, folder 1, box 26751, Ammons Papers; Emma Zanetell interview, June 27, 1978, box 14, EM, pp. 41–45; Conner to Frost, n.d.

69. McGovern and Guttridge, *Great Coalfield War,* 205; *Walsenburg World,* Apr. 16, 1914.

70. LaMont Montgomery Bowers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Apr. 18, 1914, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC; letter from president of Globe Inspection Co. [name illegible] to Ammons, Mar. 21, 1914, folder 5, box 26751, Ammons Papers. See also State Senator Helen Ring Robinson's retrospective claim, "'I knew this was going to occur,'" quoted in *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 22, 1914.

71. Martelle, *Blood Passion,* 222–223; "My men begged me to give the order to fire on these people," National Guard commander Karl Linderfelt later testified, "as they were getting into position and we were thoroughly convinced it was a fight." Karl Linderfelt testimony, May 11, 1914, in Edwin F. Carson Court-Martial, case no. 2, folder 6, CNG Courts-Martial, p. 144.

72. Pearl Jolly testimony, CIR, 7:6349–6350; Edward Boughton testimony, CIR, 7:6364–6366; Patrick Hamrock testimony, May 11, 1914, in Court-Martial of C. E. Taylor, P. M. Cullom, T. J. Casey, Charles Patton, G. G. Osborne, F. M. Mason, Dan Pacheco, H. B. Faulks, E. J. Welsh, D. C. Campbell [no case number], folder 14, CNG Courts-Martial, pp. 328–335. Typical of the confusion was C. E. Taylor's testimony: when asked "Who was it [who] fired the first shot?" he evasively replied, "They say it was the strikers." C. E. Taylor testimony, May 11, 1914, ibid., p. 374. Recent books have located Ludlow along the banks of the Purgatoire River (in fact, the camp lay near an arroyo some two dozen miles north of the river), called Ludlow a mining camp (a few small collieries operated intermittently across the canyon, but Ludlow itself was essentially a depot town), and minimized the extent of the conflict (colony residents were on strike not simply against Colorado Fuel and Iron, but against several other companies). Renowned scholars have even misplaced the year of the Ludlow Massacre (which took place in 1914, not 1917) and grossly exaggerated the number of strikers killed there (it was 18, not 60). It would seem risky to place much weight on interpretations built on such foundations. Richard White, *"It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History of the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 349; Alan Dawley, *Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 27–33; Maureen A. Flanagan, *America Reformed: Progressives and Progressivisms 1890s–1920s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 218–220.

73. P. M. Cullon testimony, May 11, 1914, in Carson Court-Martial, p. 168, and in Taylor et al. Court-Martial, 379–380; C. A. Conner testimony, May 11, 1914, in Maurice Bigelow Court-Martial, case no. 6, folder 8, CNG Courts-Martial, pp. 111–112; John R. Lawson testimony, May 28, 1914, in Karl E. Linderfelt Court-Martial, case no. 11, copy in box 2, FF, p. 40; Pearl Jolly testimony, 7:6350.

74. Uncited quotation attributed to John Lawson, in L. S. Bigelow, untitled typescript report [1915?], box 25, CF&I-RAC, 66–73; Boughton testimony, CIR, 7:6367.

75. Boughton testimony, CIR, 7:6367–6370.

76. *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 23, 1914; *Denver Times,* Apr. 25, 1914.

77. LaMont Montgomery Bowers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Apr. 21, 1914, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC; Jesse Floyd Welborn to McClement, May 27, 1914, ibid. "All the evidence," Welborn claimed, showed that with the exception of Linderfelt's attack on Tikas, "no acts that could be criticized were committed by any of the militia." The tents of the colony had caught on fire, he claimed, owing to "the act of someone within the colony"; the Snyder boy had been shot by a striker; and the victims in the so-called Black Hole of Ludlow had died of suffocation before the fire began. See also *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 25, 1914; *Denver Times,* Apr. 25, 1914; Jim Jam Junior, "The Truth about Colorado's Civil War," *Jim Jam Jems* (July 1914): 24 (excerpted versions of this article appeared in the *Oakland Tribune,* June 25, 1914, and other papers). Rev. Henry Pingree of Denver's Asbury Church declared, "What should have been done long ago, and what should be

done now is to organize a vigilante committee to call on these striking miners and say to them: 'Are you United States citizens? Do you intend to become United States citizens?' All who answer 'No' should be boxed up and deported to where they came from. Box up every man of them and deport them and you will end this reign of anarchy. There will be a wonderful roar set up if such a thing is done, but it is the only patriotic thing to do, the only religious thing to do." "Our Minister Speaks," enclosed in R. L. Hearon to William Ellis, June 5, 1914, folder 142, box 7, CF&I-CHS.

78. Edward Boughton testimony in CIR, 7:6367–6368; Robert Uhlich testimony, Dec. 27, 1913, in "Transcript of Statements of Witnesses Appearing before the Investigating Committee Appointed by John McLennan, President State Federation of Labor, Investigating Conduct of State Militia in the Southern Colorado Coal Fields," folder 3, box 1, John R. Lawson Papers, DPL; undated, unsigned report [1915], in folder 4, box 2, FF. See also Boughton, Memorandum, June 10, 1914, folder 200, box 22, CF&I-RAC; Jerome Greene to Boughton, May 24, 1914, folder 146, box 20, Organization: Industrial Relations—Colorado Fuel and Iron Co., 1914–1915, Administration, Program and Policy Series 900, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RG 3, RAC; Green to A. Lawrence Lowell, June 3, 1914, ibid.; Charles Loughridge to Greene, July 11, 1914, ibid.

79. Telegram from UMWA to Wilson, quoted in *Denver Times,* Apr. 21, 1914; Horace Hawkins quoted in *Denver Times,* Apr. 22, 1914; telegram from Owen Roberts, M. C. Davis, and N. Fowler to John R. Lawson, ibid. The rumors of incineration were eventually dismissed by the reporter Harvey V. Deuell, who visited the Ludlow colony with two doctors and two ministers and inspected all recently disturbed ground for evidence of human remains. *Denver Times,* Apr. 27, 1914. Even after this account, though, the incineration scenario remained plausible, though the UMWA's inability to supply the names of the supposed victims renders it highly unlikely that the militia had, in fact, burned additional bodies.

80. Circular quoted in *Denver Times,* Apr. 22, 1914; Doyle to McElroy quoted in "JLM" to Jesse Floyd Welborn, Apr. 21 1914, folder 144, box 7, JFW Papers. Some claimed that the militia was not only murderous but bent on raping and pillaging. State Senator Helen Ring Robinson told the *Denver Times,* for instance, "'One minister alone told me he had performed fifteen forced marriages resulting from the invasion of the southern field by gunmen since this strike began.'" *Denver Times,* Apr. 22, 1914.

81. *Florence Citizen,* Apr. 22, 1914; *Denver Times,* Apr. 23, 1914. Lying in state, the body of Louis Tikas provoked similar paeans to masculinity: "As the many bent on their errands pass him," Clara Mozzor reported, "they bow their heads and mutter softly: 'He was a true man.'" Ibid.

82. Anonymous telegram, Apr. 23, 1914, folder 144, box 7, JFW Papers; *Denver Times,* Apr. 22, 23, and 25, 1914; *Florence Citizen,* Apr. 29, 1914; Dan DeSantis interview, p. 3. It is not possible to determine with absolute certainty the sex of all of the fighting strikers. Oral histories, official testimony, and contemporary accounts universally described them

as "men," however, and there are no reports of any women getting killed or injured while bearing arms for the union. Taking great care not to inflict violence on the wives and children of scabs, mine managers, and miners who remained loyal to the companies, the strikers consciously tried to set themselves apart from enemies who had betrayed the manly code of honor and slaughtered women and children. "It was reported," wrote the *Denver Times,* "that John Lawson had issued instructions to the strikers to protect all women and children." *Denver Times,* Apr. 24 and 25, 1914; Mike Livoda interview, Aug. 1975, transcript in box 10, EM, p. 16; and anon. letter to editor, *Walsenburg World,* June 4, 1914. For contradictory rumors, see *Denver Times,* Apr. 23 and 24, 1914; *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 25, 1914. On tactics, see *Denver Times,* Apr. 26, 1914; and photo "An American Who Is Leading and Advising the Striking Miners in the Industrial Warfare in Southern Colorado," in *Denver Times,* Apr. 27, 1914. On the size of battalions, the sources are too numerous to cite.

83. *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 23, 1914; *Florence Citizen,* Apr. 22, 1914; Hamrock to Chase, Apr. 23, 1914, folder 144, box 7, JFW Papers; anonymous telegram, Apr. 21, 1914, ibid.; *Denver Times,* Apr. 21, 23, 24, and 27, 1914.

84. "Detection Rept.," enclosed in LaMont Montgomery Bowers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., May 9, 1914, folder 203, box 22, CF&I-RAC.

85. Quotations from *Denver Times,* Apr. 25, 1914. On mistrust, see Aldace Walker to U.S. Adjutant General, May 11, 1914 (two letters), box 1, AG File. Union officials blocked a brass band from playing at the funeral of Louis Tikas. "They feared martial music would create unnecessary excitement," they explained to reporters. "A guard of Italians will also be on hand, it was announced, to see that quiet was maintained." *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 27, 1914.

86. *Denver Times,* Apr. 24, 1914; telegrams in folder 144, box 7, CF&I-CHS; communications in folder 1, box 26751, Ammons Papers; Martelle, *Blood Passion,* 222–223. Guards and militiamen often reported having killed many strikers in these engagements; although it is possible that some strikers were buried unsung, the comparative death toll in this phase of the fighting suggests the miners' adeptness at offensive tactics.

87. *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 25 and 26, 1914. News accounts identified the social class of the women. "Many of Denver's best known women" participated, but Mrs. H. T. Herlinger, "wife of a laboring man," was on the committee delegated to meet with Ammons in his chambers, and a few women from the strikers' colonies, such as Mrs. Fred Renshaw, Sylvia Smith, and Mrs. Lena Bullington, were also present. *Denver Times,* Apr. 25, 1914.

88. A remarkable photograph shows a sea of women's faces, with a handful of men's scattered among them. *Denver Times,* Apr. 25, 1914. Lafferty, who later testified before the Commission on Industrial Relations, was excoriated for her involvement, in LaMont Montgomery Bowers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., May 21, 1914, folder 184, box 20, CF&I-RAC. For a critique of the Denver clubwomen allegedly written by a strikebreaker's wife,

see *Walsenburg World,* June 4, 1914. Denver businessman Lucius Hallett told John D. Rockefeller, Jr., "You are being abused and attacked by a gang of conscienceless rascals and emotional women." Hallett to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., May 1, 1914, folder 170, box 19, CF&I-RAC. Supposedly basing its accusations on an investigation of the strike and massacre, a reactionary journal scoffed: "Some of Colorado's tearful Miss Nancys have sobbed out tales of sensational fiction that would do credit to the most prolific writer of modern melodrama." Jim Jam Junior, "The Truth about Colorado's Civil War," 23, 46–47.

89. *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 26, 1914; *Denver Times,* Apr. 25, 1914.

90. The Women's Peace Association was quite conscious of the precedent it was setting: "Women," Dora Phelps Buell proclaimed to the assembly, "we are making history." An incident during the course of the meeting perfectly captured the feminist politics of the women. When "a man in the gallery attempted to interrupt the governor," Lafferty shut him up. "'This is a woman's meeting,'" she declared. *Rocky Mountain News,* Apr. 26, 1914.

91. *Denver Times,* Apr. 25 and 27, 1913.

92. Letter from Rockvale (between unnamed correspondents), Apr. 29, 1914, folder 143, box 7, CF&I-CHS; J. V. McClenathan to C. M. Schenk, Apr. 30, 1914, folder 2, JFW Papers; Juan Urbano Vigil to Edward Keating, May 1, 1914, box 1, AG File. For papers relating to the president's decision to call out troops, see Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 29:525–533, 541–542. Rumors of continuing militancy among the strikers were particularly strong in the Crested Butte area. W. A. Holbrook to Charles J. Symmonds, July 8, 1914, box 1, AG File. Strikers also carried out a small attack on federal troops at Segundo. James Lockett to Lindley Garrison, May 27, 1914, ibid. In October, "strike-sympathizers" attacked and stabbed two suspected strikebreakers at Florence, prompting the arrest of forty-eight; eight of those "identified as committing assault [were] turned over to civil authorities." Major Elliott to Garrison, Oct. 2, 6, and 10, 1914, ibid.; *Florence Citizen,* Oct. 9, 1914. For reports of strikers "drilling" in November, see William Carman to Hildreth Frost, Nov. 10, 1914, env. 1, Frost Papers. More generally, see Holbrook to Garrison, July 17, 1914, box 1, AG File; *Trinidad Advertiser,* Oct. 22, 1914.

93. Bowers, disgusted, complained that the strike had returned CF&I to the "edge of bankruptcy," thus undoing the six years of work he had devoted to reviving the company after the depression of 1907–1908. LaMont Montgomery Bowers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Dec. 3, 1914, folder 190, box 21, CF&I-RAC. As of early 1915, a company operative within the UMWA claimed that the union had spent $870,000 on the Colorado strike. J. K. T. to Ivy Lee, Mar. 23, 1915, folder 15, JFW Papers.

94. Lockett to Garrison, May 13 and 15, box 1, AG File; Garrison to Lockett, July 9, 1914, ibid.; W. W. Wotherspoon to U.S. adjutant general, Nov. 3, 1914, ibid.; Garrison to McClure, Aug. 26, 1914, ibid. On the complications that arose as field commanders tried

to determine who qualified as a "Colorado resident" for the purposes of the order, see Charles O'Neil to DeR. C. Cabell, Sept. 15, 1914, ibid.; Garrison to Lockett, Oct. 9, 1914, ibid.; Morgan to Garrison, Oct. 15, 1914, ibid.

95. McClure to Garrison, July 28, 1914, box 1, ibid.; Jesse Floyd Welborn to McClement, Aug. 18, 1914, folder 211, box 23, CF&I-RAC; John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to LaMont Montgomery Bowers and Jesse Floyd Welborn, folder 203, Sept. 1, 1914, box 22, ibid.

96. *Denver News,* Dec. 9, 1914. Wilson detailed his course of action in "A Statement on the Colorado Coal Strike" [Nov. 29, 1914], in *Papers of Woodrow Wilson,* 31:367–369. See also Priscilla Long, *Where the Sun Never Shines: A History of America's Bloody Coal Industry* (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 301–304. Strikers killed at least thirty-nine strikebreakers, mine guards, National Guardsmen, and bystanders. Martelle, *Blood Passion,* 222–223.

97. *Denver News,* Dec. 9, 1914.

98. Ibid.; "Synopsis: Special Convention Proceedings, District 15, U. M. W. of A.," env. 10, Doyle Papers.

99. *Los Angeles Times,* Dec. 13, 1914; J. K. T. to Ivy Lee, Mar. 23, 1915, folder 15, JFW Papers; Jesse Floyd Welborn to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Apr. 2, 1915, folder 16, ibid.

100. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., *The Colorado Industrial Plan* (New York: n.p., 1916); Howard M. Gitelman, *The Legacy of the Ludlow Massacre: A Chapter in American Industrial Relations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988); Ben M. Selekman and Mary Van Kleeck, *Employees' Representation in Coal Mines: A Study of the Industrial Representation Plan of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924); John Thomas Hogle, "The Rockefeller Plan: Workers, Managers, and the Struggle over Unionism in Colorado Fuel and Iron, 1915–1942" (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, Boulder, 1992); Denise Pan, "Peace and Conflict in an Industrial Family: Company Identity and Class Consciousness in a Multi-Ethnic Community, Colorado Fuel and Iron's Cameron and Walsen Coal Camps, 1913–1928" (M.A. thesis, University of Colorado, Boulder, 1994); Jonathan Rees, "What If a Company Union Wasn't a 'Sham'? The Rockefeller Plan in Action," *Labor History* 48 (2007): 457–475; and Jonathan Rees, "Rockefeller's Cross," unpublished manuscript.

Epilogue

1. John Greenway, *Songs of the Ludlow Massacre: Reprint from the United Mine Workers Journal* (n.p.: United Mine Workers of America, 1955); United Mine Workers of America, "The Ludlow Massacre," at http://www.umwa.org (accessed May 2, 2008).

2. H. Lee Scamehorn, *Mill and Mine: The CF&I in the Twentieth Century* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992).

3. Keith Dix, *What's a Coal Miner to Do? The Mechanization of Coal Mining* (Pitts-