

Struggles for Justice

Social Responsibility and the Liberal State

ALAN DAWLEY



THE BELKNAP PRESS OF
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England

1991

Progressive Statecraft

AFTER YEARS of social ferment it seemed to Walter Lippmann, perhaps the most discerning social critic of the day, that American civilization was coming apart at the seams: "the sanctity of property, the patriarchal family, hereditary caste, the dogma of sin, obedience to authority,—the rock of ages, in brief, has been blasted for us."¹ Lippmann's catalogue of disintegration was a clear sign that on the eve of the First World War American culture was breaking free from nineteenth-century orthodoxies. Newspapers rang with popular clamor about predatory practices by the "money trust," landlord abuses in tenement slums, and the cruelties of child labor. Mass meetings convened to hear sexual radicals foretell the dawn of erotic delight and social radicals extol collective ownership of wealth. City streets were exotic, open-air bazaars of Russian Orthodox peasants, Jewish pushcart operators, and Italian anarcho-syndicalists, whose raw energy was celebrated by the new breed of urban realist painters. Arts and letters were a veritable kaleidoscope of bright new ideas and sentiments from the poets of the Chicago Renaissance, the irreverent cartoonists of *The Masses*, and avant-garde artists saluting the iconoclasm of the Cubists. Against the prevailing chaos of "drift," Lippmann urged what a growing chorus of contemporaries demanded, a commanding strategy of "mastery."

No longer could Yankee Protestant elites be complacent about their place atop the social hierarchy. The unwanted children of nineteenth-century American society were in revolt against the parent, and their revolt called into question the existing relation between state and society. From 1912 through 1916 the key battles were fought out around the trust, industrial democracy, and social justice, all of which were

forced upon an otherwise unwilling national leadership by popular movements originating in the working and middle classes. In response, elites developed two new strategies with a view toward reconstructing the liberal state under the conditions of twentieth-century life. One was managerial liberalism, in which corporations were seen as the cornerstone of public affairs in everything from social welfare to foreign policy. The other was progressive liberalism, in which the state would regulate private interests in the public interest. As the pace of politics quickened in the years before U.S. entrance into the First World War, progressive statecraft gained ascendancy with the presidency of Woodrow Wilson.

Wilson and the Trust Question

The trust question dominated Wilson's first two years as President. The rise of the giant corporation threw a huge monkey wrench into the inherited governing system. Corporations as big as United States Steel did not play by the same competitive rules as small proprietary firms. They did not link up with family ownership and inheritance in the same way as individual entrepreneurs. They did not hire or supervise their thousands of employees in the same way as the on-site boss in his own shop. Yet they continued to be governed by the same legal rules that applied to the competitive marketplace. This underlying contradiction between the actual relations of production and the ideological-legal form of property came to the surface in political battles around the trust in which nearly every economic group had a stake. Wall Street wanted a private central bank; shippers wanted lower freight rates; farmers wanted cheaper credit; small manufacturers wanted competitive advantages; technocrats wanted efficiency; and workers wanted greater leverage. Out of this tangle of competing interests, a daunting possibility arose: what would happen if all those who had been gored by the plutocratic ox made common cause? The pursuit of social justice had already brought workers and middle-class elements together; could the same groups draw upon the legacy of the Knights of Labor and the Populists to forge a new antimonopoly alliance against the trusts?

The term *trust* was a holdover from nineteenth-century populism, and it came freighted with faintly evil connotations. It was easier to define the enemy in rhetoric than in fact. Contemporaries applied the term to everything from monopolies such as the American Telephone

and Telegraph Corporation to oligopolies such as the handful of giant meatpackers and, for that matter, to just about any other big business. Though imprecise, it reflected the need for some generic term to cover the emergence of large-scale enterprise whose characteristic industrial structure was neither monopoly nor competition, but something in between named oligopoly. The rise of industrial goliaths such as U.S. Steel, Armour, and the American Tobacco Company was the result of convergence of changes at several levels, including the emergence of mass-production techniques and mass consumption, along with the legal prohibition on cartels embodied in the Sherman Act.

In terms of the mode of production, the key was vertical integration, that is, the linkage of mass production with mass distribution. Integration was both a matter of new technologies, such as the integrated steel mill, which turned iron ore into steel girders, and business reorganization, in which a single firm took control of purchasing, production, and marketing. Coordinating these complex operations called forth an elaborate internal managerial apparatus in each of the giant firms. Where once separate firms had bought and sold, now functional divisions, each under its own vice-president, coordinated purchasing, production, and marketing. In short, the corporation turned the competitive markets of the proprietary era into their opposite, managed markets.²

Mass production and distribution would not have been possible without changes in social reproduction. To move beyond the pioneering stage of illustrious inventors such as Thomas Edison toward the systematic exploitation of scientific discoveries, it was necessary, particularly for new electrical and chemical industries, to have at their disposal an expanding corps of engineers and scientists coming from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and other polytechnic training grounds. By the same token, to manage markets properly required a corps of college-educated planners whose decisions were recorded and communicated by legions of high-school-trained office clerks, the same feminized work force that also made mass distribution possible through their low-paid work as telephone operators and sales clerks. Mass education inculcated the skills and work habits that prepared the rising generation for the discipline and tedium of the office routine. Absent these changes in the reproduction of daily life, the evolution of twentieth-century society with the giant corporation at the hub simply could not have gone forward.³

Presiding over these wide-ranging developments, investment bank-

ers and big stockholders were converting proprietary ownership into corporate ownership. The advantages of limited liability quickly proved themselves in manufacturing, where 87 percent of wage earners toiled for a corporate employer by 1919. Although most of the several million employers in the United States were small, a large share of corporate property was being concentrated in a few hands. By 1914 a mere 2.2 percent of all establishments produced more than \$1 million worth of goods, but these same firms employed 35 percent of all wage earners in manufacturing, and the proportion rose to more than half after the First World War. No nineteenth-century coal baron or railroad tycoon could match the \$1 billion capitalization of U.S. Steel, and soon other manufacturing combines, investment banks, and insurance companies surpassed railroads as the largest concentrations of wealth. An increasing share of this wealth was owned by corporations that purchased shares of other corporations, whether as holding companies, investment trusts, or simple owners. Individual ownership of public stock issues was also highly concentrated; although data are astonishingly sparse, there is no mistaking the uneven distribution. One investigation disclosed that the richest 1 percent of individuals in 1929 held 65.6 percent of corporate stock and 82 percent of corporate bonds. All in all, proprietary forms of ownership were turning into corporate portfolios.⁴

Such were the agglomerations of wealth that came under attack for being "trusts." Seen as standing conspiracies against the public interest, the trusts gained notoriety in the great merger wave of 1898-1904, when hundreds of horizontal competitors were consolidated into a relative handful of large corporations a few of which controlled over 70 percent of their markets (Du Pont, International Harvester) and others over 40 percent (U.S. Steel, American Smelting and Refining, National Biscuit).⁵ Maverick economist Thorstein Veblen contended that these mergers were a parasitic incubus on the underlying productive system, and in *Theory of Business Enterprise* (1904) he pressed the case for a conflict between the technical efficiency of the modern machine process and the "pecuniary motivation" of property owners. Damning the corporate investor with faint praise, he wrote, "the captain of industry works against, as well as for, a new and more efficient organization."⁶ In a more popular vein, Upton Sinclair indicted the Beef Trust for its careless disregard of public health and brutal exploitation of immigrant workers in *The Jungle* (1906). In defending supposedly "soulless corporations" against "demagogues" and socialists, John Moody ironically

gave ammunition to the critics in *The Truth about the Trusts* (1904), which depicted a steep pyramid of wealth topped by two rival groups of finance capitalists around the Rockefeller and Morgan interests. The Wall Street Panic of 1907 only confirmed public anxiety about the machinations of high finance.⁷

In this highly charged atmosphere, government efforts to resolve the contradiction between the corporation and the legal tradition of anti-monopoly only succeeded in further politicizing the issue. President Roosevelt won a reputation as a "trustbuster" largely on the strength of a single successful prosecution under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of the Northern Securities railroad empire. His successor, President Taft, initiated more prosecutions but left the deciding influence in the hands of the Supreme Court. For its part, the Court tried to take the trust issue out of politics in announcing the "rule of reason" doctrine in 1911, under which only "unreasonable" combinations in restraint of trade would run afoul of the law.⁸ Although the Court actually struck a blow against monopoly by breaking up Standard Oil and the American Tobacco Company, the result tended to promote not free competition but oligopoly. In political terms, the "rule of reason" had the opposite effect of the one intended, by inflaming public opinion against the Court. At a much lower temperature, its impact can be compared to the Dred Scott decision of 1857, when the Supreme Court had attempted to put the slavery issue above partisan politics but only wound up inflaming the kind of passions that led to the Civil War.

By the election of 1912, antitrust feeling was running high. Eugene Debs resolved to bring the system of property ownership into line with already socialized production through nationalization of big capital, while "Bull Moose" Progressives talked about thoroughgoing government regulation under their New Nationalism. Woodrow Wilson, for his part, solemnly announced with Delphic ambiguity, "I am for big business and I am against the trusts." To the consternation of conservatives, the atmosphere was reminiscent of the great battles of the Gilded Age over money inflation and the protective tariff. There was no guarantee that a Congress susceptible to democratic enthusiasms would not do something drastic such as taking public control of the banking system or putting teeth into the Sherman Act. The trust question, broadly defined, was the most pressing business faced by the incoming Wilson administration, and it was clear that a solution would require statecraft of the highest order.⁹

There is enough conflicting evidence about the president to suggest

that upon coming to office he simply did not know what he was doing, or at least he did not know exactly how to proceed. He fully accepted the rise of big business as "normal and inevitable" and in common with progressive opinion believed that some middle way in the law would have to be found between extreme individualism and public ownership. Yet he had also accepted Louis Brandeis' prescriptions for restoring competition and had campaigned as a Victorian liberal devoted to free trade and what he called "the men who are on the make rather than the men who are already made."¹⁰ Such rhetoric placated the Bryan wing of the Democratic party and other legatees of the nineteenth-century antimonopoly agitation, who were also gratified by Wilson's first major action as president in support of the Underwood Tariff, which reduced import duties from 40 percent to around 25 percent.¹¹

Having shown his gentlemanly independence from the bribery and intrigue of high-tariff lobbies, Wilson next tackled the thorny problem of currency and banking. The popular clamor for "people's money" had revived after lying dormant since Bryan's defeat in 1896. Agrarians of the Southwest and militant midwestern followers of Robert La Follette, plus the handful of surviving inflationists who had once wept with Bryan to see mankind crucified upon a "cross of gold" all demanded public currency and public control over private bankers. Even Teddy Roosevelt had been heard to denounce "the malefactors of great wealth." The revival of the antimonopoly hatred for the "money power" received a big boost in 1912 from the Pujo Committee, named after a Louisiana congressman, whose investigations of the "money trust" were condensed by Louis Brandeis into a muckraking classic, *Other People's Money* (1914). These attacks indicted finance capitalists for a vast conspiracy of interlocking directorates and behind-the-scenes banker control of industry.¹²

Money trust or not, Wall Streeters sought to insulate themselves against just this sort of "agrarianism," not to mention socialism. They came forward with the Aldrich Plan under what amounted to a revival of the old Bank of the United States, which they also hoped would prevent a recurrence of the Panic of 1907. That was too much centralized banking for Carter Glass, a Virginia senator who was thoroughly conservative on every point except his antipathy to New York banks. Although Glass was the principal author of the administration's bill, Brandeis contributed the key progressive innovations—government currency and a Federal Reserve Board to oversee private banks. In its

final form, the bill contained only weak antimonopoly provisions, which enabled a large body of big bankers to support it in the expectation that real power would lie not in the Federal Reserve Board but in the officers of the member banks themselves.¹³

What emerged as the Federal Reserve System in 1913 was an exquisite political compromise that satisfied advocates of both centralized and decentralized banking, as well as supporters of private and public control. It created a dozen federal reserve banks with New York as the first among equals; banks could issue Federal Reserve notes in small denominations backed by the U.S. Treasury; the system was overseen by a federal bank board appointed by the president but presumably drawn from the leading men of the banking community. It also created the statutory basis for U.S. branch banking overseas. In all it was a remarkable balancing act that expanded the federal government's regulatory role without resorting to statist control and built on decentralized, federal structures congenial to small property while recognizing the primacy of New York banks and their leadership in foreign investment.¹⁴ It edged away from the "drift" of laissez faire while lodging "mastery" not in a public bureaucracy but in a regulatory-corporate complex that left the main decisions in private hands. As a consequence, currency and banking disappeared as major issues until the Great Depression.

With respect to giant industrial combines, progressive statecraft followed the same lines of finely balanced compromise. The most drastic proposals came from latter-day populists, Bryan Democrats, and southwestern agrarians who wanted nothing less than destruction of oligopoly itself in the name of free enterprise. To that end they called for strict government regulation of the stock exchange, abolition of the "rule of reason," and outright prohibition on corporate interlocks of the sort uncovered by the Pujo investigation. By comparison, the socialist prescription for public ownership of concentrated capital, though a radical transformation in property relations, would have resulted in less disruption in the actual day-to-day processes of production and distribution. Keeping both of these drastic remedies at bay became the first aim of progressive policy. Taft's preferred method had been to refer the trust question to the courts, the branch of government most shielded from popular influence. In Roosevelt's case, the preference was for hands-on administrative regulation through a commission that would police the activities of big business, a position that accorded well

with the tripartite, protocorporatist proposals of the National Civic Federation. Wilson, on the other hand, was more elusive. As a professor of government at Princeton, Wilson had accepted the big corporation as a legitimate fact of life, but as a presidential candidate he had talked like a latter-day Jeffersonian about a New Freedom in support of small property and against monopoly control.¹⁵

In the event, progressive statecraft was based not on campaign rhetoric or presidential whim but on the balance of political forces. It was clear that the socialist proposal for government ownership fell beyond the pale of liberal ideology and that the agrarian proposal for dissolution of the trusts was also unacceptable. Both were ruled out when Wilson reassured businessmen at the start of the 1914 legislative session that "the antagonism between business and government is over."¹⁶ At the same time, the government could not simply continue drifting on a laissez-faire course, because doing so had only raised the popular temperature to a fever level. In the end, the administration and Congress charted a course between radical change and the status quo. They established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which was empowered to set rules for fair competition, issue cease-and-desist orders against infractions, and collect information on trade conditions.

This compromise was enough to placate both the New Nationalists, who welcomed clarification of the rules of oligopolistic competition, and New Freedomites, who hoped that small competitors would be protected against monopoly pricing. Even Taft conservatives were mollified by having FTC decisions made subject to judicial review in courts that were well beyond the reach of the people's elected tribunes. To guide judicial decisions, the Clayton Act defined "unfair" competition in terms of price discrimination, tying contracts, and some kinds of interlocking directorships and stockholding. When all was said and done, business leaders were in agreement with Wilson that antagonism between business and government was over. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce spoke for most in supporting the new arrangements for what it called industrial "self-regulation," a necessary euphemism cloaking the reality of expanded government regulation. A Missouri senator was closer to the mark in saying that the Clayton Act started out as "a raging lion with a mouth full of teeth. It has degenerated to a tabby cat with soft gums, a plaintive mew, and an anemic appearance."¹⁷

Wage earners had an immense stake in the trust question. Their abil-

ity to organize for self-protection was deeply affected by the way property relations were being redefined to keep up with the rise of the corporation. President Cleveland's use of the Sherman Act against the American Railway Union in the 1894 railroad strike was the opening gun of the era of the injunction, which lasted until the Norris-Laguardia Act of 1932. Although courts had long since stopped holding unions and strikes to be illegal per se, the broader forms of worker solidarity ran afoul of antitrust law, including the industrywide strike (*In re Debs*, 1895), the consumer boycott in support of a strike (*Loewe v. Lawlor*, 1908), and publication of a list of "foul" employers (*Bucks Stove*, 1911). In fact, most of the early prosecutions of "illegal combinations in restraint of trade" went against unions, no matter how much the American Federation of Labor invoked the free speech protections of the Bill of Rights.¹⁸

With the National Association of Manufacturers crowing over this string of courtroom victories, the AFL set out to break the potent alliance between business and the judiciary. AFL strategy was geared to the system of constitutional checks and balances and was aimed at electing "friends of labor" to Congress and the White House. Gompers supported Wilson in 1912 and used every ounce of his rather puny congressional muscle to win exemption for unions under the Clayton Act. For all his pains, the only outcomes were a pious reiteration of common legal doctrine that unions were not illegal and an eloquent but empty proclamation that "human labor is not a commodity." Grasping for any straw of legitimacy, Gompers nonetheless embraced the new law as "labor's Magna Carta." He lived to eat those words. In the ensuing fifteen years, the courts handed down more antiunion injunctions than in the twenty-four years before Clayton. Although open-shop industry enjoyed steady injunctive relief from trade unionism, it was not until the Great Depression that the balance was partially redressed and unions got some relief.¹⁹

In purely political terms, the progressive answer to the trust question was a masterful compromise. It gave just enough to Bryan Democrats and "friends of labor" for them to stand with conservative Democrats, Taft Republicans, and Bull Moosers behind the new regulations on banking and corporate practices. It harmonized the three branches of government insofar as Congress gave a statutory basis to the executive's Federal Trade Commission and Federal Reserve Board, while providing for judicial review of FTC decisions. It tended toward cen-

tralized control, but it left enough regional autonomy, for example, in the dozen Federal Reserve districts, for continuity with federalist tradition. It modified the liberal state in the direction of government regulation of the market, but instead of erecting a state bureaucracy, it lodged real power in a kind of parastate, that is, a nexus of private-public authority that combined corporate management with government regulation. As a result, it took the trust question out of politics in both senses. That is, it silenced much popular clamor, removing trust-busting as an issue in the next presidential election; and it referred future issues of corporate malfeasance to "nonpolitical" bodies of experts.²⁰

This harmonious political resolution of the trust question should not be mistaken for a resolution of social antagonism. Contrary to the aims of social-justice advocates at the grass roots, progressive statecraft at the national level favored capital against workers and large capital over small. The consequence of federal action at the height of progressive influence was to reshape property relations by helping to redefine the legal norms of ownership. The formal cartel arrangements among oligopolistic firms of the sort common in German industry—price fixing, exclusive contracts, direct government promotion—were put out of bounds, and true monopoly was discouraged. But the tight oligopoly of a handful of separate corporations was fully accepted, so long as they refrained from "unreasonable" collusion.²¹ The Supreme Court made it official in 1920 by upholding the legality of the United States Steel Corporation under the "rule of reason," leaving the steel industry in possession of a few firms that preferred stability to competition and were therefore willing to follow the lead of Judge Elbert Gary and his "Steel Trust." It was crystal clear that the new balance favored open-shop employers in their battle against the unions, a fact that would be resoundly confirmed in the defeat of the great 1919 steel strike. Thus the progressive corporate-regulatory complex altered the relation between state and society in ways that helped transform the corporate elite into the dominant class and legitimate their leadership in society at large.

Progressive Liberals versus Managerial Liberals

In the early morning of the corporate era, as industrial disorder spilled over into the public arena, it was clear that "laissez faire plus the con-

stable" would not be enough to restore public order and protect property. But what would? The problem confronting the Rockefellers, Mellons, and Morgans was not how they might secure better policing of this or that isolated industrial community, but how they were going to legitimate their considerable property before the country at large. Because of a long tradition of democratic struggles beginning in the Revolution and running through the labor and populist revolts of the late nineteenth century, popular forces probably had more influence in the state than anywhere else in the world. Why else were elites in the United States so frightened of state intervention, whereas conservatives everywhere else invariably championed state power? As soon as the question of legitimacy was broached, corporate magnates ran into the same difficulty their forerunners had encountered with labor republicanism and agrarian populism in the late nineteenth century: how could capitalist inequality be reconciled with democratic values?

Although the rich were in no imminent danger of being relieved of their fortunes, they were obliged to operate within a field of force in which the working and lower middle classes traditionally had significant access to the levers of political power and cultural authority. Having succeeded in defeating insurgent workers and farmers in the 1880s and 1890s, they were now faced with renewed initiatives from the movements for social justice behind people's lawyers such as Clarence Darrow and Louis Brandeis, social reformers such as Jane Addams and Florence Kelley, and hell-raisers such as Mother Jones and Big Bill Haywood. So it was clear that the inherited liberal governing system would have to change, that subordinate groups would have a hand in changing it, and that the outcome was not a foregone conclusion.

That was the lesson learned at considerable cost in human life from the most dramatic industrial confrontation of Woodrow Wilson's first term—the Ludlow Massacre. When the massacre occurred, on April 20, 1914, Colorado was already notorious for the ferocity of its labor wars fought out over two decades. Battle lines had been drawn in company towns such as Telluride and Cripple Creek, where miners and their families, assisted by unions such as the Western Federation of Miners and the Industrial Workers of the World, were pitted against absentee owners, Citizens' Alliances, private police, state officials, and the militia. Official tolerance for antiunion vigilantism made for legalized lawlessness, and after one especially brutal reign of mob rule, miners asked: "Is Colorado America?"²²

That question hung like a dark cloud over the property of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, a Rockefeller subsidiary located in a barren, mountainous region near the Purgatory River, during the strike-torn winter of 1913-14. The strike had erupted when the company refused to deal with the United Mine Workers and, instead, imported private detectives and sheriff's deputies, along with a motorized Gatling gun nicknamed the Death Special. With bullets flying in both directions, the governor sent in the militia, which was gradually taken over by company guards to become a strikebreaking force. "Bullet bargaining" culminated on April 20, 1914, when militiamen attacked a tent colony of miners' families who had been evicted from company housing, killing sixty-six men, women, and children, including eleven incinerated in a pit below the blazing tents. The infamy of the Ludlow Massacre raised a cry of outrage throughout the country, and telegrams flooded the White House, many demanding that President Wilson withdraw the troops currently occupying Vera Cruz, Mexico, to keep an eye on Standard Oil interests and send them, instead, to defend Colorado miners. At last, Wilson sent in federal troops who restored public order on terms that permitted the mines to reopen on a non-union basis.²³

Was Colorado America? No, not insofar as the West's unusually violent social antagonisms rapidly escalated into great political battles over property rights and state power. One reason for this politicization was the high profile of the federal government in the West. Because the frontier era had barely passed, many westerners still remembered when U.S. cavalry had suppressed Geronimo's revolt and put down Sioux tribes at the 1890 Battle of Wounded Knee. Having pacified the rebellious tribes, government agents dealt with reservation "nations," the largest of which, the Navaho, lay astride four southwestern states, and direct federal control of Arizona and New Mexico did not end until statehood in 1912. In addition, the federal government played an unusually large role in the economic development of the region, originally through railroad land grants and later in river and irrigation projects, forerunners to the lucrative military contracting of the late twentieth century.²⁴

The military also played an exceptionally large role because of chronic tension on the Mexican border. U.S.-Mexican relations were the closest analogue in North America to the border tensions among the proximate and often warring states of western Europe that did so

much to promote large military establishments and labyrinthine state bureaucracies. During the reign of Porfirio Diaz (1877-1911), the United States maintained garrisons at a number of border points from Brownsville, Texas, to Nogales, Arizona, even though the Mexican dictator was determined to win favor with U.S. mining companies by using the murderous *rurales* against bandits and unruly workers. The Mexican Revolution inflamed smoldering conflict, and twice the United States invaded Mexico (Vera Cruz, 1914; the Punitive Expedition, 1916-17), and twice more mobilized the national guard at the border in anticipation of full-scale war. For all these reasons, federal rifles and flags were close companions to the dollar in the transition from frontier industrialization to the corporate era in the West. In fact, most of the episodes of federal troop use in industrial disturbances took place in western mining districts, including Coeur d'Alene, Idaho (1892, 1897); Morenci, Arizona (1903); and Goldfield, Nevada (1907).²⁵ In short, state repression was the crux of the western solution to the problem of public disorder.

Sure to be on hand when the going got rough were the Industrial Workers of the World. The Wobblies emerged from the rough-and-tumble of western metal mining and lumberjacking, where they experienced raw exploitation of people and nature first hand in hard-fisted mining camps and rough-hewn bunkhouses. Founded in 1905 at the "Continental Congress of the working class," they gained notoriety with "Free Speech Fights" in the West, and burst upon the East in the famous Lawrence textile strike of 1912. In espousing direct action, industrial unionism, and sabotage they showed a violent streak that was very much in the American grain. They resurrected the revolutionary tradition of the Declaration of Independence, invoked the Bill of Rights in their frequent court appearances, and gave the labor movement its twentieth-century anthem "Solidarity Forever." Though described by Big Bill Haywood in a moment of conciliation as "socialism with its working clothes on," the Wobblies' brand of revolutionary unionism was similar to French syndicalism, Italian anarchism, and British industrial unionism.²⁶ And it showed the depth of the problem in American industry.

If the West was an extreme case, it was not unique in posing the conflict between property rights and worker rights, between capitalism and democracy. Violent class warfare raged in other parts of the country, notably the West Virginia coalfields and the textile mills of Law-

rence and Patterson, and western disorder was properly seen as a national problem. Certainly, the eyes of the nation were upon a Los Angeles courtroom in 1911 where the McNamara brothers, two trade unionists accused of bombing the antiunion *Los Angeles Times*, were on trial for their lives. The case ended when Clarence Darrow, the noted defense attorney, entered a guilty plea that astounded their supporters but saved their necks. But clearly, the cycle of violence and repression that brought such cases in the first place cried out for new remedies.

In fact, progressives were ready with an answer: let labor and capital work out their differences through collective bargaining under the watchful eye of an impartial public. With the goal of mediating industrial disputes before they escalated to lethal confrontations, progressives urged Congress to create a Commission on Industrial Relations. When intellectuals and social workers associated with *The Survey* magazine proposed a scientific investigation of the causes of industrial violence, President Taft embraced the idea in the hope of remedying the status quo, under which "industrial disputes lead inevitably to a state of industrial war." After intense lobbying by the AFL, Congress created a commission on Industrial Relations, composed of equal numbers of representatives from labor, capital, and the public to conduct investigations and file reports that would enlist public opinion against the parties to violent industrial disputes. Congressman William B. Wilson, soon to be the first secretary of labor, promised that the commission "will tend to show the employer and employee alike the necessity of getting together and thrashing out their differences over the table instead of in the industrial battlefield of strikes." The public would play umpire; that is to say, social workers, journalists, lawyers, educators, and other middle-class opinion makers were supposed to represent some disinterested general will, as if the middle classes did not have interests of their own in industrial peace. Although the lack of coercive power kept the commission squarely within the liberal tradition, the recognition of labor as a corporate entity coequal with capital reworked liberalism to conform more closely to the emerging corporate system.²⁷

Within these limits, commission chair Frank Walsh made the most of it. A St. Louis labor lawyer and loyal Democrat, he portrayed industrial disputes as a conflict between capitalism and democracy. Laying the blame for disorder squarely at the feet of open-shop employers who refused to deal with the legitimate grievances of their employees,

he turned the Commission on Industrial Relations into a platform for "industrial democracy." The most dramatic moment in the commission's five-year history came in hearings on the Ludlow Massacre, when Walsh inflicted humiliation upon John D. Rockefeller, Jr., by disclosing that Rockefeller, contrary to his pious protestations of innocence, had been in close touch with the situation in Colorado. Walsh laid into Rockefeller for his intransigence in refusing to deal with employees at Colorado Fuel and Iron and for the corporate callousness that had led to so many deaths. By the time he was finished, the blood on Rockefeller's hands was there for all to see. The final report, issued in 1916, warned employers to cooperate with labor voluntarily or face moves toward compulsory bureaucratic paternalism of the sort that existed in Germany. It counterposed the existing regime of "industrial feudalism" to the promise of "industrial democracy" and warned that the continuation of high levels of conflict posed a mortal threat to the republic. It concluded, "political democracy can only exist where there is industrial democracy."²⁸

The story of the Commission on Industrial Relations illustrates a recurrent feature of American politics—the tendency to conduct politics as public theater in congressional hearing rooms and public courtrooms. In the absence of ideologically polarized parties or a great state bureaucracy to adjudicate disputes, the courts carried an unusually heavy load in attempting to legitimate the regime of corporate property. The annals of labor history from 1900 to 1916 are filled with celebrated cases of defendants facing criminal charges for union or political activity: witness the IWW "free speech" fights, Clarence Darrow's defense of Big Bill Haywood on a trumped-up murder charge, the firing-squad execution of Wobbly bard Joe Hill.²⁹

Did such celebrated cases promote faith in the legal system? Unlike the everyday workings of local courts, which were often linked to working-class political machines, the more spectacular courtroom dramas probably did little to inspire popular confidence in the majesty of the law. On some occasions, anti-Red hysteria and ethnic prejudice got the best of the sober men in black robes, as in the executions of the Haymarket anarchists in 1887 and of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti in 1927. As passions cooled and these individual cases came to be perceived as miscarriages of justice, they hardly vindicated the legal system per se, any more than did the barrage of antiunion injunctions. The most that can be said is that the labor movement's running encounter with the courts probably reinforced middle-class perceptions of or-

ganized labor as a pariah and did not contribute much to winning workers' assent to their own subordination within the regime of private property. Not until the 1930s, when much of workers' collective action was decriminalized, did the law unequivocally exercise a hegemonic function.³⁰

In the meantime, the Wilson administration took a few tiny steps toward labor reform. Ignoring the call for "industrial democracy," the administration nonetheless elevated the Department of Labor to cabinet rank and worked with Congress to set up nonbinding mediation machinery under the Newlands Act of 1913 on the model of a dozen such state commissions. It was not as if the AFL wanted much more than that, certainly nothing resembling government-supervised collective bargaining of the sort that emerged in the 1930s. To the contrary, the AFL wanted to reduce the state's role in labor relations to win relief from the devastating effects of antiunion court injunctions, a goal that still eluded the movement despite the Clayton Act. Otherwise, Samuel Gompers was in tune with the ideas of labor economist John Commons, intellectuals such as Herbert Croly, and the National Civic Federation, who proposed to resolve class conflict through stable collective bargaining and the mediation of permanent government commissions. As one of the fledgling industrial relations experts defined the problem: "How can the discipline and efficiency of the shop be maintained, yet the workers be granted a larger share in the management of industry?" That question would not be answered until the Wagner Act of 1935 underwrote collective bargaining; in the meantime, the fact that these changes took place reflected the growing strength of industrial workers; but their minimalism reflected the still-impregnable inner fortress of property right in the workplace.³¹

Since a frontal assault on property right proved impossible, progressives came forward with protective legislation, a back-door attack on laissez faire. In areas that were out of the direct line of collective bargaining, the AFL could abandon its voluntarist philosophy to call for increased state intervention. Indeed, motivated by notions of manly independence, craftsmen were eager for government to exclude their dependents from the labor market altogether; similarly, for both economic and nativist motives they demanded state intervention to cut off the influx of foreign labor.³² As the experience of wage earners in modern industry more and more contradicted the norm of the self-regulating middle-class family, public authorities looked to police pow-

ers for the legal warrant to regulate the market, under which a number of states instituted factory inspections for health and safety. The issue that excited the most outrage was child labor. From Dickens' *Oliver Twist* (1838) to Lewis Hine's heartbreaking photographs of exploited children, nothing moved a stricken conscience to tears more quickly than an impoverished waif, innocent of all crime yet condemned to suffer. Tapping these humanitarian wellsprings, the National Child Labor Committee won a spate of state restrictions on child labor and, with some cynical support from northern manufacturers troubled about southern competition, pushed the Keating-Owen Act through Congress in 1916. Although the federal law failed to pass constitutional muster before the Supreme Court, even in a subsequently modified version, many state laws against child labor remained on the books.³³

At the same time, states were putting curbs on hours for adult workers. The Supreme Court had little trouble upholding an eight-hour limit in hazardous occupations such as mining, or even time-and-a-half after ten hours for male workers in *Bunting v. Oregon* (1917), although the Court took only the health, not the wealth, of workers into account. Where women workers were concerned, regulation of the market went still further, and after *Muller v. Oregon* (1908) courts routinely upheld women's maximum hours and prohibitions on night work. Minimum wages for women were more troubling, and the Court reversed itself on the matter in a span of six years.³⁴ Even so, some federal barriers were starting to fall. Pressed hard by the AFL, Congress adopted the eight-hour day for federal employees and, after similar pressure from the railroad brotherhoods, passed the Adamson Act in 1916 imposing the eight-hour day on the railroads. Thus on the eve of U.S. entry into the First World War, a cross-class alliance of middle-class reformers, social feminists, and labor advocates was successful in building a few social-justice planks into the governing system.

The more progressives chipped away at the edifice of laissez faire, the more corporate leaders recognized that unless they embarked on self-regulation, they would be subject to further unwanted government regulation. Knowing they needed to answer the arguments for industrial democracy and protective legislation with a positive program of industrial self-government, the Rockefellers and the du Ponts hired public relations men such as Ivy Lee to spruce up their images. Meanwhile, an executive from General Electric named Magnus Alexander rounded up half a dozen manufacturers' associations to create the Na-

tional Industrial Conference Board (NICB) in 1916 as an ideological clearinghouse and publicity bureau for industrial corporations. The NICB held up welfare capitalism, scientific management, and employment management as examples of corporate benevolence that benefited worker, consumer, and stockholder alike. Undoubtedly profit and power were the prime movers in the corporate drive for efficiency, but enlightened businessmen also recognized the need to legitimate big business to the public at large.³⁵

Welfare capitalism was another managerial initiative. For their own self-interest and to keep the state at bay, corporations began to experiment with programs that addressed the economic and social needs of family life. For loyal employees, they instituted pensions, health plans, and stock ownership, and they drew social engineers, Americanizers, and the Young Men's Christian Association into the vortex of industrial relations in the hope of making the fearsome factory environment seem more like the kind of happy families depicted in company magazines such as the *American Sugar Family*. In a few cases, companies supplied coal at cost, built housing, and provided garden plots, as well as clubs for "little mothers," lectures on infant hygiene, washrooms, and lunchrooms. They hired sociologists to ferret out moral evils and visiting nurses to weed out malingerers.³⁶

The railroad branch of the YMCA set the pace with leisure-time clubs, smoking and reading rooms, and gospel meetings, all of which were intended as edifying alternatives to the low theater, gambling den, and saloon. Executives hoped that a self-disciplined Christian worker would be both more efficient and loyal. As one Pennsylvania Railroad executive noted, "The fact that the Company is interested in his welfare . . . should convince the thoughtful employee that he is not working for the proverbial 'soulless corporation,' but is an integral part of a mutually conducted industry."³⁷ Moved by the same goal, the National Civic Federation established a Welfare Department under Gertrude Beeks, who helped conduct celebrated welfare work at International Harvester and National Cash Register on the principle that it was not enough to weed out socialists and labor agitators; management also had to cultivate positive loyalty from its subordinates. In all these aspects, welfare capitalism was an attempt to circumvent unions, a fact proved by the growth of welfare programs from 1916 to 1922 in the face of the most rapid union growth and the biggest strike offensive in American history. At the same time, it was an attempt to bond the

working-class family to corporate management that recognized the failure of the cash nexus as a basis for stable industrial relations.³⁸

In many ways, the main target of welfare capitalism was not the industrial worker but the middle-class public. In other words, welfare capitalism was the answer not just to unions, but also to protective legislation and the whole range of social reform. That was certainly the case with the most famous welfare plan of the period, the Colorado Industrial Plan. When the gruesome details of corporate malfeasance in the Ludlow Massacre came to light in the hearings before Frank Walsh and the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, Rockefeller brought in the big guns of the YMCA and Canadian industrial relations expert MacKenzie King to improve labor (and public) relations. The Colorado Plan included such welfare capitalist measures as YMCA recreation, subsidies to the Boy Scouts and Campfire Girls, and improvements in housing; it introduced such measures of employment management as employee representation on committees to deal with sanitation, safety, and working conditions; and it even set up grievance machinery.³⁹

In all, it was a model managerial solution to worker discontent, right down to the one thing it did not do—recognize the union. In fact, the parties involved were quite candid about their aims in developing employee relations plans: they sought to build "unity of interest" and to avoid insubordination of the sort they believed arose from "third-party" meddling among otherwise "loyal" employees.⁴⁰ More important, management had to combat the public image of the soulless corporation if it was going to rebut the ideologies of class struggle and repulse the movement for social justice. Although prewar welfare capitalism had only a marginal impact on industrial relations, it marked a change in the ideology by which capitalists sought to legitimate their dominance.

Scientific management was another route to the same end. Frederick W. Taylor and his disciples introduced the science of management with much fanfare about harmonizing the interests of employer and employee. As Taylor said, "both sides take their eyes off the division of the surplus until this surplus becomes so large that it is unnecessary to quarrel over how it shall be divided." Hard-boiled economics wrapped in the mystique of science provided an answer to class struggle. Wages did not depend on collective bargaining or a redistribution of the fruits of labor, but on efficient production calculated with stopwatch precision and rewarded by incentive and bonus. That was how Louis Bran-

deis presented the case for scientific management in public testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission in the Eastern Rate Case of 1911. He put an efficiency expert on the stand to tell an eager, gullible audience that instead of charging higher rates, railroads could save \$1 million a day by cutting labor costs, which would benefit all concerned—stockholders, railway workers, shippers, and consumers.⁴¹

A battery of progressive intellectuals were soon waving Taylor's magic wand as a cure for profiteering and discontent. Whereas nineteenth-century critics such as Edward Bellamy had indicted the capitalist system for wasting monumental amounts of labor, capital, and resources, Herbert Croly and Walter Lippmann contended that efficiency entailed eliminating waste, and Josephine Goldmark held up efficiency as the remedy for overwork, long hours, and the employment of women in unhealthy conditions.⁴² Efficiency, or "the elimination of waste," became a kind of anal-compulsive battle cry in the latter-day Puritan war on nature, outflanking the egalitarian rallying call for industrial democracy.

Another reason social reform did not make any greater headway was the counterweight of the South. In the first place, the South continued to be cursed by a vicious cycle of poverty and racism. It was possible for dogged optimists to find auguries of economic progress in the narrowing gap of regional wealth: in 1912 the South's per capita income was about half the national average; by 1940 it had risen to 65 percent.⁴³ But on balance, what stood out were the differences. On the eve of the First World War, the South was still burdened by the legacy of inequality bequeathed from plantation slavery to agrarian paternalism and then to industrial segregation. Although a few brave crusaders raised their voices in favor of labor laws, protective legislation, and women's suffrage, the South lacked the key ingredients for a successful social-justice coalition. Working-class organization was unusually weak, in large part because of the influence of racial segregation, and middle-class conscience was no stronger, in large part because of the paucity and timidity of the new urban professionals whose careers were bound up with social uplift. Where they did exist, it was often to operate the local franchise for national organizations such as the National Child Labor Committee and the Young Women's Christian Association.⁴⁴ Thus the social basis did not exist for the kind of cross-class alliance for social justice that made northern states such as Wisconsin and New York models of reform.

Southern politics was part of the problem. Progressive officeholders came largely from the ranks of planters, mill owners, and bankers and were more likely to be boosters than knockers of business. Several southern governors such as Hoke Smith of Georgia and Braxton Comer of Alabama won reputations as progressives by building roads and schools, aiding commercial banking, and otherwise promoting industrial development. Such factory and railroad regulations as existed had even fewer teeth than similar measures in the North. Thus, in the main, southern progressivism was a conservative version of its northern counterpart confined to "whites only," and it caused barely a ripple in corporate offices.⁴⁵

Populism was no longer a threat, either. Having given a great scare in the 1890s, populism had become a grotesque caricature of its former self. Elites had taken advantage of demagogic ferment around the "race question" to disfranchise virtually the entire black electorate and, by means of the poll tax, residency rules, and literacy tests, had also effectively excluded as many as half the white voters. In some cases, this evisceration of democracy had been carried out in the name of progressive reform, as in Virginia, where the turnout of the potential electorate dropped from 59.6 percent in 1900 to 27.7 percent in 1904 after the new measures went into effect. Cut off from their popular voting base and thoroughly poisoned by white racism, former Populists such as Georgia's Tom Watson and out-and-out demagogues such as South Carolina's Cole Blease clung to power by posing as champions of the little guy against the rich. Playing out the farce, what had been a vibrant reform tradition in the days of the Populists degenerated into a choice between elite progressives and populist impostors.⁴⁶

The effect was felt all the way to Washington. The Democrats' control of the White House and Congress under President Wilson, an adopted son of the South, gave southern elites greater weight in the scales of national power than they had enjoyed since the antebellum period. The names of southern legislators were affixed to every major piece of New Freedom legislation, including the Underwood Tariff, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, the Glass Federal Reserve System, and the Adamson Railway Act. In keeping with the spirit of southern progressivism, the region's representatives supported federal aid for farm loan credits, agricultural education, highways, and boll weevil eradication, in effect writing a preface to southern support for the Sheppard-Towner child health bill in the 1920s and federal aid to agriculture

under both Hoover and Roosevelt. Where capitalist development and commercial agriculture were concerned, the South supported federal action.⁴⁷

However, the southern delegation brought not just a glass of tepid progressivism to Washington, but gallons of the entire Dixie elixir. Having embraced the scholarly canon that Reconstruction had been a ghastly mistake, Wilson now appointed a raft of southern segregationists to the cabinet. Postmaster General Albert Burleson and Treasury Secretary William McAdoo promptly segregated previously integrated government facilities, a move Wilson supported over the vehement protests of Afro-American leaders such as William Monroe Trotter. Meanwhile, he waxed enthusiastic about *Birth of a Nation* (1916), D. W. Griffith's epic masterpiece of white supremacy in which the Ku Klux Klan is lionized as the redeemer of the white South from the lecherous and corrupt rule of blacks and carpetbaggers. As a Presbyterian gentleman, Wilson abominated mob rule, but he turned a deaf ear to the mounting demands from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People for national action against lynch mobs. In fairness, the North also took *Birth of a Nation* to heart and was preparing to greet southern black migrants with a spate of vicious race riots from 1917 through 1919, which strengthened white supremacy as a national phenomenon.⁴⁸

The South acted as a potent counterbalance to feminism and social justice. The South was the most reliable bastion of opposition to women's suffrage. Southern advocates of suffrage were few and far between, and for every Jessie Daniel Ames arguing the case against paternalism on grounds of equal rights there were many others such as Belle Kearney who argued that white men of power ought to see "Anglo Saxon women as the medium through which to retain the supremacy of the white race over the African." Left to the South, women's suffrage would never have been enacted; only four southern states eventually ratified the Nineteenth Amendment.⁴⁹

The same could be said for the social-justice legislation that squeaked through in Wilson's first term, such as labor laws pertaining to seamen and federal workers. In the case of child labor, the Keating-Owen Act of 1916 met intense opposition from the Carolinas, where the textile industry was centered, and if two Border states are excluded, a slight majority of the South's representatives voted against it. Where federal intervention threatened both racial segregation and property rights, southern gentlemen were among the staunchest de-

fenders of laissez faire. Heeding the warnings of the National Association of Manufacturers, they opposed an eight-hour law for federal employees on the grounds that it "would upset everything in the towns, would bring the Negro in in great numbers."⁵⁰ The one point on which the South joined forces with progressive social reformers was Prohibition; beginning in Georgia in 1907 and running through Wilson's presidency, every state in the region eliminated the saloon, and southern representatives were a leading force in passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. But Prohibition was not only a repressive measure that gave authorities a club over blacks, poor whites, and immigrants alike; as the country was soon to discover, it caused more crime than uplift.⁵¹ As southern politics counterbalanced the budding alliance of urban workers and new middle classes around social reform, it was not only southerners who paid the price of the South's peculiar institutions, it was the whole country.

National elites had to look elsewhere for models of how to govern. In fact, they experimented with three models. The first was old-fashioned liberalism—a state of courts and parties, a policy of laissez faire on social issues, the use of troops to police industrial disturbances, and the ruling myths of private property right, separate spheres, and white supremacy. Still the dominant model, it hardly presented an innovative path to the future. The other two models—progressive and managerial—were rival attempts to resolve the contradiction between emerging social forces and the existing liberal state, and they would compete with each other through the First World War into the New Era and all the way to the New Deal. They represented alternative revisions in the American liberal tradition of self-government. Managerial liberals redefined it to mean self-government in industry, emphasizing the public benevolence of the private corporation. Progressives redefined it in social terms, emphasizing government as the benevolent influence balancing the claims of selfish private interests. At the end of Wilson's first term in 1916, progressives held the initiative at the national level, and social reformers, social feminists, and the labor movement were notching victories, however small, for social legislation. For the moment it seemed as if the walls of laissez faire were going to fall.

Progressivism versus German Statism

The completion of Wilson's 1916 legislative program in time for the fall election rang down the curtain on the progressive period in American

history. It was a time when the old order of laissez-faire liberalism began to die, while a new order struggled to be born; when family capitalism gave way to corporate capitalism; when the first Industrial Revolution of factories and steam power gave way to a second phase of mass production and electric power; when small farmers took a back seat to rising industrial workers; when a nation of immigrants from northern Europe tried to decide how to react to the mass influx of southern and eastern Europeans. There was drama enough in these epic social changes; yet always the most compelling part of the story was the way people became conscious of the tensions in their daily lives and fought them out in public life. For some dozen years, insurgent forces at the grass roots had taken the initiative, carrying their campaigns for reform to the camp of Yankee Protestant elites, never marching in a single column but repeatedly throwing the enemy on the defensive. Unwilling to rest content in the face of social injustice, they threw down the gauntlet of reform whenever the New Woman demanded equal suffrage and birth control, or the labor movement demanded industrial democracy and social welfare, or socialists called for nationalization of the giant corporations. This was progressivism at the grass roots, and ever since, the term *progressive* has been applied to the junction point between liberalism and the left.

The ultimate threat in these restive social movements was that they would somehow be able to turn democratic political traditions against the reigning elites. Ever since the first age of reform, in the time of Andrew Jackson, the democratic idea that the people should rule themselves packed a potentially subversive punch, especially in combination with the antiauthoritarian implications of universal suffrage and consent of the governed. If these great myths could be put into practice in the actual life of the society as well as in the realm of formal political rights, then the upper classes, from Wall Street investors to Chicago parvenus, might well tremble. In the absence of a ruling establishment—no bishops, no king, no hereditary privilege, no bureaucracy, no great standing army—dominant and subordinate groups coexisted in an uneasy compromise between hierarchy and democracy.⁵² In the past, business elites had shielded themselves from democratic use of the state by the doctrine of laissez faire, and laissez faire remained the most adamant enemy of social reform all through the period.

However, it was plain that a society of corporate planning and mass welfare needs could not be governed by the precepts of nineteenth-

century liberalism. And if grass-roots progressivism was going to be checked, there had to be modifications of the liberal state. Among the growing number to recognize these imperatives were the managerial liberals. Refusing to play King Canute with the tide of reform rising all around, pioneer organizations of enlightened capitalists began to offer positive programs of their own. Determined to keep their shops and communities out of the hands of trade unions and social reformers, the National Civic Federation and the National Industrial Conference Board promised to bring a modicum of security to modern industrial society. They invented welfare capitalism as the alternative to state welfare, touted scientific management as the solution to waste, proposed corporate philanthropy as the alternative to public expenditure, and argued that the cure for poverty was raising productivity, not redistribution of wealth. In short, they held up big business itself as the source of social reform, and thus transformed nineteenth-century laissez-faire liberalism into modern managerial liberalism.

Recognizing the same imperatives, elite progressives at the national level charted a course between grass-roots reform and corporate business, between democracy with a "social" bent and managerial liberalism. Some of their achievements were in reform of the political process, notably the direct election of senators, made possible through the Seventeenth Amendment. Others were in economic policy. The Wilson administration performed a virtuoso balancing act as it built reforms into the liberal state. The Federal Reserve System, for example, combined the element of private banker control with the element of public oversight through the presidentially appointed board affectionately known in Wall Street as "the Fed." Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission combined private control of business with public regulation through cease-and-desist orders. Wilson was more timid about intervening in industrial relations, but the Commission on Industrial Relations, the new federal mediation service, and the Adamson Act represented the first institutional recognition that the government should mediate between labor and capital. These were the first steps in the creation of a corporate-regulatory complex, a permanent private-public structure whose respiratory cycles of expansion and contraction would carry on through wartime expansion, contraction in the 1920s, expansion again in the Great Depression, and so on down to the late twentieth century.

To understand why America's corporate-regulatory complex took

the shape it did, comparison with Germany is useful. Both countries were in the grip of similar world-historical forces—mass production/mass reproduction, corporate or “organized” capitalism, the “social question,” changes in the relation between the sexes, and the ideological and political struggles that these social forces engendered. The point of departure for understanding German development is the inverse of liberal America—not the supremacy of society over the state, but the opposite. On the eve of the First World War, the constitutional pyramid of power fashioned by Bismarck for the Wilhelmine empire remained intact, with the imperial chancellor responsible not to elected representatives in the Reichstag, but to the emperor and his army. Industrial-financial elites supported this system as strongly as traditional landed and bureaucratic elites; the middle classes had given up their quarrel with monarchy after the failed revolution of 1848; and even working-class leaders accepted a centralized regime upon which they projected their own future rule. The welter of medieval free cities, petty principalities, and the great kingdoms of Prussia and Bavaria remained united into one state, federal in form but monolithic in fact.

In an effort to explain this authoritarian system to American readers, the pro-German journal *The Fatherland* insisted on recognition of Germany's imperiled geopolitical position: “National existence among close, hostile and powerful neighbors depends on power as a nation. The individual must always place the state before himself.”⁵³ As a consequence, social relations were immediately seen in political terms, in contrast to the American system, in which the long sway of the market tended to separate social relations from state power. Just as Germany's foreign entanglements had helped crystallize the two great international blocs that had plunged into war in 1914, so government at home was a matter of interparty negotiation to form governing blocs, of which the alliance of Conservatives and National Liberals was a long-standing example, and the “Bulow bloc” a short-lived one. Not even defeat in war and the founding of the Weimar Republic would dislodge this system of parliamentary blocs, which continued to be the rule in the precarious circumstances of the 1920s.

The contrast to the United States is obvious. No such formal blocs existed, and the reason was, at least in part, geopolitical. In contrast to central Europe, the United States was spared the pressures of international diplomacy by virtue of its isolation across the seas, a circumstance that permitted the supremacy of society over the state and the

divorce of mass-based parties from particular social interests. Instead of the multiparty system with complex negotiations among the parties to form a government, the two-party system did not offer programmatic or ideological combat between Republicans and Democrats. In fact the parties were essentially loose electoral machines, not tight governing institutions. The contrast between German and American parties shows, in short, how the relation between state and society was shaped by the international relation of forces.

In further contrast, German society was thoroughly integrated at the level of the state, whereas American society was not. The difference between the two can be described as “loose coupling” in the United States versus “tight coupling” in Germany.⁵⁴ There were only indirect connections in the United States between occupation, status, access to education, religious belief, party identity, social welfare, civil service, and state power. By contrast, in Germany the links among all these things were tightly drawn. Although the links were severely strained by social change and individual mobility, boundaries between hierarchical levels were quite distinct, political parties were clearly based within occupational levels, and nothing moved without affecting some aspect of state power. In other words, the modes of social production and social reproduction were visibly tied to the governing system.

That was certainly the case at the highest levels of the state, where politics was the province of an oligarchy of notables. For example, the upper house of the federal legislature was composed of “the greatest executives of large enterprises and trusts, the most noted lawyers and professors, statesmen of the highest repute, financiers and bankers of the first rank, great land and realty owners, and prominent manufacturers and merchants.” A post in the higher civil service depended on passage through an elite training school; social insurance was provided through different channels according to blue-collar or white-collar occupation; parties openly represented different economic interests; cities were governed by a self-selecting bourgeois oligarchy, even in centers of heavy industry such as Dusseldorf, where a top-down alliance of local industrialists and Catholic notables ran things to the exclusion of industrial workers. Even the German reputation for discipline and order was an accurate reflection of the sociopolitical hierarchy in the sense that from the time of Bismarckian social insurance down to 1914, nothing moved in society without being registered in the delicate balance of social interests represented in the state.⁵⁵

Paradoxically, the proclivity for order ensured that social antagonism would be more or less openly represented in politics. That was certainly true of class conflict. Polarization between industrial workers and industrialists was measured in the rise of the Social Democrats to become the largest party in the Reichstag by 1912. It was widely believed that the schism between Social Democrats on one side and Conservatives and National Liberals on the other posed a direct threat to the Wilhelmine regime. It was also true in respect to social welfare. When Germans debated the social question, they took it for granted that answers would be worked out at the level of the state. It was even the case with religion. Bismarck's war against the pope (*Kulturkampf*) had been no more successful than his war against socialism and only guaranteed the formation of the Catholic Center party to look out for the confessional interests of Catholic citizens in a country in which Lutheranism was an established church in most of the federal states. Heirs of Luther, Marx, and Bismarck, Germans could not have escaped even if they had wanted to the direct representation of social antagonism in the state.⁵⁶

The importance of the state was brought home in the fact that prominent differences in women's experiences in Germany and the United States derived in many instances from different forms of the state. Whereas patriarchal traditions had withered in America, going the way of patrimonial inheritance and paternal autocracy, they remained extremely potent in Germany, where they were inscribed in the legal code. Until revision of the Prussian civil code in 1900, husbands reigned supreme and could legally prohibit their wives from working outside the home. Even after revision, although wives controlled their own wages, husbands still controlled all family property. Domestic servants were still subject to quasi-feudal obligations depriving them of rights vis-à-vis their employers. In addition, citizenship inhered in gender: women were denied the vote and, in a realm where the military counted heavily, were excluded from military service. Most strikingly, until the 1908 Law of Association, women were barred from even forming public associations.⁵⁷ The importance of Germanic state traditions is suggested by a comparison with Norway and Sweden, every bit as Lutheran as Prussia, but where proprietary marriage was rapidly decaying.⁵⁸ Whatever the ultimate reason, patriarchal and paternalist forms of male dominance were especially strong in Germany. Denied access to public life and subject to severe constraints in marriage,

women were not supposed to stray beyond children, church, and kitchen (*Kinder, Kirche, Küche*).

German men and women lived in the shadow of the state, for good and for ill. Foreign travelers reported German homes to be as well kept and well ordered as German factories, and linked the reputed efficiency and discipline to the habit of subordination to the state. The idea of the authoritarian family was already taking root well before the National Socialist party arrived on the scene. However, the other side of the authoritarian coin was the paternalist welfare state. With the aim of reducing infant mortality, the state added maternity insurance to accident and health benefits and gradually expanded eligibility and coverage to include all female wage earners. Thanks to the feminist Federation for Mother Protection, unmarried mothers also gained coverage.⁵⁹

In America the balance was reversed. Foreign travelers from Alexis de Tocqueville to Harriet Martineau to Lord Bryce could not help commenting on the independent spirit of American women. It would have been too much to say, as one observer did in 1905, "In Germany women are 'subordinate,' that is they take orders from men; in America they are dominant and give orders to men."⁶⁰ But there was a kernel of truth in the idea that American women enjoyed greater individual liberty, because that was true of the whole society. The unwelcome companion of personal liberty was economic insecurity. American women enjoyed less security than German women, because the German state was geared to provide it, while the United States was not. Although "mothers' pensions" and workmen's compensation were introduced in the Progressive period, there was nothing to compare with arrangements under the German welfare state.

Advanced social insurance was one thing some American progressives found attractive in Germany. New Nationalists such as Herbert Croly touted Germany's unity of national purpose, educational efficiency, and military strength. Elite urban reformers admired the clean, efficient administration of German cities as a decided improvement over America's urban machines, what one called an "infinitely divided system of 'democratic' powers preying upon the public." But to most progressives, Germany represented an undesirable extreme of state control over society, the opposite pole to the equally undesirable extreme of laissez-faire individualism. Seeking a middle way between the two, John Dewey warned that in rejecting "atomistic empiricism" reformers should know that "the remedy is not to be found in recourse to

a philosophy of fixed obligations and authoritative law such as characterized German political thinking." That fear of the state lurked behind everything progressives did, even as they expanded the sphere of state intervention.⁶¹

Wilsonian statecraft brought to a close the first chapter in the emergence of twentieth-century liberalism. The social movements of workers, women, and middle-class reformers had forced their issues into the public arena around calls for industrial democracy, feminism, and social reform, many of which were embodied in the spirited Progressive and Socialist party campaigns of 1912. But campaigning is not governing, and although American parties were responsible for putting people into elective office, they were not responsible for running the country, at least not in the same way as British, French, and, after 1918, German parliamentary parties. That cardinal difference gave President Wilson the flexibility he needed to include elements outside his own party in fashioning a program of reform. Elected as a Victorian liberal who advocated free trade and open competition, he adroitly stole regulatory and social justice planks from Roosevelt's Progressive party, thereby co-opting the social-justice wing of progressivism and, much more distantly, co-opting socialism. And if his program *contained* socialism and social reform in the inclusive sense, it also did so in the exclusive sense, making sure that there would be no significant experiments in state paternalism. Certainly, the southern wing of the Democratic party in conjunction with Republican business conservatives set severe restrictions on how far he could go toward aiding the poor.

Thus even at its highwater mark, progressive statecraft at the national level stopped far short of the kind of statist authority found in Germany. Instead of a German-style welfare state, President Wilson supported women's protective legislation on the state level and the federal child labor act, but scarcely anything more. Instead of full-scale federal mediation of industrial relations, he supported the exercise in public relations known as the Commission on Industrial Relations and the Adamson Act, but, again, little else. Instead of extensive state controls on central banking, Wilson set up the Federal Reserve System under private management with minimal federal oversight, and he appointed friends of business to the Federal Trade Commission. In short, instead of a statist bureaucracy, he constructed a corporate-regulatory complex within the liberal state that left society supreme over the state. As a consequence, the most powerful element in the market—that is, big business—remained supreme in society.

The corporate-regulatory complex pointed the way toward a new governing system in which corporate property and a new form of the nuclear family oriented toward consumption instead of production might be better secured than in the increasingly outmoded shell of laissez-faire liberalism. Certainly, the Federal Reserve helped legitimate Wall Street's finance capitalists at a time when their trusts had come under strong public censure. Likewise, protective legislation came to the support of the family ideal of husband-breadwinner/wife-homemaker, which legitimated women's subordination at a time when radical voices had been raised in favor of equality between the sexes. In addition, the new corporate order increased inequalities of wealth and income to the point that a higher share of income went to the top than ever before in American history; several combined studies show that inequality of income distribution peaked in 1916.⁶² In sum, the achievement of Wilson's progressive statecraft was to remake the liberal state so that liberalism could continue as the dominant tradition in altered form, and also as a tradition that upheld the dominance of rich, white men.

This does not mean that social antagonism was adjourned, or that the great questions of the day had been answered, or that there would never be another attempt to remake the liberal state. But it did mean that progressivism would never get another chance; for even as the Wilsonians were putting the finishing touches on their work, a new dynamic took command of events as more and more the United States was drawn into the vortex of the Great War in Europe.

The Dynamics of Total War

WHEN THE GUNS started booming on European battlefields in August 1914, the sound was just distant thunder to most Americans. Unable to conceive any course but neutrality, no one called for U.S. intervention, not Anglophiles or Germanophobes, missionary diplomats or imperial realists, President Wilson or ex-President Roosevelt. Yet over the next five years, the United States would reverse direction 180 degrees, not once, but twice. In the first reversal, Congress declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary on April 6, 1917, at Wilson's urgent request with only a handful of dissenting votes. The federal government mustered all the economic, military, and psychological resources at its command for total war. Vowing not to stop until the enemy was driven to surrender, Wilson called for "force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit."¹

Then, after the guns fell silent, the country reversed course once again. Refusing to join the League of Nations, it came to regret ever having gone to war, renounced the use of force in formal treaties in the 1920s, and passed neutrality laws in the 1930s. This erratic behavior was brought on, in part, by internal divisions between the forces of reform and the forces of order. In 1917 and 1918 there was no more important question on the home front than how the dynamic of war would affect the dynamic of reform.

The dynamic of war was foisted upon the United States from the outside, in the sense that the country was not a party to the twin crises in domestic and international affairs that caused the outbreak of war in 1914. On the eve of war, each of Europe's great powers was racked by internal division that threatened the dominant position of its ruling classes. Because imperial Russia and Austria-Hungary were the most

antiquated, their ruling classes were the most threatened; conversely, the most liberal regimes, Britain and France, were the least imperiled. Germany lay somewhere in between. It has been argued that German elites—landed, bureaucratic, and military—unilaterally plunged into war in a desperate attempt to fend off the rising power of working-class Social Democrats, and certainly they believed there was much to be gained from the national unity and internal discipline that inevitably came with war. In the international arena, two decades of economic expansion following the late nineteenth-century race for empire had produced two great international alliance systems—the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy; and the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia. The extremely delicate balance between the two blocs was revealed at every diplomatic flashpoint—the Morocco crises, revolution in Turkey, and war in the Balkans in 1912 and 1913. Add an arms race, nationalist passions, and military strategies that depended on rapid and total application of force, and the result by August 1914 was a world war waiting to happen.²

Decision

Although the outbreak of war in Europe had the air of tragic inevitability, that was not the case with the U.S. decision to intervene. Happily excluded from the two great alliance systems, the United States had no diplomatic promises to keep, and so from 1914 through 1916 a series of diplomatic crises came and went without consequence. A great public outcry over the German invasion of Belgium, fueled by British depictions of Prussian militarists bent on rape, booty, and conquest, passed without consequence. More serious was the sinking of the "unarmed" passenger liner *Lusitania* by a German U-boat on May 7, 1915, with the loss of 128 American lives, in part as a result of the explosion of munitions hidden deep in the hold. Although Wilson declared that the United States was "too proud to fight," he took the opportunity to protest the sinking to the German government, which promised to be more careful about civilian lives in the future. This exchange prompted Secretary of War William Jennings Bryan to resign in protest against the double standard that condemned Germany but ignored British violations of neutral rights on the high seas in enforcing its blockade of Germany. The next major crisis followed a similar script. A German U-boat sank an unarmed channel steamer, the *Sussex*, in March 1916,

prompting U.S. protests and a German pledge to warn merchantmen before attack. Thus through 1916 U.S. diplomacy sidestepped the snares of belligerency.³

Much had changed, however, in the two years since war began. The labor and social reform movements together made inroads upon *laissez faire* as more and more states enacted protective legislation, workmen's compensation, mothers' pensions, and tenement inspection, while Wilsonian reforms such as the Federal Reserve System, the Clayton Act, and the child labor law had given just enough ground to placate popular demands for public control of the trusts. American culture blossomed forth with bright new ideas in iconoclastic magazines such as *The Masses* and the *New Republic*, in Carl Sandburg's *Chicago Poems* (1916), and in freewheeling discussions of the "new morality." Margaret Sanger returned from her European sojourn to court arrest for defying the Comstock code by opening a birth control clinic. Charlie Chaplin was making some of his finest silent movies, including *The Pawn Shop* (1916), depicting the ragamuffin workingman who was a thorn in the side of authority but a hero who always found true romance. Although Socialist party growth had slowed, there were still hundreds of socialist officeholders, and the prairie socialist newspaper, *Appeal to Reason*, reached 100,000 subscribers. In addition, the period saw the foundation of the militant National Women's party, the rise of "new unionism" in mass production, and the first ripple in what was to become a major strike wave in industry.⁴

With every new diplomatic crisis, social reformers turned more of their attention to the issue of peace. Shortly after the outbreak of fighting, luminaries such as Paul Kellogg and Florence Kelley founded the American Union against Militarism to inveigh against militarism as a mortal enemy of social progress. Jane Addams and sister activists organized the Women's Peace party and sent delegates to a 1915 pacifist conference at The Hague, which planted many antiwar seeds, one of which became the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The American Socialist party, for its part, held fast to the antiwar internationalism that its European comrades had forsaken in 1914, and a considerable body of AFL trade unionists believed that the only ones who stood to gain from U.S. participation in the war would be profiteering munitions makers. Alarmed by proposals to expand the military, the president of the United Mine Workers told its 1916 convention that he hoped "that the plans to make our country an armed camp

which may be used to extend commercialism abroad and exploit labor at home will be defeated." Thus as the issue of the European war worked its way into the American body politic, the great majority of advanced progressives and socialists were *Cassandras* who warned that war would be the undoing for all the causes they held dear. So long as a decision on intervention could be put off, their call for peace and justice commanded the moral and political high ground.⁵

There is no doubt that a majority of the population opposed U.S. entry into the war at least through the November 1916 elections. Their motives, however, did not always square with the aims of the reformers. To isolationists of the small-town Midwest and jingoists of the big city press, the Monroe Doctrine, with its rigid separation of Western and Eastern Hemispheres, was holy writ. Such traditional liberals had no compunctions about sending the marines to Latin America, but the idea of sending troops to Europe was sheer heresy. For different reasons, Irish-Americans opposed any aid to Britain, their ancient passion rekindled by the bloody suppression of the 1916 Easter Rebellion; and there was a similar fear in German-American communities that the United States would enter the war on the wrong side. Neutrality was popular with voters in both the West and the South, but although large numbers of western voters combined peace and progressive principles, very few southern voters did, and they were the most solidly Democratic.⁶ The fact that many who supported neutrality harbored no principled opposition to war and saw no incompatibility between war, once it came, and their own domestic agendas helps explain why the country could reverse directions so abruptly in the spring of 1917.

On the opposite side of the fence, a small band of eastern patricians beat the drum for preparedness. Just as the progressives attached world peace to their reform program, so the cream of the Yankee Protestant establishment made military buildup an integral part of their campaign for national unity. The growing ranks for preparedness came from the arch-Republican members of the Union League, the "swallow-tailed" Democrats of the posh Manhattan Club, a bevy of Ivy League presidents, the *New York Times*, and a number of New Nationalists itching for a return to power, including General Leonard Wood, Elihu Root, and Teddy Roosevelt. All of these were prominent in the League to Enforce Peace, had close ties to the military through the Navy and Army Leagues, and were identified with the managerial reforms in the military begun during Root's tenure as secretary of war a decade ear-

lier. As the war on Europe's western front settled into bloody stalemate, they took some satisfaction in congressional appropriations for new battleships, but had to settle for less than they hoped in the National Defense Act of June 1916. Disappointed because the national guard, reserves, and regulars were not integrated into a massive "continental army" with universal military service, Secretary of War Lindley Miller Garrison resigned in protest. All the same, the act increased the regular army to 175,000 and the national guard to 475,000 and established machinery for civilian mobilization under the Council of National Defense.⁷ Clearly, the warmakers were gaining ground.

Besides beating plowshares into swords, the militants of preparedness countered social justice with social discipline. Teach the manly virtues of martial discipline to the unruly multitudes of immigrant workers, and the problems of popular ferment and industrial discontent would be solved. They founded such organizations as the National Security League and the American Defense Society to preach "Absolute and Unquestioned Loyalty to the State," in the words of the lead banner in a giant New York City parade, and they proposed 100 percent Americanism and universal military training as "the only way to yank the hyphen out of America." Frances Kellor, hard-headed leader of the National Americanization Committee, began to describe her work as "the civilian side of national defense" and called for universal military service in her aptly titled *Straight America: A Call to National Service* (1916). It was no accident that Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Congressman Augustus P. Gardner, leaders of preparedness in Congress, were also among the most prominent immigration restrictionists; nor is it surprising that many of their cohorts were attracted to the racist theories of "Nordic" supremacy that had begun to make the rounds of elite social clubs and Ivy League universities.⁸

The preparedness movement was also viscerally antiradical. When an unidentified bomb-thrower attacked a preparedness parade in San Francisco, local authorities pinned the blame on prominent labor radical Tom Mooney, whose innocence it took twenty years to vindicate. As the social-justice wing of the 1912 Progressive party went over lock, stock, and barrel to Wilson, New Nationalists around Roosevelt shed the trappings of reform to emerge as the first American incarnation of the twentieth-century right. New Nationalists always had an authoritarian streak—not for nothing was Teddy Roosevelt called "the American Bismarck"—and now they marched toward the netherworld of

authoritarian domination, restrained only by the liberal traditions of civilian supremacy and checks and balances, which prevented American nationalists from going the route of ultranationalist movements in Europe toward fascism.

The saber-rattlers of the eastern establishment were a potent influence for war, but they did not get exactly what they wanted. They did succeed in polarizing the presidential election in November around the question of war, but they lost the decision, in part, because their support for the Republican candidate, Charles Evans Hughes, was, at best, a mixed blessing. Wanting to avoid the appearance of a warmonger, Hughes shilly-shallied on preparedness and lost several northern states, while Wilson was able to ride to a narrow victory on the unequivocal slogan "He kept us out of war." Democratic victory came in the middle of an era of Republican dominance, and, aside from the anomalous election of 1912, the only time Democrats won the presidency between 1896 and 1932 was when they combined the issues of peace and justice. Eventually, when war came, the most prominent men of the Big Stick did not even get to wage it—Theodore Roosevelt was denied command of a volunteer regiment, Leonard Wood was denied command of the American Expeditionary Force, and Henry Cabot Lodge was excluded from the councils of power.⁹

Although Republican militarists did not get their way, pressure from northern elites was highly influential in the final decision for war. Certainly, there was no groundswell of popular enthusiasm to join the fighting. Even after the resumption of Germany's unrestricted U-boat warfare on February 1, nothing happened to compare with the jingoist outburst that erupted after the sinking of the *Maine* in 1898. But if the common people did not beat the war drums, more and more of the people in power did. To understand why neutrality became intolerable to governing elites, it is useful to examine the one place where American troops were already engaged on foreign soil—Mexico.

A decade and a half after the Spanish-American War, the United States was well on its way to hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Although Britain and, increasingly, Germany maneuvered for influence among the unstable republics of Latin America, they were no match for U.S. investment, the Platt Amendment, the Olney and Roosevelt corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine, and repeated marine landings. The keystone of Latin America was Mexico. The same extractive and banking corporations that were coming to dominate the economy

of the southwestern United States were growing increasingly potent in Mexican affairs—Daniel Guggenheim's American Smelting and Refining Company, with copper mines in Arizona and in Chihuahua; the Southern Pacific Railroad, with lines on both sides of the border; and Standard Oil, with wells in California and Tampico. Altogether, U.S. interests owned an astonishing 43 percent of all Mexican wealth, more than the Mexicans themselves!¹⁰ Seeing Mexico through the distorting lens of dollar signs did not help Yankees understand the historic differences between their country and Mexico. With great landed estates, patriarchal authority, and a Catholic establishment, nineteenth-century Mexico had not seen the growth of a large middle class of businessmen and family farmers upon which liberal forms of government could bite; instead, a corrupt, autocratic regime had grown up under the iron rule of Porfirio Díaz.

By 1911 leading families decided they had had enough of Díaz, and they ousted the dictator in a typical palace coup. But events soon took a more profound turn. Rapid and uneven economic development had generated great extremes of wealth and poverty, and under the leadership of men such as Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa, the submerged mass of dispossessed peasants, landless peons, and manual laborers began to stir. Their demands for redistributing the latifundia and for humanizing industrial conditions threatened to overturn the whole governing system, including the centuries-old network of special privilege, quasi-feudal estates, and the established church, as well as the more recent nexus of industrial and financial power. Though roughly contemporary with revolutions in China and Iran, the Mexican revolution was the first in the world to link a change of government with mass social upheaval.¹¹

The Wilson administration plunged into this vortex of social revolution with painfully little understanding of the forces at work. Although Wilson was no fan of Taft's "dollar diplomacy," he operated within the same nexus of interests and assumptions—large-scale corporate investments, paternalist attitudes, and a closed mind on the superiority of liberal self-government. For the same reason that Yankee elites could not sympathize with dictators, *caudillos*, and corruption, they could not sympathize with peasant armies and the invasion of property rights. In the fall of 1913 Wilson persuaded the British government to follow the U.S. lead with a policy that was intended to "teach the South American Republics to elect good men" who would establish a government

"under which all contracts and business and concessions will be safer than they have been." One of Wilson's key emissaries to Mexico was Franklin K. Lane, who publically invoked the White Man's Burden in justification of U.S. intervention: "There is a great deal of the special policeman, of the sanitary engineer, of the social worker, and of the welfare dictator about the American people . . . It is one of the most fundamental instincts that have made white men give to the world its history for the last thousand years." Lane would later describe the revolutionary leaders as "naughty children who are exercising all the privileges and rights of grown ups."¹²

To teach the Mexicans how to behave like good Americans, Wilson twice sent in troops. In April 1914, after the Tampico incident involving Mexican arrest of a U.S. naval officer and the discovery of an impending shipment of German arms, Wilson ordered a small detachment of U.S. troops to shoot their way into Vera Cruz. The stated purpose of extracting an apology from Victoriano Huerta's government, which the U.S. did not recognize, barely masked the real hope that Huerta would fall. And so he did, to be replaced by the Constitutionalist leader Venustiano Carranza, a man more in line with liberal principles but no more amenable to taking orders from Washington. Wilson was not to be mollified by only apparent success, and no sooner had "the First Chief" marched into Mexico City than the United States was casting about for someone to replace him. That it chose bandit-turned-revolutionary Pancho Villa to be the standard-bearer of stability lent an air of comic-opera unreality to the whole Mexican imbroglio. As the balance of forces in Mexico shifted toward the Constitutionals, Villa made a desperate gamble to draw the United States into combat on Mexican soil and thereby weaken Carranza's claim to authority by crossing the border and attacking the U.S. garrison at Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9, 1916. Wilson took the bait. He ordered up the Punitive Expedition under General "Black Jack" Pershing, sent it into Mexico to hunt down Villa, and mobilized all 100,000 national guardsmen to defend the border. When Pershing blundered into a battle with the government's regular troops, the two countries stood at the brink of a full-scale war.¹³

Yet war did not come, even though the social revolution was reaching its crest. Radical influence reached high tide in the new constitution, in which article 123 established advanced social-welfare and labor regulations and article 27 provided for appropriation of latifundia for

the purpose of creating smallholdings, as well as reserving all subsoil resources to the nation. The new constitution took effect February 5, 1917, the same day the last U.S. forces were evacuated. The puzzle is why the United States withdrew at the very moment corporate interests seemed most imperiled. The answer is that a larger threat was looming in Europe. In the same weeks Wilson was deciding on withdrawal from Mexico, he was attempting to mediate the war in Europe and could ill afford a war at his back while presenting himself to Europe as a peacemaker. He had already pulled back from the brink in Mexico on another occasion in the summer of 1916 because "it begins to look as if war with Germany is inevitable. If it should come, [and] I pray God it may not, I do not wish America's energies and forces divided for we will need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany."¹⁴

What sealed the decision to let Mexico go its own way was the growing fear that a German victory in Europe would upset the balance of power in Latin America. Since the United States was getting along well under British control of the high seas, and since Britain was cooperating with American policy in Mexico, the United States had reason to worry about a British defeat at the hands of Germany. Just five days before U.S. withdrawal from Mexico was complete, Germany had resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, and in anticipation of a probable U.S. declaration of war in response, German Secretary of State Arthur Zimmermann proposed a secret alliance in which Mexico would be encouraged "to reconquer its former territories in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona." A flagrant affront to the Monroe Doctrine, the Zimmermann note burst like a bombshell upon Wilson's cabinet on February 25. Now, it must have been apparent to all concerned that Germany was in no position to make good on its promise to help Mexico regain territory lost to the United States seventy years earlier; Germany could not even contemplate a cross-Channel invasion, let alone wage transatlantic war. But the expression of intent was enough to convince the cabinet that the war in Europe was threatening U.S. interests throughout Latin America. The irony was that in preparing to defend the Monroe Doctrine, the United States was getting ready to violate one of its cardinal precepts—that the affairs of Europe should remain separate from those of the Western Hemisphere. But conditions had changed since the doctrine was originally formulated in the 1820s, and now U.S. hemispheric hegemony required action on a global scale. Much the same idea governed the favorable U.S. response to revolu-

tion in Russia, which broke out in March just as Wilson was making up his mind about intervening in Europe; that is, the precondition for incorporating revolutionary Russia in a liberal world order was the defeat of German autocracy.¹⁵

Wilson would not have dared turn the Monroe Doctrine inside out without compelling reasons. The first was American economic interests in Europe, a stake that grew with every increase in trade and credit to Britain and France. Owing to the effective British blockade, U.S. trade with Germany fell to a trickle while the tide of food, cotton, manufactured goods, and munitions going to the Allies rose to a flood. Above all, J. P. Morgan and other big Wall Street bankers were already financing the Allied war effort to the tune of more than \$2 billion. It was not a calculation of short-term profits that tipped the balance; after all, neutrality had been good for business; for example, export-oriented cotton and wheat farmers remembered 1915-1917 as bonanza years to be used as the standard for determining "parity" between the prices of agricultural and manufactured commodities. Rather, it was the long-term worry about what would happen if America's biggest debtors and best trading partners went down to defeat.

The second reason was the Anglo-American cultural bond. To a generation raised on Tennyson, Kipling, and Shakespeare, England was still the Mother Country. From the earliest days of the war, there was little doubt that U.S. elites were largely Anglophilic, something the preparedness movement played to the hilt, since a decision for war seemed to promise a renewal of Anglo-Saxon cultural leadership in the face of "balkanizing" cultural influences. Germanophiles such as Sylvester Viereck were few and far between; Anglophiles were legion, and none was more devoted to English ways than the president. The New York patriciate and the first families of Virginia aped the mores of Britain's faded aristocracy, not those of German barons, and despite the impact of German scholarship in certain American universities, the Ivy League looked to Oxbridge more than to Heidelberg for its curriculum, architecture, and social values. Somehow identification with German, Polish, Italian, or Russian roots was the mark of undesirable "hyphenates," whereas worshiping at the feet of English aristocracy was the mark of a true American. In the same vein, the decision for war rallied Yankee Protestants, southern Anglo-Saxons, midwestern Wasps, and western Anglos around the White Man's Burden. Even as Wilson postponed a final decision through the agonizing days of March, he told

Secretary Robert Lansing that "white civilization' and its domination over the world rested largely on our ability to keep this country intact as we would have to build up the nations ravaged by war."¹⁶

The third and final reason was Wilson's realization that he would have no voice at the peace table unless he put armies into the field. In December 1916, seeking a middle way between peace and preparedness at home and between Britain and Germany abroad, Wilson tried a hand at peacemaking by asking the belligerents to state their war aims. When the responses to his messages made it clear that despite the military stalemate, both sides still sought victory, he took it unto himself to define the basis for settlement in his famous "Peace without Victory" message of January 22, 1917. In it he proposed freedom of the seas, equality of nations, moderation of arms, and consent of the governed as the basis for a lasting peace. Given the strength of the great powers even as they tore each other apart, there could be no assertion of U.S. hegemony over Europe. Instead, American diplomacy presented its egalitarian face, as it always did when checked by equal or greater power. Ignoring the fact that the Monroe Doctrine had become a warrant for U.S. domination in the Western Hemisphere, Wilson pretended that it stood unambiguously for self-determination and recommended that all nations "adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world." Having failed to mediate between the belligerents, he was, in effect, proposing to go over their heads and guarantee peace among equals by "the organized force of mankind," a beautiful and grandiose notion that was the germ of the League of Nations.¹⁷ Taken together, these were the basic ideas of the Fourteen Points.

Even as Wilson called for "peace without victory," Germany had decided upon resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, to begin February 1. This was the decision that lit the fuse that eventually ended in the U.S. declaration of war two months later, but only after the application of a diplomatic double standard. British violations of freedom of the seas and neutral rights with the intention of starving the Central powers into submission did not provoke humanitarian outcries and diplomatic protest in the United States of the same magnitude as German U-boat sinkings of merchant and passenger ships. Nor did the fact that Britain and Japan had already picked clean the carcass of Germany's overseas colonies in Africa and China. In other words, Germany would be held to strict account for violations of liberal principles, whereas Britain would be excused. In any event, when a small group

of determined neutral senators blocked the president's request to arm U.S. merchantmen, Wilson scorned them as "a little group of willful men" and went ahead and armed the vessels anyway under obscure executive authority. Armed neutrality, not war, was the immediate response to U-boat warfare, and for a short time it kept the U.S. on the middle path between peace and preparedness.¹⁸

With each step toward belligerency, more segments of American opinion came to accept full-scale war as preferable to armed neutrality. In mid-March the entire cabinet, including southern Democrats such as Albert Burleson and progressives such as Josephus Daniels and Newton Baker, recommended the warpath. Traditional liberals in the Republican party swung around to a prowar stance alongside the New Nationalists, as did southern Democrats and even many Bryan Democrats and *New Republic* progressives.¹⁹ This shift in the internal balance of forces was accompanied by a shift in the international balance as a result of the Russian Revolution in early March, which seemed to make it a clear fight between democracy and autocracy (provided, of course, British and French imperialism were ignored). Thus on April 2, his conscience clear, Wilson could finally ask Congress for a declaration of war.

The speech was a masterstroke of national unification. In the first place, its spirit of crusading liberalism fused the main segments of elite opinion—the bellicose nationalists of the eastern establishment, the traditional liberals of the Midwest, and the leading men of the New South. After noting the outrages of submarine warfare, Wilson reiterated the main points of his "Peace without Victory" message—freedom of the seas, self-determination, and a concert of nations opposed to militarism. But even more significant was his appeal to the common people through the single most memorable phrase of the entire war, the ringing pledge "to make the world safe for democracy." Confronted by a lack of popular enthusiasm for war, he reached out to the laboring masses in town and country with the one thing that might inspire a passion great enough to overcome revulsion for the mass slaughter going on in the trenches. He said that world order depended on all people becoming "really free and self-governed," not subject to autocratic governments dominated by little groups of ambitious men and outmoded dynasties. Thus the United States would make war on Germany in order to rid the world of tyranny on behalf of "the liberation of its peoples," adding with remarkable audacity, "the German peoples

included."²⁰ Wilson's vision of America leading a world crusade was a tour de force that united elites and masses, liberalism and democracy.

It was true that antiwar sentiment persisted. It could be found in many working-class precincts of northern cities, where the socialist vote increased; among farmers of the high plains who followed the Non-Partisan League; among some midwestern progressive backers of Wisconsin's Robert La Follette and Nebraska's George Norris, both of whom joined Claude Kitchin of North Carolina to lead Senate opposition to the war resolution. Warning that belligerency would benefit only bankers and munitions makers, Norris spoke fervently against the resolution in the populist tones of Bryan's "cross of gold" speech: "We are going into war upon the command of gold . . . I feel that we are about to put the dollar sign on the American flag." Whatever its effect on prairie populists and discontented workers, such dire warnings otherwise fell on deaf ears. Jeremiads against big business no longer incited anger among what Randolph Bourne called "the worried middle classes." Those who had been through the crusades against the trusts and industrial abuses "were only too glad to sink back to a glorification of the State ideal, to feel about them in war the old protecting arms, to return to the old primitive sense of the omnipotence of the State, its matchless virtue, honor, and beauty, driving away all the foul old doubts and dismays."²¹

When the vote came, only six senators stood opposed. Victorious at home, Wilson was free to embark on the high seas of world power, not as a Machiavellian power broker, but as a crusading liberal, indeed, a New World revolutionary who would redeem the sins of the Old. Truly, Woodrow Wilson was the last of the Founding Fathers.

War Nationalism

Having chosen to fight, there was no alternative but to wage total war. Europeans had already shown the way. In 1914 the spirit of nationalism had overwhelmed domestic political squabbles, uniting each country in collective hatred for the enemy. Germans sang a "Hymn of Hate" for the ancient Slavic enemy; France came together around the spirit of revenge for defeat in 1870; Britons of all ranks rushed to defend Britannia against the Prussian marauder; and even the doddering empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary felt a wave of national pride that temporarily washed away internal conflicts. Such were the enthusiasms that

turned Europe into a charnel house. The casualties at the siege of Verdun in the spring of 1916 reached 350,000 French and 330,000 German dead, and that summer an even more staggering 1 million died on both sides in the protracted Battle of the Somme.²²

Thus, by the time the United States began to gear up for war, the diabolical path to fear and loathing was clearly marked. The extraordinary thing is that the American public, which must have had some inkling of this immense slaughter, still marched off to war in a spirit of jaunty confidence. Never were soldiers so perky while entering the death house. Singing the popular ditties "The Yanks Are Coming," "Over There," and "Mademoiselle from Armentiers," American doughboys set out to test their mettle, blithely ignoring what the young men of Europe had been finding out—that the muck and barbed wire of trench warfare was a sorry place to practice the manly art of war.

Evidently nationalism had the capacity to make sane men mad. This was but the latest of America's periodic binges of patriotic fervor. Particularly around moments of national expansion in the Mexican and Spanish-American wars, the country went into fits of Manifest Destiny and jingoism, spasms that soon passed in an extreme, up-and-down emotional cycle. Now, once again, the declaration of war in the spring of 1917 put the United States into a manic mood. In the conjurings of an overheated imagination, no image of "the Hun" was too barbaric, no depiction of Prussian militarism too bloodthirsty, no account of the "rape of Belgium" too repulsive. Such mass pathology was what Randolph Bourne had in mind when he warned, "War is the health of the state."²³

The fact was that in the age of democratic warfare, it would have to be fought by the masses *with their consent*. And where consent was not freely given, the state was ready to enforce it by fostering what Tocqueville had long before called the "tyranny of the majority." Wilson agonized about it the night before he asked Congress to declare war: "Once lead this people into war and they'll forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fibre of our national life, infecting Congress, the courts, the policeman on the beat, the man in the street." Nationalism brooked no domestic enemies. Needless to say, everything German was suspect. There had been much alarm about "German intrigues" during the neutrality period,

and now federal authorities interred some 6,000 enemy aliens, while the Bureau of Investigation mobilized some 250,000 volunteer sleuths under the American Protective League who pretended to ferret out German spies. Authorities at all levels of government were determined to expunge German influence in American culture by prohibiting German-language instruction, impugning the loyalty of people with German names, and going to the absurd lengths of renaming sauerkraut "liberty cabbage."²⁴

Other immigrant nationalities also fell under the shadow of suspicion, regardless of their position on the war. In particular, Slavs and Jews from the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, along with Italian immigrants became the target of an increasingly virulent nativism; it did not seem to matter that Italy had switched to the Allied side, and most South Slavs yearned for the breakup of Austria-Hungary. Such nice distinctions mattered little to the growing chorus of nativists who identified foreign birth itself with disloyalty. Although President Wilson opposed immigration restriction, he had given aid and comfort to the nativists, unintentionally perhaps, in his warning about "hyphenated-Americans pouring their poison into our veins." Now in the first rush of nationalism, Congress enacted over Wilson's veto a literacy test designed to exclude unlettered and supposedly ignorant immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.²⁵

The deepest prejudices were reserved for African-Americans. Under the stress of war, contradictions between nationalism and racism quickly came into the open. The cutoff in European immigration created a demand for unskilled labor that was met in part by some 500,000 African-Americans who moved north in the Great Migration. As a consequence, northern cities were rife with racial tension, and white youths unleashed a brutal race riot in East St. Louis in the summer of 1917. The same contradiction could be found in the military itself. There were black American soldiers in every war fought by the United States, and this was no exception, as units like the notable 92nd Regiment made their contribution on the battlefield. But African-Americans served in segregated units with mostly white officers and were relegated for the most part to logistical operations. These indignities, compounded by mistreatment by local police, led to a bloody mutiny of black American soldiers stationed in Houston on August 23, 1917, which left twenty-one dead, mostly whites, and resulted in courts-martial and hangings for the rebels. Not since the end of Recon-

struction had the country seen African-Americans in armed rebellion, a spirit of defiance kindled by the promises and betrayals of wartime nationalism that would soon give birth to the race-proud New Negro.²⁶

Wartime flag-waving unleashed a new round of vigilantism. The West had its share of antiwar dissidents, such as the Central Labor Union of Miami, Arizona, which denounced the "purely commercial war brought about by the concentration of wealth," and the draft resisters of Oklahoma's Green Corn Rebellion, which took its name from the proposal to forage on ripening corn along a protest march route to Washington. But on the whole, the IWW and other opponents resisted conscription with words, not arms. Supporters of the war were considerably more violent. When industrial disputes broke out in the summer of 1917, Anglo residents along the border with Mexico had already organized paramilitary squads to deal with border raiders from Mexico and rebellious copper workers, in the belief that Mexican revolutionaries such as Pancho Villa were collaborating with the IWW. In Bisbee and Jerome, Arizona, vigilantes conducted infamous "deportations"; on July 12 copper company officials and Citizens Protective Leagues rounded up over 1,000 strikers and sent them in sealed boxcars into the desert heat. The hapless deportees wound up in what amounted to military confinement at the army post in Columbus, New Mexico, site of the notorious Villa raid a year earlier. In a similar episode on August 1, vigilantes in Butte, Montana, put a rope around the neck of Wobbly organizer Frank Little, cut off his genitals, and flung his beaten and mutilated body off a railroad trestle to dangle until he died. No southern lynch mob could have done more.²⁷

One of the heaviest ironies of the war was the suppression of dissent in the name of democracy. The fact that elites had closed ranks around the declaration of war did not automatically translate into universal popular support. The worst fear in Washington was that somehow vocal opponents of the war would tap into the mass of disgruntled farmers, workers, and Irish- and German-Americans. Indeed, in the fall 1917 elections socialist candidates increased their percentage of the vote over their prewar totals in a number of cities, vindicating the decision of the Socialist party to defy the government, the only member of the Second International to do so. In addition, Quaker pacifists and Wobblies raised dissident voices, and some labor progressives, immigrant socialists, and single taxers set up the People's Council (with a friendly eye toward the councils of workers and soldiers in revolutionary Rus-

sia). Given the possibility that antiwar sentiment might fuse with social reform, Washington could not afford to ignore it.²⁸

With the "ruthless brutality" Wilson had predicted, his own administration moved to silence dissent. Armed with the Espionage Act (June 1917) and the Sedition Act (May 1918), Postmaster General Burleson excluded *The Masses*, *International Socialist Review*, and all other left-wing publications from the mails, except those that followed minority Socialists in recanting their party's position. Seeking to silence its most vociferous working-class critics, the Justice Department moved to outlaw the IWW altogether. In the first of many raids, agents swooped down on IWW offices in September 1917, scooping up tons of evidence to be used in the prosecution of more than 100 top leaders of the embattled organization. Indictments charged the IWW with deliberate violation of the Selective Service and Espionage Acts and with seditious conspiracy for its strikes and sabotage against war producers, even going so far as to criminalize syndicalist ideas in prosecutions for use of the motto "An injury to one is an injury to all." The antiradical campaign reached absurd heights on the western slopes of the Rockies when the army sent in Colonel Bryce Disque, veteran of the campaign against Aguinaldo in the Philippines, to pacify recalcitrant timberworkers by enrolling them in what amounted to an antiunion closed shop christened the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen.²⁹

The loyalty campaign spread far and wide. The Justice Department's fledgling Bureau of Investigation gave encouragement to the amateur gumshoes of the American Protective League in their surveillance of labor radicals and their vigilante-style "slacker raids" directed largely against unemployed workers. Meanwhile, official spies from the Justice Department attended socialist rallies against "capitalist war" to collect evidence for use against scores of socialist leaders, including Eugene Debs, who was convicted and sent to the Atlanta penitentiary. Debs's lawyers objected that the suppression of liberty in the name of liberty did not make a very pretty sight, but that did not impress the Supreme Court, which upheld book banning and the convictions of dissenters. One case involving a Socialist party leader yielded one of the most significant doctrines in American jurisprudence, the "clear and present danger test." In the *Schenck* (1918) decision, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes opined that free speech could be punished under circumstances such as war where there was "a clear and present danger" that speech could lead to illegal acts.³⁰

The first six months of war confirmed Wilson's dire prediction about the spirit of intolerance. Once loosed, the dogs of war could not be restrained from attacking immigrants, racial minorities, pacifists, radicals, and, in general, anyone who did not conform to the superpatriots' notion of true Americanism. It did not take long for the political impact to be felt. First, war nationalism drove a fatal wedge into the fragile coalition from below that had made 1916 a banner year for social reform and had elected the peace candidate president, sealing the once-open border between socialism and national progressivism. One illustration of the end of cooperation between the left and the progressives was the fragmentation of the American Union against Militarism, an organization that had grown up on the border between socialism and progressivism, so to speak, but that now shattered into three opposing parts—the antiwar People's Council (hounded out of existence), the forerunner of the American Civil Liberties Union (put under surveillance), and prowar supporters of the Wilson administration (welcomed into the fold). Although the left was the immediate sufferer, the whole progressive reform project was dealt a crushing blow. Second, the ability of the patriotic societies to wrap themselves in Old Glory revitalized old-fashioned liberalism, with all its racial and nativist assumptions. After suffering a decade of criticism from the reformers, the worried middle classes of British-American descent could at last reestablish the claim for their own small-town verities—self-made men and true women, Anglo-Saxon preeminence, and the rights of property—as the only true 100 percent Americanism.

Mobilizing Masses

If there was madness in nationalism, there was also a method to it. Total war involved a devastating combination of rationality and irrationality, modern efficiency and atavistic hatreds, the machine gun and war hysteria. Because society had evolved elaborate structures of rationalized production and mass reproduction, the United States could not fight the kind of "splendid little war" it had waged against Spain in 1898. Instead, it would have to fight as Europeans had learned to fight, not by daring cavalry maneuvers or bold Schlieffen Plans, but by systematically mobilizing all available forces and hurling them against the forces on the other side, mass against mass. By the time it was over some 10 million had died, and the killing power of modern mechanized

warfare was linked to the rapid growth of heavy industry. Pig iron output in Germany grew from 1.3 million tons in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War to 14.7 million tons in 1914, and there were similar increases elsewhere. Once the Industrial Revolution was harnessed to war nationalism, the potential for destruction was virtually limitless.³¹

The Wilson administration used modern mass communications to mobilize every bit of emotional and material energy in the country. All the agencies of government used the mass media for their own purposes—the Treasury sold Liberty Bonds, the Food Administration sold conservation, and the War Department sold patriotism. The prime minister of high-power salesmanship was George Creel, head of the Committee on Public Information (CPI), who boasted about “how we advertised America” through three dozen propaganda films such as “Pershing’s Crusaders,” 1 million four-minute speeches in movie theaters by “4-Minute Men,” and 75,099,023 pieces of patriotic literature. Unlike out-and-out nativists, the Creel Committee accorded immigrant cultures a certain respect through its Division for Work with the Foreign Born, which used the foreign-language press as a multilingual megaphone to advertise Red Cross subscriptions and Liberty Bonds. Government agencies mobilized ethnic benevolent and religious societies for prowar celebrations, such as a big Kosciusko Day rally in Chicago that brought together the Polish National Alliance, Polish Falcons, and Roman Catholic Union.³²

The aim, of course, was to foster not immigrant nationalism but American nationalism. Toward that end, the U.S. Bureau of Education endorsed the National Americanization Committee’s proselytizing in the public schools and private business for Flag Day ceremonies and other patriotic rituals on the factory floor. The Creel Committee tried to impart reverence for the old republic to recent immigrants by staging patriotic festivals, including a Fourth of July pilgrimage to Mount Vernon in which prominent figures from thirty-three immigrant nationalities sailed up the Potomac aboard President Wilson’s yacht *The Mayflower* to lay wreaths at the grave of the Father of Our Country, serenaded as they went by a band playing the “Battle Hymn of the Republic.” This historical mishmash of Pilgrims, Founding Fathers, and Civil War anthems showed a decided awkwardness in government efforts to Americanize their Old World brethren. Nevertheless, these Americanization activities hastened the emergence of Polish-American, Italian-American, and other immigrant-American identities.³³

The martial spirit was evident in both peacetime social protest and wartime mobilization.



May Day: the regiments of socialism march behind quasi-military banners in New York, 1909.

Government sponsorship of Americanization attested to the role of the state as "educator" in cultivating a hegemonic set of values and beliefs among its citizens. But who would educate the educator? Immigrants were not merely empty vessels into which the state poured its propaganda. They imparted their own meanings to Americanism—freedom from Old World restraint, the American standard of living, the right to join a union, or cultural pluralism.³⁴ Once immigrants themselves were included in the equation through official toleration of cultural diversity, the path was open for winning consent of the governed. Insofar as the state established a rational—rather than religious or ethnic—test of republican citizenship, it became possible for America's heterogeneous peoples to find common ground within the liberal framework of the Constitution.

By the time the United States began to make its influence felt on the battlefields of Europe in the winter of 1917–18, the western front had long since become a grueling war of position. After General Alfred von Schlieffen's sweeping offensive had been halted at the First Battle of the Marne in 1915, the two sides settled into the stalemate of trench warfare that converted the gentle rolling fields of northeastern France into a vast graveyard. Massed land armies backed by great industrial machines and superheated civilian emotion had proved impotent when confronted with the equivalent sum of civilian and military forces on the other side. By contrast, the eastern front was a war of maneuver along a boundless battlefield that stretched from the Baltic to the Dardanelles upon which the mechanized discipline of the armies of the German emperor prevailed over the demoralized forces of the Russian czar. Just as Russian armies disintegrated on the battlefield, so the Romanov dynasty collapsed in the revolution of March 1917 (February in the old calendar), and after a second revolution in November, the Bolsheviks made a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918.

The collapse of the eastern front made U.S. weight all the more important in the scales of power. War weariness on both sides was undermining the will to fight; French mutinies, British munitions strikes, and German food protests signaled popular disenchantment, which prompted socialist and labor leaders to lay plans for a people's peace conference that would bring together delegates from both sides in Stockholm. Wilson did his best to foil this effort. Since gaining influence at the peace conference was one of Wilson's main war aims, he forgot about "peace without victory" and bent every effort to keep the war going until U.S. troops could make their weight felt in the total



The New Negro: convention delegates of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association show their militance in a Harlem parade, 1920.

defeat of Germany. To bolster workers' fighting spirit, Wilson sent his "labor ambassador" Samuel Gompers to Europe to head off the Stockholm plan. Shortly after Wilson issued his own Fourteen Point peace proposal, members of the influential League to Enforce Peace were writing in private, "We must not forget that the statements of our peace terms mean not peace but war until Germany is beaten into accepting them." To great U.S. relief, peace did not break out before American soldiers arrived in significant numbers, thus getting the opportunity to die by the thousands for every foot of ground at obscure places such as St. Mihiel, Chateau-Thierry, and Belleau Wood. All told, 112,000 doughboys were killed.³⁵

If U.S. influence tipped the balance, it was not because of stunning battlefield victories, but because the United States possessed a seemingly inexhaustible reserve of troops, food, and war matériel that bolstered Allied resolve in the face of German submarine warfare and the last German offensive in the spring of 1918. Drawing from a population just over 100 million, the United States raised an army of some 4.8 million men, of whom almost 2 million eventually served in the American Expeditionary Force in Europe. Propaganda promised that the AEF would deliver a "bath of bullets" to the enemy, made possible by "the man behind the man behind the gun" working in munitions plants, garment factories, and increasingly mechanized farms. Men and matériel moved about on a rail network that had grown eightfold since 1860 to its alltime peak of 254,251 miles of track in 1916; factory furnaces burned coal whose output had risen fivefold since 1890 to a peak of 579,000 tons in 1918; steel output increased tenfold in the same period, reaching 42.1 million tons in 1920.³⁶ The hyperindustrialism of the First World War marked the culmination of trends that had appeared in the Civil War, the first modern war fought with large conscript armies transported on steam railways bearing arms made with interchangeable parts. The democratic and industrial revolutions that had made this possible by the 1860s continued to influence the American way of war half a century later.³⁷

In debating how to pay for the new military machine, wartime finance reached an impasse between progressives, who wanted to tax high incomes and excess profits, and managerial liberals, who wanted to tax mass consumption. The first round went to the progressives in the Revenue Act of 1916, which significantly increased the income tax, imposed new taxes on corporate profits, and hiked estate taxes. To the

delight of farmer and labor groups, this system moved several notches toward shifting the federal tax burden from customs and excise taxes—that is, taxes on popular consumption—to personal income, corporate profits, and estates—that is, taxes on the rich. It did so by setting the personal exemption high enough to exclude all but the well-to-do from the obligation to pay. Although it stopped far short of the conscription of wealth, which many advanced progressives were calling for, it marked a step toward fulfilling the redistributive goal of the original Populist income tax of the 1890s, and it was a benchmark in aligning government financing to fit twentieth-century society.

The second round, however, went to federal bondholders. With expenses outrunning all predictions at \$1 million per month, the government had to find other sources of funds. It relied on bonded debt and price inflation, both of which tended to cancel out any redistributive effects from taxes on high incomes. Besides hawking Liberty Bonds to the general public, Treasury Secretary William McAdoo sold certificates of indebtedness to banks through the Federal Reserve System. That fueled inflation because banks used the debt they accumulated as reserves, which rapidly expanded the money supply, and along with the inevitably inflationary effect of military purchases, these factors caused consumer prices to double. Since inflation amounted to an indirect tax on mass consumption, and since wealthy bondholders would collect the lion's share of future interest payments, the system of war finance took back with one hand what it had given with the other.³⁸

The military mobilization of 1917-18 would have seemed strange to Abraham Lincoln and even to William McKinley. Gone were the days of citizen soldiers when a national army could be patched together from local regiments connected to state politics. The rise of corporate capitalism and modern management had induced a managerial revolution in military methods begun by Secretary of War Elihu Root during the Taft administration and continued in the National Defense Act of 1916. The organizational reforms paralleled scientific management in industry and, under the army chief of staff, created a more efficient bureaucracy capable of shouldering the immense logistical burden of equipping and transporting nearly 5 million men in arms. To make that possible the navy, meanwhile, commissioned 300 destroyers in an expansion that would soon bring it up to parity with the mighty British fleet. Facilities such as the Watertown, Massachusetts, arsenal were veritable proving grounds for scientific management, and the new con-

tingency planning of the Army War College represented a stab in the same scientific direction, although, as with much bureaucratic planning, prognostications often went far astray. For example, the Black Plan for war with Germany envisioned the kaiser ferrying troops to the East Coast but made no provision for an American Expeditionary Force of the sort that embarked in the opposite direction. Riddled with faulty assumptions, the contingency plans had to be left on the shelf.³⁹

The reorganization of American society to make room for mass production and mass reproduction altered civilian mobilization, as well. Gone were the days when the isolated household could be left to look after its own affairs; now, with all the urgency and fanfare that accompanied the war emergency, federal agencies wrapped the home in the flag. Herbert Hoover's Food Administration exhorted housewives to patriotic service in the home through "victory bread" made with cornmeal, "wheatless Mondays" and "meatless Tuesdays," and even distributed pamphlets on "garbage utilization." Likewise, the Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts who joined Uncle Sam's Home Garden Army saved food by rooting around in backyard "victory" gardens. Lacking a centralized bureaucracy to allocate resources, Hoover relied instead on the channels of mass communication and the pressure of community conformity—the tyranny of the majority—to make the message stick. Just as the Creel Committee's propaganda taught commercial advertisers a thing or two, so the Food Administration's campaign for efficient consumption helped shape a new ideal of the family—one that would be oriented toward consumption rather than production, the acquisition of consumer durables rather than the accumulation of property.⁴⁰

The same set of social changes altered the methods of industrial mobilization. Gone were the Civil War days of competitive capitalism, when the quartermaster had merely gone into the open market to purchase needed supplies. Although many purchases were still made in this old-fashioned way, now the government had to deal with a relative handful of corporations that had come to manage their respective industrial markets. To coordinate the complex war economy, the Wilson administration had set up the Council of National Defense in 1916, comprising, for the most part, such paragons of the corporate world as Charles Schwab of Bethlehem Steel and Julius Rosenwald of Sears & Roebuck. During the war itself, responsibility shifted to the War Industries Board (WIB) under the flamboyant financier Bernard Baruch. The fact that the WIB set prices of industrial products, allocated mar-

ket shares, and otherwise intervened in the market was evidence of how much things were changing. None of the prewar corporate-regulatory machinery, not even the Federal Trade Commission, had dared penetrate this far into the sacred preserve of private property. No wonder many progressives believed the war was a great opportunity to advance their reform agenda; as the *New Republic* said, it would serve "as a pretext to foist innovations upon the country."⁴¹

In the end, however, the center of "war collectivism" lay closer to the giant corporations themselves than to the new Washington bureaucracies, or perhaps somewhere in between. Stripped to the essentials, the WIB was a constellation of industrial leaders hammering out their own cooperative policies under the aegis of the state, a fact Baruch recognized in admitting he lacked the authority to dictate terms to a recalcitrant firm. Likewise, Herbert Hoover relied heavily on personal powers of persuasion and the pressure of public opinion to bring giants such as Pillsbury and Swift into line and to stimulate an association of prosperous farmers that eventually grew into the American Farm Bureau Federation. The two exceptions to this rule were the railroads and telegraphs. Owing to their strategic importance the government took direct control of rail transportation and communication, making Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo the only government official who actually got to boss corporate presidents around. But even here the owners had little to complain about, since the government paid a guaranteed 6 percent profit, and, in any case, they repossessed their lines shortly after the war ended.⁴² Indeed, business, in general, made out rather well. Corporate profits showed such substantial gains that Congress investigated the steel and copper companies amid charges of wartime profiteering, and the Du Pont corporation had so much money at the end of the war that it was able to buy controlling interest in General Motors, later held in violation of antitrust.⁴³

How did the mobilization affect business-government relations? Since the new government bureaus came to life during an emergency lasting less than two years, there was little in the way of a permanent institutional legacy. Yet even these short-lived growths revealed long-term imperatives. Forced by an emergency such as war (and later the Great Depression), one way or another the United States had to go beyond laissez faire to coordinate the workings of a society increasingly attuned to mass production and mass reproduction and dominated by corporate capitalism. The great corporations themselves were taming

the wild horses of free-market competition, and their managerial liberalism thwarted any attempts to create statist bureaucracies for the control of industry. Instead, what emerged was a nexus of private institutions keyed to the corporation and clothed in the raiment of public authority. In marked contrast to Germany, where business was subject to far greater state control under a state of emergency where something approaching martial law prevailed, the United States mobilized under what might be called a parastate, representing a compromise between still-dominant liberal institutions and the imperatives of modern management.

Nationalism in Industry

As the biggest industrial machine in the world wheeled into action, it was unclear what impact wartime nationalism would have on the balance of power in industry. On the one hand, the captains of industry were sure to gain added leverage as a result of their command over war production. "War means autocracy," President Wilson confided to a friend. "The people we have unhorsed will inevitably come into the control of the country, for we shall be dependent upon the steel, oil, and financial magnates. They will run the nation." And so they did, in a way, in the Council of National Defense, the War Industries Board, the Food Administration, and at scores of other para-state junctures where the state and the great corporations meshed together. But there was another side to the conflict. Working people were equally sure to gain advantages through the improvement in the labor market and the absolute need to win their cooperation in production. What was more, fighting a war to make the world safe for democracy would inevitably raise their aspirations for true democracy at home. Even the skeptical Walter Lippmann was temporarily swept off his feet by the glorious possibilities: "we shall stand committed as never before to the realization of democracy in America . . . We shall turn with fresh interest to our own tyrannies—to our Colorado mines, our autocratic steel industries, our sweatshops and our slums." Either the autocrats of big business were going to run things, or the laboring masses were going to get industrial democracy. Which would it be?⁴⁴

The European experience from 1914 through the end of 1916 had proved that nationalism could override industrial conflict, at least temporarily. The spirit of national unity that broke out everywhere in 1914

rang down the curtain on a mounting crescendo of discontent.⁴⁵ Under "war collectivism," all belligerent governments had suppressed dissent and subjected society to unprecedented bureaucratic regulation. In Germany, industrialists and industrial workers concluded a formal "fortress truce" (*Burgfrieden*) at the beginning of the war, a peace pact that held up through 1916 even in the face of mass slaughter and severe privation. Beset by growing labor shortages, Germany conscripted much of its industrial working class into a civilian counterpart of compulsory military service under the National Service Law of December 1916, with only Minority Socialists and the free-market National Liberals dissenting.⁴⁶

In Britain, where Conservatives and Liberals alike frowned upon such extreme government intervention, the truce between labor and capital was informal and state regulation more limited. Under the Munitions Act of July 1915, the ability of workers to protest was curtailed by a "leaving certificate," a kind of good-conduct pass regarded as a potential blacklist, but under the circumstances all parties, including Labour, accepted it. In France workers were determined to defend the nation against the force of German arms and showed loyalty to the tricolor throughout. Although privation and war weariness caused food demonstrations and wage protests on both sides by 1917, they were on a limited scale, so that industrial relations within the western powers resembled the stalemated war of position on the western front.⁴⁷

Equally eager for labor peace, the Wilson administration had fewer levers by which to obtain it. Typically, it made full use of its powers of persuasion. Wilson appointed Samuel Gompers and other AFL leaders to various government posts, in return for which Gompers issued a much-publicized "no-strike" pledge, and no one noticed when the AFL Executive Committee quietly repudiated it. The importance of public relations in winning workers' consent was attested by the unprecedented appearance of President Wilson at the September 1917 AFL convention, and by the Creel Committee's "4-Minute Men" who spoke to movie audiences in hopes of inspiring "the man behind the man behind the gun" with a patriotic work ethic. All this ballyhoo showed the weakness of federal bureaucracy under the American liberal state and the consequent need to ply the channels of mass culture to reach the laboring masses.⁴⁸

At the same time, the war emergency put such a high premium on

harmony in the factory that authorities relaxed their liberal inhibitions about state intervention and began to experiment with corporatist bureaucracies. As early as March 19, 1917, the day Wilson's cabinet unanimously recommended war, the president had told feuding railroad executives and union leaders that they had to accept the mediation of the Council of National Defense on the issue of the eight-hour day, because "the peace of the whole world makes accommodation absolutely imperative." Without doubt the most significant piece of mediation machinery was the War Labor Board. Chaired jointly by former president Taft and feisty labor attorney Frank Walsh, the War Labor Board was the most advanced national progressive solution to industrial disputes to come forward at any time before the New Deal. It was created at the instigation of the National Industrial Conference Board, itself a brand-new organization composed of flagship corporations and employer associations, which won the privilege of appointing business representatives to the board. The AFL got to select the labor representatives, eagerly grabbing the opportunity to appear as the equal of business, and the board was rounded out by presidential appointments supposed to represent the public. Too much should not be made of this departure from the norms of the liberal state. The board lacked strong coercive powers, leaving some important awards unenforced, and it was an emergency creation that quickly went out of business at war's end. All the same, the fact that it incorporated the two great estates of the realm, business and labor, in a tripartite structure unknown to the Constitution clearly marks the War Labor Board as an American counterpart of similar corporatist agencies in Europe.⁴⁹

As Gompers' vigorous support of the War Labor Board implies, the AFL chief was determined to make the most of wartime opportunities. Beginning with his service on the Council of National Defense, Gompers' extensive collaboration with the government marked a dramatic rupture with the past practice of AFL voluntarism. Ever since Grover Cleveland had crushed the railroad strike of 1894, top AFL leaders had based their strategy on the twin assumptions that organized labor could not win a battle with the giant corporations as long as they were backed by state power. The contrast between the success of craft unions in the building trades and the virtual absence of unions from mass production was evidence to bolster what had become self-fulfilling prophecy. But Gompers was quick to recognize that total war changed the rules of the game. With 2.5 million members, AFL unions had something the gov-

ernment badly needed—skilled war workers, many of whom were German and Irish union officers who could bolster support for the war in the very ethnic communities where it was weakest. Under these conditions, it might be possible for unions to win benevolent neutrality from the executive branch to balance the resolutely hostile Supreme Court, which upheld the yellow-dog contract in the 1917 *Hitchman* case, and an unreliable Congress, whose Clayton Act had miserably failed to fulfil Gompers' wish that it be "labor's Magna Carta." As proof of AFL loyalty, Creel and Gompers set up the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. As the loyal alternative to the People's Council, the AALD became the main bridge over which the minority of prowar socialists, including John Spargo, Charles Edward Russell, and Rose Pastor Stokes, could cross into the two-party mainstream. Gompers actually became more loyal than the National Security League and the American Defense Society, elite loyalty leagues that were honeycombed with carping Republicans.⁵⁰

If the aim of war nationalism was to stifle industrial discontent, it did not succeed. The evidence of wartime strikes is eloquent on that point: the number of workers on strike shot up in 1916, and, although it dipped the next year, it remained well above prewar levels through the end of the war.⁵¹ Skilled machinists fought quick, sharp battles over work rules; operatives and laborers in the heavily female garment trades obtained wage increases to offset rising prices; and coal miners braved fierce employer resistance to increase membership in the United Mine Workers to 400,000, turning some sectors of West Virginia into what was described as "civil war." Riding the wave, union membership doubled from 2,607,000 in 1915 to 5,110,000 in 1920, and strikes crested in the extraordinary year of 1919, when more than 4 million workers hit the bricks. It was a remarkable working-class offensive the likes of which had not been seen since the 1880s, nor would be seen again until 1946. In contrast to the situation in Europe in 1914-1916, the war did not close the floodgates of industrial discontent; it opened them.⁵²

One reason for the discontent was the pinch on working-class consumers. The mobilization disrupted the delicate balance of family economy, particularly among immigrants in mine patches, steeltowns, stockyards, and garment districts whose reliance on multiple incomes from children and boarders was thrown off kilter. Worse, runaway inflation seemed to devour whatever income was left: all the available

price indices concur that consumer prices roughly doubled between 1914, when the Bureau of Labor Statistics index stood at 42.9, and 1920, when it registered 85.7.⁵³

The experience was nothing like the absolute impoverishment in Europe, of course, but insecurity was rife, against which halfhearted regulation did little. Indeed, government sometimes made things worse, as in New York City, where municipal rationing of meat caused food riots in 1917 when Jewish women from New York's Lower East Side turned American nationalism into a justification for protest against wartime price inflation. Fusing new expectations of an American standard of living with Old World notions of moral economy, they rioted when the city tried to substitute rice for the traditional chicken, carrying banners that read:

We American Can Not Live on Rice.
We Want All Food Stuffs to Come Down in Price.
Speculators and Robbers Will not Survive
By Lowering the Standard of American Live.⁵⁴

Fortunately, for the first time in decades workers were in a position to do something about insecurity. Thanks to an influx of war orders at the same time immigration was falling to a trickle, workers experienced the tightest labor market they had ever known; unemployment fell precipitously from upward of 15 percent in 1915 to an unprecedented 2.4 percent in 1918. Given the unusual shortage of unskilled labor, employers began hiring women and southern migrants and engaged in something of a bidding war for skilled and semiskilled labor, with the result that average hourly earnings in manufacturing increased 137 percent from 1915 to 1920, compared with a 44 percent increase over the previous twenty-five years. For the same reason, average hours declined substantially. Short hours had been a prime demand of the labor movement since the 1830s. In the twenty-five years before 1915 the average work week fell from 60 to 55 hours; in the four years after 1915 it plunged rapidly to 51.⁵⁵

For all the political and economic gains notched by workers, there was a darker side to wartime industrial relations. The war brought a dramatic expansion in the repressive machinery of state. Newly expanded police forces tightened work discipline as they ferreted out disloyalty, stopping just short of equating loyalty to the nation with absolute obedience to the employer. Although nothing like Germany's

Auxiliary Service Law was ever contemplated, Selective Service chief General Enoch Crowder issued a well-publicized "work or fight" order threatening to draft the unemployed. Armed with the Espionage Act and the Sedition Act, the Bureau of Investigation infiltrated into war plants industrial spies who commonly equated protest against overwork with apologies for the kaiser. Intertwined with existing law-and-order leagues, these new loyalty police collaborated intimately with private labor spies at such corporations as International Harvester, U.S. Steel, and Ford. Additional help came from Military Intelligence and its subsidiary, the Plant Protection Service, which spied on civilians through its Negative Branch MI-4 under doubtful constitutional warrant.⁵⁶

Repression reached its apogee in the West, where industrial relations displayed the sharpest point/counterpoint anywhere in the nation. Absentee corporations and their local minions squared off against a ragtag assortment of hard-living industrial workers, migratory "bindlestiffs," and pugnacious tenant farmers among whom socialists, Wobblies, and assorted other labor radicals had wide-ranging influence.⁵⁷ In the customary western response to industrial discontent, authorities cracked down on labor radicals, only now on a far grander scale than ever before. Under the logic of total war, any production site with even a remote connection to the war effort could be defined as a "public utility," so any disruption of production could be taken as a threat to the national interest. In the past, the use of the army as a domestic police had been constrained by the "insurrection" doctrine which prohibited use of the army unless state authorities could not "guarantee a republican form of government" as stipulated in Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution.⁵⁸ Now such constraints were swept aside as the War Department hastily improvised a new "public utilities" doctrine under which Army Department commanders were authorized to supply troops directly upon request of the governor, and soon soldiers were guarding West Coast lumber yards, orchards, and wheat fields against merely "threatened" strikes and the perceived "danger" of sabotage.⁵⁹

When actual strikes hit copper camps from Bisbee, Arizona, to Butte, Montana, in the summer of 1917, the Wilson administration was ready with the iron heel of troops in the velvet sock of mediation. Whereas a hastily assembled President's Mediation Commission did little to dampen conflict, the military was more effective, sometimes in tacit collaboration with local vigilantes, as in the infamous Bisbee de-

portation, in which three people were killed on deportation day, yet the Military Intelligence officer on the scene calmly cabled his superiors: "Everything orderly." In fact, U.S. troops would continue to keep labor peace in the copper districts at both ends of the Rocky Mountains until 1921.⁶⁰

It would be a mistake to visualize a monolithic state conspiring with a nefarious network of night riders to suppress worker discontent. Indeed, the Justice Department prosecuted the Bisbee vigilantes all the way to the Supreme Court (where the vigilantes won), and cries were heard from congressional representatives such as Jeannette Rankin, the nation's first congresswoman, in protesting anti-IWW lynch mobs. There were checks and balances even within the federal bureaucracy, as evidenced by the obstinate refusal of the Labor Department to accept mere IWW membership as grounds for deportation of aliens.⁶¹

Yet it would be a still greater mistake to believe that in its own discordant, pluralistic fashion the Wilson administration did not play a major role in winning the West for big business and, in general, securing a political-legal order congenial to corporate capitalism. In extreme cases, the federal government even went so far as to collaborate with vigilantes. The Loyal Legions and Citizens Protective Associations of western industrial districts were establishment vigilantes who sought the restoration of accepted rules of the marketplace against usurpers, not the overthrow of constituted authority. That fact helps explain why so many authorities from the local to the national level held a double standard toward violence: strikes of immigrant workers, especially with the IWW present, were disorder, whereas vigilante raids on private homes and union offices, deportations, terrorism, and even lynchings were indications that everything was "orderly."⁶²

And what of the balance in industry between autocracy and democracy? Did nationalism favor one over the other? In many respects, wartime nationalism boosted the preferred progressive solutions to industrial discontent. That much was clear when the War Labor Board and its companions went much further than any prewar institution in mediating industrial disputes. Likewise, insofar as they incorporated "labor" as one member of a tripartite body, they redressed the balance of power somewhat in favor of industrial workers. And there was no doubt that the ideology of "making the world safe for democracy" boosted the idea of democracy in industry. Frank Walsh used the War Labor Board as a platform to broadcast the message: "The country, I

promise you, is beginning to understand that we may have 100 per cent democracy in the form of our political government and yet autocracy of the most despotic type in industry." Workers filled Americanism with democratic content, and their support for the war grew the more they held Wilson to his promise to make it a war for democracy.⁶³

But the price of nationalism was acceptance of the state's right to define what was and was not legitimate. That was fine for the AFL so long as it was the "legitimate" organization, as against the "illegitimate" IWW.⁶⁴ But did Gompers think he could dictate the terms of labor's bargain with the government? What would happen in peacetime when the nation-state had less need of labor's loyal service? The entire labor movement—conservative and radical alike—was about to find out. After the war, the tables were turned rapidly as national loyalty became equated with the open shop in the "American Plan" and as the western solution became the blueprint for suppressing industrial discontent. In response to the unprecedented level of strikes in 1919 and 1920, all the features of suppression reappeared writ large, including the use of troops as domestic police, military spying on civilians, deportation of alien radicals, and the coordination of Loyalty League vigilantes with local police and federal troops. And further, the wartime experience with enforced consent—that is, loyalty as defined by the state backed by legal coercion—prepared the ground for the Red Scare looming just over the horizon. While protecting wage earners from autocratic employers, the weak from the strong, the state also took care to protect the strong from the weak.

War between the Sexes

Total war politicized relations between the sexes, though not quite in the way anyone intended. The messages from most government publicity bureaus traded heavily on sentimental conventions of femininity and masculinity. It was time to end the battle of the sexes and pull together—women and men alike—for total victory in Europe. In the saccharine iconography of propaganda posters, wives with husbands away at the front were urged to keep the home fires burning for the eventual homecoming, and the image of saintly motherhood was milked for every drop of patriotic sentiment it held: Recruiting posters artfully played on masculine themes: the famous "Uncle Sam Wants You!" challenged men to be *real* men from one direction, while Howard

Chandler Christie's fetching band of coquettes challenged from another: one poster with a pert blond decked out in Navy blues was captioned, "Gee!! I wish I were a man; I'd join the Navy—Be a man and do it." Gone was the identification of manhood with being "too proud to fight"; gone was the message of the most popular song of 1916, "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier." Instead, the country harked to the message of the preparedness movement that the strenuous life under army discipline would convert callow youth into sturdy defenders of family and nation. The same martial spirit that would make boys into men would also make a young nation into a world power; going to fight would mark the end of innocence and the beginning of national maturity. Thus were psychosexual energies drafted to serve the ambitions of the nation-state.⁶⁵

Yet the gulf between these conventional images and the changing relations of the sexes was only widened by the war. There were so many points at which the formerly separate spheres overlapped, so many objections to the Victorian double standard, so many more women in the labor market, and so many women voting in the fourteen states that had enacted female suffrage that it was impossible to put the genie of change back in the bottle. The fact that there was no going back did not make clear which was the way forward. Unfortunately, the war confronted the women's movement with agonizing choices. Should they support the war in hopes of making gains for women's suffrage and women's protections, or should they risk these advances in principled devotion to the pacifism that had long been an integral part of their cause? Was there a way between the Scylla of opportunism and the Charybdis of marginalism?

To many suffragists and social feminists, the opportunity to grab a seat at the table of power and thereby legitimate their cause was too great to pass up. Well-connected matrons of the civic clubs and genteel suffragists of the National American Woman Suffrage Association secured appointments to many state Councils of National Defense, capped by the appointment of Anna Howard Shaw to head the all-volunteer Women's Advisory Committee. Long thorns in the side of the male power structure, women such as Shaw put aside their professed pacifism and busied themselves with the kind of charitable and philanthropic work benevolent ladies had always done, only now clothed in the kind of public authority that would weaken the antisuffragist argument that women's place was in the home.⁶⁶ Others in the

movement, however, were not so quick to compromise. Crystal Eastman was among the sturdy band of feminists who helped establish the People's Council in a vain effort to link opposition to the war with social reform. The division between Shaw and Eastman roughly paralleled the division in the labor movement between AFL chief Gompers, who also won a coveted seat on the CND, and Eugene Debs, who wound up in jail for making antiwar speeches.

The militant feminists of the National Women's party followed a very narrow third path between the rocks of prowar and antiwar opinion. Declining to take any position on the war, they also refused to abandon militant tactics. Having vowed to oppose the party in power as long as it failed to support equal suffrage, they were not mollified by a mild pledge from the president to consider suffrage; instead, they took his promise to "make the world safe for democracy" and threw it back in his face with a campaign of civil disobedience that included hunger strikes, pickets for "Kaiser Wilson," and the burning of "watchfires" across from the White House. Like a number of labor leaders who walked a similar tightrope by leading strikes in war industries, they earned the enmity of the authorities, but they also kept the suffrage question on the front pages alongside news from the war front.⁶⁷

Social reformers beat a path to Washington in the hope of expanding the toehold they had already won for protective legislation at the state level. The clearest sign of their success was the newfound Women in Industry Service, soon rechristened the Women's Bureau, which took up the aspirations of the the National Women's Trade Union League for women's hours and wage regulations and prohibitions on night work and heavy lifting. As always, it was easier to get special protection for women than to implement equal protections for workers of both sexes. Although "equal pay for equal work" became the official government policy, there was virtually no enforcement, since that would have meant hard battles with industry.⁶⁸

The path of least resistance was the family wage. All the main players in the regulatory game—male bureaucrats, private employers, middle-class allies of working women, and trade unionists—supported the idea that a man should earn enough to support wife and child. Before the war, the government had begun to implement the concept in a halting fashion as the basis for wage standards in railroad arbitrations, industrial commissions, and family budget studies. Now, in the rush to mobilize industrial workers, Felix Frankfurter's War Labor Policies

Board drew up a presidential proclamation setting the family wage as official government policy.⁶⁹ Though commonly honored in the breach, that meant the state was, in effect, putting its authority behind the old saw that women's place was in the home. Progressive reformers thus ran into the same dilemma that had bedeviled them before the war. They had to choose between special protections for women, which courtseyed to the conventional notion of the "weaker sex," and equal protections, which had little chance of being effective.

This was not the only breach in the barrier between the state and family welfare. Congress had already lent support to the principle by outlawing child labor at the height of the prewar progressive tide, an act the flinty-hearted Supreme Court now deemed unconstitutional in *Hammer v. Dagenhart* (1918) on the grounds that Congress had overreached its authority over interstate commerce by invading the private preserve of manufacturing, not to mention the sanctity of the family. Without wasting a moment, Congress enacted a new law that outflanked the Court's laissez-faire decision by laying a heavy tax on the interstate products of child labor, although that too would be thrown out in a few years. The list of social-welfare innovations did not stop there. For the first time, the federal government sponsored dozens of housing projects at war production sites and set up a social insurance fund to which soldiers were required to contribute. At the state level, inhibitions about government regulation of family affairs were falling even faster as social reformers won expanded tenement inspection, milk provision, and juvenile courts. The sum of these innovations was not a greatly expanded welfare state under anything like the "war collectivism" in Germany but a few more small steps on the road away from laissez faire.⁷⁰

The principle of the family wage was severely tested by the need to attract women to fill jobs vacated by men. There is evidence that women workers made gains during the war in the entrance of half a million new workers into the job market and the promulgation of "equal pay for equal work." Certainly, Mary Anderson, a veteran trade unionist, had some reason for optimism as she assumed her post at the helm of the newly created Women's Bureau. But closer examination reveals that these gains for equal treatment were overridden by other decisions upholding women's second-class status. Even as bureaucrats and employers enticed women into such nontraditional lines as machine shops and streetcar conducting, the prevailing attitude was that

these women were only temporarily filling in at men's jobs and could be properly discharged at the end of the war. For its part, the War Labor Board sometimes violated its own stated policy of equal pay in awarding differential pay on the basis of gender. The clearest test of government influence was the railways. Precisely because Uncle Sam was a relatively good employer, people expected a minimum of discrimination under the Railway Administration, but such was not the case. At the end of federal control, just as at the beginning, women were segregated by sex into lower-paying jobs with virtually no supervisory responsibility. Despite flirtations with the outer limits of opportunity, women remained overwhelmingly concentrated in "women's jobs," even though the jobs might have changed.⁷¹

Government regulation of sexuality was still more conservative. Social hygienists marched into Washington upon the outbreak of war, determined to expand their crusade against commercialized vice. The efficiency-minded social engineers of the American Social Hygiene Association advanced in seven-league boots, according to the head of the organization in a letter to its principal financial backer, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.: "In the early years, the problems of social hygiene were carefully studied and public opinion molded in such a way as to prepare for the wonderful opportunity which came to the Association at the outbreak of the war."⁷² The "wonderful opportunity" arrived when the Social Hygiene Association beat out the YMCA in competition for control of the Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA), the most important command post for the government's campaign against venereal disease and prostitution. With a faith that surpasses understanding, the CTCA set out to combat venereal disease through continence. The same idea had also seized the Social Hygiene Division of the Council of National Defense, which officially adopted the principle "that continence is compatible with health and that it is the best means of preventing venereal disease." To spread the word, the CTCA lecturers produced the first film ever made by the U.S. government, *Fit to Win*, warning of the dire consequences that awaited a man who consorted with diseased women.⁷³

To end all temptation in that direction, the CTCA switched off the lights in every major red-light district in the nation. Just as national Prohibition would win its first victory in a military regulation excluding drink from the area around military cantonments, so the CTCA shut down red-light districts on the grounds that they were making

American servicemen unfit to fight, a claim buttressed by the shockingly large percentage of enlisted men tested positive for VD. One after another the citadels of vice fell to the attack. Most dramatic was the closing of New Orleans' fabled Storyville, "the Gibraltar of commercialized vice." Altogether, the agency claimed credit for putting 110 red-light districts out of business. Wrapping repression in the flag, the American Social Hygiene Association dubbed this work the "American Plan": "It did not try to make the rattlesnake harmless by extracting its fangs. It chose rather to kill the snake outright as an enemy to national efficiency and welfare."⁷⁴

Unfortunately, there were a lot of rattlesnakes in Uncle Sam's army. When Samuel Gompers got wind of the policy of continence, he no doubt spoke for the prevailing attitude among enlisted men in objecting that "real men will be men." Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels was initially aghast at the prospect of recommending continence during shore leave, and army and navy officers merely ignored the exhortations of the social hygienists and handed out condoms to the troops instead. Once the American Expeditionary Force began arriving in Europe, French officials found the policy totally incomprehensible, and Premier Georges Clemenceau reportedly offered to furnish the doughboys with medically certified prostitutes. Clemenceau may have seen nothing unseemly in offering to be chief procurer to the American army, but when Raymond Fosdick, a CTCA officer on loan from Rockefeller, took this proposal to the secretary of war, Newton Baker exclaimed, "For God's sake, Raymond, don't show this to the President or he'll stop the war."⁷⁵

In case the recruits failed to heed the call of continence, social hygienists were there to protect the young girls who might become their victims. The main federal agency charged with this task was the Committee on Protective Work for Girls, which boasted the patronage of society dames such as Mrs. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and whose matrons of virtue saw themselves as surrogate chaperones to the urban masses. They were especially vigilant toward unescorted girls who congregated in dance halls, movie theaters, and other haunts of popular entertainment and supposedly vicious commerce. Not ones to curse the darkness without lighting a candle, they went about literally putting lights in darkened movie theaters, and they were on high alert against low forms of dancing:

1. No undue familiarity, exaggerated or suggestive forms of dancing will be tolerated.
2. Partners must be at least three inches apart, including heads. Hands must not be placed below the waist, nor above the shoulder, nor across the breast. Clapsed hands must not be less than six inches from the body.

They functioned as a kind of chastity police.⁷⁶

If social engineers took the fun out of vice, they also took the vice out of fun. To rear up a generation worthy of the Boy Scout oath to be "cheerful, brave, thrifty, clean, and reverent" required the substitution of wholesome recreation for commercialized vice. The CTCA enlisted the services of the Playground Association, the Russell Sage Foundation, and the ubiquitous YMCA to bring edification and fitness to the troops through baseball, community sings, and university extension courses. The U.S. Public Health Service was not far behind in recommending uplifting literature, including *Treasure Island* and *Tom Sawyer*, a list modified in a special exhibit for young black men to include Rudyard Kipling's *Kim* alongside W. E. B. DuBois's *The Negro* and Booker T. Washington's *Up from Slavery*. Public health officials also campaigned for cleanliness in mind and body with a traveling exhibit, "Keeping Fit," that urged men to honor their mothers by protecting the honor of all women and girls: "Take no liberties with any girl that you would not have another man or boy take with your sister or sweetheart."⁷⁷

The modern sex hygienists did not so much overturn Victorian conventions as reformulate them. They actually carried to an impossible extreme the either/or image of the madonna/whore. Pamphlets such as *Keeping Fit to Fight* contrasted all-American sweethearts at one extreme with the diseased prostitute, every one an enemy agent, at the other; and visual exhibits counterposed wholesome family scenes—mother and sister waiting patiently for the soldier's return—to a blindfolded soldier's lascivious reverie of titillating nudes titled "Is Your Mind Diseased?" They also relied on old-fashioned concepts of male honor that presented woman as the sexually passive helpless victim. To foment hatred for the enemy, propagandists appealed to the male protector of feminine virtue in relentlessly invoking "the rape of Belgium" and asking: "How would you like to have twenty Prussian beasts, one after another, indulge their lusts upon your sister?"⁷⁸ So long as the moral

reformers played out this script, they could only rework the idylls of the proprietary family—feminine chastity and masculine chivalry—around the theme of scientific efficiency. But they could not develop a new morality suitable to the coming age.

The wartime triumphs of social purity ended commercialized vice as a major issue in American politics. It marked the culmination of efforts to moralize the marketplace by drawing a hard and fast legal boundary between virtuous and vicious commerce. Exulting in their victories, the purity crusaders never stopped to ask whether state coercion was the best way to resolve contentious issues of private morality. Critics rightly objected that it was futile, at best, to try to run a multicultural twentieth-century society as if it were a Puritan theocracy, or even a secularized utopia fit only for efficiency experts. By the law of unintended consequences, the suppression of commercialized vice only led to the criminalized vice of bootleggers, gangsters, pimps, and procurers in the Roaring Twenties. If sexual purity won a pyrrhic victory during the war, other ostensible gains for women were quickly offset. The victories of female reformers in getting the Women's Bureau and of female workers in gaining job opportunities were also offset by new forms of subordination in which war nationalism played a prominent part in terms of patriotic motherhood and patriotic housewifery. Although the democratic ideology of Wilson's war aims probably made women's suffrage inevitable, it still had a long way to go when the fighting stopped. Thus the overall impact of the war on the relations between the sexes was by no means wholly or even primarily in the direction of equality.

Consequences

By the time the guns fell silent on November 11, 1918, the balance of forces in American life had changed considerably from what it had been when Wilson had made his fateful decision a brief twenty months earlier. Most important, the state loomed larger than ever in the workings of society. Never before had federal officials dumped so much patriotic gore into the channels of mass communication, silenced so many voices of dissent, intervened in so many labor disputes, coordinated so many business activities, sold so many government bonds, or collected so many tax revenues. For the first time, federal bureaucracies intervened in the market on a large scale through the War Industries Board

and the War Labor Board, while the permanent bureaucracy expanded as the Treasury Department sold Liberty Bonds, the Justice Department conducted domestic surveillance, and, of course, the War Department mobilized millions of men and policed industrial disputes. The heavy features of state power—nationalism, suppression of dissent, military and secret police—were all much in evidence. Had the country been mobilized for four years instead of a year and a half, these centralizing influences undoubtedly would have evolved further in the direction of a more statist system.

But the contrast with the Continental European regimes remains striking. In Germany, for example, the heavy hand of the state was present at the outset and only grew stronger during the war. The statist tradition derived partly from the persistence of authoritarian elements from the old regime—landed and bureaucratic elites, hereditary princes, the army officer class, and the aristocratic ethos—none of which, of course, had any provenance in the liberal republic of the United States. To be sure, Germany was no medieval kingdom in 1914. The rise of the bourgeoisie had left an indelible mark on civil society through the preeminence of industrial over agrarian wealth and on the state through the principle of equality before the law. As opposed to the old regime, in which assent was secured through deference under patriarchal, monarchical, and military hierarchies, the integration of liberal elements into the German empire by 1914 obliged elites to secure active consent in some fashion from the governed. Indeed, historians have shown that elites grew increasingly alarmed about the advancement of the lower and middle classes, and may very well have consciously chosen a path for war in the hope of resolving domestic conflicts. If socialists insisted on asking the "social question," the answer of industrialists and landlords would be war.⁷⁹

Whatever the reasons, once war was chosen the chancellor had to submit his military budget to the Reichstag, where it was permitted to pass only by the abstention of the main opposition Social Democrats. Ever afterward, their action was rightly remembered as the triumph of nationalism and the betrayal of socialist internationalism. It permitted Germans of all parties to march off to war in lockstep. Under "war collectivism" the government coopted civil society wherever it could, securing a "fortress truce" in industry, spreading the mythology of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, calling upon housewives to make patriotic sacrifices in the face of the food blockade, and putting the middle-class women's

movement to work on home relief. In sum, German mobilization on the home front cannot be understood solely in terms of the persistence of the old regime, but must also take into account modern industry, mass communication, and the political integration of subordinate groups.⁸⁰

That granted, the comparison between Germany and the United States is not one between a traditional and a modern system, but between a statist and a liberal one. Germany fought total war under a hierarchical chain of command that reached its apex at the kaiser. Under his authority, the government immediately imposed a state of emergency, abrogated all civil liberties, rationed food, and subjected civilian workers to military discipline. As the war dragged on, more and more of civilian life came under military control, so that by the end of 1916 the country was under a virtual military dictatorship by Generals Ludendorff and Hindenberg. Nothing like this was possible in the United States. Liberal inhibitions on centralized power, civilian supremacy over the military, the sanctity of private property, reverence for the self-reliant family, opposition to public welfare—in short, the supremacy of society over the state—made for a business-dominated system that instead relied heavily on voluntarism and high-power advertising.

Paradoxically, these very liberal restraints on state power turned into their opposite in federal restrictions on drink and sex. Taking advantage of the wartime need for discipline, the century-old temperance movement seized the levers of power in the fond hope of delivering a knockout blow to alcohol. The most enduring element in the antiliquor impulse was evangelical Protestantism. With roots in the stern religious discipline of Methodist camp meetings and Lutheran self-denial, the Women's Christian Temperance Union and revivalist preachers such as Billy Sunday embodied an unforgiving attitude toward the pleasures of the flesh, small-town hostility toward the sinful city, and a large dose of feminine anger toward ne'er-do-well husbands. Having watched with growing alarm the rising tide of immigrant "wets," they found in the martial discipline of the war an opportunity to scratch the evangelical itch to make everybody a saint. Another prime impulse originated in the South, where New South elites seeking to master the poor of both races led a campaign that succeeded in shutting the saloons in every southern state by 1919. An added impetus for national Prohibition came from women reformers and social engineers, who grasped

the "wonderful opportunity" provided by wartime discipline to remake the urban masses in their own image of self-respecting efficiency.

Prohibition became the law of the land in a series of ever-widening decisions. First, the War Department encircled military encampments with a kind of *cordon sanitaire* across which the Army Section on Vice and Liquor Control allowed neither sex nor drink to pass. This purity zone was repeatedly expanded under the doctrine of military necessity until it encompassed a complete prohibition on the manufacture of all liquor, a position reaffirmed by the postwar Volstead Act. Meanwhile, Congress had sent the Eighteenth Amendment out to the states, whose ratification in 1919 finally made it the law of the land. Because of the absence of a strong regulatory tradition, when teetotaling morality seized control of the state, its aim was not to regulate vice but to abolish it. Thus *laissez faire* turned into its opposite, absolutist state control of private life.⁸¹

Prohibition cannot be understood apart from the class field of force. In the name of regeneration and efficiency, middle- and upper-class elements set out with the intention of completely reforming, in the literal sense, entire ethnic cultures whose customs were profoundly opposed to Yankee Protestant temperance, individualism, and self-denial. Unlike the nineteenth-century working class, which was honeycombed with temperance movements of its own, twentieth-century working people floated on the high seas of alcohol. Needless to say, that was more the case with men than with women, who all too often suffered abuse at the hands of drunken husbands. But even so, Italian women who may have despised the saloon for stealing bread from their table would not have dreamed of giving up wine at Communion or their daughter's wedding; Polish Catholic families toasted health at Sunday afternoon picnics; and the inebriated uncle was a necessary fixture of the legendary Irish wake.

Thus the Prohibitionist exercise in social uplift was condemned to become in equal measure an exercise in repression. Whether Prohibitionists represented a majority of the country is doubtful, but it is certain they did not win over a majority of the urban working class, who simply turned to bathtub gin, rum runners, and bootleggers. Perhaps more than any other single governmental act, Prohibition earned the undying enmity of working people. Not one to overdramatize class consciousness, Samuel Gompers described Prohibition as a class law against workers' beer, and in the same vein, one urban congressman

undoubtedly spoke for the majority of wage earners in denouncing the howls of malicious joy issuing from rural America in "inflicting this sumptuary prohibition legislation upon the great cities. It preserves their cider and destroys the city workers' beer."⁸²

Prohibition had a close parallel in the regulation of sexuality. Like drinking, prostitution bore a moral stigma but was not in itself illegal until the early twentieth century when it came under a widening ban culminating in the wartime closure of the red-light districts. The same combination of evangelical Protestants and social hygienists was behind the abolition of prostitution, and in the absence of a regulatory tradition, the only alternative to *laissez faire* was its exact opposite, total suppression. That was also the case with public discussion of sexuality, which was proscribed from the mails on grounds of obscenity, defined as whatever Anthony Comstock, special inspector for the Post Office, said it was. A more distant parallel lay in the suppression of dissent; again, liberal openness turned into its opposite.

Upper-class control of drink also had a parallel in the regulation of courtship. Most of the patriotic protectors of prostitutes, juvenile girls, and the poor came to the government from organizations such as the Rockefeller-backed American Social Hygiene Association or the Juvenile Girl's Protective Association, run by a wealthy Chicago philanthropist. Outlets for the upper-class impulse to remake the urban poor appeared in such Protestant reform agencies as the Salvation Army, YWCA, Red Cross, and women's clubs. At the same time they totally neglected such working-class institutions as extended families, ethnic benevolent societies, and parochial schools, which they shunned as too closely tied to "the swarm of petty politicians" buzzing around urban political machines. Although the social hygienists protested affronts to womanhood in the criminal justice system, they believed working-class youth had to be protected from their own dating customs, risky sexuality, and popular amusements, an attitude that was less sisterly than matriarchal.⁸³

The war left an indelible imprint on the contest among progressive, managerial, and *laissez-faire* liberals for national leadership. At the outset, it looked as if progressives might overtake *laissez faire*. The dynamic of reform had been building for a decade, the war would inevitably bring federal regulation of the market, and a host of veteran leaders took up command posts in Washington, including Felix Frankfurter in the Labor Department, Anna Howard Shaw at the Council of

National Defense, and Newton Baker in the cabinet. Small wonder that progressives believed with Lippmann that the moment of "mastery" was at hand. Sure enough, the government created new machinery for adjusting social conflict in the War Labor Board, the Women's Bureau, and the Federal Employment Service, and, what was more, the air rang with high ideals of crusading liberalism and industrial democracy. By the end, the expansion of corporate-regulatory machinery had marked a milestone in the transformation of nineteenth-century *laissez faire* into twentieth-century regulatory liberalism. But in the excitement of the moment, progressives mistook the spirit of nationalism for crusading reform. Heedless of dark warnings about superpatriotism and little troubled by the crushing blows that fell upon radical dissenters, they went their optimistic way under the illusion that somehow they could encompass the dynamic of war within the dynamic of reform.

Laissez-faire liberals made no such mistake. With no hidden reform agenda, they had no illusions that the war would permanently redress the balance of power between the weak and the strong. Instead, their illusion lay in believing the war would restore the fast-disappearing world of Victorian America. Intolerant of "hyphenates," feminists, radicals, and unionists, they held fast to a vision of a self-governing republic of sturdy Anglo-Saxons scattered in self-reliant families who revered the old verities of respectability, property, and motherhood. Though overshadowed in Washington, they dominated the court system and state legislatures, flourished as the shock troops of "100 percent Americanism," and exulted in Prohibition. Their menfolk identified with self-reliant Sergeant Alvin York, the sharpshooter who single-handedly wiped out enemy machine-gun nests to become the prime hero of the war; and their womenfolk, prompted by the Daughters of the American Revolution and the Women's Section of the Navy League, believed it their duty to support the boys overseas through the Red Cross and "victory bread." Although most historians continue to regard the First World War as an advance for women, the fact remains that enemies of the women's movement, male and female alike, used superpatriotism to strengthen their networks at lower levels of the bureaucracy and in the Republican party that would serve well the conservative cause of antifeminism after the war.⁸⁴ Along with the business defenders of *laissez faire*, they would soon discover champions in Calvin Coolidge, Henry Ford, and the Ku Klux Klan, and they would

return with a vengeance in the early 1920s to reverse the dynamic of reform.

In the meantime, managerial liberals were closest to the real centers of power. They had no intention of redressing the social imbalance of power and no illusion about restoring the lost world of Victorian liberalism. Instead, their illusion lay in believing that they could somehow surmount all the forces of war, bureaucracy, and social conflict making for the growth of massive state structures in the twentieth century. Since American participation in the war was relatively brief, they were spared an unwelcome confrontation with the truth, and had much to cheer about in the way the government mobilized for war through a parastate. The key wartime agencies of civilian mobilization—the War Industries Board, the Food Administration, and the like—were prime examples of the nexus of public-private authority under the nominal control of “dollar-a-year men” such as Bernard Baruch and Herbert Hoover. In addition, the federal government sanctioned the war work of a host of private organizations, including the American Social Hygiene Association, the National Americanization Committee, the Playground Association, and the omnipresent YMCA, all of which owed their budgets, personnel, ideas—in short, their very existence—to business philanthropy. The character of the parastate was brilliantly illuminated at war’s end when most of the new federal quasi-bureaucracies simply disappeared. To the extent that scientific, managerial minds imagined the future, they saw a utopia fit for efficiency experts, with workers subordinate to managers and consumers responding to the ploys of mass advertising. They would eventually find their champion in Herbert Hoover.

The war heightened the influence of the state, and especially of the federal government, in American society. Certainly, at war’s end public regulation of private enterprise and private life in general was greater than ever before. In fact, it is possible to see agencies such as the War Industries Board and the War Labor Board as examples of corporatism, a far-reaching development in twentieth-century capitalist societies defined as rule through quasi-public institutions based on large-scale producer groups such as business, agriculture, and labor rather than through elected officials. If so, the American state had a good deal less corporatism than the European states, where war collectivism had been more extensive.

Whatever the form, corporatist or liberal, mediating or repressive,

state intervention only sometimes protected the weak from the strong. In the main, it was the other way around. That was the opposite of what most progressives had intended, but the fact that history did not turn out as they intended does not absolve them of the blame or burden of making history. That is to say, progressives in the Wilson administration, and certainly Wilson himself, supported the parastate machinery and, more fatefully, the new repressive machinery of state. Not only did the suppression of dissent deny national progressives their most vital source of new ideas; they also lost vital links to the industrial working class and discontented farmers, the only groups big enough to stand up to big business. If the progressives were knocked out of the running, it was in part by their own hands. Taken as a whole, the dynamic of war doomed the dynamic of reform to defeat.

A few of Wilson’s progressive supporters saw the turnabout coming in late 1918. Frederick Howe, for example, was custodian of immigrant radicals held for deportation, many of whom he personally knew to be innocent, and he deeply regretted becoming a jailer “not of convicted offenders but of suspected persons who had been arrested and railroaded to Ellis Island as the most available dumping-ground under the successive waves of hysteria which swept the country.” Racked with guilt, Howe suffered a nervous breakdown. Another prominent progressive, George Creel, was too much of a self-booster to admit culpability for the sins of his own propaganda machine, but he was a perceptive political soothsayer who saw ominous signs in the 1918 election results. Writing to Wilson just three days before the November 11 armistice, he said: “All the radical or liberal friends of your anti-imperialist war policy were either silenced or intimidated.” Democrats were “afraid of raising the class issue” against big-business Republicans, who had wrapped themselves in the flag ever since the preparedness campaign. Unless this electoral verdict was reversed, Creel predicted, “the reactionary patrioteers will defeat the whole immediate future of reform and progress.” Rarely has a prophecy proved more accurate.⁸⁵

- for direct taxes to fund the big military buildup in 1913 gave a "progressive" luster to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's program.
76. Martin Kitchen, *The Political Economy of Germany, 1815-1914* (Montreal, 1978); Volker Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914* (New York, 1973); Geoff Eley, *From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past* (Boston, 1986), 42-60, 154-170.
 77. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "Education and Social Security Entitlements in Europe and America," in *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America*, ed. A. J. Heidenheimer and Peter Flora (New Brunswick, N.J., 1981), 269-306.
 78. Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917* (New York, 1970; orig. 1955), 49-53, 195-196, 224-226. The SPD accepted trade union autonomy in its Mannheim resolution of 1906; but, for all its class unity, the SPD had no record of significant reforms to show. The Reich Insurance Act of 1911, for example, fell far short of expectations for expanding the welfare state, and in any case, credit for reform accrued not to the socialists, but to the government as it sought to win consent of the workers by an end run around their chosen representatives, just as Bismarck had done in launching social insurance in the first place.
 79. *Ibid.*, 225, 228-234; B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970* (New York, 1975), table C3, 174; Berghahn, *Germany and Approach of War*.
 80. Werner Sombart, *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?* (White Plains, N.Y., 1976; orig. 1906).
 81. Marc Karson, *American Labor Unions and Politics, 1900-1918* (Carbondale, Ill., 1958); Stephan Thernstrom, *Poverty and Progress* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963); John Commons et al., eds., *History of Labor in the United States*, 4 vols. (New York, 1918-1935); Selig Perlman, *A Theory of the Labor Movement* (New York, 1949; orig. 1928); Aileen Kraditor, *The Radical Persuasion, 1890-1917* (Baton Rouge, 1981).
 82. Baer and Roosevelt quoted in Richard Hofstadter, "Theodore Roosevelt: The Conservative as Progressive," in *The American Political Tradition* (New York, 1974; orig. 1948), 288, 289.
 83. William A. White, *The Autobiography of William Allen White* (New York, 1946), 429-430, 465. For a dramatic overview of the period 1877-1919, see Nell Painter, *Standing at Armageddon* (New York, 1987).
 84. Ira Kipnis, *The American Socialist Movement, 1897-1912* (New York, 1968; orig. 1952); Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism*, 93-103.
 85. The socialist-progressive dialogue is plumbed in Martin Sklar, *The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916* (Cambridge, 1988), to whom I am indebted for the idea that progressivism "contained" socialism. According to Judith Anderson, *William Howard Taft: An Intimate History*

- (New York, 1981), 21, Taft's inept leadership earned him the epithet "the blundering politician," although the problem was deeper than personal failing. Taft's later laissez-faire rulings as a member of the Supreme Court indicate that he was unable to make the transition from the nineteenth-century state of courts and parties to an administrative state of executive management.
86. Hofstadter, *American Political Tradition*, 327-337.
 87. For an interpretation of progressivism as a conservative, elitist force, see Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916* (Chicago, 1963).

4. Progressive Statecraft

1. Lippmann, *Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961; orig. 1914), 16.
2. Alfred Chandler, *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 357-358; Sanford Jacoby, *Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Transformation of Work in American Industry, 1900-1945* (New York, 1985).
3. David Noble, *America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism* (New York, 1977), 1-32; Margerie Davies, *Women's Place Is at the Typewriter: Office Work and Office Workers, 1870-1930* (Philadelphia, 1982); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life* (New York, 1976).
4. National Industrial Conference Board (NICB), *A Graphic Analysis of the Census of Manufactures of the United States, 1849-1919* (New York, 1923), 113; figures on concentration of large-scale employers from Harry N. Scheiber, Harold G. Vatter, and Harold U. Faulkner, *American Economic History* (New York, 1976), table 15-3, 232; Robert Lampmann, *The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth, 1922-1956* (Princeton, 1962), 206. Jeffrey Williamson and Peter Lindert, *American Inequality: A Macroeconomic History* (New York, 1980), 46-51, portray the era from the Civil War to the Great Depression as a high plateau of wealth inequality, in which the years around the First World War reduced inequality but the 1920s restored and perhaps increased the extremes; using figures from a Federal Trade Commission sampling of probated estates, they estimate that the top 5 percent of wealth holders owned from 77 to 80 percent of all wealth in 1912; as is the case with all such figures, these are estimates based on data and econometric assumptions that may or may not be valid.
5. Naomi Lamoreaux, *The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904* (Cambridge, 1985), 1-4.

6. Thorstein Veblen, *Theory of Business Enterprise* (New York, 1904), 39, 64; idem, *The Engineers and the Price System* (New York, 1921). Veblen was the pivotal figure in the rise of "institutional" economics. More recent critics of big business include Marxist economists and historians who critique the hierarchical strategies of "scientific" management and examine struggles for power on the shop floor, such as Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (New York, 1974); David Montgomery, *The Fall of the House of Labor* (Cambridge, 1987). After the Great Depression, Keynesians diagnosed unequal distribution of wealth and income as an inherent malady of the unregulated private enterprise system that led not just to a gap between rich and poor, but to common ruin, as in the many works of John Kenneth Galbraith, including *The New Industrial State* (Boston, 1967) and *The Great Crash: 1929* (Boston, 1954).
7. Richard Abrams, introduction to Louis Brandeis, *Other People's Money* (New York, 1967; orig. 1914), vii-xliv.
8. George Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912* (New York, 1958).
9. Arthur Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* (New York, 1954), 18-24.
10. Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York, 1944), 256; Martin Sklar, *The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916* (Cambridge, 1988), 402-407, 418-419.
11. Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 36-43.
12. James Livingston, *Origins of the Federal Reserve System: Money, Class, and Corporate Capitalism, 1890-1913* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1986), 217; Brandeis, *Other People's Money*.
13. Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 44-53; Livingston, *Origins of Federal Reserve System*, 224, cites a letter from Irving Bush to Paul Warburg before the bill's passage saying, "in practice, the real banking operations of the country will be carried on under the direction of the officers and directors of the Federal Reserve banks."
14. Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York, 1982), 68-69.
15. In composing this picture of progressive aims, I have drawn on the very different interpretations in Hofstadter, *American Political Tradition*, 292-304, 327-338, which portrays Wilson as an Edwardian liberal in progressive clothing; and Sklar, *Corporate Reconstruction*, 402-404, 406-407, 418-419, which portrays Wilson as a corporate liberal and consistent proponent of government regulation.
16. Wilson quoted in Sklar, *Corporate Reconstruction*, 326.
17. *Ibid.*, 226, 325-330, 420; Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 69-71, 72-73; the senator was James Reed.
18. Christopher Tomlins, *The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the*

- Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960* (Cambridge, 1985), 65-67.
19. Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 73; Edwin Witte, *The Government in Labor Disputes* (New York, 1932), 70; hostile Supreme Court decisions include *Duplex Printing Press* (1921) and *Bedford Cut Stone* (1927), outlawing the secondary boycott, or sympathy strike; and *American Steel Foundries* (1921), against mass picketing.
20. Sklar, *Corporate Reconstruction*, 332; Livingston, *Origins of Federal Reserve System*, 215-234.
21. Lamoreaux, *Great Merger Movement*, 187-194; Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State," in *Regulation in Perspective*, ed. Thomas McCraw (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 56-94.
22. George C. Suggs, *Colorado's War on Militant Unionism* (Detroit, 1972), 110-111, 118-119, 125-143, 150-151; Mark Wyman, *Hard Rock Epic* (Berkeley, 1979), 218-227; David Grover, *Debaters and Dynamiters: The Story of the Haywood Trial* (Corvallis, Ore., 1964), 52-56.
23. Howard Zinn, *The Politics of History* (Boston, 1970), 79-101; *The Military Occupation of the Coal Strike Zone of Colorado by the Colorado National Guard, 1913-14*, Report of the Commanding General (Denver, 1914), 36-37, 49-74; "Colorado Coal Strike," Adjutant General, RG 94, file 2154620-1,2,3; Justice Department, RG 60, file 168733.
24. D. W. Meinig, *Southwest: Three Peoples in Geographical Change* (New York, 1971), 66-71.
25. Robert D. Gregg, *The Influence of Border Troubles on the Relations between the United States and Mexico* (New York, 1970; orig. 1937); Karl Schmitt, *Mexico and the United States, 1821-1973* (New York, 1974); Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1969), 21-23; Edward Berman, *Labor Disputes and the President* (New York, 1968; orig. 1924), 36-42, 60, 64-69; Frederick Wilson, *Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances* (Washington, D.C., 1969; orig. 1903), 249; Adjutant General, RG 94, files 488494; 13/0155.
26. The most colorful of American labor movements, the Wobblies spawned a large literature; for a comprehensive treatment see Melvyn Dubovsky, *We Shall Be All: The History of the I.W.W.* (New York, 1969). Their lives made for high drama, as recounted in William D. Haywood, *The Autobiography of Big Bill Haywood* (New York, 1977; orig. 1929). The largest collection of IWW papers is housed at Reuther Library, Wayne State University. For obvious reasons, they also made it into Justice Department and Military Intelligence papers, housed at the National Archives.
27. Graham Adams, *Age of Industrial Violence, 1910-1915: The Activities and Findings of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations* (New York, 1966), 32, 40.
28. U.S. Senate, Commission on Industrial Relations, *Final Report*, 16 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1916), I, 2, 3-4; Adams, *Age of Industrial Violence*,

- 161-175; Frank P. Walsh Papers, New York Public Library, boxes 142-144.
29. Haywood, *Autobiography*, 190-222; Adams, *Age of Industrial Violence*, 1-24; for comparison to the role of courtroom theater in eighteenth-century England, see the essays in Douglas Hay, et al., eds., *Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England* (New York, 1975).
30. For a discussion of labor and the law see Tomlins, *The State and the Unions*.
31. J. H. Cohen, *Law and Order in Industry: Five Years' Experience* (New York, 1916), 291-292; J. R. Commons and Florence Harriman, report in U.S. Senate, Commission on Industrial Relations, *Final Report*, I, 173-183; Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York, 1963; orig. 1909).
32. Alice Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States* (New York, 1982), 202-214; John Higham, *Strangers in the Land* (New York, 1963), 112-163.
33. See Walter Trattner, *Crusade for the Children: A History of the National Child Labor Committee and Child Labor Reform in America* (Chicago, 1970).
34. Women's minimum wages were upheld in *Stettler v. O'Hara* 243 U.S. 629 (1917), only to be overturned in *Adkins v. Children's Hospital* 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
35. Montgomery, *Fall of the House of Labor*, 353-354; Daniel Nelson and Stuart Campbell, "Taylorism versus Welfare Work in American Industry: H. L. Gantt and the Bancrofts," *Business History Review* 46 (Spring 1972), 1-16. The multitude of NICB pamphlets and publications provides a running guide to managerial philosophy: see, for example, NICB, *Bulletin 1: Industrial Self-Government* (n.p., n.d.); NICB, *Health Service in Industry* (New York, 1921); NICB, *Industrial Pensions in the United States* (New York, 1925). See also Jacoby, *Employing Bureaucracy*.
36. Jacoby, *Employing Bureaucracy*, 49-52; report of the Sociological Committee at International Harvester, Cyrus McCormick Papers, box 42, SHSW.
37. Personnel Records, Pennsylvania Railroad YMCA, 1899-1927 and 1922-1960, HL; the quote is from about 1932; likewise, the purpose of the Reading Railroad's relief association was "greater co-operation and more harmonious relations."
38. Marguerite Green, *The National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement, 1900-1925* (Westport, Conn., 1973; orig. 1956); Robert Ozanne, *A Century of Labor Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester* (Madison, Wis., 1967); Daniel Nelson, "The New Factory System and the Unions: The National Cash Register Co. Dispute of 1901," *Labor History* 15 (Winter 1974), 163-178.
39. James Allen, *The Company Town in the American West* (Norman, Okla., 1966), 65-66; Adams, *Age of Industrial Violence*, 172.
40. Clarence J. Hicks, *My Life in Industrial Relations* (New York, 1941), 47-50, 80.

41. Frederick W. Taylor quoted in Samuel Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920* (Chicago, 1964), 27; *ibid.*, 51-56. See also Frederick W. Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management* (New York, 1911).
42. Croly, *The Promise of American Life*; Josephine Goldmark, *Fatigue and Efficiency* (New York, 1913).
43. Richard A. Easterlin, "Regional Income Trends, 1840-1950," in *American Economic History*, ed. S. E. Harris (New York, 1961), 528; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1933*, 259, cited in C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South*, 319.
44. Lucy Randolph Mason of the YWCA was a southern Florence Kelley, as portrayed in Anne Firor Scott, *The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics, 1830-1930* (Chicago, 1970), 192-197; see also Jacquelyn Hall, *Revolt against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the Women's Campaign against Lynching* (New York, 1979).
45. George Tindall, *The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945* (n.p., 1967), 17-18; Woodward, *Origins of the New South*, 371-380.
46. Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York, 1970), 78, 84, 80; J. M. Kousser, *The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910* (New Haven, 1974), 224-225, 231-238; C. Vann Woodward, *Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel* (New York, 1963; orig. 1938).
47. Tindall, *Emergence of the New South*, 17, 13-15; Pete Daniel, *Standing at the Crossroads* (New York, 1986), 73-74.
48. Tindall, *Emergence of the New South*, 143-144; Daniel, *Standing at the Crossroads*, 75-76; Robert Zangrando, *The NAACP Crusade against Lynching, 1909-1950* (Philadelphia, 1980), 33-34, 37-38.
49. Kearney quoted in Scott, *Southern Lady*, 182; Hall, *Revolt against Chivalry*, 35-38, 43.
50. Marshall Cushing to Charles Tuller, March 8, 1904, in National Association of Manufacturers Papers, series 1, box 43, HL.
51. Tindall, *Emergence of the New South*, 16n50, 20, 321-322.
52. For a discussion of liberal democracy as the political expression of a balance between capitalists and the working class, see Alan Wolfe, *The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism* (New York, 1977).
53. Frank Koester, "The Greatest Secret of German Progress," *The Fatherland*, December 16, 1914, 5.
54. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "Education and Social Security Entitlements in Europe and America," in *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America*, ed. A. J. Heidenheimer and Peter Flora (New Brunswick, N.J., 1981), 269-306.
55. Koester, "The Greatest Secret of German Progress," *The Fatherland*, De-

- ember 23, 1914, 7; and January 13, 1915, 9; Molly Nolan, *Social Democracy and Society: Working-Class Radicalism in Dusseldorf, 1890-1920* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981); Geoff Eley, "Joining Two Histories," in *From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past* (Boston, 1986), 180-186; Jurgen Kocka, *Facing Total War: German Society, 1914-1918*, trans. Barbara Weinberger (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 77-83; Heidenheimer and Flora, *Development of Welfare States*, 17-36, 269-304.
56. Arthur Shadwell, *Industrial Efficiency: A Comparative Study of Industrial Life in England, Germany and America* (London, 1920; orig. 1905), 424; Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917* (New York, 1970; orig. 1955), 225, described prewar Germany as a case of "stagnation on the surface, tension and ferment beneath it." Strike statistics offer some support for this view: after peaking in 1905 at 966,000, the number of strikers fell to a low of 281,000 in 1908 and then climbed again to the prewar high of 1,031,000 in 1912; B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970* (New York, 1975), table C3, 174.
57. Jean Quatert, *Reluctant Feminists in German Social Democracy, 1885-1917* (Princeton, 1979), 24-26; Katherine Anthony, *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia* (New York, 1915), 173-179; see also Ute Frevert, *Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation*, trans. Stuart McKinnon-Evans (Oxford, 1988).
58. Norway was arguably home to the world's first feminist, Henrik Ibsen's Nora, and at the start of the First World War Norway gave out-of-wedlock children the same rights as legitimate children; Norway and Sweden permitted divorce by mutual consent; and Swedish writer Ellen Key's *Renaissance of Motherhood* rejected monogamy as the sole legitimate sexual union; Anthony, *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, 95-96, 147-158. Norway, Sweden, and Finland all adopted women's suffrage before the war; see Ross Evans Paulson, *Women's Suffrage and Prohibition: A Comparative Study of Equality and Social Control* (Glenview, Ill., 1973), 153-154, 154 n. 23.
59. Anthony, *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, 117-133.
60. Shadwell, *Industrial Efficiency*, 33-35, 331, 457.
61. Koester, "Greatest Secret of German Progress"; Koester was a civil engineer who wrote about city planning; John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, 1920), 208; Croly, *The Promise of American Life*, 249-52.
62. There were short-term redistributive effects from the First World War, after which inequality more or less recovered in the 1920s to the point that the top 5 percent received on the order of 30 percent of national income in 1929; results of several studies are combined in Williamson and Lindert, *American Inequality*, 75-80. The distribution of national wealth was considerably more skewed, and the time bomb of uneven distribution finally went off in 1929.

5. *The Dynamics of Total War*

1. Wilson, Baltimore address, April 6, 1918, *Harper Book of American Quotations*, ed. Gorton Carruth and Eugene Ehrlich (New York, 1988), 237.
2. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1900* (London, 1987), 315-323. The argument that Germany went to war to overcome internal division was put forward by Fritz Fischer, *German Aims in the First World War* (New York, 1967); the same argument is found in Volker Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914* (New York, 1973).
3. Wilson quoted in William Leuchtenburg, *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932*, (Chicago, 1958), 18. See *ibid.*, 12-34; also Ernest R. May, *World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).
4. Henry F. May, *The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917* (New York, 1959), 366-368, 393-395; Linda Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America* (New York, 1976), 186-230; Nancy Cott, *The Grounding of Modern Feminism* (New Haven, 1987), 12-50; Elliot Shore, *Talkin' Socialism* (Lawrence, Kans., 1988); J. M. Budish and George Soule, *The New Unionism in the Clothing Industry* (New York, 1920).
5. UMW president John White quoted in David Montgomery, *The Fall of the House of Labor*, (Cambridge, 1987), 363; C. Roland Marchand, *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898-1918* (Princeton, 1973), xii-xv; Jane Addams, *Peace and Bread in Time of War* (New York, 1945).
6. This analysis suggests that Wilson was less successful in fusing peace to progressivism than Arthur Link claims, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* (New York, 1963; orig. 1954), 247-251.
7. Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1981; orig. 1956), 225-233; Martha Derthik, *The National Guard in Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 29-30, 33-35.
8. John P. Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon: The American Campaign for Military Preparedness, 1914-1917* (Westport, Conn., 1974), 111, 105; John Higham, *Strangers in the Land* (New York, 1963), 199-200; Frances Kellor, *Straight America: A Call to National Service* (New York, 1916).
9. Arthur Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* (New York, 1954), 239-251; David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York, 1980), 148-149. On Republican dominance and the "system of 1896," see Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York, 1970).
10. Lloyd C. Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas McCormick, *Creation of the American Empire* (Chicago, 1973), 305.
11. Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1969); John Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York, 1967); for an ac-

- count that vividly captures the chaos and upheaval, see John Reed, *Insurgent Mexico* (New York, 1914); on the world-historical significance of the Mexican Revolution, see Hobsbawm, *Age of Empire*, 286.
12. Wilson quoted in Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 119, 111-113; Lane quoted in R. F. Smith, *The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932* (Chicago, 1972), 90; Lloyd C. Gardner, *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-23* (New York, 1984), 62.
 13. Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 123; Karl Schmitt, *Mexico and the United States, 1821-1973* (New York, 1974), 147-149.
 14. Joseph Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him* (New York, 1921), 159, quoted in Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico* (Chicago, 1981), 311. As early as October 1915 Secretary Robert Lansing had said: "Our possible relations with Germany must be our first consideration: and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly"; quoted in *ibid.*, 302.
 15. Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 271; Gardner, *Safe for Democracy*, 122-139.
 16. Lansing's recollection of Wilson's statement is quoted in N. Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (New York, 1968), 25; Leuchtenburg, *Perils of Prosperity*, 14-16; the Anglo-American special relationship is the subject of Gardner, *Safe for Democracy*.
 17. Wilson, "Peace Without Victory," *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 6 vols. (New York, 1925-27), II, 407-414; Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 261-264.
 18. Katz, *Secret War*, 350, notes that Germany's decision had been made on January 7, 1917; Leuchtenburg, *Perils of Prosperity*, 31-32; Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 278-281.
 19. Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 276, 279.
 20. Wilson, address to Congress, April 2, 1917, in *Public Papers*, I, 6-16.
 21. Norris quoted in Kennedy, *Over Here*, 21; Randolph Bourne quoted in Leuchtenburg, *Perils of Prosperity*, 46; see also Bourne, "The State," in *War and the Intellectuals*, ed. Carl Resek (New York, 1964); James Weinstein, *The Decline of Socialism in America* (New York, 1967), 145-159; Theodore Saloutos and John Hicks, *Twentieth-Century Populism* (Lincoln, Neb., 1951), 179; Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 282.
 22. Hobsbawm, *Age of Empire*, 324-327; Kennedy, *Over Here*, 3-4.
 23. Bourne, "The State," 71.
 24. Wilson quoted by *New York World* journalist Frank Cobb, in Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York, 1944), 352; Frederick Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I*

- (De Kalb, Ill., 1974); Carl Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War* (Columbus, 1936).
25. John Higham, *Strangers in the Land* (New York, 1963), 164.
 26. Florette Henri, *Black Migration Movement North, 1900-1920* (Garden City, N.Y., 1975); Elliot Rudwick, *Race Riot at East St. Louis* (Cardondale, Ill., 1964), 16-19, 75, 217-218; Pete Daniel, *Standing at the Crossroads* (New York, 1986), 61-63, 77-79.
 27. Vernon Jensen, *Heritage of Conflict* (New York, 1968; orig. 1950), 384-385; James Green, *Grass-Roots Socialism: Radical Movements in the Southwest, 1895-1943* (Baton Rouge, 1978), 357-360; Evan Anders, "Boss Rule and Constituent Interests: South Texas Politics during the Progressive Era," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 84 (January 1981), 280; Clarence Clendenen, *The United States and Pancho Villa* (Port Washington, N.Y., 1972; orig. 1961), 286-287; President's Mediation Commission, transcript of Bisbee sessions, November 1-5, 1917, RG 174, entry 8; William D. Haywood, *Bill Haywood's Book* (New York, 1929), 298, 301; Melvyn Dubovsky, *We Shall Be All: The History of the I. W. W.* (New York, 1969), 391-392.
 28. Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism*; Marchand, *American Peace Movement*, 308-309.
 29. William Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 119, 145-147. The goal of criminalizing dissenting ideas was manifest in the rash of "criminal syndicalism" statutes, such as the one passed in California that outlawed any doctrine *advocating* sabotage "as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control," according to R. W. Henderson, *Constructive Conspiracy* (San Francisco, n.d.), 6; U.S. Spruce Production Corporation, *History of Spruce Production Division* (n.d., n.p.), 1-11, 16, 19; Secretary William Wilson to Newton Baker, December 14, 1917, February 21 and March 2, 1918, Glasser Files, Justice Department, RG 60; report of C. O. Young, August 2, 1918, *ibid.*; see also Harold Hyman, *Soldiers and Spruce: Origins of the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen* (Los Angeles, 1963); Eldridge F. Dowell, *A History of Criminal Syndicalism Legislation in the United States* (New York, 1969; orig. 1939).
 30. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 83-86; Ray Ginger, *The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene V. Debs* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1949), 353-376. See also Zechariah Chaffee, *Free Speech in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941).
 31. Millis, *Arms and Men*, 211-213; Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War* (New York, 1973), 192-200; for a general interpretation of the relation between war and society, see Stanislaw Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (Berkeley, 1968).
 32. George Creel, *How We Advertised America* (New York, 1920), 94, 125-129, 459; for the Polish rally, see *Dziennik Zwiazkowy*, September 24 and 27,

- 1918, reel 51, Chicago Foreign Language Press Service (hereafter CFLPS); see also *Daily Jewish Courier*, June 14, 1918, May 1, 1919, reel 34, CFLPS; for similar evidence about Italian-Americans, see John Duff, "The Italians," in *The Immigrants' Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies*, ed. Joseph O'Grady (Lexington, Ky., 1967), 114.
33. John McClymer, *War and Welfare: Social Engineering in America, 1890-1925* (Westport, Conn., 1980), 29-30; Kellor, *Straight America*, 188; U.S. Bureau of Education, *Americanization Bulletin*, September 15, 1918, 7; for example, photographs of flag-raising ceremonies at Westinghouse on August 20, 1918, show the multiethnic work force assembled in the steam turbine shed, as if in steerage aboard ship, beneath a patriotic display of half a dozen little European flags surmounted by one imposingly large Old Glory; Photo Collection, HL; Creel, *How We Advertised America*, 200-207.
34. Antonio Gramsci stressed the "educative" role of the state in developing a ruling consensus or *egemonia*; see Gwynne Williams, "Gramsci's Concept of *Egemonia*," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 21 (October-December 1960), 586-599. Elizabeth Ewen, *Immigrant Women in the Land of Dollars* (New York, 1985), 76-92; McClymer, *War and Welfare*, 29-40. Denying that America was a "melting pot," one Jewish editor wrote: "America is a gathering of peoples in the family of one nation"; *Daily Jewish Courier*, June 5, 1918; Horace Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States* (New York, 1924), is the best exposition of cultural pluralism.
35. Samuel Gompers, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor* (New York, 1984; orig. 1925), 203-206. On the AFL's efforts against the Stockholm plan, see Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (New York, 1969); the papers of one of the members, John Frey Papers, LC; Elihu Root to S. Menken, February 16, 1918, Elihu Root Papers, box 136, LC; Weigley, *American Way of War*, 202-203; Robert Leckie, *The Wars of America*, rev. ed. (New York, 1981), 642-655.
36. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D.C., 1960; hereafter cited as *Historical Statistics*), 427-429, 356-357, 416. Only in the years 1942-1948 did coal production exceed the First World War level.
37. Millis, *Arms and Men*, 236-238; Weigley, *American Way of War*, 192-200.
38. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 195-196, 98-105; Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 228.
39. The prophet of a professional army was Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (New York, 1968; orig. 1904); Weigley, *American Way of War*, 201. Millis, *Arms and Men*, emphasizes the changes wrought by the managerial revolution, while Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), emphasizes the extent to which things remained the same.

40. Food Administration pamphlets, RG 287, boxes Y772-773; Harold Tobin and Percy Bidwell, *Mobilizing Civilian America* (New York, 1940), 12-13; Lewis P. Todd, *Wartime Relations of the Federal Government and the Public Schools, 1917-1918* (New York, 1945), 14-15; Young Men's Christian Association, *Summary of the World War Work of the American YMCA* (n.p., 1920).
41. *New Republic* quoted in Kennedy, *Over Here*, 40; Robert Cuff, *The War Industries Board: Business Government Relations during World War I* (Baltimore, 1973); Bernard Baruch, *American Industry in the War* (New York, 1941); Grosvenor Clarkson, *Industrial America in the World War* (Boston, 1923).
42. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 130-137; 118-122; Ellis Hawley, *The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order* (New York, 1979), 20-27.
43. Amos Pinchot, "Patriots and Profits," *International Socialist Review* 18 (January 1918), 350-351. In the 1930s the Nye Committee investigated profiteering as part of the campaign to secure neutrality legislation and published forty volumes of hearings as well as seven volumes of reports; U.S. Senate, Special Committee to Investigate the Munitions Industry, *Report*, 7 vols., 74th Cong. 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., 1935-1936).
44. Wilson quoted by Newton Baker, *American Chronicle*, in Nell Painter, *Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919* (New York, 1987), 328; Lippmann quoted in Kennedy, *Over Here*, 39.
45. On the effect of the war on prewar social polarization, see Georges Haupt, *Socialism and the Great War: The Collapse of the Second International* (Oxford, 1972); Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917* (New York, 1970; orig. 1955); Jurgen Kocka, *Facing Total War: German Society, 1914-1918*, trans. Barbara Weinberg (Cambridge, 1984).
46. Gerald Feldman, *Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918* (Princeton, 1966), 3-38; Robert Armeson, *Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor* (The Hague, 1964), 57-60; see also Kocka, *Facing Total War*.
47. Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), 245-246, shows that only Italy experienced large-scale internal collective violence during the war; James Hinton, *The First Shop Stewards' Movement* (London, 1973).
48. Montgomery, *Fall of the House of Labor*, 374-375, notes that the AFL Executive Committee repudiated the "no-strike" pledge; Kennedy, *Over Here*, 45-92, emphasizes the public relations aspect of mobilization, as, of course, does Creel, *How We Advertised America*.
49. Wilson quoted in Edward Berman, *Labor Disputes and the President* (New York, 1968; orig. 1924), 118-119; Mark Wiseman, *Keeping the Peace with Labor* (New York, 1920), 11. Felix Frankfurter at the newly created War Labor Policies Board crafted a cohesive set of rules on hours and labor standards; the Frankfurter Papers, LC, are a rich source for the War Labor

- Policies Board. Innovations in mediation receive emphasis in numerous accounts of the Wilson years, as in Melvyn Dubovsky, "Abortive Reform," in *Work, Community, and Power: The Experience of Labor in Europe and America*, ed. J. E. Cronin and Carmen Sirianni (Philadelphia, 1983), 207-213; Valerie Jean Conner, *The National War Labor Board* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1983), 18-34; Montgomery, *Fall of the House of Labor*, 354-356. In addition, the four-year-old Federal Mediation Commission was revamped.
50. Frank Grubbs, *The Struggle for Labor Loyalty: Gompers, the A.F. of L., and the Pacifists, 1917-1920* (Durham, N.C., 1968), details the AALD; Gompers to Robert Maisel, July 31 and September 29, 1917, AFL Records, boxes 25 and 26, respectively, SHSW; boxes 25-27 in this collection are a crucial resource for studying the AALD, including its role in the power struggle within the AFL between Gompers and socialist opponents such as James Maurer, leader of the Pennsylvania State Federation; Samuel Gompers, *American Labor and the War* (New York, 1919), reprints Gompers' tub-thumping prowar addresses before such groups as the National Security League and the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy.
 51. David Montgomery, *Workers' Control in America* (Cambridge, 1979), 97, reports the number of workers on strike throughout the country for the following years: 1915: 640,000; 1916: 1,600,000; 1917: 1,227,000; 1918: 1,240,000; 1919: 4,160,000; 1920: 1,463,000; 1921: 1,099,000; 1922: 1,613,000; 1923: 757,000.
 52. Montgomery, *Workers' Control*, 91-108, 332; strike data from Florence Petersen, *Strikes in the United States*, U.S. Department of Labor Bulletin, no. 651 (Washington, D.C., 1938), 21; Fred Mooney, *Struggle in the Coal Fields* (Morgantown, W.Va., 1967); U.S. Senate, Hearings, *West Virginia Coal Fields*, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., 1923); on the battles in Mingo County, see Adjutant General's Office, RG 94, Project File, W.Va., files 370.6 and 370.61; P. K. Edwards, *Strikes in the United States* (New York, 1981).
 53. *Historical Statistics*, 126; similarly, the Douglass cost-of-living index went from 139 in 1914 to 286 in 1920; *ibid.*, 127.
 54. Quoted in Dana Frank, "Housewives, Socialists, and the Politics of Food: The 1917 New York Cost of Living Protests," *Feminist Studies* 11 (Summer 1985), 255-286.
 55. Montgomery, *Workers' Control*, 97; Stanley Lebergott, *Manpower in Economic Growth* (New York, 1964), 512; minutes of Du Pont plant managers, Parlin and Haskell, New Jersey, Du Pont Corporate Papers, accession 500, box 134, HL; *Historical Statistics*, 91, 127; see also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Biennial Census of Manufacturers, 1923* (Washington, D.C., 1926), 1150, which shows 12 percent of the labor force working forty-eight hours per week or less in 1914, compared with 49 percent in 1919.

56. The definitive story on federal suppression is Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters*; the president made an example of striking munitions workers by threatening to blacklist them and strip them of deferments unless they acceded to a War Labor Board order. Alexander Bing, *Wartime Strikes and Their Adjustment* (New York, 1921), 79; Interchurch World Movement, *Report on the Steel Strike of 1919* (New York, 1920), 229-231; Steven Meyer, *The Five-Dollar Day* (Albany, 1981), 169-194; Henry Landau, *The Enemy Within* (New York, 1937), 112-113; Joan Jensen, *The Price of Vigilance* (Chicago, 1968), 117-119; Leonard Wood, diary, November 12, 1919, Leonard Wood Papers, LC; Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 280; Walter Sweeney, *Military Intelligence: A New Weapon in War* (New York, 1924), 95-96.
57. Green, *Grass-Roots Socialism*, 329-344; Edward Levinson, *I Break Strikes!* (New York, 1969; orig. 1935), 200, 207.
58. Federal Revised Statutes, secs. 5297, 5298, 5300; Berman, *Labor Disputes*, 59-62.
59. The main source on troop use is Adjutant General's Office, RG 407, Decimal Files, files 381 and 370.6; most of this material, and much else besides, was collected in the mid-1930s by Justice Department lawyer Abraham Glasser, and the Glasser Files are an incomparable resource, in perennial danger of being closed by the FBI, as they were for fifteen years in the 1960s and 1970s. War Department cables, June and July 1917, box 8, Glasser Files, reveal the "public utilities" doctrine and the emergency directive for direct response to governors' requests; this was modified November 20, 1917, to have requests referred to the adjutant general, but the requirement of a presidential proclamation was not reinstated until June 8, 1922; cf. unfinished manuscript of Glasser Report, box 10, Glasser Files. Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters*, 106 and passim, has made extensive use of these files and is a definitive guide.
60. Capt. James Hornbrook to War Department, July 12 and 16, 1917, Glasser Files, box 7. Glasser Files, box 7, contains copies of Adjutant General's Office, file 370.61, with the relevant material on the copper disturbances, including incoming correspondence of Newton Baker, July 2-5 and 8, 1917; Maicopa Co. Loyalty League to Commander Southern Department, July 20, 1917; Baker to Governor Campbell, July 24, 1917. The frustrations of the President's Mediation Commission in the copper industry are amply detailed in RG 174, entry 8, 3 vols., 1 box, and in Glasser Files, box 8. On the role of U.S. troops, see General Liggett to Adjutant General, July 19, 1917, *ibid.*; Attorney General Gregory to Baker, October 23, 1918, *ibid.*, box 7; Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters*, 113-114. Philip Taft, "The Bisbee Deportation," *Labor History* 13 (Winter 1972), 3-40, lacks mention of military intelligence.
61. Taft, "Bisbee Deportation," 13; W. H. Rogers to Secretary Wilson, June 26, 1917, Glasser Files, box 3, notes Rankin's objection. See also Rankin

- to Woodrow Wilson, December 8, 1917, *ibid.* Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis Post impeded the Justice Department's deportation proceedings; Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 231-232.
62. H. J. Rosenbaum and P. C. Sederberg, "Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence," in *Vigilante Politics*, ed. Rosenbaum and Sederberg (Philadelphia, 1976), 3-29; and, in the same volume, Richard M. Brown, "The History of Vigilantism in America," 79-109.
 63. Frank Walsh, Labor Day speech, 1918, Frank P. Walsh Papers, scrapbook 41, New York Public Library.
 64. Hywel Davies to Felix Frankfurter, July 20, 1918, Labor Department File 33-1730, Glasser Files, box 3.
 65. The theme of war and gender is the subject of Margaret Higonnet, ed., *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars* (New Haven, 1987).
 66. For a general account of organized women, pro- and antisuffrage, see Barbara Steinson, *American Women's Activism and World War I* (New York, 1982).
 67. Cott, *Grounding of Modern Feminism*, 59-61; Eleanor Flexnor, *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States* (New York, 1970; orig. 1959), 82-90.
 68. Alicia Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States* (New York, 1982), 171; see also Nancy Schrom Dye, *As Equals and as Sisters: Feminism, the Labor Movement, and the Woman's Trade Union League of New York* (Columbia, Mo., 1980); Maureen Greenwald, *Women, War, and Work: The Impact of World War I on Women Workers in the United States* (Westport, Conn., 1980).
 69. Eli Zaretsky, "The Place of the Family in the Origins of the Welfare State," in *Rethinking the Family*, ed. Barrie Thorne (New York, 1982), 188-219.
 70. On child labor, see Walter Trattner, *Crusade for Children: A History of the National Child Labor Committee and Child Labor Reform in America* (Chicago, 1970); National Child Labor Committee Papers, scrapbooks, boxes 42-44, LC; Allen Davis, "Welfare, Reform, and World War I," *American Quarterly* 19 (1967), 522-524.
 71. Conner, *National War Labor Board*, 142-157. In celebrated cases involving women streetcar conductors, the Labor Board decided according to circumstances, first ordering women discharged in Cleveland because of male workers' objections, then reversing itself to order only current women employees reinstated, locking out future women employees. It never accepted the principle of equal employment opportunity. Greenwald, *Women, War, and Work*, 97, 107, 113.
 72. [William A. Snow] to Rockefeller, January 7, 1919, copy in American Social Hygiene Association (ASHA) Papers, box 25 folder 9, SWHA.

73. Social Hygiene Division, War Department, "Venereal Diseases," n.d., RG 165, box 246; Allan Brandt, *No Magic Bullet* (New York, 1985), 52-65, 68. The Commission on Training Camp Activities admonished the troops: "A man who is thinking below the belt is not efficient"; *ibid.*, 64.
74. Brandt, *No Magic Bullet*, 75, 72, 77; Joseph Mayer, *The Regulation of Commercialized Vice: An Analysis of the Transition from Segregation to Repression in the United States* (New York, 1922), 9; ASHA, *Legislation Manual* (n.p., 1920), 7.
75. Gompers quoted in Brandt, *No Magic Bullet*, 67; Baker quoted in "Welfare, Reform, and World War I," 531.
76. Ethel Sturges Dummer Papers, box 24, folder 381, SL; "The Venereal Menace," ASHA Papers, box 177; Mayer, *Regulation of Commercial Vice*, 1-9; Ruth Rosen, *The Lost Sisterhood: Prostitution in America* (Baltimore, 1982), 69-111. For primary material on reconstructing gender in wartime, see "Committee on Protective Work for Girls," Ethel Sturges Dummer Papers, box 24, folders 378 and 381; War Department, General and Special Staffs, Commission on Training Camp Activities and Social Hygiene Division, RG 165, entry 399, boxes 232-246; also Kathy Peiss, *Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York* (Philadelphia, 1986).
77. "Keeping Fit," ASHA Papers, box 178; Davis, "Welfare, Reform, and World War I," 528-530.
78. Brandt, *No Magic Bullet*, 66.
79. The observations on Germany are drawn primarily from the following sources: Kocka, *Facing Total War*; Arno Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York, 1981); Feldman, *Army, Industry, and Labor*; David Blackburn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History* (Oxford, 1984).
80. See Arthur Marwick, *War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1974); Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossman, and Marion Kaplan, eds., *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany* (New York, 1984), 1-5; Ute Frevert, *Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation*, trans. Stuart McKinnon-Evans (Oxford, 1988), 151-167; Feldman, *Army, Industry, and Labor*.
81. Rural Protestant animus toward the city is emphasized in Paul Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Andrew Sinclair, *The Era of Excess: A Social History of the Prohibition Movement* (New York, 1964); Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York, 1955). The gender component is discussed in Barbara Epstein, *The Politics of Domesticity: Women, Evangelism, and Temperance in Nineteenth Century America* (Middletown, Conn., 1981); spiritual ambiguity is emphasized in Joseph Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American*

Temperance Movement (Urbana, Ill., 1963); progressive social engineers receive attention in James Timberlake, *Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 1900-1920* (New York, 1970).

82. See Sinclair, *Era of Excess*, 161.
83. See Section on Women and Girls, Commission on Training Camp Activities, "Monthly Text Reports" for 1918, RG 165, box 232; "Committee on Protective Work for Girls," Ethel Sturges Dummer Papers, box 24, folder 381.
84. Steinson, *American Women's Activism*, 299-309.
85. Frederick Howe, *The Confessions of a Reformer*, (New York, 1925), 267; Creel to Wilson, November 8, 1918, George Creel Papers, box 2, LC.

6. Response to Revolution

1. Wilson quoted in C. Gardner, *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923* (New York, 1984), 1.
2. The revolution occurred in October under the old Julian calendar; when the Bolsheviks replaced it with the Gregorian calendar, the date became November.
3. Arno Mayer, *Wilson v. Lenin* (New York, 1967; orig. 1959), 264-265, 276, 334-339; N. Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (New York, 1968), 55-56, 82-87.
4. Examples of scholarship associated with these respective interpretations include: (1) state breakdown: Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge, 1979); (2) class antagonism: V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (Peking, 1973; orig. 1917); and, with a Weberian inflection, Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, 1966); (3) resistance of the oppressed: Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1969); Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York, 1966; orig. 1963).
5. F. L. Carsten, *Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919* (Berkeley, 1972), 323-335; Klaus Schwabe, *Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), 59, 120-121; Kocka, *Facing Total War: German Society, 1914-1918*, trans. Barbara Weinberger (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 155-161.
6. The vast library on the Bolshevik Revolution includes E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 3 vols. (London, 1950-1953); Leon Trotsky, *The Russian Revolution* (New York, 1959; orig. 1932); and, for a less sympathetic treatment, Roger V. Daniels, *Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917* (New York, 1967).
7. Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," *New Left Review*

- 100 (January 1977), 5-80. Georges Haupt, *Socialism and the Great War: The Collapse of the Second International* (Oxford, 1972), 249, argues: "In this context, the revolutions of 1917-19 would not appear as an incident inserted artificially in the history of the Great War or as a violent catastrophe interrupting long-term developments, but as a process in which the war acted as a delaying or a deviating force and not as a catalyst." See Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quentin Hoare and G. N. Smith (New York, 1971).
8. Strong support for U.S. intervention in Russia came from Wilson's cabinet, including the archly antiradical Postmaster General Albert Burleson. Relying on reports sent from State Department emissary J. B. Wright, Burleson sent a memo to Wilson on June 17, 1918, urging that a U.S. police force be dispatched to Siberia; copy in A. S. Burleson Papers, vol. 21, LC; the Allies' dual motives for the intervention—to bolster the war against Germany and "to resist the spread of Bolshevistic ideas"—are noted by the commander of the U.S. Siberian forces, William S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure: 1918-1920* (New York, 1931), 69; the two motives are discussed by George F. Kennan in *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: The Decision to Intervene*, vol. II (Princeton, 1958), and in *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (New York, 1960). Peter G. Filene, *Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 20-21, 41-46; Committee on Public Information, *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy* (Washington, D.C., 1918), copy in George Creel Papers, box 23; although a panel of distinguished historians confirmed the authenticity of the "Sisson documents," they soon came to be regarded as forgeries; see correspondence between Ambassador Francis and the State Department in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations: 1918, Russia*, vol. I (Washington, D.C., 1931).
9. James Cronin, "Labor Insurgency and Class Formation," in *Work, Community, and Power: The Experience of Labor in Europe and America*, ed. J. E. Cronin and Carmen Sirianni (Philadelphia, 1983), 20-48; Carsten, *Revolution in Central Europe*. For a perspective that plays down the insurgent spirit in Germany, see Stanley Weintraub, *A Stillness Heard round the World: The End of the Great War* (New York, 1918), 378-406.
10. Lansing and Hoover quoted in Schwabe, *Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking*, 76, 151-152; Wilson quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas McCormick, *Creation of the American Empire* (Chicago, 1973), 343.
11. Scheidemann quoted in Schwabe, *Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking*, 108; Dick Geary, "Radicalism and the Worker: Metalworkers and the Revolution, 1914-23," in *Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany*, ed. R. J. Evans (London, 1978), 267; Mary Nolan, "Workers and Revolu-