Strangers in the Land

PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM
1860-1925

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and Labor to admit borderline cases; it established in the Bureau of Immigration a division of information, designed by anti-restrictionists to promote the distribution of immigrants by finding jobs for them outside the big cities; and it set up a commission charged with making an exhaustive investigation of the impact of immigration on the nation. The last idea crept into the law as a substitute for the literacy test. It had the merit of sounding constructive, and above all it would afford a breathing spell, postponing another nativist assault until the opposition to restriction was better organized.[70]

The anti-restrictionists had had a narrow squeeze, and they knew that the issue was far from settled. Perhaps they sensed that the ruthless power of the Speaker might not again avail them, though they could not foresee that it would be broken before the immigration question came to a head again. Yet they could count on building more durable barriers to legislative action. Big business was just beginning to take an active part in resisting restriction. The masses of naturalized Americans from southern and eastern Europe had shown only a fraction of their potential voting strength, and every ship was bringing more recruits. The victors of 1907 resorted to the delaying action of a lengthy investigation in the belief that time was on their side.

In a limited sense it was. Every year the new immigrants and their allies put up a more energetic defense. From a larger point of view, however, they had made too little and too sluggish use of a crucial interlude. The complacent optimism of the early twentieth century could not, in the nature of things, last for very long; the social and economic problems of the industrial age were certainly far from solved. Henceforth, confidence in the future of American society would have to rest increasingly on the use of organized intelligence to preserve and fulfill what fortune initially provided. With the extension of centralized direction over the national life, immigration would surely come under purposeful control. Yet the friends of the immigrant had simply adopted on the issue of restriction a frozen posture of defending the status quo. The progressive spirit reacted to ethnic problems too ambiguously to be of much help. So the opportunity to think out an immigration policy that might be both realistic and democratic was lost.

Chapter Six

Toward Racism: The History of an Idea

> It need not puzzle us that Malay and Papuan, Celt and Roman, Saxon and Tartar should mix. . . . The best nations are those most widely related. . . .
>
> —Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1856

> "You cannot dodge the Mendelian law, my boy. Like begets like, but in a union of opposites we get throwbacks. . . . You're not going to run the risk of mongrelizing the species, are you?"
>
> —Peter B. Kyne, 1923

Hardly any aspect of American xenophobia over its course from the eighteenth to the twentieth century is more striking than the monotony of its ideological refrain. Year after year, decade after decade, the same charges and complaints have sounded in endless reiteration. Variously combined, formulated, and documented, adapted to different and changing adversaries, rising and falling in intensity and acceptance, nearly all of the key ideas persisted without basic modification.

But in one major respect the pattern of nativist thought changed fundamentally. Gradually and progressively it veered toward racism. Absent from the strictures of the eighteenth century nationalist, notions of racial superiority and exclusiveness appeared in the mid-nineteenth, but they were to undergo a long process of revision and expansion before emerging in the early twentieth century as the most important nativist ideology. Several genera-

tions of intellectuals took part in transforming the vague and somewhat benign racial concepts of romantic nationalism into doctrines that were precise, malicious, and plausibly applicable to European immigration. The task was far from simple; at every point the race-thinkers confronted the liberal and cosmopolitan barriers of Christianity and American democracy. Ironically and significantly, it was not until the beginning of the present century, when public opinion recovered much of its accustomed confidence, that racial nativism reached intellectual maturity.

Of course racial nativism forms only a segment, though a critical and illuminating segment, of the larger evolution of race consciousness in modern times. The greater part of the complex phenomenon which is now fashionably called "race prejudice" lies beyond the scope of this book; its history is tangled and still largely unwritten. What concerns us is the intersection of racial attitudes with nationalistic ones—in other words, the extension to European nationalities of that sense of absolute difference which already divided white Americans from people of other colors. When sentiments analogous to those already discharged against Negroes, Indians, and Orientals spilled over into anti-European channels, a force of tremendous intensity entered the stream of American nativism.

The whole story of modern racial ferment, nativist and otherwise, has two levels, one involving popular emotions, the other concerning more or less systematic ideas. Most of the emotions flow from a reservoir of habitual suspicion and distrust accumulated over the span of American history toward human groups stamped by obvious differences of color. The ideas, on the other hand, depend on the speculations of intellectuals on the nature of races. The distinction is partly artificial, for the spirit of white supremacy—or what may be labeled race-feeling—has interlocked with race-thinking at many points. Indeed, their convergence has given the problem of race its modern significance. But at least the distinction has the merit of reminding us that race-feelings and explicit concepts about races have not always accompanied one another. The Anglo-Saxon idea in its early form did not entail the biological taboos of race-feeling. Nor did the pattern of white supremacy, in all likelihood, depend at the outset on formal race-thinking. Traditional religious beliefs, often hardly articulated

at all, served the pragmatic purposes of the English colonists who enslaved Negroes and who scourged Indians as Satanic agents "having little of Humanitie but shape." [1] However, the evolution of white supremacy into a comprehensive philosophy of life, grounding human values in the innate constitution of nature, required a major theoretical effort. It was the task of the race-thinkers to organize specific antipathies toward dark-hued peoples into a generalized, ideological structure.

To the development of racial nativism, the thinkers have made a special contribution. Sharp physical differences between native Americans and European immigrants were not readily apparent; to a large extent they had to be manufactured. A rather elaborate, well-entrenched set of racial ideas was essential before the newcomers from Europe could seem a fundamentally different order of men. Accordingly, a number of race-conscious intellectuals blazed the way for ordinary nativists, and it will be useful to tell their story before turning in later chapters to the popular emotions their ideas helped to orient.

From Romanticism to Naturalism

Two general types of race-thinking, derived from very different origins, circulated throughout the nineteenth century. One came from political and literary sources and assumed, under the impact of the romantic movement, a nationalistic form. Its characteristic manifestation in England and America was the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Largely exempt through most of the century from the passions of either the nativist or the white supremacist, this politico-literary concept of race lacked a clearly defined physiological basis. Its vague identification of culture with ancestry served mainly to emphasize the antiquity, the uniqueness, and the permanence of a nationality. It suggested the inner vitality of one's own culture, rather than the menace of another race. Whereas some of the early racial nationalists attributed America's greatness (and above all its capacity for self-government) to its Anglo-Saxon derivation, others thought America was creating a new mixed race; and, such was the temper of the age, many accepted both ideas at the same time. But whether exclusive or cosmopolitan in tendency, these romantics almost always discussed race as an ill-

defined blessing; hardly ever as a sharply etched problem. During the age of confidence, as Anglo-Saxonism spread among an eastern social elite well removed from the fierce race conflicts of other regions, it retained a complacent, self-congratulatory air.

Meanwhile a second kind of race-thinking was developing from the inquiries of naturalists. Stimulated by the discovery of new worlds overseas, men with a scientific bent began in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to study human types systematically in order to catalogue and explain them. While Anglo-Saxonists consulted history and literature to identify national races, the naturalists concentrated on the great "primary" groupings of *Homo sapiens* and used physiological characteristics such as skin color, stature, head shape, and so on, to distinguish them one from the other. Quite commonly this school associated physical with cultural differences and displayed, in doing so, a feeling of white superiority over the colored races. On the whole, however, the leading scientific thinkers did not regard race differences as permanent, pure, and unalterable. A minority insisted that races were immutable, separately created species; but the influence of this polygenist argument suffered from its obvious violation of the Christian doctrine of the unity of mankind. For the most part, early anthropologists stressed the molding force of environmental conditions in differentiating the human family.[2]

In the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the separation between the two streams of race-thinking gradually and partially broke down. Racial science increasingly intermingled with racial nationalism. Under the pressure of a growing national consciousness, a number of European naturalists began to subdivide the European white man into biological types, often using linguistic similarity as evidence of hereditary connection. For their part, the nationalists slowly absorbed biological assumptions about the nature of race, until every national trait seemed wholly dependent on hereditary transmission. This interchange forms the intellectual background for the conversion of the vague Anglo-Saxon tradition into a sharp-cutting nativist weapon and, ultimately, into a completely racist philosophy.

Behind the fusion—and confusion—of natural history with national history, of "scientific" with social ideas, lay a massive trend in the intellectual history of the late nineteenth and twentieth

centuries. Hopes and fears alike received scientific credentials; and men looked on the human universe in increasingly naturalistic terms. In religion, literature, philosophy, and social theory ancient dualisms dissolved. Human affairs and values were seen more and more as products of vast, impersonal processes operating throughout nature. The Darwinian theory represented a decisive step in this direction; in the eyes of many, it subsumed mankind wholly under the grim physical laws of the animal kingdom.

While the whole naturalistic trend encouraged race-thinking and lent a sharper flesh-and-blood significance to it, Darwinism added a special edge. By picturing all species as both the products and the victims of a desperate, competitive struggle for survival, Darwinism suggested a warning: the daily peril of destruction confronts every species. Thus the evolutionary theory, when fully adopted by race-thinkers, not only impelled them to anchor their national claims to a biological basis; it also provoked anxiety by denying assurance that the basis would endure. Although most Anglo-Saxonists still identified their race with an indwelling spiritual principle, now they had also to envision the bearers of that principle as combatants in the great biological battle raging throughout nature.

On the other hand, it is not true that Darwinian (and Spencerian) ideas led directly to an outburst of racial nativism or to an overriding hereditarian determinism. The whole scientific revolution of the nineteenth century merely prepared the way and opened the possibility for those developments. Actually, the evolutionary hypothesis left major obstacles to a rigidly racial creed.

First of all, the general climate of opinion in the early Darwinian era inhibited the pessimistic implications of the new naturalism. What stood out in the first instance, as the great social lesson of the theory of natural selection, was not the ravages of the struggle for survival but rather the idea of "the survival of the fittest." To a generation of intellectuals steeped in confidence, the laws of evolution seemed to guarantee that the "fittest" races would most certainly triumph over inferior competitors. And in their eagerness to convert social values into biological facts, Darwinian optimists unblinkingly read "the fittest" to mean "the best." They felt confirmed in their supremacy over the immigrants, who in turn seemed the winnowed best of Europe. Darwinism, therefore, easily

ministered to Anglo-Saxon pride, but in the age of confidence it could hardly arouse Anglo-Saxon anxiety.

Secondly, Darwinism gave the race-thinkers little concrete help in an essential prerequisite of racism—belief in the preponderance of heredity over environment. Certainly the biological vogue of the late nineteenth century stimulated speculation along these lines, but the evolutionary theory by no means disqualified a fundamentally environmentalist outlook. Darwin's species struggled and evolved within particular natural settings; they survived through adaptation to those settings. This aspect of the theory ultimately impressed itself so forcefully on American social scientists that toward the end of the century one of them acclaimed the doctrine of evolution for actually discouraging racial as opposed to environmental interpretations.[3] And while liberal environmentalists drew comfort from the new scientific gospel, it left the race-thinkers with no definite knowledge of how hereditary forces function or persist. Darwinism explained only the survival, not the appearance, of biological variations from pre-existing types. The origins of and relationships among races remained obscure.

Obviously both of these difficulties would have to be overcome if the Anglo-Saxon nationalism of the 1870's was to evolve into a fully effective instrument for race-feelings. Even to begin the transition the race-thinkers would have to cast loose from Darwinian optimism, discarding the happy thought that the fittest, in the sense of the best, always win out. That done, they would still lack a strict racial determinism. To divorce race entirely from environment and to put biological purity at the center of social policy, American nationalists would need further cues from the developing natural sciences.

Patricians on the Defensive

Americans were slow to take that second and more drastic step. Although sweeping theories and pretentious sciences or pseudosciences of race developed in continental Europe in the late nineteenth century, American intellectuals of that period knew practically nothing of them. Nor did American scientists make any contributions to race-thinking similar to those of Broca, Ammon, or Lapouge. In the United States psychologists dealt with individuals

rather than groups, sociologists with institutions rather than peoples. Anthropologists immersed themselves in narrowly empirical studies of primitive folk, chiefly the Indians.[4] The movement toward racism was an up-hill fight in democratic America.

But a number of Anglo-Saxon nationalists in the eighties and nineties did begin to break away from evolutionary optimism. At first, instead of trying to qualify or rebut the principle of the survival of the fittest, the race-thinkers simply turned from complacent contemplation of America's Anglo-Saxon past to an anxious look at its future. This swing to a defensive outlook marks the initial phase of racial nativism. It required no fresh intellectual stimulus; it was precipitated by the general crisis in American society.

The same internal crisis that reactivated the older nativist traditions crystallized the new one. Until unrest and class cleavage upset the reign of confidence in the 1880's, the assimilationist concept of a mixed nationality had tempered and offset pride in Anglo-Saxon superiority. But when the Anglo-Saxon enthusiasts felt their society and their own status deeply threatened, they put aside their boasts about the assimilative powers of their race. They read the signs of the times as symptoms of its peril. Contrary to an impression widespread among historians, the new racial xenophobia did not originate as a way of discriminating between old and new immigrations. It arose from disturbances, within American society, which preceded awareness of a general ethnic change in the incoming stream. At the outset, Anglo-Saxon nativism vaguely indicted the whole foreign influx. Only later did the attack narrow specifically to the new immigration.

The current social scene presented a troubling contrast to the image of America that Anglo-Saxon intellectuals cherished. The tradition of racial nationalism had always proclaimed orderly self-government as the chief glory of the Anglo-Saxons—an inherited capacity so unique that the future of human freedom surely rested in their hands. But now the disorders of the mid-eighties cast doubt on the survival of a free society. The more anxious of the Anglo-Saxon apostles knew that the fault must lie with all the other races swarming to America. Did they not, one and all, lack the Anglo-Saxon's self-control, almost by definition? So, behind the popular image of unruly foreigners, a few caught sight of un-

ruly races; and Anglo-Saxon nativism emerged as a corollary to anti-radical nativism—as a way of explaining why incendiary immigrants threatened the stability of the republic.

The explanation came out clear-cut in the convulsion that followed the Haymarket Affair. A writer in a business magazine stated the racial lesson of the riot in the baldest terms: anarchy is "a blood disease" from which the English have never suffered. "I am no race worshipper," he insisted, "but . . . if the master race of this continent is subordinated to or overrun with the communistic and revolutionary races, it will be in grave danger of social disaster." [5] During the same fateful summer a leading Congregational theologian equated race and unrest in words so sharp that he withheld them from publication for a year and a half. The Reverend Theodore T. Munger, an exponent of evolutionary theology, had long admired the Anglo-Saxons, the most highly developed, the most individualistic, and indeed the most Christian of races. As he surveyed the strife of 1886, he saw "anarchism, lawlessness . . . labor strikes, and a general violation of personal rights such as the Anglo-Saxon race has not witnessed since Magna Charta. . . . This horrible tyranny is wholly of foreign origin." Fundamentally, however, the problem was not just foreign. It was "physiological": how to restrict immigration "so that the physical stock shall not degenerate, and how to keep the strong, fine strain ascendant." [6]

Compared to the common and simple attack on radical *foreigners*, the attack on radical *races* was at first a minor theme. Indeed, it did not immediately displace the older kind of race-thinking. During the eighties many Anglo-Saxonists still clung to the traditional pride and confidence in America's powers of assimilation. Josiah Strong, for example, was still celebrating the absorptive capacities of the Anglo-Saxons after he had begun to attack the immigrants as socially disruptive. And in 1890 James K. Hosmer's glowing constitutional history of the Anglo-Saxon race still conceded that racial mingling invigorated it, although Hosmer was equally certain that immigration was diluting the Anglo-Saxons' blood and subverting their social order.[7]

During the 1890's, as the social crisis deepened, racial nativism became more defined and widespread. If one may judge, however, from Congressional debates, newspapers, and the more popular

periodicals, Anglo-Saxonism still played a relatively small part in public opinion. The rising flood of popular xenophobia drew much more upon conventional anti-foreign ideas.

On the whole, the Anglo-Saxon tradition in its new nativistic form still found its support within the patrician circles where it had persisted throughout the age of confidence. Now, as then, the race-thinkers were men who rejoiced in their colonial ancestry, who looked to England for standards of deportment and taste, who held the great academic posts or belonged to the best clubs or adorned the higher Protestant clergy. Some, like Frank Parsons or Albert Shaw, were active reformers, especially in the municipal field. But, in general, racial nativists worshipped tradition in a deeply conservative spirit, and in the tumult of the nineties it seemed to them that everything fixed and sacred was threatened with dissolution. Among them were Episcopalian Bishop A. Cleveland Coxe, who added the final "e" to his family name in order to re-establish its antique spelling; [8] Woodrow Wilson, then a historian with aristocratic sympathies, a disciple of Burke and Bagehot who believed heartily in evolution because it moved so slowly; John W. Burgess, who brought from German seminars a love for "the race-proud Teutons" rather than the Anglo-Saxons and whose political science proved that racial amalgamation endangered private enterprise; and of course Henry Cabot Lodge, who mourned for the days when society venerated the old families, their traditions, and their ancestors. No one expressed the state of mind in this group better than the Presbyterian clergyman in New York who thought nature's great principle of inequality endangered by a "specious humanity," liberty-loving Anglo-Saxons beset by socialistic foreigners, and the intelligent people in the clutches of the unintelligent.[9]

A substantial number of these patrician nativists belonged to the cultivated intelligentsia of New England, the region where the Anglo-Saxon idea was most firmly entrenched. There the proportion of foreign-born in the total population was rising more sharply than in any other part of the country. There too the declining vitality of the native culture contributed to a defensive attitude. Brahmin intellectuals such as Lodge, Henry Adams, and Barrett Wendell knew that the historic culture of New England had entered its "Indian Summer," and the knowledge gave them added

cause to see their race and region beleaguered by the alien.[10] In other places also a pessimistic spirit was creeping into intellectual life as the century waned. What the German writer Max Nordau was calling "vague qualms of a Dusk of the Nations" darkened various minds receptive to social anxieties or to the grimmer implications of Darwinian naturalism. But New Englanders particularly succumbed to the melancholy, *fin de siècle* mood and gave it a racial form. Thus at Harvard, Barrett Wendell, whose English accent matched his Anglophile interpretation of American literature, was settling into the conviction that his own kind had had its day, that other races had wrenched the country from its grasp for once and all.[11]

Many if not most of these men in the early nineties remained oblivious of the new immigration, assuming that the immigrants as a whole lacked the Anglo-Saxon's ancestral qualities. However, the avant-garde of racial nationalists was discovering during those years the shift in the immigrant stream. The discovery was important, because it lent a new sharpness and relevance to race-thinking. By making the simple (and in fact traditional) assumption that northern European nationalities shared much of the Anglo-Saxon's inherited traits, a racial nativist could now understand why immigration had just now become a problem. Also, the cultural remoteness of southern and eastern European "races" suggested to him that the foreign danger involved much more than an inherited incapacity for self-government: the new immigration was racially impervious to the whole of American civilization! Thus Anglo-Saxon nativism, in coming to focus on specific ethnic types, passed beyond its first, subordinate role as a corollary to anti-radical nativism. It found its own *raison d'être,* and in doing so served to divide the new immigrants from their predecessors in an absolute and fundamental way. Racial nativism became at once more plausible, a more significant factor in the history of immigration restriction, and a more precisely formulated ideology.

Three prominent intellectuals of the day illustrate this evolution in the Anglo-Saxon idea. Each of them embarked on anti-foreign agitation in the loose terms provoked by the internal events of the eighties, and each of them ended by fixing on the new immigration as constitutionally incapable of assimilation.

Nathaniel S. Shaler, the Kentucky-born geologist who presided

over the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard, was in some ways a reluctant and unlikely nativist. One of the most benign of individuals, Shaler felt a real sympathy for disadvantaged groups; and his professional training impressed upon him the large influence of the physical environment in creating human differences. But his early southern background had given Shaler an indelible race consciousness. He easily shared the belief of his Brahmin colleagues that American democracy rested on an English racial heritage. At first he stated the racial argument against immigration in class terms, contending that the immigrants threatened social stability because, as peasants, they lacked the Americans' inborn instinct for freedom. In 1894, however, he shifted to a more specific and sweeping attack on the new immigration. Instead of indicting the immigrants as a whole, he now drew a sharp racial contrast between northwestern and southeastern Europeans, maintaining that the new "non-Aryan" peoples were wholly different from earlier immigrants and innately impossible to Americanize.[12]

Henry Cabot Lodge arrived by a similar route at the same conclusion but carried it much further. What was perhaps his earliest public attack on immigration reflected simply a nationalist reaction to the crisis within American society. At that time, in 1888, he actually repudiated the injection of racial considerations into political issues. His own Anglo-Saxonism still conformed to the traditional eulogistic pattern.[13] Events, however, soon turned his attention to invidious racial comparisons.* In 1891 Lodge published a statistical analysis, which cost him much time and effort, concerning "the distribution of ability" in the American population. By classifying the entries in a biographical encyclopedia, he tried to show "the enormous predominance" of an English racial strain over every other in contributing to the development of the United States. Although the figures in this study suggested the inferiority of every non-English group in America, thereafter Lodge concentrated his fire on the new immigration, arguing that

* In 1890, for largely partisan reasons, Lodge brought to a head a Republican drive to enact a Force Bill designed to insure Negro suffrage in the South. The attempt failed; in fact, it brought down upon Lodge the condemnation of "the best people" of Massachusetts. The next year, instead of opposing racial barriers, Lodge proceeded to champion them by opening his campaign in Congress against the new immigration. See James A. Barnes, *John G. Carlisle, Financial Statesman* (New York, 1931), 188.

it presented a supreme danger transcending political or economic considerations: it threatened "a great and perilous change in the very fabric of our race." [14]

To support this view, Lodge went far beyond his American contemporaries in the direction of a racial philosophy of history. During a summer in France in 1895, he happened upon a new book by Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Peoples*. Le Bon was a poetic social psychologist, an enemy of democracy, and a man who lived in dread of an imminent socialist revolution. His book treated nationalities as races and races as the substrata of history. Only through crossbreeding, according to Le Bon, could a race die or miss its destiny. He saw little hope for continental Europe but thought that the English, alone among European races, had kept their purity and stability. Lodge took these ideas back to the United States and repeated them practically verbatim on the floor of the Senate in 1896 in leading the fight for the literacy test. Without restriction of the new immigration, he warned, America's fixed, inherited national character would be lost in the only way possible—by being "bred out." [15]

Lodge was exceptional both in his direct contact with European race-thinking and in the degree to which he embraced an ideal of racial purity. It was not so easy for others to ignore the influence of environment or to understand how a supposedly backward, inferior type could overwhelm the puissant Anglo-Saxons.

A third member of the Yankee upper crust moved more cautiously into racial nativism but exerted in the long run a more telling intellectual influence. Francis A. Walker, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one of the outstanding economists of his day, was virtually the only American who made an original contribution to nativist thought in the late nineteenth century. Unlike Lodge, Shaler or the rest, Walker faced up to the key Darwinian issue of the survival of the fittest.

When he awoke to the menace of the foreign-born during the great labor upheaval of the mid-eighties, it was not race but rather the European's characteristic "insolence and savagery" that gave Walker visions of "great cities threatened with darkness, riot, and pillage." He continued to think of labor unrest as the most important aspect of the foreign peril and, in fact, never indulged in comprehensive racial theorizing. But as early as 1890 he trembled at a

new influx of totally unassimilable races, representing "the very lowest stage of degradation." That these were laggards in the struggle for existence Walker had no doubt. Lest anyone should still defend the old Darwinian notion of migration as a selective process bringing America the most energetic and enterprising of Europeans, Walker neatly turned the tables, declaring that natural selection was now working in reverse. Due to the cheapness and ease of steamship transportation, the fittest now stay at home; the unfit migrate. The new immigrants, he declared in phrases that rang down through the restriction debates of the next three decades, "are beaten men from beaten races; representing the worst failures in the struggle for existence. . . . They have none of the ideas and aptitudes which . . . belong to those who are descended from the tribes that met under the oak trees of old Germany to make laws and choose chieftains." [16]

But still there was the hard question: How and why can such unfit groups endanger the survival of America's strong native stock? Walker held the clue long before it occurred to him to ask the question. As superintendent of the United States census of 1870, he had noticed that the rate of population growth in America was declining. At the time and for many years afterward he interpreted the decline very sensibly as a result of urbanization and industrialization. Then, when the events of the eighties and early nineties turned his attention to the racial significance of immigration, the old problem of population growth appeared in a new light. Might not the dwindling birth rate be a prudential response by the old American stock to a Darwinian struggle with immigrants capable of underbidding and outbreeding them? With an ingenious show of statistics, Walker argued in 1891 that the reproductive decline was occurring largely among the native population and that immigration rather than domestic conditions was responsible for it. In order to compete with cheap foreign labor, he said, Americans preferred to reduce the size of their families rather than lower their standard of living. Thus the foreign-born were actually replacing the native stock, not reinforcing it; in the very act of maintaining social and economic superiority, native Americans were undergoing biological defeat. In view of the new influx from southern and eastern Europe, Walker was sure that this long

process of replacement would now enter an increasingly ominous stage.[17]

From a racial point of view, the argument had the disadvantage of resting on social and economic determinants and therefore failing to make any real distinction between immigrant types. Nevertheless, it did effectively counter Darwinian optimism while defining the foreign danger in plainly biological terms. Like Lodge's bluster about crossbreeding, Walker's birth-rate hypothesis suggested that unobstructed natural selection might insure the survival of the worst people rather than the best. The recasting of the Anglo-Saxon tradition into the mold of a gloomy, scientific naturalism was under way.

Optimistic Crosscurrents

Before this naturalistic trend made further headway, in fact before nativists paid much attention to Walker's theory, events temporarily twisted race-thinking in a very different direction. The fears and forebodings that were pushing Anglo-Saxonism toward sharper, more dogmatic formulations suddenly lifted at the end of the century; a new era bright with hope and flushed with well-being relieved the need to define enemies and explain failures. At a time when every xenophobia subsided, racial nationalism softened, relaxed, and resumed once more its historic air of triumphant confidence. Yet, oddly, it flourished as never before.

Actually, two currents of racial nationalism had developed among American intellectuals during the 1890's. One was defensive, pointed at the foreigner within; the other was aggressive, calling for expansion overseas. Both issued, in large measure, from the same internal frustrations; both reflected the same groundswell of national feeling. But one warned the Anglo-Saxon of a danger of submergence, while the other assured him of a conquering destiny. By 1898 the danger and doom were all but forgotten, and the conquest was made. An easy and successful adventure in imperialism gave racial nationalism both an unprecedented vogue and a cheerful tone. In a torrent of popular jubilation over the Anglo-Saxon's invincibility, the need to understand his predicament scientifically dissolved in a romantic glow.[18]

Imperialists happily intent on absorbing Filipinos and Puerto

Ricans felt little doubt of the Anglo-Saxons' powers of assimilation. Instead of Lodge's dread of racial mixture and his insistence on the fixity of the Anglo-Saxon folk, the country now heard once more the earlier theory of John Fiske: that Anglo-Saxons possess a unique capacity to merge with other peoples while retaining their own dominant traits. Franklin H. Giddings, the first professor of sociology at Columbia University, dressed up in scientific language the old notion that immigration was recapitulating in the United States the same blend of European strains from which the English had originally emerged. His proof that the United States was still English moved the editor of the *Ladies' Home Journal* to congratulate the home of the oppressed for its success in assimilation.[19] Others admitted that America's racial composition was changing but insisted that its Anglo-Saxon (or Teutonic) ideals were imposed on all comers. Albert Shaw, once one of the leading racial nativists, explained his shift away from a restrictionist position by asserting that America's power to assimilate had increased. Another imperialist felt so strong a sense of national homogeneity that he gave a new definition to the term Anglo-Saxon. All who stand together under the stars and stripes and fight for what it represents, he declared, have a right to that proud designation.[20]

Of course, there was another, less uplifting side to this frame of mind. The prime object of the imperialist ideology, after all, was to justify imposing colonial status on backward peoples. Every Anglo-Saxonist knew that the United States was taking up "the white man's burden" in extending American control over the dark-skinned natives of the Philippines, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Under these circumstances the Anglo-Saxon idea easily associated itself with emotions of white supremacy. In other words, while welcoming the immigrant population into the Anglo-Saxon fold, imperialists were also linking their ideal of nationality to a consciousness of color. Although a romantic idealism temporarily blurred the ideological sharpness of racial nationalism, at a deeper and more permanent level the Anglo-Saxon would henceforth symbolize the white man par excellence.

The imperialist excitement itself lasted only a short while, leaving the Anglo-Saxon tradition freighted with race-feelings and exposed again to a defensive, nativistic reaction. Overseas adventures lost their savor as soon as they engendered difficult moral prob-

lems and serious international entanglements. As early as 1901 the bloodshed necessary to impose United States rule on the "new-caught, sullen peoples" of the Philippines was deflating enthusiasm for expansion. And by 1905, when Japan emerged as a new world power menacing American interests in the Far East, American opinion was nervously repudiating the conquering, global destiny of a few years before.[21] Confronted by the "Yellow Peril," the Anglo-Saxon abandoned his rampant stance and resumed a somewhat defensive posture.

There were various indications in the early years of the twentieth century that race-thinking was entering a fretful, post-imperialist phase. One very direct reflection of the change of mood came in a book published in 1905 by a United States Army surgeon on his return from a tour of duty in the Philippines. In *The Effects of Tropical Light on White Men,* Major Charles E. Woodruff passed a depressing verdict on the racial results of imperialism. The blond, blue-eyed race, he argued, is born to command and to conquer; but in expanding southward from its foggy, overcast homelands in northern Europe it always succumbs to intense sunlight, which only the brunette races can withstand. And as Woodruff glanced apprehensively at the complexion of the immigrants pouring into the United States at the time, he added a significant afterthought. Perhaps the blond Teutons cannot expect to survive even under the climatic conditions prevailing throughout most of the United States.[22] Woodruff displayed all of the color feelings aroused by imperialism and none of its buoyant idealism. Much the same can be said of the gloomy tracts that California's leading race-thinker, Homer Lea, wrote in the next few years on the decline of American militancy and the spread of the Yellow Peril.[23]

Among other racial nationalists the reaction from imperial euphoria brought back the vague fears of the nineties about the Anglo-Saxons' stamina. They spoke of the old stock becoming decadent and being elbowed aside, of the Anglo-Saxon race as doomed, of the native Americans suffering from all manner of moral, physical, and psychic deterioration, due in large measure to immigration. Since nativism was at a low ebb in the early years of the century, the complaints usually sounded a mournful note rather than a belligerent or defiant one. Professor George E. Woodberry, one of the old-guard literary critics, even tried to find some

comfort in the dismal spectacle. Lecturing on "race power" in literature in 1903, he suggested that the dissolution of the English race would fulfill a historic, sacrificial principle by which each great race succumbs in order to bequeath its heritage to a broader humanity.[24]

A less spiritually satisfying but more scientific explanation of the Anglo-Saxon's flagging energies could be found in Francis A. Walker's theory that immigration discouraged reproduction among the older stock. The theory was more and more widely discussed, with hardly anyone equipped statistically to challenge it.[25] Instead of critical scrutiny, Walker's sober argument now got a popular currency as it was inflated into the more grandiose concept of "race suicide." This happened in a curiously roundabout fashion. In 1901 Edward A. Ross used Walker's ideas in an address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science to explain how unchecked Asiatic immigration might lead to the extinction of the American people. When a higher race quietly eliminates itself rather than endure the competition of a lower one, said Ross, it is committing suicide. At the time, Ross was too confident of America's powers of assimilation to write about European immigration in these terms.[26] Before "race suicide" did become directly pertinent to the problem which Walker himself had had in mind, Theodore Roosevelt simplified it into an argument against birth control. For all of his booming optimism, Roosevelt could not entirely repress lurking doubts over the future. His nativist tendencies being in check, he discharged his anxieties through vague, thundering appeals to mothers to arrest the suicide of "the race" by having more children.[27]

The President's campaign for fecundity popularized the notion of race suicide. During the period from 1905 through 1909 the general magazines published over thirty-five articles dealing directly with the topic. Once it became a minor national phobia, the original, nativistic implications of the idea speedily reasserted themselves. In reply to a Rooseveltian tirade, *Harper's Weekly* remarked caustically in 1905 that exhortation would have little effect on the native birth rate as long as unlimited European immigration continued to reduce it. Soon books were being written to warn that race suicide would "toll the passing of this great Anglo-Teuton people" and the surrender of the nation "to the Latin and

the Hun." [28] In the end, the whole discussion probably caused more race-thinking than reproduction. At least it brought to a wider audience the racial pessimism previously confined to a limited group of upper-class intellectuals.

It would be wrong to suppose, however, that any despairing note sounded very loudly or struck very deeply during the first decade of the twentieth century. Pessimistic anxieties crept about the fringes of American thought; at the heart of it was a supreme confidence. As the ebullience of imperialism ebbed away, much of the slack in American spirits was taken up by another enthusiasm. Progressivism inherited and sustained a good deal of the verve and exuberance which imperialism had generated. Many of the empire-builders of 1900 became apostles of social reform in the following years,[29] their crusading élan shifting from expansion abroad to improvement at home. As long as progressivism kept that psychological tone, as long as it radiated a sense of promise and victory, it limited the impact of imperialism's other heritage of race-thinking.

Furthermore, the premises of progressive thought, as well as its optimistic spirit, blunted the force of Anglo-Saxon nativism. By renewing faith in democracy, progressivism tended to challenge belief in racial inequalities. By concentrating on environmental reconstruction, it implicitly disputed all racial determinisms. At a time when politicians, public, and intelligentsia, alike, quickened with a vision of intelligence recasting environment, the Anglo-Saxon tradition faced powerful opposing currents. If nativistic intellectuals were to capitalize on the race consciousness left in the wake of imperialism, they would have to breast the mainstream of progressive thought.

Thus the race-thinkers of the early twentieth century belonged in considerable degree to the same social minority that had sustained the Anglo-Saxon tradition during the late nineteenth. Conservative patricians were less likely than most Americans to share the prevailing optimism and environmentalism. To men like Lodge and the founders of the Immigration Restriction League, like Major Woodruff and Professor Woodberry, the crusading spirit of progressivism brought little solace. Surely reform was not restoring the more stable social order of the past, and those who above all valued family and tradition often relapsed into a gloomy view of their racial future once the appeal of imperialism faded.

A number of patrician intellectuals, it is true, were caught up in the wave of social reform and surrendered some of their ethnic worries in the process. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, who had applauded Lodge's racial tirade in 1896 and rushed off to France an order for Le Bon's books, by 1904 was calling into question the whole tendency to use racial criteria in judging nationalities.[30] But others of Roosevelt's background felt increasingly their own social displacement in a democratic age and hugged ever more tightly —in Henry James' words—"the honor that sits astride of the consecrated English tradition." [31]

In short, when imperialism subsided, the Anglo-Saxon tradition moved again in the nativist direction it had taken during the early and mid-nineties. Yet the subsequent compulsions of empire-building and progressive reform decisively affected its course—one in a positive, the other in a negative, way. Imperialism left a heritage of race-feelings that enriched the emotional appeal of Anglo-Saxon nativism; progressivism challenged its intellectual basis. The democratic, environmentalist outlook adopted by most of the leading social scientists and historians of the Progressive era weakened the intellectual respectability of the confused, ill-defined concepts of race prevalent in the nineteenth century. To vindicate its intellectual pretensions and rationalize its emotional tone, the Anglo-Saxon tradition more than ever needed restatement in the form of a scientific law. And this was exactly what happened.

Enter the Natural Scientists

In the 1890's nativist intellectuals had barely begun to think of European races as a biological threat or to associate national survival with racial purity. Even Walker's birth-rate theory offered no logical reason to suppose that the country would suffer from the replacement of old stock by new. Perhaps the most serious intellectual handicap of American race-thinkers before the twentieth century was the lack of a general scientific principle from which to argue the prepotency of heredity in human affairs. But at the turn of the century, when social science and history came increasingly under the sway of environmental assumptions, biologists advanced dramatic claims for heredity and even helped to translate them into a political and social creed.[32]

The new science of heredity came out of Europe about 1900 and formed the first substantial contribution of European thought to American nativism after the time of Darwin. The study of inheritance suddenly leaped into prominence and assumed a meaningful pattern from the discovery of the long-unnoticed work of Gregor Mendel and its convergence with August Weismann's theory of germinal continuity. Together, these hypotheses demonstrated the transmission from generation to generation of characteristics that obeyed their own fixed laws without regard to the external life of the organism.

Amid the excitement caused in English scientific circles by these continental discoveries, Sir Francis Galton launched the eugenics movement. Galton, who was England's leading Darwinian scientist, had long been producing statistical studies on the inheritance of all sorts of human abilities and deficiencies. But it was only in the favorable climate of the early twentieth century that he started active propaganda for uplifting humanity by breeding from the best and restricting the offspring of the worst. To Galton, eugenics was both a science and a kind of secular religion. It certified that the betterment of society depends largely on improvement of the "inborn qualities" of "the human breed," and Galton preached this message with evangelical fervor.[83] Thus he provided biologists and physicians, excited over the new genetic theories, with a way of converting their scientific interests into a program of social salvation—a program based wholly on manipulation of the supposedly omnipotent forces of heredity.

In the latter part of the 1900's the eugenics movement got under way in the United States, where it struck several responsive chords. Its emphasis on unalterable human inequalities confirmed the patricians' sense of superiority; its warnings over the multiplication of the unfit and the sterility of the best people synchronized with the discussion of race suicide. Yet the eugenicists' dedication to a positive program of "race improvement" through education and state action gave the movement an air of reform, enabling it to flourish in the ambience of progressivism while still ministering to conservative sensibilities. By 1910, therefore, eugenicists were catching the public ear. From then through 1914, according to one tabulation, the general magazines carried more articles on eugenics than

on the three questions of slums, tenements, and living standards, combined.[84]

The leading eugenicist in America was Charles B. Davenport, a zoologist of tremendous ambition and drive who established the country's first research center in genetics at Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island. Davenport's father, a descendant of one of the Puritan founders of New England, was a genealogist who traced his ancestry back to 1086, and Davenport himself often mourned "that the best of that grand old New England stock is dying out through failure to reproduce." His early experiments at Cold Spring Harbor were devoted to testing the Mendelian principles in animal breeding; by 1907 he was beginning to apply them to the study of human heredity. In 1910 he persuaded Mrs. E. H. Harriman to finance a Eugenics Record Office adjacent to his laboratory with the aim of compiling an index of the American population and advising individuals and local societies on eugenical problems. Over a course of years she poured more than half a million dollars into the agency, while Davenport—already one of America's leading biologists—gave the rest of his life to studying the inheritance of human traits and spreading the gospel of eugenics.[85] An indefatigable organizer, Davenport was also one of the leaders of the American Breeders' Association, where the eugenics agitation first centered. Established in 1903 by practical plant and animal breeders who wanted to keep in touch with the new theoretical advances, the association enlarged its field in 1907 to embrace eugenics.[86]

The racial and nativistic implications of eugenics soon became apparent. From the eugenicists' point of view, the immigration question was at heart a biological one, and to them admitting "degenerate breeding stock" seemed one of the worst sins the nation could commit against itself. It was axiomatic to these naïve Mendelians that environment could never modify an immigrant's germ plasm and that only a rigid selection of the best immigrant stock could improve rather than pollute endless generations to come. Since their hereditarian convictions made virtually every symptom of social disorganization look like an inherited trait, the recent immigration could not fail to alarm them.[87] Under the influence of eugenic thinking, the burgeoning mental hygiene movement picked up the cry. Disturbed at the number of hereditary mental defectives supposedly pouring into the country, the psychiatrists

who organized the National Committee for Mental Hygiene succeeded in adding to the immigration bill of 1914 an odd provision excluding cases of "constitutional psychopathic inferiority." [38] By that time many critics of immigration were echoing the pleas in scientific periodicals for a "rational" policy "based upon a noble culture of racial purity." [39]

None were quicker or more influential in relating eugenics to racial nativism than the haughty Bostonians who ran the Immigration Restriction League. Prescott F. Hall had always had a hypochondriac's fascination with medicine and biology, and his associate, Robert DeCourcy Ward, was a professional scientist. They had shied away from racial arguments in the nineties, but in the less favorable atmosphere of the new century their propaganda very much needed a fresh impulse. As early as 1906 the league leaders pointed to the new genetic principles in emphasizing the opportunity that immigration regulation offered to control America's future racial development.[40] Two years later they learned of the eugenics sentiment developing in the American Breeders' Association. They descended upon it, and soon they were dominating its immigration activities. The association organized a permanent committee on immigration, of which Hall became chairman and Ward secretary. Ward proceeded to read papers on immigration legislation before meetings of eugenicists, and for a time the two considered changing the name of their own organization to the "Eugenic Immigration League." [41] Meanwhile they seized every occasion to publicize the dogma that science decrees restrictions on the new immigration for the conservation of the "American race." [42]

Obviously the eugenics movement had crucial importance for race-thinking at a time when racial presuppositions were seriously threatened in the intellectual world. But basically the importance of eugenics was transitional and preparatory. It vindicated the hereditarian assumptions of the Anglo-Saxon tradition; it protected and indeed encouraged loose talk about race in reputable circles; and in putting race-thinking on scientific rather than romantic premises it went well beyond the vague Darwinian analogies of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, eugenics failed utterly to supply a racial typology. In their scientific capacity, the eugenicists—like their master Galton—studied individual traits and reached

conclusions on individual differences. When they generalized the defects of individual immigrants into those of whole ethnic groups, their science deserted them and their phrases became darkly equivocal. Indeed, the more logical and consistent eugenicists maintained that America could improve its "race" by selecting immigrants on the ground of their individual family histories regardless of their national origins.[43]

In the end the race-thinkers had to look to anthropology to round out a naturalistic nativism. Anthropology alone could classify the peoples of Europe into hereditary types that would distinguish the new immigration from older Americans; it alone might arrange these races in a hierarchy of merit and thereby prove the irremediable inferiority of the newcomers; and anthropology would have to collaborate with genetics to show wherein a mixture of races physically weakens the stronger.

American anthropology remained cautiously circumspect on these points. The influence of the foreign-born progressive, Franz Boas, was already great; in 1911 he published the classic indictment of race-thinking, *The Mind of Primitive Man*. In the absence of interest on the part of American anthropologists, a perfected racism depended on amateur handling of imported ideas. In a climate of opinion conditioned by the vogues of race suicide and eugenics, however, it is not surprising that scientifically minded nativists found the categories and concepts they needed without assistance from American anthropologists.

Again the inspiration came from Europe. There, chiefly in France and Germany, during the latter half of the nineteenth century anthropologists furnished the scientific credentials and speculative thinkers the general ideas out of which a philosophy of race took shape. The first of the thoroughgoing racists, Count J. A. de Gobineau, reached a limited audience of proslavery thinkers in America on the eve of the Civil War and then was forgotten. His successors were even less effective. Once in a while an immigrant writer tried to translate some of this literature into terms that might appeal to an American public, but the stuff simply was not read.[44] Not until the beginning of the twentieth century did the invidious anthropological theories which had been accumulating in Europe for over thirty years reach a significant American audi-

ence. And when they did, they were delivered in a characteristically American package.

William Z. Ripley was a brilliant young economist who had the kind of mind that refuses to stay put. In the mid-nineties, before he was thirty years old, Ripley was teaching economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, while simultaneously developing a unique course of lectures at Columbia University on the role of geography in human affairs. In its conception this course reflected Ripley's conviction of the basic importance of environmental conditions in molding the life of man; but he quickly came up against the problem of race. The question led him to the controversies among continental scholars on the anthropological traits of European peoples, and he chose the locale of Europe as a crucial test of the interplay of race and environment. In *The Races of Europe*, a big, scholarly volume appearing in 1899, he anatomized the populations of the continent, pointing temperately but persistently to ways in which physiological traits seemed to reflect geographical and social conditions.

This was cold comfort to nativists, but the book had another significance apart from the author's well-hedged thesis. Ripley organized into an impressive synthesis a tripartite classification of white men which European ethnologists had recently developed. For the first time, American readers learned that Europe was not a land of "Aryans" or Goths subdivided into vaguely national races such as the Anglo-Saxon, but rather the seat of three races discernible by physical measurements: a northern race of tall, blond longheads which Ripley called Teutonic; a central race of stocky roundheads which he called Alpine; and a southern race of slender, dark longheads which he called Mediterranean.[45] Here was a powerful weapon for nativists bent on distinguishing absolutely between old and new immigrations, but to make it serviceable Ripley's data would have to be untangled from his environmentalist assumptions.

It is ironical that Ripley himself did some of the untangling. For all of his scholarly caution he could not entirely suppress an attachment to the Teutonic race that reflected very mildly the rampant Teutonism of many of the authorities on which he relied. In the early twentieth century the new genetic hypotheses and a growing alarm over the new immigration turned his attention from

environmental to inherited influences. He began to talk about race suicide and to wonder about the hereditary consequences of the mixture of European races occurring in America.

Before abandoning anthropology completely to concentrate in economics, Ripley delivered in 1908 a widely publicized address in which he suggested an answer to the old problem of how the crossing of superior and inferior races can drag down the former. His roving eye had come upon the experiments that some of the Mendelian geneticists were making on plant and animal hybrids. Hugo De Vries and others were demonstrating how hybridization sometimes caused a reassertion of latent characters inherited from a remote ancestor. The concept of reversion was an old one, discussed by Darwin himself, but the rise of genetics brought it into new prominence. Ripley fastened on the idea and raised the question whether the racial intermixture under way in America might produce a reversion to a primitive type.[46] In contrast to the theory of race suicide, this doctrine—torn from the context of genetics and applied to the typology of European races—provided a thoroughly biological explanation of the foreign peril. Presumably race suicide might be arrested by legislation and by education raising the immigrant's standard of living; but reversion seemed remorseless. All of the pieces from which a sweeping statement of racial nativism might be constructed were now on hand.

The man who put the pieces together was Madison Grant, intellectually the most important nativist in recent American history. All of the trends in race-thinking converged upon him. A Park Avenue bachelor, he was the most lordly of patricians. His family had adorned the social life of Manhattan since colonial times, and he was both an expert genealogist and a charter member of the Society of Colonial Wars. Always he resisted doggedly any intrusion of the hoi polloi. On his deathbed he was still battling to keep the public from bringing cameras into the zoo over which he had long presided.[47]

In addition to a razor-sharp set of patrician values, Grant also had an extensive acquaintance with the natural sciences and a thoroughly naturalistic temper of mind. Beginning as a wealthy sportsman and hunter, he was the founder and later the chairman of the New York Zoological Society, where he associated intimately with leading biologists and eugenicists. In the early years of the twen-

tieth century he published a series of monographs on North American animals—the moose, the caribou, the Rocky Mountain goat. He picked up a smattering of Mendelian concepts and, unlike his eugenicist friends, read a good deal of physical anthropology too. Ripley's work furnished his main facts about European man, but he also went behind Ripley to many of the more extreme European ethnologists. Thus Grant was well supplied with scientific information yet free from a scientist's scruple in interpreting it.

By 1910 Grant's racial concepts were clearly formed and thoroughly articulated with a passionate hatred of the new immigration.[48] He showed little concern over relations between whites and Negroes or Orientals. His deadliest animus focused on the Jews, whom he saw all about him in New York. More broadly, what upset him was the general mixture of European races under way in America; for this process was irretrievably destroying racial purity, the foundation of every national and cultural value.

Grant's philippic appeared finally in 1916. It bore the somber title, *The Passing of the Great Race*, summing up the aristocratic pessimism that had troubled nativist intellectuals since the 1890's. Everywhere Grant saw the ruling race of the western world on the wane yet heedless of its fate because of a "fatuous belief" in the power of environment to alter heredity. In the United States he observed the deterioration going on along two parallel lines: race suicide and reversion. As a result of Mendelian laws, Grant pontificated, we know that different races do not really blend. The mixing of two races "gives us a race reverting to the more ancient, generalized and lower type." Thus "the cross between any of the three European races and a Jew is a Jew." [49] In short, a crude interpretation of Mendelian genetics provided the rationale for championing racial purity.

After arguing the issue of race versus physical environment, Grant assumed a racial determination of culture. Much of the book rested on this assumption, for the volume consisted essentially of a loose-knit sketch of the racial history of Europe. The Alpines have always been a race of peasants. The Mediterraneans have at least shown artistic and intellectual proclivities. But the blond conquerors of the North constitute "the white man par excellence." Following the French scientist Joseph Deniker, Grant designated this great race Nordic. To it belongs the political and military

genius of the world, the daring and pride that make explorers, fighters, rulers, organizers, and aristocrats. In the early days, the American population was purely Nordic, but now the swarms of Alpine, Mediterranean, and Jewish hybrids threaten to extinguish the old stock unless it reasserts its class and racial pride by shutting them out.

So the book turned ultimately into a defense of both class and racial consciousness, the former being dependent on the latter. The argument broadened from nativism to an appeal for aristocracy as a necessary correlative in maintaining racial purity. Democracy, Grant maintained, violates the scientific facts of heredity; and he was obviously proud to attribute feudalism to the Nordics. Furthermore, Grant assaulted Christianity for its humanitarian bias in favor of the weak and its consequent tendency to break down racial pride. Even national consciousness ranked second to race consciousness in Grant's scale of values.

This boldness and sweep gave *The Passing of the Great Race* particular significance. Its reception and its impact on public opinion belong to a later stage in the history of American nativism, but its appearance before America's entry into the First World War indicates that the old Anglo-Saxon tradition had finally emerged in at least one mind as a systematic, comprehensive world view. Race-thinking was basically at odds with the values of democracy and Christianity, but earlier nativists had always tried either to ignore the conflict or to mediate between racial pride and the humanistic assumptions of America's major traditions. Grant, relying on what he thought was scientific truth, made race the supreme value and repudiated all others inconsistent with it.

This, at last, was racism.[50]

Chapter Seven

The Loss of Confidence

> Heredity will tell the story of our greatest woes. It is like inoculating a whole nation of people with leprosy, that can be eradicated from the blood only by a racial lapse, through decades of time, to rejuvenating savagery.
>
> —Charles Major, 1910

In the decade from 1905 to 1915, while patrician nativists were building a systematic ideology, popular nativism was struggling to recover the vitality it had had in the mid-nineties. From 1906, when the literacy test reappeared in Congress, to the beginning of American involvement in the First World War, the jaunty self-assurance with which America as a whole had greeted the twentieth century was slowly deteriorating. Xenophobia was steadily on the rise. Although we may take 1905 or 1906 as its starting point, resurgent nativism did not announce itself with the explosive force of a second Haymarket riot. Nor did it, in all probability, regain even at the end of the period the hysterical intensity of the 1890's. Yet the prewar revival of nativism has major significance. It prepared the way for the greater passions of the war years, and it also set in motion trends that reached fulfillment once the war was over.

This most obscure of all periods in the history of American nativism eludes any simple or easy analysis. It started during relatively happy, abundant years, when most people felt sure that reform was liquidating the problems of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, anti-foreign feelings steadily gathered strength at a time when the dominant force of progressivism was also surging upward in potency and enthusiasm. To understand the growing vigor

of nativist movements in the late years of the Progressive era one must take account of many things: of changes in the pattern of immigration; of ideas, inherited from earlier periods, that had little to do with a progressive spirit; and of certain alterations that occurred in that spirit itself.

The Ethnocentric Background

All through the Progressive era, through its years of confidence and through its returning doubts, the human tide rolled in from crowded Europe. From a low point in 1897 the current ascended to its zenith in 1907 and then fluctuated at a level above 650,000 per year until the outbreak of the World War. At no time in the nineteenth century had such numbers crossed the Atlantic. On the other hand, the proportion of native- to foreign-born in the total population did not substantially vary, and the cityward movement of the native population more than kept pace with the increasing urbanization of the immigrants. Percentagewise, the immigrants were barely holding their own.

What was changing significantly was their destination and their composition. Like the major domestic migrations, the transatlantic current was moving more than ever toward the cities; despite the efforts of private agencies and of the federal Division of Information, established in 1907, Europeans no longer in any number found homes in the small towns or the countryside of America. Also, the new immigration from southern and eastern Europe now thoroughly overshadowed the dwindling stream from Germany, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and the British Isles. In the period from the Spanish-American to the World War the new immigration was nearly three and a half times the size of the old.[1] Few nativists, except the anti-Catholic crusaders who could never forget the Irish, now failed to attribute great importance to the shift in nationalities. Around this distinction between old and new—not around the general anti-foreignism that had prevailed in the 1890's—the return of nativism clearly centered.

The collapse of widespread hatred at the turn of the century by no means dispensed the new immigrants from the distaste which older Americans had always felt for their culture and appearance. Since only a small segment of progressive opinion sought positive

values in the foreigners' way of life, a traditional ethnocentric aversion spread with the growing numbers of the newcomers and their increasing prominence on the American scene.

Among the score or more of nationalities now funneling through Ellis Island, only Italians and Jews were commonly distinguishable in American eyes from the nameless masses who accompanied them, and Italians and Jews continued to suffer the most resentment. The Italian still bore as vividly as ever the stigma of impassioned crime. During the ebb of nativism in the early years of the century, headlines in metropolitan newspapers trumpeted the tale of Italian blood lust incessantly: "Caro Stabs Piro . . . Cantania Murdered . . . Ear-Biting Crime . . . Rinaldo Kills Malvino . . . Gascani Assaulted . . . Vendetta Near Oak Street. . . ." [2] Doubtless the reports inspired less terror than they had a decade earlier, partly because the public was learning that the violence was almost entirely intramural. Italian lawlessness ignited no further jingoist explosions and precipitated fewer lynchings. Nevertheless, it was universally believed that serious offenses were rapidly increasing—as they probably were. Lax American law enforcement was attracting to the United States a considerable number of Sicily's bandits; here, through blackmail and murder, they levied tribute on their intimidated countrymen more successfully than they had at home. By 1909, when a combined drive of American authorities and Italian community leaders began to reduce these activities, the image of a mysterious Black Hand Society, extending from Italy into every large American city, was fixed in the public imagination.[3]

Although the Jews were certainly not exempt from the new immigrants' general reputation for criminality,[4] on the whole the anti-Semitic stereotype pointed to private misbehavior rather than public misdemeanor. With the return of confidence, the nationalistic fears of the 1890's, that the Jews were wrecking the American economy and conspiring to rule the world, had vanished; no one now accused the Jews of subversive activity. Nor were they so liable to physical attacks, except in the foreign quarters.[5] But what did persist, and indeed advance, was the older Shylock tradition, the notion of the Jews as an immoral, unmannerly people, given to greed and vulgarity. The general American materialism and social climbing that followed the Civil War had thrown this image

into relief and had set in motion a corresponding pattern of social discrimination. Throughout the late nineteenth century, beneath the stormy surface of harsher sentiments, this tendency to judge Jews as acquisitive barbarians and to recoil from association with them affected ever larger segments of American society. In the Progressive era social anti-Semitism was still spreading.

Part of the explanation for the sharpening of discrimination at a time of relative tranquillity lay in the swift upward thrust of the new Jewish immigrants. Like the German Jews who preceded them and whose social ascent had occasioned the earliest prohibitions, the refugees from Czarist persecution had a dynamism rare among foreign groups. They quit the slums in conspicuous numbers, produced an affluent class of real estate speculators and clothing manufacturers, and alone among recent immigrants sent a good many of their children to college.[6] As they rose, native Americans threw new obstacles across their path. Already shut out of clubs, most summer resorts, and many private schools, Jews found it increasingly difficult in the early twentieth century to enter college fraternities and faculties. Restrictive covenants became common in urban residential areas.[7] More important, job opportunities were beginning to contract. Sons and daughters of eastern European Jews were edging into the white-collar world and finding office managers unwilling to employ them.[8]

Because of their exceptional mobility, the Jews met the most economic discrimination, but at the same time other new groups ran athwart middle-class proscriptions. Italian applicants for clerical jobs often felt obliged to call themselves French or Spanish or Turkish,[9] just as some Jews denied their national origin. As if to demonstrate that the pattern of discrimination did not apply exclusively to any single nationality, state legislatures enacted prohibitions on the entry of all aliens into certain specialized occupations. In the nineteenth century, discriminatory legislation had aimed largely to exclude the immigrant from the relatively unskilled occupations he first sought out. But at the turn of the century states began to outlaw the unnaturalized foreigner from various white-collar jobs. Some revised their codes to require American citizenship of all attorneys. New York in 1909 adopted the same stipulation for private detectives. Michigan prohibited the issuance of a barber's license to any alien. About 1909 a successful

legislative campaign to deny nondeclarant aliens acceptance as certified public accountants got under way. Three eastern states went entirely beyond the vocational field to regulate avocations. New York in 1908 required aliens to pay $20 for a hunting license, as against $1 for citizens. A little later Pennsylvania flatly prohibited aliens from hunting and so from possessing shotguns, rifles, or dogs of any kind. In two counties of Massachusetts it became a crime for an alien to pick wild berries or flowers except on his own property.[10]

Yet none of this unfriendliness necessarily signified a rebirth of the nativist spirit. Conceivably the coldness, the repugnance, and the exclusions could have resulted simply from the growth of the new immigrant population. Nativism cut deeper than economic jealousy or social disapproval. It touched the springs of fear and hatred; it breathed a sense of crisis. Above all, it expressed a militantly defensive nationalism: an aroused conviction that an intrusive element menaced the unity, and therefore the integrity and survival, of the nation itself. The coming of the new immigration had contributed to late nineteenth century xenophobia, and its presence played a more crucial role in the twentieth century, but at both times the intensity of the hostility reflected larger factors in the American situation.

For clues to the distinctive sources of the new nativism one must turn to its earliest significant symptom: the fresh and surprisingly vigorous effort to enact a literacy test in 1906. This fourth failure to secure what had been defeated in 1897, in 1898, and again more dismally in 1902, revealed the emerging influence of the newer immigrants in American politics; but the narrow margin and desperate measures by which Uncle Joe Cannon and his immigrant allies prevented passage of the literacy test also signaled a recrudescence of nativist power. Here several of the tangled threads of modern American xenophobia first intersected, some old, others just coming into view. The incident furnishes a starting point for unraveling them.

Early on the Congressional scene appeared pressure groups which had labored for similar legislation in previous years: the veterans of immigration controversies. The patrician intellectuals of the Northeast, while busy modernizing their ideology, had not changed their legislative tactics. The Immigration Restriction League, still

supported by old New England families, was carrying on in 1905 and 1906 as it had since the 1890's. Sensing a shift in public opinion, the league hired a new Washington lobbyist and prepared another campaign. Henry Cabot Lodge again cooperated with the league in the Senate, although with unwonted circumspection. Seemingly the multiplication of immigrant votes in Massachusetts (and perhaps the pressure of business opinion) lent a certain prudence to Lodge's activities. He never again exercised the initiative and leadership on restriction which he had taken during the nineties. In his impetuous son-in-law, Congressman Augustus Gardner, the league had a more aggressive spokesman in the House of Representatives. It was Gardner who forced the immigration bill out of the standpat Rules Committee and who struggled vainly against Speaker Cannon's stratagems.[11]

Organized labor too returned to the fray and returned with unprecedented vitality. The unions had played a rather limited role in nineteenth century movements for general restrictions on immigration. Even in the feeble, literacy test campaign of 1902 the American Federation of Labor had not acted with conspicuous vigor or resolution. By 1906, however, conditions had changed, and labor's heart was in restriction. In the years from 1897 to 1904, a period of relative harmony between capital and labor, the A.F.L. grew enormously, in no small measure by recruiting native American artisans. Because of this expansion and also because most A.F.L. unions ignored the masses of unskilled workers, the proportion of native-born in the organization was evidently increasing; it was losing touch with its own immigrant roots.[12] The decline of immigrant influence in the federation might alone account for the organization's heartier acceptance of restriction, but after 1904 another factor gave a positive impetus to the idea. A massive attack by organized business threw organized labor on the defensive. The unions stopped growing, blocked by boycotts, open-shop campaigns, and in some measure by employers' handling of cheap immigrant labor (notably through the practice of "balancing nationalities"). This display of corporate power whetted resentment against men who seemed more than ever pliant tools of the corporations. Fearful, angry, and discouraged, the A.F.L. for the first time turned to immigration restriction with determination. The literacy test became one of its cardinal legislative objectives,

as it warned recalcitrant Congressmen of retaliation at the next election.[13]

The strange alliance of patricians with union labor, an alliance which linked A.F.L. President Samuel Gompers and Henry Cabot Lodge in the only common endeavor of their two careers, would not of itself have made much headway against the powerful forces arrayed in opposition. The gathering resistance to restriction by big business and by the new immigration was creating a coalition at least as strong as the Lodge-Gompers axis, and because both alignments cut across party divisions, neither the Republican nor the Democratic party could serve as a nativist vehicle. The traditionally restrictionist groups needed substantial outside support for any show of strength, and this meant a shift in at least some sectors of public opinion. The shift was occurring in 1905 and 1906, chiefly in two regions of the country.

The veteran restrictionists felt the new wind that was rising in one section. In fact, they set their sails to catch it. Gompers later recalled: "When the Japanese school issue originating in San Francisco focused attention on the Japanese phases of the immigration question . . . there developed an opportunity of getting action on immigration." Lodge had the same perception. "This intense feeling on the Pacific Slope," he wrote to Theodore Roosevelt in the summer of 1905, "may help us to get some good general legislation . . . on the anti-Japanese-Chinese agitation supported by the labor people we might win." [14]

Neither Gompers nor Lodge realized that another section was taking their cause just as much or more to heart. The South as well as the Far West was stirring with nativist ferment. In fact, two southerners seized the initiative in Congress. An Alabaman, Oscar W. Underwood, was the first to raise the immigration question when the legislators convened in December 1905. Breaking irrelevantly into another debate, Underwood instructed the House on the pure whiteness of the old immigration in contrast to the mixture of Asiatic and African blood coursing in the veins of southern Europeans. When the Senate took up the issue a few months later, the literacy test was not introduced by the more cautious Lodge but rather by Senator F. M. Simmons of North Carolina. Simmons appealed fervently for the preservation of Anglo-Saxon civilization against immigrants who "are nothing more than the degenerate progeny of the Asiatic hoards [*sic*] which, long centuries ago, overran the shores of the Mediterranean . . . the spawn of the Phoenician curse. . . ." [15]

Grass Roots of Anglo-Saxon Nativism

With these words, a new phase in the history of American nativism inauspiciously began. Although beaten in the legislative fight of 1906-07, the southern and western opponents of immigration, together with the eastern restrictionists, pressed steadily forward in succeeding years. And just as steadily the importance of the West and South in the nativist coalition grew, until the preponderant strength of the movement came from those outlying regions, where the main object of attack, the new immigration, was least numerous.

Throughout that whole vast area one prevailing quality and character stamped the anti-foreign drive from the outset. It was racial; it rang with the shibboleths of the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Yet the southern and western nativists knew little or nothing about the racial science that was beginning to affect literate northern circles. For some time the crude bombast of cotton Senators and California statesmen owed hardly anything to the pretentious doctrines of race suicide, eugenics, and racist anthropology. South and West were sectional spearheads of a popular kind of racial nativism that arose parallel with but was not dependent upon the new racial ideology.

The taproot of the reaction was gnarled and massive, imbedded deeply in the common folkways of the two areas. The South and the Pacific Coast alike thought of themselves as a "white man's country." They had long struggled—in different degrees and in different ways—to maintain white supremacy, often without the aid of a systematic ideology. From Seattle to Savannah primitive race-feelings, wrought deeply in the American character, flourished as nowhere else in the United States. Projected on the new immigration, these ancient feelings gave southern and western nativism its peculiar energy.

On the West Coast, as Lodge and Gompers appreciated, the Japanese question precipitated the racial anxieties which infected attitudes toward Mediterranean and eastern European peoples.

Anti-Japanese sentiment, gathering strength slowly after 1900 as immigration from Nippon increased, burst forth in a raging flood in 1905. Alive with hysteria, the California legislature unanimously called for Japanese exclusion, boycotts of Japanese businesses began, and the San Francisco School Board ordered the segregation of Asiatic pupils. The fires of anti-Oriental hatred cast at least a pale reflection on European outsiders. California newspaper editorials excoriating the Japanese had a way of broadening into appeals to preserve America for Americans. The Asiatic Exclusion League, an organization formed in 1905 which soon claimed over one hundred thousand members, resolved that *all aliens* should be disarmed in order to prevent insurrection. Other anti-Japanese agitators on the West Coast trembled at the dangerously inferior blood pouring across the Atlantic from southern Europe as well as across the Pacific. Far Western Congressmen repeatedly tried to attach anti-Japanese provisions to general immigration measures, and in doing so they became one of the foremost blocs in the whole restrictionist movement. Occasionally a representative of the West Coast might regret that the literacy test was not more directly a test of blood and race, but by 1912 not a single member of Congress from the eight westernmost states voted against the literacy proviso.[16]

The threat of the "Yellow Peril" to white America touched a responsive chord in the South, the only other section of the country which sympathized quickly and widely with California's war against the Japanese.[17] Southerners also sensed the general, nativist significance of the Japanese issue, as the comments of Underwood and Simmons on the semi-Asiatic ancestry of southeastern Europe suggested. Fundamentally, however, the South's hostility to the new immigration reflected its own long-standing "ethnophobia"; the Japanese were settling in a section of the country so remote from the South that their presence could not concern it vitally. At bottom it was the Negro issue that stirred southern anxieties about European and Asiatic immigrants alike. For decades the South, above all other regions, had cherished race-feelings in order to keep the white man irrevocably superior to the black. Now, Dixie spokesmen warned time and again that one race problem was bad enough without further endangering white supremacy through immigration. In 1912 southern Senators voted 16 to 1 for the literacy test; southern Representatives 68 to 5.[18] And in both houses they supplied the driving force behind the measure.

The extension of southern and western race-feelings to include European immigrants seems, therefore, a simple and "natural" development as long as one does not ask why it occurred when it did. Both sections had nourished a pride of race for a very long time; yet only in the twentieth century did these regional patterns of white supremacy breed a related attack on the European newcomers. If residents of the Pacific Coast discovered a Japanese menace only after 1900, they had fought another Oriental people, the Chinese, ever since the 1850's. It is significant that the anti-Chinese movement in the Far West in the late nineteenth century had not contributed directly to other anti-foreign phobias. Although the basic Chinese exclusion law was enacted in 1882, the year of the first general immigration law, the Congress that passed the two measures sensed no connection between them. At no time in the nineteenth century did immigration restrictionists argue that Chinese exclusion set a logical precedent for their own proposals. The two issues seemed so different that foreign-born whites felt no embarrassment in leading the anti-Chinese crusade, while San Francisco's most bitterly anti-European nativists held entirely aloof from the war on the Oriental.[19]

The nativist eruption in the South presents a still more difficult puzzle, for the Negro—unlike the Japanese on the West Coast—had always been there, and his presence never ceased to trouble the southern mind. Yet southern views on immigration underwent an astonishing revolution in the early twentieth century. Like the West, the South had shared in the nation-wide nativism of the mid-nineties, but what panic it felt then took a largely anti-radical and jingoist form. Southern spokesmen in the late nineteenth century seldom attacked immigrants in terms of race, and some invoked the unity of "the great Caucasian race" in resisting immigration restriction. Moreover, economic interests kept every kind of nativism so well in check that in January 1898, southern Senators voted 15 to 3 against the literacy test, supplying more than half the opposition to it.[20] A decade later the South was becoming the nativist section par excellence, its spokesmen soon to be prominent in every anti-foreign movement.

Undoubtedly one reason for the blossoming of these long en-

cysted race-feelings lay in the character of the Europeans who were now arriving. The predominance of new over old immigration—a trend which was clearly appreciated in the early 1890's only in the Northeast—was now becoming apparent to Americans in every part of the country. Everywhere the thought of European immigration now suggested strange images of Mediterranean, Slavic, and Jewish types, rather than the familiar German, Irishman, or Scandinavian. The new groups did, on the whole, have an exotic look about them for ethnological as well as cultural reasons, and in sections with a highly developed race consciousness their whiteness was easily open to question. "The color of thousands of them," warned Congressman Thomas Abercrombie of Alabama, "differs materially from that of the Anglo-Saxon." [21]

Along with a general realization that the whole stream of immigration was changing, southerners and westerners were beginning to see a substantial number of the newcomers with their own eyes. In the early twentieth century a good many southern and eastern Europeans worked their way westward to the Pacific Coast. By 1907 they formed, together with the Mexicans and Asiatics, the great majority of the general construction workers and railway section hands. They provided a very large part of the common labor in mills and fisheries, while the Italians and Portuguese aroused sharp jealousy by duplicating the success of the Japanese in intensive truck farming. During the decade the total number of new immigrants in the Far West more than tripled.[22] At the same time a relatively less important but not insignificant stream was seeping into the South. Outside of New Orleans and a few adjacent parishes, the South had known hardly any new immigrants until the very end of the nineteenth century. Then they became somewhat more common: Italian farmhands and railroad workers, eastern European shopkeepers and miners, scattered widely enough to be noticeable. While the South's small population of northern European birth declined between 1900 and 1910, the number of southern and eastern Europeans more than doubled.[23] Both the southward and westward movements were only trickles compared to the great tide pouring into the North; the whole area beyond the Rockies and below the Mason and Dixon Line had only half as many new immigrants as did New York City. But

sections deeply sensitive to complexion and cast of features readily detected a swarthy face.

In the South, the newcomer's "in-betweenness" seemed a double threat. He might endanger not only the purity of the white race but also its solidarity. In other words, the foreigners, partly because of their low cultural and social status, more largely because they had no background of southern traditions and values, might relax the pattern of white supremacy. Particularly the Italians, who sometimes worked beside the blacks on large plantations, seemed to lack a properly inflexible spirit. In the little town of Tallulah, Louisiana, for example, the coming of five Sicilian storekeepers disturbed the native whites because the Italians dealt mainly with the Negroes and associated with them nearly on terms of equality. They violated the white man's code. In a few years a quarrel over a goat resulted in the lynching of all five. In another locality the whites tried to keep the color line sharp and clear by barring Italian children from the white schools.[24] Meanwhile the Negroes too distrusted the "Third Force" entering the southern racial world, for the newcomers did their work and sometimes came as their competitors. Booker T. Washington echoed the sentiments of white nativists by warning that southern European immigration might create "a racial problem in the South more difficult and more dangerous than that which is caused by the presence of the Negro." [25]

To explain the nativistic thrust of southern and western race-feelings solely in terms of a change in immigrant types is, however, to tell only half of the story. If we conclude that the penetration of the new immigration into the South and West automatically activated the color phobias of those areas, we do little justice to the distinctive essence of all nativisms. In every guise, the nativist stood always as a nationalist in a defensive posture. He chose a *foreign* adversary, and defined him, in terms of a conception of the nation's most precious and precarious attributes. Along with the social impact of the new immigration, the South and the Far West in the early twentieth century were also tingling with the ideological stimulus of a new nationalism. Perhaps the kind of nationalism that flourished in the wake of the Spanish-American War did as much as anything else to enable the guardians of white supremacy to discharge their feelings on the new foreign groups.

Ordinarily, the almost instinctive pride and arrogance with which white men met black and yellow and red men in North America bore little relation to a nationalist spirit. The pattern of white supremacy crystallized long before the birth of American nationalism, and in the nineteenth century the latter, despite its gradual assimilation of race-ideas, remained largely detached from primitive race-feelings. The exaltation of white supremacy in the ante-bellum South had actually served to weaken national loyalty; and California's anti-Chinese hysteria had presented itself largely as a defense of "white civilization," not as an explicitly nationalist movement.[26] At the turn of the century, however, the Anglo-Saxon idea of American nationality was so widely popularized that the racial egoisms of South and West could easily permeate a nationalism ideologically adapted to receive them. The expansion of the Anglo-Saxon tradition at the turn of the century, while preparing the way toward racism among northern intellectuals, also opened a wider field for the popular hatreds at the grass roots of the South and West.

Every section of the country shared in the jubilant Anglo-Saxonism touched off by the victories of 1898. The South, though somewhat less enthusiastic about a colonial policy than other parts of the United States, found the ideological by-products of the new departure deeply satisfying. The imperialist theory of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons seemed to southerners to vindicate their own regional pattern. White supremacy was becoming, in Professor C. Vann Woodward's phrase, the American Way. It was perhaps not entirely coincidental that the period of overseas expansion coincided with a general tightening of race lines within the South through disfranchisement and sterner segregation laws.[27] Moreover, the Spanish-American War itself set the South firmly in the midstream of American nationalism. As long as the bitter heritage of disunion dominated southern thought—and much sectional hatred persisted through the 1870's and 1880's—nearly all of the animus against outsiders centered on the northern Yankee. The War of 1898 completed a stage in sectional reconciliation by turning the martial ardor of the Confederate tradition into a patriotic crusade, by linking all parts of the country in a common purpose, and by giving the South an opportunity to demonstrate a passionate national loyalty.[28] Relatively secure now in its own

acceptance in the Union, the South could join wholeheartedly in other crusades for national homogeneity, especially when racial sentiment synchronized with nationalism. Southerners (like New Englanders) had been proud of their Anglo-Saxon ancestry since ante-bellum days; in the twentieth century they found it easy to boast that this inheritance, buttressed by the code of white supremacy, made the South the real bastion of true Americanism. The testimony of Congressman Martin Dies, Sr., of Texas, before a House committee is a fair illustration of how the southern assault on the new immigration blended race-feelings with the ideas of Anglo-Saxon nationalism.

> MR. DIES. As the little turtle, when the egg hatches on the sea shore instinctively makes for the water, so these beaten races of earth instinctively turn to the head of the government as the great father . . . I would quarantine this Nation against people of any government in Europe incapable of self-government for any reason, as I would against the bubonic plague. . . . I will admit the old immigration of the English, Irish, Germans, Scandinavians, and Swedes, the light-haired, blue-eyed Anglo-Saxons, or Celts—I mean the nations I have enumerated—
>
> THE CHAIRMAN. Pure Caucasians?
>
> MR. DIES. Yes; they were great in their own country and great in our country.[29]

Apparently a somewhat similar process took place on the Pacific Coast, local race-feelings blending with nationalism, though usually in a milder and less explicit way. In both sections imperialism created a congenial atmosphere for nationalizing the spirit of white supremacy. Moreover, there were special incentives in the Far West for the offensive spirit of imperialism to lapse into a defensive nativism. Due to its geographical location, this region undoubtedly felt more keenly than other parts of the country the frustrations and difficulties to which the expansionist policy of 1898 soon led. In the flush of confidence at the turn of the century many westerners looked forward to vistas of enterprise and adventure in the Orient. But instead of substantial benefits the "large policy" bore bitter fruit of international rivalry and insecurity. Japan's stunning victories over the ponderous Russian war machine in 1904-05 placed her in a position to threaten Amer-

ica's new stakes in the Far East. As a result the West Coast felt a double sense of crisis: added to an internal fear of Japanese blood was an external fear of Japanese power. One exacerbated the other. From 1905 on, war scares recurrently agitated the Pacific states, and California nativists commonly looked upon Japanese immigration as a quasi-military invasion of soldiers and spies.[80] Consequently western race-feelings gained a nationalistic dimension not only from the philosophy of imperialism but also from the international discord that expansion engendered.

Homer Lea, the leading theoretician of the Yellow Peril, summed up the nationalist aspects of western nativism in their most naked and pretentious form. Lea, a frail, wizened Californian who worshiped power and spent most of his life playing at war, argued that nations flourish only through expansion and conquest. He believed implicitly in the mission of the Anglo-Saxon to rule the world, but in Japan he feared that America had met a race-enemy which was its match in militancy. In 1909 his most influential book, *The Valor of Ignorance*, worked out in startling detail a prediction of Japanese military occupation of the West Coast. The widening stream of European immigration, Lea warned, is augmenting the Japanese danger by sapping America's racial strength and unity.[81]

It remained, however, for a novelist to translate this creed into a frontal assault on the new immigration and to disseminate it far and wide. Jack London, the West Coast's most popular writer, came gradually to a fully nativistic position via an ingrained sense of white supremacy and an extensive education in imperialistic race-thinking. As a roustabout on the San Francisco waterfront he learned the white man's arrogance in boyhood. By 1900 he was reveling in the Anglo-Saxons' destiny to seize the earth for themselves. As a correspondent in the Russo-Japanese War he felt less assurance, turning from racial braggadocio to warnings about the Yellow Peril.[82] Finally, around 1913, London wrote in rapid succession two novels which showed "the dark-pigmented things, the half-castes, the mongrel-bloods" of southern and eastern Europe swamping the blond, master race in America. In both books the protagonists saw visions of their ancestors roving westward in beaked ships and winged helmets. In one, the heroine's name was Saxon.[83]

Both Lea and London echoed the biological pessimism—the appeal to iron laws of heredity, the morbid speculations on racial defeat—which eastern nativist intellectuals were adding to the Anglo-Saxon tradition in the early twentieth century. Both wrote for a nation-wide audience, and both indicate that by 1910 the sophisticated theories of the patrician East were beginning to intermingle with the popular nativisms of the West and South. By no means was the exchange all in one direction. If new doctrines spread gradually beyond an eastern elite, the mass sentiments of the West and South found an increasingly sympathetic response in the rest of the country. No part of the United States was immune to the spirit of white supremacy; in all sections native-born and northern European laborers called themselves "white men" to distinguish themselves from the southern Europeans whom they worked beside.[84] And everywhere Anglo-Saxon nationalism, bereft of the exhilarating prospect of continued overseas expansion, was reverting to the defensive.

To this nation-wide trend the primitive race-feelings emanating from the South and Far West gave a constant spur. The East and Midwest, although inclined to depreciate anti-Japanese hysteria, could not entirely escape the influence of the Yellow Peril agitation and its broad racial implications. After 1908, for example, the national Socialist party abandoned a cosmopolitan immigration policy under the racist urgings of one of its western leaders.[85] Anti-Negro feeling radiated northward more easily than anti-Oriental feeling spread eastward. In northern attitudes toward Negroes a derogatory trend, evident since Reconstruction, sharpened during the 1900's under the pressure of an increasing Negro influx; and a series of race riots bloodied the streets of the Midwest.[86] All this affected the image of the new immigration. As early as 1905 the *Outlook* asked if immigration might "so add to the serious race problems we already have that it will endanger the success of America's task." In every section, the Negro, the Oriental, and the southern European appeared more and more in a common light.[87]

The best single index to the nation-wide growth of Anglo-Saxon nativism was the hardiest, most vigorous of the nativist fraternal orders, the Junior Order United American Mechanics. Its career mirrored the history of popular xenophobia. Largely anti-Catholic during its formative years before the Civil War, the

Junior Order's emphasis shifted to anti-radicalism in the 1880's and 1890's. At the turn of the century the order declined in size and energy; then another successful period set in. Membership rose from 147,000 in 1904 to 224,000 in 1914. Significantly, much of the growth seems to have come from expansion into the South and West.[38] The order took a very active part in the restrictionist campaign of 1906 and continued to agitate throughout the period. While anti-Catholicism persisted as a distinctly subsidiary part of the order's program, its former concentration on foreign radicals yielded to a primary fear of foreign races. Indeed, the organization echoed almost every theme in the racial polyphony. Its national chairman worried lest southern European immigrants should intermarry with Negroes, as in Latin America. The order's California council affiliated with the Asiatic Exclusion League and announced that southern Europeans were semi-Mongolian. The national chaplain told a House committee quite simply that he wanted "the kind to come from which we came . . . I glory in my kinship. My father, on one side, was a German, my father upon the other was an Englishman. . . . That is the kind we want and can absorb. . . . They belonged to that independent race . . . who . . . came with the idea already imbedded in their hearts and minds of the beauties of self-government." [39]

Yet one should not overemphasize the strength of this nationwide trend. Although racial nativism tugged at men everywhere in the United States, during the prewar years it never established a really firm grip on public opinion outside of the South and the West Coast. Those were its strongholds; the aroused and pervasive race-feeling of those areas touched the East and Midwest only to a limited degree. A spirit of confidence, sustained by the triumphant march of progressive reform, remained widespread throughout the era, and in the Northeast the regnant values of progressivism tended to inhibit racial anxieties. As long as northeastern progressives took to heart their optimistic faith in environmental reform, they held the Anglo-Saxon tradition in check. But this was not true of the South or of the Far West. There, without anguish and with no apparent sense of inconsistency, reform-thinking accommodated itself to race-thinking; progressivism was for white men only. No prominent easterner exhibited such wildly contradictory attitudes as Jack London, a radical champion of social justice for exploited and submerged classes who was forever glorifying the ruthlessness of supermen and master races.[40]

Meanwhile the southern brand of progressivism actually reinforced the racial reaction. Concerted opposition to immigration crystallized in the South about 1905, in the form of a counter-attack against the large landlords and business interests then engaged in a promotional campaign for European manpower. To many the power of organized wealth seemed to be undoing the South's long struggle to maintain race purity.[41] Much of the leadership in fighting the immigration promoters came from the fast-growing Farmers' Union, the largest farmer organization in the South, which leveled a fierce propaganda barrage at the state immigration bureaus and at the whole influx from southeastern Europe and Asia.[42] In South Carolina, Cole Blease, idol of the cotton mill operatives, seized upon the issue in 1908. The next year the state abolished its immigration bureau and prohibited its officials from encouraging immigration in any way. Several other states reduced the activities of their agencies, and by 1910 the promotional drive was moribund, the victim of a progressivism charged with racial nativism.[43]

Anti-Radical and Anti-Catholic Revivals

During the early twentieth century anti-radicalism and anti-Catholicism languished everywhere in the United States. Except for a flurry at the time of McKinley's assassination, the anti-radical tradition was dormant through the whole decade of the 1900's.[44] Anti-Catholicism fared worse yet; even within the Junior Order United American Mechanics it faded into the background. Undoubtedly the progressive mood, along with all of the other factors which renewed national confidence, helped to check these xenophobias. A people with great expectations of building a better society could perhaps afford a certain nonchalance toward radical critics of the present one; and a crusade clearly fixed on close-at-hand symbols of economic privilege pointed away from shadowy religious targets.

At least such was the case when the progressive impulse was fresh and young. In the last years of the prewar era, when reforms seemed more abundant and reformers more ebullient than

ever, the specters of foreign revolution and of popish despotism once more grew visible on the American scene. They reappeared more slowly than Anglo-Saxon nativism, and neither of these older anti-foreign traditions won the general vogue race-thinking now enjoyed. But the seemingly unpropitious circumstances under which anti-radicalism and anti-Catholicism came to life make their renewal a subject of moment. Unlike racial nativism, which had started up from factors largely independent of the prevailing progressive faith, the anti-radical and anti-Catholic revivals after 1910 were direct outgrowths of the ongoing currents of social protest. In the end, the ferment of reform revived anxieties which it had initially helped to repress.

The great underlying change running through the Progressive period was one of tempo. Year by year the innovating spirit whirled faster and faster, overrunning old objectives, generating new schemes for reform, raising men's level of expectation ever higher, broadening into a force that stirred every nook and cranny of American life. By 1910 the excited talk of reformers about "social democracy," breaking the "money trust," shackling the judiciary, and emancipating the "new woman" suggested that a reconstruction of some of the country's major institutions, from the banking system to the home, lay in the offing.

As progressivism moved from first successes toward grander visions, it showed signs of accumulating stress. On the right, conservative opposition tightened. The Republican party was dividing by 1910, and President Taft, once regarded as a loyal standard-bearer by reformers, now assailed them for exciting a class spirit. Within the broad movement of liberal opinion intellectuals were discovering divergent trends and weighing distinctions between the older American freedom and a planned society. On the left, an astonishing number of people were growing impatient with all the progressive promises. Longings too vast for any kind of moderate leadership to fulfill played into the hands of a new type of southern demagogue, like Cole Blease, or in other areas strengthened the Socialist party. In 1910 the Socialists elected their first mayors and congressmen; two years later the party polled the highest percentage of a Presidential vote it would ever receive. Meanwhile the most militant radicalism crackled in the West, where lumberjacks

and harvest hands joined the Industrial Workers of the World and brandished the strike as a revolutionary weapon.

Here were conditions faintly reminiscent of those in the 1880's. Symptoms of a head-on clash between capital and labor, a sense of increasing class conflict, dissatisfactions blurring immediate objectives and conjuring up vaguer issues: all these tugged again at the bonds of social unity. To be sure, the profound anxieties of the earlier period were muted by the continuing vitality of the progressive impulse. But some who found the pace of change too rapid, and others for whom it was too slow, drifted uneasily toward the psychology of the late nineteenth century, with its fears for the survival of the social order, with its compensatory nationalisms.

It was among men who deeply distrusted the whole current of innovation that anti-radical nativism reawakened after 1910. A generation earlier the dread of an approaching social catastrophe had touched a wider range of opinion, liberal as well as conservative. In the progressive era, when even the Socialist party was winning a certain respectability, few except the most orthodox took to heart the peril of revolution. Among them, however, labor militancy again inspired dismay: in place of the half-forgotten anarchists the Industrial Workers of the World came into view. What if the Wobblies were an essentially indigenous group? They swept a good many immigrant workers into their rough-and-tumble ranks, and they were "un-American" enough to preach class war.

In the Pacific Northwest a chunky hard-faced newspaper editor vaulted into national politics by mobilizing nativistic opposition to the I.W.W. Albert Johnson published a small daily at Gray's Harbor, the lumbering center of southwestern Washington. Early in 1912, when local businessmen put him forward as a standpat Republican candidate for Congress, he was known largely as a booster, a jolly after-dinner speaker at commercial clubs, and a foe of conservation. Then an I.W.W.-led strike of the lumber mills paralyzed the local economy. Johnson made a state-wide reputation by leading an armed citizens' movement which broke the strike, ran the leaders out of town, secured the recall of the mayor, and tried to punish the foreign laborers who obeyed the strike call by announcing that preference in re-employment would be given

to native Americans. The peppery editor turned his own Congressional campaign into a holy war against radicalism and for immigration restriction, raging at the I.W.W. as a flag-hating foreign conspiracy out to wreck the country.[45] He defeated the incumbent, who ran as a Progressive, and carried his crusade to Congress, where he soon alienated other restrictionists by the embarrassing violence of his proposals.[46]

The same year the I.W.W. burst into the East, where it organized the new immigrant workers in textile mills. Cruelly exploited by employers and rejected by the A.F.L., the unskilled immigrants turned temporarily to the "One Big Union" where all workers were on an equal footing. A bitter but victorious I.W.W. strike at Lawrence, Massachusetts, involving twenty-two thousand workers of sixteen nationalities, signaled the new foreign threat. This thunder on the left awakened conservative alarm in the East. Convinced that all radical experiments endangered "the solidarity of the Nation," organs such as the New York *Evening Sun* were equally sure that "the first considerable development of an actually revolutionary spirit comes today, and comes . . . among the un-American immigrants from Southern Europe." In the next few years anti-radical nativism formed a minor but persistent undercurrent in middle-class thinking.[47]

While the prevailing, progressive spirit confined anti-radicalism to right-wing groups, anti-Catholicism reappeared in an entirely different quarter. About the same time that foreign revolutionists were beginning to excite conservative nativists, a dread of foreign Romanists came to life on the nativist left. Both fears emerged out of the increasing restlessness of the day: one as a reaction against it, the other as a perverse expression of it.

The new religious xenophobia contained all of the traditional ideological ingredients: ex-priests lecturing on the moral iniquities of confessional and convent; warnings about Catholic political conspiracies; widespread rumors that the faithful were drilling nightly in church basements in preparation for an armed uprising.[48] More remarkable were the progressive sympathies and aspirations that often shone through the hatred. To be sure, Protestant nativism had long had a certain liberal flavor, in contrast to the conservative bias implicit in anti-radical nativism. Since the Enlightenment, Americans had tended to look upon the Pope as a reactionary despot, hostile to liberty and progress alike. One could always point to the Inquisition or the Syllabus of Errors, and more than once native reformers balked by the opposition of Irish immigrants had moved easily into an anti-Catholic crusade.[49]

The new religious xenophobia in the years after 1910, while building on the historic identification of popery with tyranny, went significantly further. It frequently displayed a subdued but unmistakably progressive response to social problems; its principal spokesmen hinted that the Pope stood in the way of all social improvement; and there is reason to suspect that much of the energy behind the movement came from a displacement or distortion of anti-monopolistic sentiment. Whereas, in the days of the American Protective Association, anti-Catholic agitators betrayed a horror of revolt as well as reaction, their counterparts in the 1910's railed largely at reaction. The former approach suggested dissatisfactions not yet disciplined by the hard immediacies of reform. The latter suggested an overflow of discontents which reform *had* canalized. It is hard to explain the rebirth of anti-Catholic ferment except as an outlet for expectations which progressivism raised and then failed to fulfill.

A frustrated southern radical, a man of the people who had battled for economic democracy since 1890, started the new crusade against Rome. Tom Watson led the hosts of Populism in the nineties and spurred Georgia progressives in the mid-1900's. His feverish campaigns brought little permanent benefit to the farmers he loved, and by 1910 his prestige was clearly waning, though he still commanded a devoted following through his personal organ, *Watson's Magazine*. Without abandoning entirely his old agitation against corporate privilege, Watson shifted to a primary attack on the Catholic peril. A trivial but much publicized incident apparently precipitated his change of course. The Pope cancelled a scheduled interview with the former vice-president of the United States, Charles W. Fairbanks, because Fairbanks had first visited a group of Methodist missionaries in Italy. A defense of the Pope's conduct in the Hearst press sent Watson into a rage. He decided to expose the Catholic plot against democracy, America and the home.[50] Soon the issue became a consuming passion with Watson, the immigrants entering indirectly as the agents of Rome.

"There is a foreign foe at our gates," he thundered, "and that

foe is confidently expecting the spies within to unlock the portals. Those domestic traitors are the voracious Trusts, the Roman Catholic priesthood . . . the Knights of Columbus. . . ." His propaganda followed the traditional anti-Catholic line so closely that it relied on tracts written eighty years before, but there were progressive undertones as well.[51]

Another wayward reformer established a much more successful nativist publication the year after Watson's conversion. In Aurora, Missouri, a small town in the Ozark highlands with a declining population, Wilbur Franklin Phelps founded in 1911 a national "patriotic" weekly called *The Menace*. Phelps, a country editor who had worked up from the printer's trade and who always prided himself on his progressive outlook, was already publishing the local Aurora newspaper. Soon *The Menace* completely overshadowed it. In a year circulation rose to 120,000, in two years to over five hundred thousand, in three years to a million. Along with the paper grew a large publishing plant which employed 135 people, did a rousing mail-order business printing anti-Catholic books, and arranged engagements for anti-Catholic lecturers.[52]

Nothing interested *The Menace* very much except a Roman one. It alleged, for example, that the Vatican was now ordering subversive Italian immigrants to the United States instead of Irish, having learned that the Irish became Americanized too quickly. The paper's most notorious sally was against the Knights of Columbus, who, according to an oath *The Menace* helped to publicize, pledged their fourth degree members to a war of extermination and mutilation against all heretics.[53] At the same time the paper wore a progressive air. It said that the Catholic Church was trying to obstruct all progressive legislation and was combining with big business to break the labor unions; it showed a vague, guarded sympathy with the Socialists; and it warned all reformers that no progressive development of democracy could succeed unless everyone united to preserve America's free institutions against the common foe.[54]

Phelps' paper shared with *Watson's Magazine* a second characteristic that defines the sources of the new religious nativism. Both were published in country towns with a population of four thousand or less. So also were a number of other nativistic sheets that sprang up in their wake. From 1912 through 1914 a score of less

successful imitators appeared, often in such unlikely communities as Mankato, Minnesota, Anderson, Indiana, Magnolia, Arkansas, or Moravian Falls, North Carolina. Nearly every important urban newspaper denounced the spirit these rustic journalists represented. Anti-Catholic nationalism found some city support, notably among Protestant railroad employees who had taken a prominent part in the A.P.A. and who still felt threatened by their Irish fellow workers. Nevertheless, the broad base—as the New York *Times* pointed out—now lay in rural areas.[55]

This inverted the structure of former anti-Catholic movements and marked a historic transition in the character of Protestant nativism. During the nineteenth century the tradition drew its main strength from the larger towns and cities where Catholics were actually settling.[56] Even in the 1890's, when the excitement invaded the midwestern countryside in a grotesquely jingoistic form, anti-Catholic xenophobia remained primarily an urban movement. But in the twentieth century it re-emerged most actively in rural America, where adherents of the hated faith were relatively few.

This shift tied in with a trend already under way in the late nineteenth century: the extrusion of religious nativism from the citadels of middle-class culture. Among educated urban groups, nationalism, like almost everything else, was gradually secularized. Penetrating down the social scale, the secular outlook softened religious frictions, turned aggressive impulses to other adversaries, and forced each successive wave of anti-Catholic hysteria farther from the centers of cultivated society. What had issued from Boston, New York, and Philadelphia in the 1840's radiated from the smaller cities of the Middle West in the 1880's and finally found its most valiant champions among the hicks and hillbillies.

They, at least, had never abandoned the old-time religion. In fact they were beginning in the years after 1910 to pass over to the offensive against the diluted doctrines and moral laxity of their urban brethren. The rise of a militant rural fundamentalism coincided with the upsurge of rural nativism. Perhaps the two came partly from a common need, aggressive fundamentalism ministering to the same unfulfilled urges that sent rural Protestants crusading against popery. At any rate the reassertion of the straight Gospel truth undoubtedly quickened the rural war on Rome. In large parts of the South, Catholics were so uncommon that nativists

found popular sentiment harder to rouse than in the Midwest, but in both areas the movement was definitely taking hold. In both, barnstorming evangelists lent an apocalyptic fury to the assault; and the devout could often be seen going to church with the Bible in one hand and *The Menace* in the other.[57]

At the same time this anti-Catholic propaganda often lacked genuine religious feeling.[58] A political and social emphasis connected much of it so directly with an unsatisfied progressivism that one wonders if a tendency to lose faith in the pattern of reform did not affect rural groups in some special way. The progressive movement did not belong to rural America, as the agrarian crusades of the late nineteenth century had. Farmers joined it readily enough and hoped for much from it, but city folk controlled it, and city folk could best appreciate the substantial victories it achieved. Big business was a long way off from many country people. Sometimes it was hard for them to tell whether the trusts or some grander power was really thwarting them.[59]

The significance of both anti-Catholic and anti-radical nativism in the late Progressive period lies in their origins, not in their achievements. Neither reached far enough to have an important impact at the time. The No-Popery tradition, though strong in propaganda outlets, suffered particularly from inadequate organization. As always, Protestant nativists needed the striking power of political secret societies. Several such groups cropped up: the Guardians of Liberty in 1911, and some time later the Covenanters (who covenanted to have no dealings with Catholics) and the Knights of Luther.[60] None, however, made much impression, perhaps partly because of ineffective leadership. The most important body, the Guardians of Liberty, was formed by several retired army and navy officers and up-state New York civic leaders of respectable antecedents. The former United States Chief of Staff, General Nelson A. Miles, became the Chief Guardian. The Guardians aimed primarily at defeating any political candidate "who owns superior temporal allegiance to any power above his obligation to . . . the United States." Initially their principles also included opposition to corporate monopolies. But the Guardians insisted on agitating in a genteel way, and at least until 1914 they remained a negligible influence.[61]

1914: Summit of Prewar Nativism

By this time, corrosion of the confidence in unity and homogeneity that America had regained at the turn of the century was well advanced. All of the anti-foreign and anti-Catholic traditions, though they remained largely separate from one another, were gaining momentum, and each was firmly grounded on international or internal problems which a generation of progressives had failed to solve. In 1914 nativism displayed symptoms of hysteria and violence that had been rare or nonexistent since the 1890's. The war then beginning in Europe played no part in these anxieties; they reflected domestic conditions. As if to complete the pattern of peacetime xenophobia, the economy slid from a recession in 1913 into a depression the next year. Not a major depression, perhaps, but a strain on prices and employment sufficient to embitter existing animosities.

Most obviously the depression preyed on the nativistic susceptibilities of workingmen, who now coveted the inferior jobs the immigrants held. "I see employment furnished to foreigners every day at good pay where Americans are not wanted," wrote a down-and-out descendant of colonial stock. "I have reached the limit, I have been out of work until I can stand it no longer." [62] In Arizona the State Federation of Labor, supported by the miners, secured as an initiative measure a law requiring all employers of more than five workers to recruit at least 80 per cent of their labor force from American citizens. As a general and drastic restriction on the employment of foreigners in private industry, the law was unprecedented, and the United States Supreme Court soon declared it in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand, the Supreme Court was adjusting itself to milder discriminatory statutes. In the 1890's it had invoked the Fourteenth Amendment against laws excluding aliens from employment on public works. But now the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute of that nature when the Bricklayers' Union demanded its enforcement against unnaturalized Italians engaged in building the New York subways. In effect the Justices endorsed the discharge of the Italians, in conformity with the law, on the ground that the state in selecting its employees should have the same freedom that private

employers enjoy—the freedom to discriminate against any group.[63]

While private and public discrimination against immigrant workmen increased, the anti-Catholic movement also pushed ahead during the hard times of 1914 and early 1915. The circulation of *The Menace* grew by leaps and bounds, reaching a high point of 1,507,923 in April 1915. In addition to the stimulus of economic tensions, the paper benefited considerably from Catholic efforts to suppress it by securing its exclusion from the mails.[64] Meanwhile anti-Catholic proposals were coming under discussion in several state legislatures. Arkansas and Missouri, for example, considered an official inspection of sectarian hospitals and convents; Texas meditated public supervision of parochial schools.[65]

Furthermore, for the first time since 1894, religious xenophobia became a substantial factor in the 1914 elections in some areas, notably in the New York gubernatorial campaign. In that state William Sulzer, a flashy, insincere progressive who had been removed as Democratic Governor the year before on proof of corruption, was seeking popular vindication. The Democratic candidate was Martin Glynn, a Catholic supported by the Tammany forces that had engineered Sulzer's impeachment. After Sulzer failed narrowly in an attempt to seize control of the collapsing Progressive party, he organized his own, the American party, claimed that the Tammany bosses had framed him, and exploited all of the anti-Catholic commonplaces as openly as he dared. The Guardians of Liberty, now a formidable force in up-state areas, turned their back on the tarnished ex-Governor and endorsed the Republican candidate as the surest way to defeat Glynn. Despite this division in the anti-Catholic vote, Sulzer showed remarkable strength in several up-state counties. Some staunchly Republican rural districts capitulated to him almost en masse.[66]

Elsewhere the year of depression brought back another phenomenon of the nineties. Flashes of lawless fury seared relations between old and new Americans. In the mining country of southern Illinois, long a dark and bloody ground which was now acquiring a very large foreign population, a street brawl resulted in the death of one Italian and two native Americans. The only survivor, an Italian, was promptly lynched under circumstances which suggested collusion on the part of the local mayor. A few months later, in another mining town, a mob wrenched an Italian from

jail and hanged him; he had been arrested on the faintest suspicion of complicity in an attempt to assassinate a mine superintendent.[67] The most dramatic incident occurred in Georgia, where economic resentment, frustrated progressivism, and race consciousness combined to produce a classic case of lynch law. The victim this time was not a poor Italian worker but a well-to-do Jewish employer.

Leo Frank, the son of a wealthy New York merchant, managed an Atlanta pencil factory which employed female labor at low wages. When one of the factory girls, Mary Phagan, was found murdered on the premises, unsubstantiated rumors of sexual perversion helped to fix suspicion on Frank. Most aroused were the working classes, who saw in Frank a symbol of the northern capitalist exploiting southern womanhood. Although he was convicted in frantic haste, the carpenter, the blacksmith, the millhand, and the motorman kept saying, "He will never hang. He's rich and Mary Phagan has no friends." According to later reports, overt anti-Semitic sentiment played little part at this initial stage.[68]

All through 1914, evidence of the flimsiness of the case against Frank accumulated. Wealthy northern Jews financed a determined legal battle for a new trial. Leading Georgia newspapers and prominent Atlanta clergymen supported the appeal for justice. This shift in cultivated opinion, together with mounting "outside interference," only inflamed the masses.[69] Hatred of organized wealth reaching into Georgia from outside became a hatred of Jewish wealth. From one end of the state to the other the story went: "The Jews have said that no Jew has ever been hanged and that none ever will be." Tom Watson threw himself into the fray, with enormous effect. The hostility to corporate privilege which he was already shunting toward the Pope had found a closer, more popular target in Leo Frank, and by the end of the year, Watson's tirades against the attempt of "Big Money" to invade and subvert the Georgia courts were growing increasingly anti-Semitic.[70]

Finally all the fears of the populace seemed confirmed; the victim was almost literally snatched from the scaffold when the Governor at the last minute commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. Most of the urban press in Georgia praised or defended the Governor's action; the bulk of the population plunged into hysteria. Boycotts of Jewish merchants began; throughout the state nightly mass meetings howled for retribution; at the murdered

girl's grave the Knights of Mary Phagan pledged themselves never to rest until the crime was avenged; and Tom Watson now saw the hand of a world-wide "Invisible Power." [71]

The dénouement was practically inevitable. A band of citizens from Mary Phagan's home town took Leo Frank from the state prison, carried him 175 miles across the state, and butchered him almost in their own back yards. This ended the affair but not its consequences. In the last stages of the Frank Case, anti-Semitism regained the fiercely nationalistic twist it had acquired briefly in the nineties; and it assumed also an explicitly racial tone. About the time of the lynching Tom Watson marked this ideological advance:

> It is a peculiar and portentious [*sic*] thing, that one race of men —*and one, only*,—should be able to convulse the world, by a system of newspaper *agitation and suppression*, when a member of that race is convicted of a capital crime against another race. . . . From all over the world, the Children of Israel are flocking to this country, and plans are on foot to move them from Europe *en masse* . . . to empty upon our shores the very scum and dregs of the *Parasite Race*.[72]

Something bigger than a local episode was in the air, something nourished by all the forces of racial nationalism, distorted progressivism, and economic decline. Before the Frank Case attracted nation-wide attention, a leaflet circulated in the streets of San Francisco. "Mr. White American," it warned, "if you have any race pride or patriotism, you will organize for the protection of your race." [73] San Franciscans had read words like that directed against the Orientals for a long time. But this leaflet was against the Negroes—and the Jews.

The Failure of Restriction

Like every other manifestation of nativism, the immigration restriction movement gathered strength year by year through the late Progressive period. Its points of special intensity rested where they had in 1905-1907: the South, the Far West, the native-born working class, and the patrician intellectuals. It also received general support in public opinion, and whenever restriction came to a

vote in Congress it rolled up overwhelming majorities. The most remarkable aspect of the movement was its repeated failure; it accomplished nothing. Each Congress confronted a flurry of immigration bills. Not one of them of any consequence became law for a decade after the essentially anti-restrictionist measure of 1907. There are few better examples of the toughness and conservatism of American institutions than this steady persistence of a traditional immigration policy in the face of widespread demands for change.

In this case, as in many others, the status quo survived blow after blow for two related reasons. Despite the militancy of certain groups, the immigration issue was not yet deeply felt throughout the country as a whole. Restriction sentiment, though general, was not generally intense; a substantial part of the American population seemed to regard the question as one of secondary importance. And in the absence of an imperious, nation-wide clamor, strategically situated minorities could prevent either of the major political parties from committing itself resolutely on the issue. The minorities that blocked restriction had the additional advantage of appealing to traditional American ideals.

Big business constituted one of those minorities; through the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Iron and Steel Institute, and leading chambers of commerce it spoke out against disturbing the country's open gates.[74] Far more active and vocal, however, were the immigrants. The southern and eastern European opposition to restriction, partially demonstrated in 1906, swelled into a mighty, insistent chorus in the next few years. The federal immigration investigation authorized in the 1907 law gave the immigrant leaders the breathing spell they hoped for, and by the time another Congressional showdown arrived, the chaotic masses of the slums and tenements formed a pressure group of formidable size.

No single organization played a dominating role, though the National Liberal Immigration League tried to direct strategy. From its New York offices, it developed a network of connections with big city representatives in Congress. It was able, for example, to reward Congressman James M. Curley by sending volunteer workers from various cities to Boston to help in an election. Also the league laid down a barrage of propaganda designed to appeal to

conservative American opinion, opposing restriction on the ground of manpower needs while favoring stricter deportation and naturalization regulations. It clearly sought rapport with like-minded business groups and received some of its financial support from the Susquehanna Coal Company, the Hamburg-Amerika Line, and the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique.[75]

A very important factor in inciting and sustaining the immigrants' interest in the anti-restriction campaign was the foreign-language press, which teemed with lurid accounts of injustices under present legislation and the danger of worse. Although little of this journalistic ferment went beyond its immediate audience, the immigrant press had one strong voice in high councils in the American Association of Foreign Language Newspapers. This agency of Louis Hammerling's, mingling business with politics, kept its member papers loyal to the Republican party in return for corporate advertising; and at least it tried to keep the Republican leaders loyal to the immigrants. It served other interests better than the foreigner's, but it gave immigrant editors a voice in party councils, reminding the administration of the support it received from 508 newspapers with a vital stake in a generous immigration policy.[76]

The principal vehicles of immigrant pressure were the national societies—numberless organizations of every size and description ranging from the great German-American Alliance to a tiny Lithuanian club on the South Side of Chicago. Delegates from a score of Polish benevolent societies, from Italian federations, and from Jewish associations trooped before Congressional committees, sometimes stumbling over their English, sometimes speaking with the commanding eloquence of Louis Marshall, head of the American Jewish Committee. In the large cities the societies combined to organize mass meetings; everywhere they circulated petitions.[77] In addition, some immigrant opinion also reached a larger public through the great immigrant church, for Roman Catholic leaders at various times expressed an unofficial opposition to restriction.[78]

While the immigrants mobilized their forces and the United States Immigration Commission ground through its vast investigation, the nativists fumed impatiently. At first they used the legislative lull to try to secure more drastic administration of existing statutes. The Immigration Restriction League directed its fire at

Oscar Straus, Roosevelt's Secretary of Commerce and Labor, who frequently exercised his authority to overrule harsh decisions which the Commissioner of Immigration, a former labor leader, made in the cases of individual immigrants. But with Roosevelt's support, Straus continued to administer the law with humanity. His successor in the Taft administration, Secretary Charles Nagel, was another second-generation immigrant who followed a similar course.[79] Meanwhile, the A.F.L. was sniping futilely at the Bureau of Immigration because of its new Division of Information, established under the law of 1907. The division functioned in a very small way as an employment agency for newly arrived immigrants; the A.F.L. charged it with strikebreaking. Finally the restrictionists tried to cut off the appropriation for the Immigration Commission in order to force out its report more quickly; and again they failed.[80]

At last, in 1911, the commission issued its report in forty-two volumes. Its recommendations were largely technical, but it took a moderately restrictionist position. The commission endorsed the old device of a literacy test; it favored on economic grounds a reduction in the supply of unskilled immigrant labor; and it cast its mountainous social and economic data in the form of an invidious contrast between the northwestern and southeastern Europeans in the United States at that time. Instantly, the struggle reopened in Congress, with anti-restrictionists still pursing Fabian tactics. For a year they kept the commission's recommendations bottled up in committees. Restrictionists finally got a general bill out of the Senate committee in 1912 and attached the literacy test to it on the floor. In the House, however, the Democratic leadership proved as recalcitrant as Speaker Cannon had been in 1906. A presidential election was imminent; this was no time to antagonize the foreign vote. Southern Democrats raged at their party for cowering before foreign flags, but the Rules Committee refused to release an immigration bill before November.[81]

Never have the political parties made greater efforts to curry favor among the immigrants than in the election of 1912. Each party, the Republican, the Democratic, and the Progressive, established adjunct organizations to work among the foreign-born during the campaign. Taft scarcely campaigned at all, but at least he tried to hold the immigrants. In the last days of the campaign he spoke in honeyed words about their influence on America, and

the chairman of the Republican National Committee promised that Taft would veto the literacy test if re-elected. Hammerling faithfully supplied pro-Taft editorials to the foreign-language papers under his domination. He admitted disbursing more than $100,000 of Republican campaign funds and was said in some cases to have paid editors not to print advertisements for other candidates.[82]

On the Democratic side Woodrow Wilson labored throughout the campaign under the embarrassing handicap of having to repudiate over and over again the contemptuous phrases he had written about southern and eastern European immigrants in his *History of the American People* a decade before. Flaunted by his enemies, those sentences evoked indignant protests from immigrant societies. Wilson countered by lavishing admiration on the Poles, the Italians, and others. In a letter to an Italian-American which the Democratic National Committee distributed by the hundreds of thousands, Wilson declared: "America has always been proud to open her gates to everyone who loved liberty and sought opportunity, and she will never seek another course under the guidance of the Democratic Party." [83]

Theodore Roosevelt's new Progressive party adopted the most positive approach, due to the influence of social workers. Calling itself "the Party of Social Justice," the Progressive party welcomed social workers and incorporated bodily into its platform a sweeping program for social security worked out by a committee of the National Conference of Charities. The program included pledges to protect the immigrant from exploitation and to promote his assimilation and education. Frances Kellor, who was already pioneering in exactly this area, became a national committeewoman of the Progressive party and probably did more than anyone else to direct Roosevelt's growing reformist zeal toward the special plight of the urban immigrant.[84] The Junior Order United American Mechanics denounced the Progressive party for those promises to the foreign-born, but Roosevelt captured the imagination and the loyalty of a large proportion of southern and eastern European voters. In three out of the four New York City districts that gave Roosevelt a plurality, Slavs and Russian Jews constituted the great majority of the electorate.[85]

After this interparty demonstration of affection for the immigrants, Congress returned to the business at hand. Both houses hastily completed action on a general immigration bill recodifying all previous legislation and limiting admission to those able to read some language, the immediate family of a qualified immigrant being excepted. The measure came before President Taft in the closing weeks of his term of office. Taft was genuinely divided in his own mind on the issue. Since he had a business sense of the immigrants' economic contribution and considerable confidence in America's powers of assimilation, he was inclined to veto; but until the last minute no one knew what he would do.[86] In the end Taft vetoed and submitted to Congress the unfavorable recommendations of his Secretary of Commerce and Labor, Charles Nagel, as his reasons for doing so. Nagel was a prominent corporation lawyer with deep roots in the German community of St. Louis. To him illiteracy meant a lack of opportunity, not of ability; America needed the labor and could supply the literacy.[87] The Senate overrode the veto, but the House failed to do so by a margin of five votes. The voting followed the characteristic line-up that had emerged out of twentieth century nativism: the South and Far West almost unanimous for restriction, the urban areas of the North strongly against it, and considerable opposition lingering in the old immigrant districts of the Midwest.[88]

Woodrow Wilson, the new President, brought to Washington a bold program of economic reform that filled the rest of the year. The restrictionists had to wait for the next session of Congress. Early in 1914 their turn came. Southern Democrats now headed the immigration committees of both houses, and concern over rising unemployment was adding to all of the other nativist pressures. In the House of Representatives, the bill which Taft vetoed was revived, strengthened by broader provisions for the exclusion and deportation of revolutionists, embellished with the eugenic category of "psychopathic constitutional inferiority," and rushed to passage.[89] The Senate was prepared to follow suit when it began to wonder about Wilson. No one really knew his attitude on the question, but Jewish leaders were calling at the White House, and Wilson's Catholic secretary, Joe Tumulty, was said to exercise a baneful influence over him.[90] "Cotton Ed" Smith, chairman of the Senate Committee, confronted the President before proceeding further and discovered a reluctant opponent. Wilson tried to deflect Smith from restriction to a plan for distributing immigrants to

rural areas—something that a rural nativist could only regard with horror.

To another southern Senator, Wilson later justified his own position on the literacy test in unusually frank terms: "I find myself in a very embarrassing situation about that bill. . . . I myself personally made the most explicit statements at the time of the Presidential election about this subject to groups of our fellow-citizens of foreign extraction whom I wished to treat with perfect frankness and for whom I had entire respect. In view of what I said to them I do not see how it will be possible for me to give my assent to this bill. I know you will appreciate the scruple upon which I act." [91]

Wilson in those days dominated his party to an unusual degree; Smith hesitated to defy him. Nevertheless, the Senate Immigration Committee decided after a month of doubt to press for action. Wilson's whole manner on the issue was constrained. Perhaps he might adopt a hands-off policy in the end. The matter dragged on through the spring and early summer. By then the Democratic leaders in the Senate were cocking their eyes toward another election. Despite a threat of a southern filibuster, they refused to allow time for debate until December.[92] So the literacy test waited again until the immigrants had cast their votes. Then the Senate passed the bill easily, and it went to the White House in January 1915.

Wilson proved inflexible. Apart from motives of political expediency, he had undoubtedly sloughed off his earlier fears of the immigrant as he responded to progressivism, and he was especially struck by the failure of the bill to exempt from the literacy test refugees from political persecution. (Congress had resisted strong pressure for such an exemption exerted in the interest of Russian Jews by the American Jewish Committee and the Friends of Russian Freedom.) [93] This failure gave Wilson an opportunity to stand on the high ground of traditional American idealism. His veto message rested four-square on an eighteenth century doctrine which immigrant spokesmen had kept alive: the idea of America's cosmopolitan mission to provide a home for the oppressed. The proposed legislation, Wilson declared, "seeks to all but close entirely the gates of asylum which have always been open to those who could find nowhere else the right and opportunity of constitutional agitation for what they conceived to be the natural and inalienable rights of men. . . ." [94]

For the third time in American history the literacy test received a Presidential veto, and for the third time its supporters tried to override executive disapproval. But Wilson apparently did more than disapprove. According to current reports, he brought the administration's patronage powers to bear to pick off Congressmen sympathetic to the literacy test. On February 4, 1915, the House of Representatives failed by four votes to pass the bill over the President's veto.[95] The dikes of interest and tradition still stood against the flowing nativist tide.

On the same day Imperial Germany announced a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in all the waters surrounding the British Isles.

Chapter Eight

War and Revolution

> We are 100 per cent American in the State of Wyoming, and we are going to remain 100 per cent American.
> —Governor Frank Houx, 1918

The deadly convulsion in Western civilization that began in 1914 did not significantly impinge on American intellectual history until the following year. At first Europe seemed a long way off. Americans felt safely sheltered from the upheaval not only by a broad expanse of ocean but also by their own virtually unanimous determination to stay at peace. An overwhelming majority of native Americans sympathized with Britain through ties of geography and history, and the militarism evident in Germany affronted the prevailing pacifist mood itself; but few leaders of American opinion supposed that any latent preference for one side or the other would really compromise a neutral stance.

For all of its devotion to peace, the United States was psychologically prepared to react to an international challenge with nationalistic fervor. The Progressive era had built up a crusading spirit, a sense of dedication to high ideals. It had drawn powerfully on a modernized evangelical impulse, investing a secular crusade with religious significance, making the struggle against bosses and monopolists a way of battling for the Lord. By 1915 the reform leaders had nearly exhausted their capacity for constructive domestic achievement. Wilson's program was very largely on the statute books, and the Congressional elections of 1914—fought wholly on domestic issues—had set back reformers generally. On the other hand, the moral energy of the age, its appetite for splendid tri-

umphs over the forces of evil, was far from appeased. While progressivism was losing coherence as a practical program, its messianic zeal remained unquenched. This yearning idealism took a new lease on life when the specter of German militarism arose. Freed from the lagging drive for internal reform, the progressive spirit expanded into a global crusade.[1] This exalted sense of righteousness beat upon America throughout the war years, giving an almost religious significance to the struggle for victory abroad and unity at home.

In another way too there was continuity between a waning progressivism and the developing war spirit. We have already observed a slackening of confidence, an accumulation of tensions, as the progressive movement reached its crest in the immediate prewar years. Men were groping again for national unity, alarmed at unhealed or widening rifts of class, of race, of ideology. Perhaps a vigorous assertion of American rights functioned in some measure to submerge the drift and clash of purpose in domestic affairs. Undoubtedly the growing nativism of 1910 to 1914 formed a backlog of sentiment for and a bridge of transition into the greater nationalism of the war period.

Hyphens and Preparedness

If these and other impulses from an earlier day deeply colored the American response to the international crisis, the fact still remains that a new era was at hand; for the issues of 1915 inaugurated a tremendous alteration both in the course of American history and in the character of American nativism. While modern wars have generally imparted a fresh vigor to the tide of nationalism, they have often calmed the waves of nativism borne along within that tide. Certainly the wars that America fought in the nineteenth century had (whatever their other effects) diverted nationalism temporarily from nativist channels. The struggle with Germany, however, called forth the most strenuous nationalism *and* the most pervasive nativism that the United States had ever known.

The World War caused the first big international conflict between America and a country which had been sending to it a large and cohesive immigrant population. Despite the volume of

new immigration, Germans still comprised the largest single nationality among the foreign-born. They numbered more than 2.3 millions,[2] and behind the first-generation immigrants stood countless others with attachments to the culture from which their fathers and forefathers came. What had occurred in a limited and partial form during the Italian war scare of 1891 and the friction with Japan after 1905 now erupted on a colossal scale and with classic purity. The Germans fell subject, not to any of the specific nativist traditions, but rather to the plain and simple accusation in which every type of xenophobia culminated: the charge of disloyalty, the gravest sin in the morality of nationalism.

The fury that broke upon the German-Americans in 1915 represented the most spectacular reversal of judgment in the history of American nativism. During the post-Civil War age of confidence the initial distaste for German customs had rapidly worn away. Public opinion had come to accept the Germans as one of the most assimilable and reputable of immigrant groups. Repeatedly, older Americans praised them as law-abiding, speedily assimilated, and strongly patriotic. In 1903 a Boston sociologist pronounced the Germans the best ethnic type in the city. In 1908 a group of professional people, in rating the traits of various immigrant nationalities, ranked the Germans above the English and in some respects judged them superior to the native whites.[3] These opinions rested on substantial foundations of social and economic prestige. By and large the Germans had risen out of the working class. They were businessmen, farmers, clerks, and in a few cases highly skilled workmen. Among workers in the major industries, a German was more likely to own his own home than was a native white.[4]

The friendliness they were used to meeting contributed to the Germans' undoing. Adversity had not disciplined the German-American leaders to meekness or restraint. Accustomed to acceptance and respect, they pressed for what they wanted confidently, even belligerently. Were they not, through the mighty German-American Alliance, the best organized foreign-language group in the country? Thus, when the European holocaust called forth their strong sympathies for the Fatherland, they rallied loudly and openly to influence American foreign policy. In the winter of 1914-15, as munitions shipments flowed out in ever larger quantities to the Allies, German-Americans launched a massive campaign for an embargo on the export of war supplies.[5] An embargo would have offset Britain's natural advantage over Germany in securing supplies from the United States. Although the German-Americans described their proposal as the only genuinely neutral course, Americans interpreted the agitation as an attempt to undermine the nation's cherished neutrality in the interest of a foreign power. They responded to the embargo movement with the first passionate outburst of anti-German hysteria. On January 30, 1915, just a few days before the German government declared submarine warfare on Great Britain, representatives of every large German-American organization met in Washington in a show of strength that sent a shiver through public opinion. The New York *Times* editorialized: "Never since the foundation of the Republic has any body of men assembled here who were more completely subservient to foreign influence and a foreign power and none ever proclaimed the un-American spirit more openly."[6]

The recoil from organized German-Americanism had hardly begun when policies of the German government made matters far worse. Within the week following the embargo conference, the first instances of sabotage executed by agents operating from the German embassy in Washington came to light. Bungling attempts to smuggle bombs onto American ships or to wreck American factories occurred fairly regularly during the following months. Each cast a darker shadow across the whole German community in the United States. At the same time the Reich embarked on a submarine campaign which soon spilled American blood. Through popular thinking there spread an image of the German-American community riddled with treason and conspiring under orders from Berlin. As early as February wild rumors told of German-American intentions to invade Canada. By August there was common talk that German-Americans were rejoicing over the death of American citizens on torpedoed ships; and whispers told of a mysterious multiplication of German street bands spreading propaganda by playing "The Watch on the Rhine." Before long public opinion transformed the German-American Alliance into a vast engine of the German government.[7]

The more a web of international conflict entangled the Americans, the fiercer grew their insistence on national solidarity and

the more certain their feeling that the country was dangerously divided. Instead of unifying America, the issues of foreign policy and internal security in 1915 and 1916 created a sense of deeper disunities. Since the agitation against German-Americans arose from this free-floating nationalistic anxiety, not from dislike of specifically German cultural traits, it tended to assume a vague, generalized form. From the very beginning, the phraseology of the attack was directed less at Germans as such than at an entirely disembodied category: the "hyphenated American," i.e., the immigrant of divided loyalty. The *Literary Digest* asserted in October 1915 that the hyphenate issue was the most vital one of the day.[8]

The two most distinguished men in public life lent their influence to the anti-hyphenate campaign. Theodore Roosevelt bestrode the movement; Woodrow Wilson surrendered to it; and together they illustrated the change that the progressive impulse was undergoing. Roosevelt stood out as the standard-bearer and personification of "unhyphenated Americanism." Through all the turns of his protean career the Rough Rider had followed the fixed star of militant nationalism. Though he emphasized various functions and ends of state power at different times, he was always happiest when invoking its authority and glory. Long before, as a jingo and an ardent immigration restrictionist in the 1890's, Roosevelt had upbraided immigrants who failed to break loose from every Old World tie. Then, during the years of reform, the democratic and humanitarian strains in his character (encouraged by political expediency) brought him into sympathy with those who wanted to use the state in behalf of hyphenated minorities; in 1912 he championed a "New Nationalism" that would bind the foreign-born closer to the rest of America by a broad federal welfare program. But with the scent of battle in his nostrils in 1915, he swung back to his earlier view of the hyphen as a menace rather than a challenge.

Now he denounced every kind of divided loyalty as "moral treason." He insisted on one maxim for all Americans, regardless of birth or ancestry, "and that is the simple and loyal motto, AMERICA FOR AMERICANS." Roosevelt regularly cautioned the public that his attacks concerned only the "German-Americans who call themselves such" or the "professional German-Americans," not "the Americans of German origin," and he believed

that his fairness toward unhyphenated people who happened to have German names or lineages justified the harshness of his assault on "those who spiritually remain foreigners in whole or in part." [9] Doubtless his audiences felt that the distinction clothed their hatreds with righteousness too.

By the time of the election of 1916, Wilson had also picked up the loyalty issue and was assailing the hyphenates. Unlike Roosevelt, Wilson did not mention any national group by name, and he always asserted that the disloyal people formed but a small minority of the foreign-born population. Nevertheless, he and his party exploited the hyphenate theme much more effectively than did the Republicans, who hoped to profit from the Germans' animosity toward the President. While the Republican candidate Charles Evans Hughes tried uneasily to temper the anti-German speeches that Roosevelt was making in his behalf, Wilson executed one of the master strokes of the campaign by defiantly repudiating the "hyphenate vote" in a stinging letter to an Irish agitator.[10]

The whole excitement over undivided loyalty developed hand in hand with another nationalist movement stemming from the European war. Preparedness, the term that described the campaign for national defense in 1915 and 1916, constituted an appeal for strength analogous to the anti-hyphenate demand for unity. The two causes, each full of alarm at the weakness of the republic, naturally supplemented one another. The preparedness movement tended, in fact, to aggravate anti-German nativism, partly because its emotional tone suggested vague dangers of foreign aggression, partly perhaps because it was easier to play up an internal menace than to show how European armed forces could threaten the United States. Psychologically the hyphen could serve as surrogate for enemy fleets or armies.

Certainly it was not accidental that the first Congressional advocates of preparedness were Augustus P. Gardner and Henry Cabot Lodge, the most fervent immigration restrictionists in politics in the Northeast, nor was it happenstance that the principal preparedness societies, the National Security League and the American Defense Society, evolved into leading instruments of wartime nativism.[11] Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt's thunderous campaign for military preparedness paralleled his trumpeting against the hyphenates, while President Wilson said little about hyphens

until he gave up his opposition to armaments. Until the fall of 1915, Wilson resisted pressure for substantial increases in the country's armed forces. Then, in coming out for preparedness, he expressed a temperate alarm at voices speaking with "alien sympathies." In December, when the President began to appeal vigorously for defense appropriations, he struck out harshly at those immigrants "who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life . . . America never witnessed anything like this before. . . . Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out." [12]

Unlike the attack on hyphens, the crusade to arm America had to overcome bitter opposition from native groups, but this friction at an hour of seeming national peril only heightened the military enthusiasts' fear of disunity. The tremendous preparedness parade on New York's Fifth Avenue in 1916 moved beneath a great electric sign that summarized the essential principle growing out of the whole international crisis: "Absolute and Unqualified Loyalty to Our Country." [13] The monolithic adjectives of that flashing sign summoned Americans toward a concept of national unity surpassing any they had known.

Greatly as the temper of American nationalism changed during those years of painful neutrality, the alterations were far from complete. The inflation of loyalty was just beginning, and the anti-German, anti-hyphenate movement—for all of its sound and fury—was still a matter of talk; it did not yet involve concrete proscriptions and reprisals. The period from the beginning of 1915 until America's entry into the war stands as a transitional one, in which a good deal of anti-foreign sentiment continued to function within the older, prewar patterns.

Although preoccupation with the German issue tended to push all other nativisms more or less into the background, the new situation affected the older traditions in different degrees. Anti-Catholicism sustained the greatest setback. In one of those sudden collapses that have marked its history the anti-Catholic movement shrank like a pricked balloon in 1915. The circulation of *The Menace* reached a high point of 1,507,923 in April and thereafter fell steadily and swiftly. It lost a million subscribers in little over a year and soon was reduced to futility. Meanwhile most of its journalistic competitors either ceased publication or changed policy. The

Guardians of Liberty disappeared from sight. A Knights of Columbus Commission on Religious Prejudices, established in 1914, disbanded in 1917 in a joyful mood.[14] The decline must have resulted partly from the economic upswing of 1915—from the prosperous returns on a flood of Allied purchases. But undoubtedly the breakup of Protestant xenophobia also reflected a shift of attention from the Pope to the more substantial and exciting menace of the Kaiser. Instead of invigorating anti-Catholicism, anti-Germanism stole its thunder. The two movements, so similar in their imagery of disloyal fifth columns acting under orders of a foreign "despot," had competitive appeals; for the papacy could not very readily be equated with Prussianized Germany.

Racial nationalism during those transitional years proved more resistant to the shift in public interest, though it too lost ground at a time of conflict between the American people and their Teutonic racial cousins. Many of the patrician intelligentsia of the East remained faithful to the Anglo-Saxon tradition, which at least ministered to their strong pro-British sympathies. Among them, the scientific race-thinkers pursued their inquiries uninterruptedly. Eugenicists followed with intense interest the studies that Aleš Hrdlička, an eminent anthropologist, began in 1914 to determine, by cranial-measurements, if a race of Old Americans really existed. Madison Grant's book appeared in 1916 with only a casual reference to the war as another deplorable example of an old suicidal blood rage among the Nordics. It is noteworthy, however, that the book received rather little notice at the time.[15]

Meanwhile other racial nativists were tempering their ideas to the exigencies of the new international crisis, the chief problem being to eliminate any Germanic flavor from the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Some of the most ardent Anglophiles, assuming that the Anglo-Saxons alone constituted the truly American element, viewed the hyphenate vote as a threat to Anglo-American racial ties and thus to the source of American liberty.[16] This new distinction between hyphenated Teutons and unhyphenated Anglo-Saxons meant, of course, ignoring the latter's supposedly Teutonic origins. The Anglo-Saxonists, in effect, had to secede from the larger Teutonic race—a maneuver which they executed with dispatch. The psychologist G. Stanley Hall, for example, trained in German universities and long an apostle of Teutonism, now de-

cided that "there was something fundamentally wrong with the Teutonic soul," and thereafter lavished his admiration on Anglo-Saxons alone.[17] After 1915 little more was heard in the United States about the origins of liberty in the forests of Germany.

The third proscriptive tradition, anti-radical nativism, had not reached by 1914 an intensity at all comparable to that of the other two. Apparently it had only minor importance during the next two years. Nonetheless, a radical spirit interfered in general with the solidarity that nationalists were increasingly demanding, and left-wing groups formed an important part of the opposition to preparedness. That fear of foreign radicals was far from dead was plainly evident in the immigration law passed in February 1917. This omnibus measure contained very broad anti-radical provisions evolved before the outbreak of the European war under urging from Albert Johnson and other foes of the I.W.W. The anarchist clause of 1903 was expanded in two ways: first, to exclude from the United States not only individual advocates of violent revolution but also those who advocated sabotage or belonged to revolutionary organizations; second, to deport any alien who at any time after entry was found preaching such doctrines. Thus organizational membership ("guilt by association") became a test of exclusion, and, in contrast to the original three-year time limit on deportation, an alien revolutionist might be sent back to his homeland even for beliefs acquired after long residence in America.[18]

The whole law provides the best illustration of how older xenophobias persisted into the neutrality period, interacting with the new anxiety over hyphenated loyalties. The 1917 statute was essentially the immigration restriction bill that Wilson had blocked in February 1915; the subsequent German crisis supplied the impetus for reviving and enacting a measure grounded in prewar problems. By the time the law was finally passed, it served no immediately restrictive purpose; the European war had already reduced emigration far more drastically than any legislator could hope to do. Proponents of a literacy test, however, warned that once the war ended a real deluge would begin.[19] Also they made much of the hyphenate issue. In their arguments all of the customary complaints against southern and eastern European immigration mingled somewhat incongruously with the fresh excitement over divided loyalties. Some observers noted that the nationalities which

the literacy test was designed to penalize were showing, in contrast to the shocking behavior of German-Americans, "almost incomprehensible" restraint. Nonetheless, the German example suggested that one could never tell when a foreigner might betray the country to an enemy. To the Chicago *Tribune* the problems created by the war in Europe demonstrated the need for a more "intense and inspiring nationality" and made immigration restriction a phase of national defense.[20]

Before the measure became law, the old lure of the immigrant vote in a national election once more forced a delay. The Democrats, who posed in 1916 as the party of pure Americanism, warily took foreign influence into account at the very time their platform was denouncing it. Democratic publicists might accuse the Republican Presidential nominee of truckling to the foreign vote, but a Democratic Senatorial caucus meanwhile agreed not to take up the immigration bill until after the election. A group of southern Democrats revolted against the caucus decision but were brought to heel.[21]

As soon as Wilson was safely re-elected, the Senate passed the bill with only seven negative votes. Wilson, still keeping faith with the immigrants, vetoed it for a second time. Most big city newspapers endorsed the President's action, as did the United States Chamber of Commerce; but anti-hyphenism gave the restrictionists the extra margin they needed to override the veto. In the final tally the bill met virtually no opposition outside of industrial centers.[22] After a quarter of a century of agitation and more than a score of favorable votes in Congress on literacy bills, a provision excluding from the United States adult immigrants unable to read a simple passage in some language was enacted on February 5, 1917. There were two important exceptions. An admissible alien might bring in members of his immediate family despite their illiteracy, and in the interest of Russian Jews the same exemption applied to all aliens who could prove they were fleeing from religious persecution. Significantly, refugees from political persecution received no such exemption.

The law was a comprehensive one, based originally on recommendations of the United States Immigration Commission, which had been revived and expanded in each Congress since 1911. It codified existing legislation, added to the excluded classes "per-

sons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority," "vagrants," and chronic alcoholics, and raised the head tax from $4 to $8. Along with the new prohibitions on alien radicals, the statute also established an Asiatic "barred zone" which served to exclude Hindu and East Indian labor. For reasons of diplomacy the Wilson administration managed to ward off a similar ban on Japanese, thus retaining the Gentlemen's Agreement which Roosevelt made with Japan in 1907.[23]

With this act, the question of immigration restriction rested for a time. The leaders of the Immigration Restriction League, at a quiet victory dinner in Boston's Union Club, began at once to plan additional barriers,[24] but America's entry into the World War was imminent, and Congress would take no further interest in the question until after the war. Already most nativistic anxieties centered on the lingering alien rather than the entering immigrant. Once war came, the immigrant qua immigrant disappeared from view, while fear of the alien absorbed the whole of American nativism and grew a hundredfold.

100 Per Cent Americanism

When President Wilson delivered his somber war message to Congress in April 1917, almost every member of the excited audience before him was waving or wearing an American flag.[25] The sight was impressive—and symbolic. The declaration of war ushered in a new ideology, rooted in the transitional years of 1915 and 1916 but now grown full scale. Though first visible through the preparedness and hyphenate movements, the change was not confined to any specific aspect of American nationalism. It amounted to nothing less than an alteration in the whole texture of nationalist thought. This pervasive shift came on the wings of a freshly minted phrase. By converting the negative term "unhyphenated Americanism" into a positive and prescriptive one, writers and orators of the war years created the expression "100 per cent Americanism." Like most simple phrases, this one implied far more than it said. Without rising to the dignity of a systematic doctrine, 100 per cent Americanism expressed, or connoted, a cluster of assumptions.[26] To understand its components and its dynamics is to reach

the essence of wartime nativism and the spirit of much that followed in the postwar years.

Above all, 100 per centers belligerently demanded universal conformity organized through total national loyalty. Nothing in this demand was wholly new; certainly not loyalty, certainly not conformity. Partly because of the great social diversity within the country and the relatively limited force of government and custom, America had long since developed a remarkable degree of conformity through the sway of public opinion. European observers since de Tocqueville had repeatedly commented on how effectively Americans regulated one another through the pressure of collective judgment. Never before the First World War, however, had the urge for conformity blended so neatly with the spirit of nationalism. As a result, 100 per centers regarded the maintenance of the existing social pattern as dependent on the individual's sense of complete identification with the nation—a sense of identification so all-embracing as to permeate and stabilize the rest of his thinking and behavior.[27]

But passive assent to the national purpose was not enough; it must be grasped and carried forward with evangelical fervor. In addition to equating loyalty with conformity, patrioteers stressed the inculcation of a spirit of duty. Steady, uniform subordination of other interests to one national endeavor imposed a heavy psychic strain on a loose-knit, individualistic society; to practice conformity ardently all citizens must have a high sense of obligations and responsibilities laid upon them by the nation. Patriotism therefore was interpreted as service; the public was scolded for having thought too much in the past about its rights and privileges. About the time of America's entry into the war, the press inaugurated a country-wide contest for the best statement of a national creed which would emphasize the citizen's duties. The result, "The American's Creed," became a part of classroom ritual, an ever repeated reminder that love of country is to be understood in terms of duty. Meanwhile Theodore Roosevelt was thundering: "we must sternly insist that all our people practice the patriotism of service . . . for patriotism means service to the Nation. . . . We cannot render such service if our loyalty is in even the smallest degree divided."[28]

Millions of civilians displayed the same evangelical temper in

flocking to serve the war effort through countless voluntary organizations, drives, and pledge-signings—activities that often acquired a semi-obligatory status. The essential duty, however, consisted in right-thinking, i.e., the enthusiastic cultivation of obedience and conformity. A newspaper editor who headed the Iowa Council of Defense spelled out three specific imperatives for every citizen: to join a patriotic society, to preach the impropriety of considering terms of peace, and "to find out what his neighbor thinks." [29]

Thus the primary sanction on which 100 per centers depended to enforce a crusading conformity was exhortation. Verbal appeals seemed so potent, and the calculated manipulation of opinion was practiced to a degree so unprecedented that men began to talk of "propaganda" as a kind of modern magic.[30] But techniques of persuasion, no matter how high-pressured, seemed only partly adequate to discipline the well-disposed, and entirely inadequate to punish the disaffected. As their tempers rose, 100 per centers fell back increasingly on the punitive and coercive powers of government to execute their mandates. The war was enlarging the scope of governmental action in all sorts of ways, building on precedents which reformers had supplied for protecting the community by extending the functions of the state. Without often realizing they were doing so, 100 per centers took part in the general statist trend. For all their faith in pep talks, they also brandished a club.

An explanation for this whole temper of mind is not hard to find: it was caused by the unexpected exigencies of modern war impinging on traditional American habits and ideas. The struggle with Germany suddenly imposed enormous tasks upon a loose-knit, peaceful society, calling for an immense output of manpower and material. The war seemed so encompassing, so arduous, that the slightest division of purpose or lack of enthusiasm appeared an intolerable handicap to it. Only a single-minded, even simple-minded, dedication to a presumably single national objective could, it was believed, prevent other interests or loyalties from competing or conflicting with the luminous will of the nation. To achieve this kind of unity, wartime nationalism drew heavily on the crusading impulse that had flowed both through imperialism and through progressivism. The same intense belief in the power of ideals to accomplish social objectives, the same reliance on exhortation, the same moral energy, were now at work in the summons to national service. In this sense 100 per cent Americanism was the final fruit of a generation of political moralizing, though now the missionary spirit was turning toward the strengthening of existing institutions rather than the creation of new ones.

One must distinguish, therefore, between this American response to total war and the totalitarian nationalisms that have developed in other parts of the modern world. One hundred per cent Americanism involved no conscious repudiation of other social values such as individual freedom, but rather a refusal to recognize any legitimate conflict between such values and conformity; no hostility to the existing social order, but rather a zeal to maintain it; no desire to build an omnipotent state, but rather an appeal to state power only as a court of last resort when public opinion seemed incapable of enforcing conformity.

Though this new nationalism outlawed many kinds of deviation, it had already discovered its primary target in the formative years of 1915 and 1916. On the hapless German minority 100 per cent Americanism broke with great force as soon as the United States entered the war. Ironically, the German-Americans now suffered far more than they had during the neutrality period for a resistance which they no longer offered to the nation's purpose. Sabotage ceased with the flight of official German agents to Mexico when war was declared. Before long the German-language newspapers, at least in their public professions, embraced a blatant patriotism.[31] The 100 per centers, however, saw evidence of conspiracies everywhere. In the month before the United States entered the war, tales poured into the War and Justice Departments, often from highly responsible people, about secret organizations which were planning an earthquake of explosions under the direction of the German General Staff once hostilities commenced. Army commanders, especially in the Middle West, braced themselves to suppress insurrections that never materialized.

The fear of organized plots survived every disappointment and triumphed over every symptom of tranquillity. German-American Red Cross volunteers were widely believed to be putting ground glass in bandages and in food sent out to soldiers. Others were supposed to be selling court plaster containing tetanus bacilli, spreading influenza germs, or poisoning wells.[32] The Hoboken

Council of Six wanted the city placed under martial law to suppress a "Whispering Propaganda Organization" led by German-Americans. The President's secretary, Joseph Tumulty—a target of anti-Catholicism in the early years of the Wilson administration—felt called on to issue a formal newspaper statement denying that he had been shot as a German spy. The closing of many normal channels of communication and criticism stimulated the circulation of all sorts of rumors, so that the air was full of stories of transports sunk, Red Cross sweaters on sale in department stores, and governmental plans to confiscate all savings. Both press and government intensified the anti-German hysteria by branding such reports as inventions of German agents. Thus the Food Administration warned the public that a rumored shortage of salt, matches, and laundry blue was "the result of the latest efforts of pro-German propagandists." [83]

With the minions of the Kaiser moving in such mysterious ways, 100 per centers felt sure that the nation would never be safe until every vestige of German culture had been stamped out. German societies dared not hold public meetings or outings even in cosmopolitan New York. Many patriots clamored for suppression of all German-language newspapers, and in numerous areas local officials banned their sale.[84] A special act of Congress repealed the charter of the German-American Alliance. A campaign to eliminate German from the public school curricula made considerable headway on the theory that the study of the language served to inculcate un-American ideas. A poll of 1,200 public school systems in March 1918 showed that about one out of seven had already dropped German. The proportion was much higher in the South (almost 40 per cent), and wherever classes remained open, enrollment was dwindling rapidly. Before the war ended, some whole states—Delaware, Iowa, Montana, and others—banned the teaching of German. Meanwhile German opera was boycotted, sauerkraut became "liberty cabbage," and many towns, firms, and individuals with German names changed them. All of these repressive drives received much encouragement from the American Defense Society, a propaganda organization of wealthy conservatives and militarists.[85] Born in 1915 to agitate for preparedness, it lived on to become an embodiment of the 100 per cent philosophy.

Inevitably the zeal to expunge disloyalty and to "swat the Hun"

roused a spirit of violence. Theodore Roosevelt advised shooting or hanging any German who showed himself disloyal,[86] and eminent clerical spokesmen demanded the death penalty for German propagandists. Plainer citizens meted out their own brand of informal justice. Mobs occasionally destroyed a German's books or musical instruments. Sometimes a German was forced to kiss the American flag. Passion mounted in the spring of 1918 as American troops went into action against the great German offensives unleashed on the Western Front. Supposedly seditious utterances by Germans and others provoked frequent public floggings or tar-and-feathering parties. Some of the worst vigilante groups in the Midwest and in California called themselves the Knights of Liberty. The climax came in April when a mob of miners lynched a German alien on the bloody ground of southern Illinois, where Negroes and Italians had met a similar fate in days of peace.[87]

In large measure these acts of repression and reprisal by private groups and local communities reflected the 100 per center's conviction that the federal government was timid and even criminally negligent in dealing with traitors. Popular indignation was rising against a nerveless government hampered by inadequate authority or paralyzed by respect for law. Were not thousands of disloyal utterances going unpunished? Were not German spies constantly being caught and then released without trial? Was not the government's anti-German propaganda, asked the American Defense Society, so pacific as to give aid and comfort to the enemy? Many 100 per centers believed that the weakness of federal action compelled them to take the law into their own hands.[88] This pressure from below for a more potent and coercive national state pressed hard on the Wilson administration. The government never went nearly as far as super-patriots wanted, but to some extent it was infected by 100 per-centism, and to some extent it was driven to appease it.

At the outset federal policy showed an uneasy but notable restraint. Unsatisfied with existing conspiracy statutes, Congress passed the Espionage Act in June 1917, which penalized individuals for false statements designed to obstruct the war effort or to aid the enemy. Although somewhat ambiguous, the measure appeared on its face to outlaw only those statements which constituted dangerous acts; not all deviant opinions.[89] To deal with the

acts and statements of enemy aliens the government had a far more summary weapon at its disposal. During the first great anti-foreign scare of 1798, the Alien Enemies Act had given the President arbitrary control over unnaturalized subjects of a hostile power during wartime; he could arrest, restrain, regulate, and deport them by fiat. Alone among the Alien and Sedition Acts, this one remained in force, and Wilson invoked it as soon as war was declared. However, only a small fraction of the half million German aliens in the United States was molested under this authority. Sixty-three deemed most dangerous were seized at once; about 1,200 were arrested in the course of the year. By contrast, Britain interned all German aliens (some forty-five thousand); and Portugal, which was almost as secure from invasion as the United States, expelled them en masse from the country.[40]

The initial restraints upon American policy were progressively whittled away. Federal judges proceeded to flout a strict construction of the Espionage Act and to mete out long prison sentences to individuals who said that war violated the teachings of Christ or enriched profiteers. Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory tried to prevent indiscriminate prosecutions, but his own ability to distinguish between dangerous and innocuous utterances became somewhat blurred. Like many others in responsible positions, he was torn between passion and principle. Although he set himself against the demand of the Assistant Attorney General, Charles Warren, for imposing martial law on the country, Gregory felt keenly the prevalent criticism of federal laxity. Spurred by public opinion, he asked Congress to enlarge the Espionage Act slightly. It responded in May 1918 with more than he had bargained for—the draconic Sedition Act. Any opinion deemed disloyal, any contemptuous reference to the American flag, form of government, or Constitution, became subject to a twenty-year sentence.[41]

Meanwhile the Justice Department was hustling greater numbers of German aliens into internment camps under the President's summary powers. The total of enemy aliens arrested on Presidential warrants rose from 1,200 at the beginning of 1918 to 6,300 ten months later. Regulations governing the conduct of German aliens who remained at large were tightened, requiring them to register and forbidding them to move without official permission. Also the Justice Department in 1918 found a way of stripping "disloyal" naturalized Germans of their citizenship, and Gregory prepared a drive for denaturalization proceedings.[42]

Super-nationalist tendencies also came to bear on the federal government through secret societies of volunteer spy-hunters. One of the most satisfying ways by which a 100 per center disqualified from military service could answer the urge for duty and conformity was to take part in a society engaged in ferreting out disloyalty. A number of such societies appeared around the time of America's entry into the war, including (according to one report) the Anti-Yellow Dog League, composed of boys over ten who searched for disloyalists and claimed a thousand branches throughout the country.

The Justice Department, daunted by the puny size of its own staff of three hundred investigators, gave a kind of unofficial blessing to several of the secret bodies.[43] One of them, the American Protective League, secured a unique status as a semiofficial auxiliary to the Justice Department and grew to phenomenal size. Established by a Chicago advertising executive, A. M. Briggs, in March 1917, with the Justice Department's approval, in a few months the league mushroomed into an organization of more than 1,200 separate units functioning in nearly every locality in the United States. Its members were largely business and professional men, who financed it through their own contributions supplemented by subsidies from large corporations. According to the league's claim, it attracted a total of 250,000 members, each equipped with an impressive badge and imbued with 100 per cent fervor. To middle-aged soldiers of the home front, the league supplied the gratifications of participating in a secret, oath-bound society, the respectability of operating more or less within the law, and above all the opportunity to clothe themselves in the authority of the national state. By joining, any "red-blooded patriot" could become a policeman.

As their primary task, A.P.L. "operatives" pried into men's opinions. They carried out investigative assignments referred to them by the Bureau of Investigation and later by the War Department's Military Intelligence Division, and flooded public officials everywhere with unsolicited, melodramatic information. Reports on "seditious and disloyal utterances" comprised their main stock in trade, these often consisting of gossip, hearsay, and mis-

information offered from malevolent motives. Sometimes the silent were browbeaten into public confessions of thorough loyalty; sometimes those who might have spoken critically were silenced by advance warnings. The authorized history of the A.P.L. records such feats as the following: "Prowers County, Colorado, investigated fifty cases of mouth-to-mouth propaganda, a notable case in its annals being that of a German Lutheran minister who refused to answer the question as to which side he wished to win the war. . . . He asked for time. The next day he declared very promptly that he wanted the United States to win. He was instructed to prove this by preaching and praying it in private as well as in public, which he agreed to do." [44]

The league performed other chores as well, sometimes with a muscular vigor that disturbed its official sponsors. It checked up on people who failed to buy Liberty bonds, looked for draft evaders, spotted violators of food and gasoline regulations, and took a suspicious interest in citizens living in luxury without visible means of support. Attorney General Gregory tried to restrict the league to investigative work, but the desire of its members to police their communities could not always be held in check. In New York they took part in a mass roundup of draft evaders. In Cleveland they broke up meetings of a Socialist local. In Milwaukee they threatened members of the Machinists Union with immediate induction into the Army, and German aliens who tried to change jobs with internment. In at least two cities league members served as strikebreakers to prevent walkouts of policemen and firemen who wanted higher pay.[45] "It is safe to say," Gregory reported to Congress with truthful pride, "that never in its history has this country been so thoroughly policed. . . ." [46]

A Common Cause

Although wartime nationalism bore down most severely and painfully on the German element, obviously a conformist ethic that applied so broadly to the whole American population could easily jeopardize other immigrant groups as well. Conceivably, 100 per cent Americanism could have unleashed a general xenophobia against all aliens. To what extent did this in fact occur?

Certainly the war created a more widespread concern than

Americans had ever before felt over the immigrants' attachment to their adopted country. Decades of xenophobia in all parts of the country had failed to touch a substantial part of the native public in any primary or significant way. Now that national solidarity was at such a premium, many Americans had a sense of discovering a momentous issue hitherto only dimly grasped.

Statistics alone were disturbing enough. An estimate by the Bureau of the Census in 1917 showed that the American population included about 4,662,000 people born within the boundaries of the Central Powers, half of them Germans and the other half a queer conglomeration of nationalities from Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. Altogether, about one-third of America's foreign-born derived from enemy territory. An overwhelming majority of those who had come from the countries allied with Germany had not yet acquired American citizenship; [47] and when the United States declared war on Austria-Hungary in December 1917, its subjects became enemy aliens. Furthermore, their significance for the American war machine was crucial. The Slavic and Magyar nationalities originating in the Dual Monarchy now dominated the eastern coal fields, formed perhaps two-thirds of the labor force in the iron and steel industries and an equal proportion in the slaughterhouses, and worked in most of the munitions factories.[48]

The Slovaks, Slovenes, Magyars, Bohemians, and all the rest of the great mass from eastern Europe were not Teutonic, to be sure, nor did American opinion ever view them in quite that light. To the United States the enemy was Germany. The other Central Powers seemed (when one thought about them at all) not so much the allies of the Kaiser as his pawns. Nevertheless the thought that the adversary had at least a technical claim on the sympathies of millions in the industrial heart of America was deeply disquieting.

What was worse than the size and the strategic position of the alien population was its apartness. The impulse for unity crashed against the plain, frightening fact that the new immigrants lived in a social universe so remote from that of the Americans on the other side of the tracks that they knew practically nothing of one another. The average citizen's acquaintance with the immigrants scarcely went beyond some unpleasant concepts about their character and the conditions under which they lived. Of their inmost

loyalties he knew nothing but suspected much when the war began. In a magazine article entitled "Invaded America," Samuel Hopkins Adams described the millions born on enemy soil in a manner characteristically vague and characteristically ominous: "Reckon each as a pound of dynamite—surely a modest comparison. . . . Not all these enemy aliens are hostile. Not all dynamite explodes." [49]

The general apprehension about alien influence highlighted an anomalous condition surviving in seven western states. Operating on constitutions written in the frontier era, Indiana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas still permitted aliens to vote on the mere declaration of intention to become citizens. Since the 1880's a number of other states had eliminated this right, but during the same period the nativists' preoccupation with the issue of immigration restriction had left the question of alien suffrage largely unattended. In 1917 the realization that aliens, many of them legally enemies, might control elections in certain districts, caused a determined movement for limiting suffrage to citizens only. Three states amended their constitutions in 1918, and the rest followed suit in the immediate postwar years.[50]

Meanwhile compulsory military service bore more heavily on citizens than on aliens and thus added to the resentments and anxieties inherent in the war situation. The Selective Service Act of May 1917 exempted enemy aliens and all other aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens; on the other hand, quotas were apportioned on the basis of total population. Consequently, as the draft began to cut deeply into the country's manpower, it took a disproportionate number of citizens from communities with a large alien population. Along with indignation that young aliens should be enjoying the fruits of war prosperity while citizens filled up the military quotas, there was concern lest the induction of too many native-born workers in mill towns and other industrial areas should disturb "American control" of plants by causing the elevation of aliens to supervisory posts. In 1918 a new system of apportioning quotas was instituted and ended most of the dissatisfaction.[51] There remained the problem of a relatively small number of declarant aliens from neutral countries who sought exemption from military service on the basis of treaties the United States had with their homelands. In an act of July 1918, Congress

yielded to the claim of treaty obligations but stipulated that to secure exemption, such aliens must withdraw their first papers and in doing so would be forever barred from citizenship.[52]

All in all, a foreigner was well advised to conduct himself with unusual circumspection in an atmosphere so highly charged. There was, for example, the case of a foreign-looking man, unable to speak English, who ripped a Liberty Loan poster from a Cleveland trolley car. The other occupants of the car mobbed him, and only a timely arrest saved him from what might have become a lynching. He proved to be an illiterate Pole infuriated by the poster's illustration: the glaring visage of the Kaiser.[53]

Yet, despite the indiscriminate anti-foreign suspicions omnipresent in the war mood, incidents of this kind were unusual. Toward the German, American opinion showed little restraint; toward the rest of the immigrant population it showed a great deal. The average non-German alien passed through 1917 and 1918 unscathed by hatred, and often touched by sympathy. The logic of 100 per cent Americanism was against him, but the war also created powerful forces which held that logic in check. Latent hostilities toward hyphenated nationalities became overt only in the case of the Germans. An incident in Texas, where a corrupt governor in the course of a general assault on the state university tried to oust all aliens from the faculty, stands alone in the annals of the war.[54] This was the paradox of American nationalism during the First World War. On the one hand it created an unappeasable and unprecedented demand for unity and conformity. On the other, it saved the foreigner from the persecutory or exclusionist consequences of this demand as long as he was non-German and showed an outward compliance with the national purpose. To a remarkable degree the psychic climate of war gave the average alien not only protection but also a sense of participation and belonging.

In this respect the First World War resembled previous American wars. Like the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, the struggle with Germany drained many internal antagonisms out of American society, turning them instead onto the common enemy. The people were seeking national unity through fraternity *and* through hatred, developing modes of sympathy as well as repression. Foreign groups usually excluded from community affairs were invited to take part in Red Cross projects, Liberty Loan

drives, and a host of similar activities. In the oneness of the war effort, nationalities, churches, and classes found a common ground. A sociologist studying a Vermont industrial city in the mid-1930's met many residents who still looked back nostalgically to the social homogeneity of 1917, when some of the traditional ethnic and religious barriers had broken down.[55] This spirit of community flourished side by side with 100 per cent Americanism, each providing an approach to unity. Perhaps they complemented one another, but to a considerable extent the achievement of fellowship tempered the force of fear and compulsion.

The most powerful of all of the symbols of loyalty was military service. The complaints about "alien slackers" that grew out of the inequities of the draft act made little impression beside the immigrant soldier's bright reputation for patriotism and valor. The prestige which the foreign-born had won fifty-five years before at Fredericksburg, Antietam, and Shiloh was won again on the battlefields of France. Despite the nondeclarant and enemy aliens' right of exemption from the draft (an exemption which great numbers of them waived), the foreign-born constituted about 18 per cent of the United States Army. This was somewhat more than their share of the total population.[56] Not only immigrant leaders but all who wished to stress the cohesiveness of a fighting America exalted the foreigners' service record. Popular military commentators evinced a sense of relief at the immigrant response to the test of war. The government's official propaganda agency, the Committee on Public Information, made much of the decorations which individual immigrants received. A Victory Liberty Loan poster by the famous illustrator, Howard Chandler Christy, painted perhaps the most vivid image. It showed an Honor Roll full of outlandish foreign names and above the caption, "Americans All!" [57]

A deliberate effort was made to emphasize the loyal cooperation of the immigrants on the home front also. At the instigation of the C.P.I., communities throughout the country organized great pageants on the Fourth of July, 1918, with every available nationality conspicuous in its native costumes and in its demonstrations of patriotism. Even the German-Americans were not entirely excluded from the ceremonial joining of hands. They too had American war heroes to whom orators could point, and in the parade at Sandusky, Ohio, a group of them marched with a banner inscribed "100% Americans of German birth and descent." [58] Little wonder that a leading Protestant periodical, the *Missionary Review*, exclaimed indulgently, "These handicapped races are showing such loyalty, such devotion to our country, that we are realizing our former undemocratic, unchristian attitude toward them." [59]

This tendency to play up the common ties of interest and purpose among old and new Americans was strengthened by the very real hatred most Austro-Hungarian immigrants displayed toward their official fatherland. The bulk of immigrants from the Dual Monarchy were subject nationalities who saw an Allied victory as an opportunity for their own people to secure independent statehood. The foreign districts of American cities bubbled with agitation and propaganda for such independence movements—a kind of hyphenate activity which served to demonstrate the attachment to American war aims of many technically enemy aliens. If the Magyars, who dominated half of Austria-Hungary, failed to share this enthusiasm for disrupting their homeland, they apparently kept their resentments to themselves.[60] The general impression that Austro-Hungarian aliens had little sympathy with their home government reinforced the implicit distinction Americans drew between Germany and her allies. The federal government treated unnaturalized immigrants from the other Central Powers very differently from unnaturalized Germans. After the belated declaration of war with the Dual Monarchy, Wilson refrained from applying to its subjects in the United States any of the enemy alien regulations which hampered all German aliens. The press, according to the *Literary Digest*, tended to applaud Wilson's action in parting "the goats of German nationality from the sheep who owed allegiance to the Hapsburg Kaiser. . . ." [61]

The Nativist Traditions in Wartime

To a considerable extent, the spirit of a common cause also laid its inhibitions on the older patterns of nativism. Many hatreds functional to peacetime tensions were expensive luxuries during war, and any type of xenophobia not directly relevant to the conflict between the United States and Germany had little chance to prosper. Accordingly, the tendency, already manifest in the prepared-

ness period, to subordinate other nativist ideas to the new international challenge was steadily pursued.

Two of the historic traditions of American nativism ran counter to the common purpose. Anti-Catholicism was generally discouraged and remained at low ebb; speculation that the papacy sympathized with Germany was denounced as "Hun propaganda" designed to divide America.[62] Nor did racial nativism make headway while the United States was aligned with Italy and Japan against the masters of northern Europe. Very few racial attacks on foreign groups appeared in the general books and magazines. The leading race-thinkers strove primarily to bring their theories into harmony with the spirit of the hour. Madison Grant brought out a hastily revised edition of *The Passing of the Great Race* in 1918, eliminating references to early American settlers as Teutonic and declaring that most present-day inhabitants of Germany are Alpines rather than Nordics. A physician, William S. Sadler, wrote a whole book to prove the latter point, arguing that 90 per cent of the German Nordics had been killed off in the wars of the previous three hundred years. This indicated, according to a lurid report in the Hearst press on the views of Professor Henry Fairfield Osborn, that the modern German population was actually descended from Asiatic barbarians.[63] There is no evidence, however, that these readjustments gave racial nationalism any wartime vogue.

On the other hand, the third of America's anti-foreign traditions fitted very usefully into the mood and circumstances of the war years. Whereas anti-Catholicism and racism could only strain existing bonds of unity, anti-radicalism served to counteract an existing disunity. All religions and races joined willingly in the war effort; many radicals did not. Consequently a nationalist attack on radicals gathered great strength during 1917 and 1918. It supplemented and interacted with the reigning anti-German hysteria, forming a subordinate but important outlet for 100 per cent Americanism.

When war came, the conditions which had discouraged fears of revolutionists during the Progressive period were reversed. Then, the strong current of enthusiasm for social change had confined anti-radical hysteria to a conservative minority; and since a great part of America was then responding to varying degrees of reform, the line between progressive and revolutionary opinion dimmed.

The war, however, had precisely the opposite effect. It put a premium on stability rather than dissent, and it created a sharp distinction between liberals and radicals. Liberals, like most groups in wartime America, restricted or suspended their own struggle, in the interest of harmony. Radicals alone remained unregenerate enough to oppose the war itself in a relatively outspoken and organized way.

While nationality groups such as the Germans and Magyars publicly avowed their support of the war, left-wing spokesmen denounced it as a capitalistic blood-bath. Just about all of the meager anti-war propaganda in the United States came from the I.W.W., from tiny anarchist groups, and from the dwindling Socialist party, at least until they were bludgeoned into silence. Horrified at what seemed outrageous disloyalty, 100 per centers poured upon members of these groups, regardless of nativity, a hatred second only to their abomination of the hyphenated German. A provision in the Espionage Act banning disloyal literature from the mails was used largely against left-wing publications, and an important motive behind the sweeping Sedition Act was a desire to clamp down on radical sentiment more completely.[64]

The attack on radicalism was thoroughly interwoven with the anti-German hysteria. The equation between the two was partly an outgrowth of the whole anti-radical tradition, with its assumption that militant discontent is a foreign importation, and partly a reflection of the new inclination to see the hand of the Kaiser in any divisive symptom. Any radical critic of the war was customarily designated a "pro-German agitator."[65] Then too the frustrating scarcity of disloyal acts among German groups undoubtedly encouraged the belief that the crafty Hun was actually working through left-wing organizations.

Although Socialists were occasionally horsewhipped, frequently arrested, and generally silenced, anti-radicalism now as in the late Progressive era found its chief target in the I.W.W. To the Wobbly organizers a class loyalty transcended any national loyalties. In the early summer of 1917, when the organization reached a peak membership of about one hundred thousand, it had no compunction about stopping work in the copper mines and launching a series of strikes among the exploited, migratory workers in the northwestern lumber camps. This action raised the most overt

challenge that was to occur during the war to the new spirit of patriotic conformity. Convinced that German influence lay behind it all, the middle-class public responded with extraordinary violence. Sheriffs' posses and armed citizens' committees expelled more than 1,300 miners thought to be Wobblies from points in Arizona. One large group was met at the California border by a similar armed committee which threatened to shoot both the guards and their prisoners if they set foot in California. New Mexico vigilantes stopped a similar deportation from Arizona, with the result that federal authorities had to take charge of the captives. In Butte, Montana, a half-breed Indian active in the I.W.W. was lynched. Throughout the western states vigilante groups were springing up, and men were talking about further "neck-tie parties." [66]

Western state legislatures began to pass "criminal syndicalism" laws, severely penalizing membership in any organization advocating violence. On the other hand, state authorities felt helpless to halt the violence of their own enraged citizenry. A group of western governors appealed for federal action against the I.W.W. to forestall further mob action against it. Attorney General Gregory, who shared the suspicion that Germany was financing the I.W.W., probably needed little encouraging. In July 1917, he ordered the internment of all German aliens found to be I.W.W. members. But still the popular clamor for more drastic steps continued. On September 5, therefore, Gregory began a thoroughgoing campaign of repression. His agents descended on every I.W.W. hall in the United States. Further raids and confiscations of literature followed, resulting in all in the arrest of more than three hundred I.W.W. leaders, who were tried chiefly for violating the Espionage Act. Another group, consisting of non-German aliens identified with the I.W.W., was seized through the collaboration of the Immigration Bureau and the American Protective League and held for deportation under the new immigration law.[67]

In deportation the nation grasped its absolute weapon against the foreign-born radical. During the World War, deportation assumed a wholly new significance. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it had had a purely instrumental function. It was a way of enforcing the existing laws regulating immigration—a way of sending back recently admitted aliens who should have been stopped at the port of entry because of specific excludable qualities. Deportation, therefore, never received wide public attention until the war period. Then nationalists glimpsed broader potentialities in what had been purely an administrative instrument; they began to envisage it as a major public policy in its own right. They saw it as a means of purifying American society. Through deportation and the threat of it, the nation might rid itself of divided loyalties. In this broad sense deportation now became a subject of considerable comment. "We are going," said the chairman of the Iowa Council of Defense, "to love every foreigner who really becomes an American, and all others we are going to ship back home." The ex-president of the Native Sons of the Golden West added that every foreigner "must live for the United States, and grow an American soul inside of him, or get out of the country." [68] In short, the popular concept of deportation expanded to fit the ideals of 100 per cent Americanism.

The immigration law of 1917 furnished an initial opportunity to experiment along these lines. By permitting the Department of Labor to deport aliens implicated in certain kinds of radicalism regardless of how long they had lived in the United States before the offense occurred, the statute freed the weapon of deportation from the simple and limited function of enforcing the immigration code. However, after beginning to arrest aliens active in the I.W.W. in the winter of 1917-18, the government discovered that for purposes of deportation the law was less commodious than it had appeared on first glance. Although immigrants could be excluded, alien residents of long standing could not be expelled merely for membership in a subversive organization. Deportation in such cases depended on proof that the man had personally advocated subversive doctrines. In order to carry out the campaign against foreign Wobblies, therefore, the Justice and Labor Departments in 1918 asked Congress to authorize the deportation of any alien simply on grounds of belonging to an organization which advocated revolt or sabotage. Congress passed the bill in October with no opposition, and with little comprehension of the momentous step it was taking.[69]

Even with this broader dispensation, only the beginnings of an anti-radical purge were possible while the war lasted. By disrupting normal diplomatic relations and maritime connections, the war prevented the government from effecting more than a few individ-

ual deportations. In almost all cases the Secretary of Labor, who had official jurisdiction in the matter, postponed action until the end of hostilities.[70] Furthermore, anti-radicalism remained a subsidiary manifestation of the 100 per cent spirit as long as the German menace was unquelled. It was one thing to call the radicals German agents but quite another to equate radicalism with the whole foreign population. Thus the war laid both the legislative and ideological foundations for a nationalistic, anti-radical crusade but curbed its channels of expression.

Big Red Scare

On Armistice Day a close observer might have guessed that the anti-radical tradition would make trouble for the immigrants in the months ahead. It is unlikely that he could have predicted the full fury of the Big Red Scare. Who could have foreseen that the emotions stirred up by the war would persist so violently into the postwar era? Yet the survival of 100 per cent Americanism under peacetime conditions is one of the great keys to the storm of xenophobia that followed in the wake of battle. An unappeased demand for the kind of conformity which only an extremely belligerent nationalism might provide flowed on for years, making World War I a major turning point in American nativism.

It is hard to explain the tug of wartime passions on the postwar mind except in terms at least partly psychological. The clamor for absolute loyalty, continuing relentlessly into peacetime, spoke, perhaps, an unwillingness to surrender the psychic gratifications the war had offered. Along with death and sacrifice the war had brought the warmth of a common purpose into millions of lives; it had touched them far more heroically than ever before with the moral idealism of the early twentieth century; it had given them catharsis for a host of aggressive impulses. These were experiences to cherish deeply, and men who had discovered them in the heat of national conflict had little difficulty supposing that the war had not ended, that the adversary had merely assumed another guise and still presented a deadly challenge to loyalty and a summons to hatred. Although other wars, too, had left violent emotional aftermaths, the martial spirit of 1918 could adapt itself to changing issues and fasten itself on changing enemies with unusual flexibility:

the new creed of total loyalty outlawed so many kinds of dissent. Projected into the postwar world, the 100 per cent ideology gave war hatreds a wide and various field.

With the collapse of the German onslaught in November 1918, therefore, Germanophobes rallied swiftly and easily to repulse the foreign revolutionist. The latter—already stamped as an ally or agent of the Hun—merely moved from a subordinate to a central position on the enemy front. So interlocked and continuous were the anti-German and anti-radical excitements that no date marks the end of one or the beginning of the other. In the summer of 1918, after the new Bolshevik government of Russia had made an abject peace with Germany, stories circulated in the United States to the effect that the Kaiser actually controlled the Soviet régime. The Committee on Public Information confirmed this illusion by releasing a sensational report from one of its officials, Edgar Sisson, which sought to prove that the Bolshevik leaders were German agents. After the armistice the equation between Germanism and Bolshevism enabled a Senate committee investigating pro-German propaganda in the United States to shift smoothly to an inquiry into Bolshevik propaganda.[71] All through 1919 much hatred and suspicion of German influence lingered, erupting time and again in the charge that Teutonic machinations lay behind every symptom of unrest. In early 1920 New York state's famous Red-hunter, Clayton R. Lusk, was still proclaiming that paid agents of the German Junkers had started the radical movement in America as part of their plan of world conquest.[72]

The undercurrent of 100 per cent Americanism running through both waves of xenophobia appeared still more clearly on the organizational level. When the war ended, the American Protective League had no intention of dissolving. It looked forward to a happy career ferreting out new disloyalties, sharpened its surveillance of radical meetings, and tried to work out with the United States Naturalization Service an arrangement for investigating every applicant for citizenship. Attorney General Gregory soon decided, however, that public opinion might not tolerate a secret system of citizen espionage under peacetime conditions. He and the national directors of the league had to apply considerable pressure to persuade the organization to disband. At that, some local divisions continued under other names, such as the Loyal American League

of Cleveland, which kept trying to help public officials in suppressing disloyalty and disorder.[73]

A new organization, operating with no pretense of secrecy or of official status, stepped into the league's shoes as the guardian of national orthodoxy. This was the American Legion. Being a veterans' organization, the legion perpetuated more directly than any other group the corporate values of the war experience, the solidarity, the fellowship, the special identification with the nation. It took form in France in the early weeks of 1919, launched by a group of Army officers who were concerned about the morale of restless, homesick troops. They were alarmed too at signs of radical ferment on all sides, and from the beginning leaders of the legion thought of it as an agency for defending America from revolution. A constitution was drawn up pledging the organization "To foster and perpetuate a one-hundred-percent Americanism." Of this it soon became a veritable incarnation. It kept alive the whole cluster of war hatreds (against Germans, "alien slackers," and Wobblies), pressed for stronger military defenses and a stronger sense of duty to the nation, sowed patriotic propaganda broadcast, and in the sweep of its attack on radical dissent proved a pillar of the economic status quo. Although the national leaders tried to chart a respectable course, during 1919 and 1920 representatives of local posts attacked left-wing meeting places and newspapers, helped to break strikes, and otherwise flexed their muscles.[74]

While a coercive zeal to maintain absolute loyalty endured after the armistice, the gentler, more spontaneous aspects of wartime national unity disappeared. With the end of hostilities, individuals and groups who had pulled together soon pulled apart. This postwar loss in actual homogeneity had as much to do with bringing on the Big Red Scare as did the continuing pressure of 100 per cent Americanism. The sense of community, which had confined wartime nativism within fairly narrow channels and which had given status to all who took part in the great common cause, was swept away after the armistice. Thus the 100 per cent impulse survived, but the principal barrier which had held it in check disappeared. In place of the very high degree of harmony prevailing in 1917 and 1918, the country shook in 1919 under a wave of class conflict unparalleled since the turbulent nineties.

After shackling their own freedom of action for two years in the interest of national unity, both capital and labor kicked loose like young colts. Businessmen, resentful at the swift growth of unions under government benediction during the war, set themselves to crush any sign of labor militancy. Workers, on the other hand, determined to keep abreast of the booming cost of living. Beyond that, they were fired by visions of social reconstruction, by bright hopes of a brave new world rising in the morning of peace and victory. The highly respectable railroad brotherhoods came out for government ownership of the railroads; the United Mine Workers proposed nationalizing the coal mines, organizing a labor party, and establishing a program of compulsory health insurance. At the same time strikes flared more widely than ever before in American history.

To the left of most of the labor movement, a similar dynamism surged in radical groups, which, rebounding from wartime restrictions, were magnetized by forces radiating from the new Russia. About fifty radical newspapers began publication in the year after the armistice, many of them anticipating an imminent social cataclysm. Out of the Socialist party, which was shaken apart by the ferment, arose at least two communist parties, both small but bubbling with insurrectionary élan. A number of little anarchist groups became active. Nor was all the excitement verbal. On December 30, 1918, bombs exploded on the doorsteps of two Philadelphia judges and a police superintendent, and similar attempts on the lives of public officials occurred sporadically over the next few months.[75]

Although American labor and the American left were, generally, in upheaval, foreign-born workers and radicals played a very prominent part. In addition to the anarchists, the great majority of American communists had a recent immigrant background. The bulk of Russian peasants in the United States seemed sympathetic to the Bolshevik régime.[76] Also some of the biggest strikes occurred in basic industries manned largely from the new immigration. The first blaze of labor unrest after the war broke out in the textile industry, beginning with thirty-five thousand New York garment workers in January and spreading throughout New England and the mid-Atlantic states. The great majority of the strikers were recent immigrants, and in some places such as Lawrence, Massachusetts, the English-speaking employees remained at work while the foreigners went out. In the autumn, at the height of the Red

Scare, the great steel strike drew together 376,000 workers, largely from the unorganized masses of southern and eastern Europe, despite the companies' best efforts to exploit nationality cleavages.

As part of a fierce counteroffensive, employers inflamed the historic identification of class conflict with immigrant radicalism. In advertisements and interviews they confirmed impressions that the strikes represented alien outbreaks intended to inaugurate an actual revolution.[77] It is little wonder that the immigrants got rough treatment. Out of fear, some factories discharged all their Russian employees, and many others adopted a policy of refusing to hire them. One company advised its workers to give discontented foreigners "a good swat on the jaw." In Lawrence, mounted police with flailing clubs charged orderly meetings.

In Gary, Indiana, a vigilante of the "Loyal Legion" gave this report on how it maintained "law and order" during the early days of the steel strike:

> A bunch of these foreigners, six or eight times the number of our posse, met us this side of the tracks, and we went into them. I told the men with me not to trouble too long with a man. Our method of work was to grab a man's right arm with the operator's own left hand, then bring down the blackjack across the hand bones or wrist of the man thus caught. One rap was enough, and after one of those people had got that we could go on to the next man, as he could not make any more trouble. We have a nice hospital in Gary. There were thirty-five people in there the next day with broken wrists and hands.[78]

Other 1919 strikes principally involved native-born workers, but it was inevitable that every step in the breakdown of class unity should lead a public conditioned by the belligerent qualities of the new nationalism, and by the long anti-radical tradition, deeper into nativism. As early as February a general strike of sixty thousand old-line union men in Seattle turned the country's fears of a foreign insurrection into sheer panic. That foreign agitators had provoked the "uprising" was axiomatic; that it marked the actual beginning of a communist revolution was hardly less so. Even Woodrow Wilson's staunchly liberal aide, Joe Tumulty, thought the Seattle strike was "the first appearance of the soviet in this country." [79] Thus the wartime tendency to distinguish between

pro-German radicals on the one hand and the rank and file of loyal foreigners on the other gave way to an impression that radicalism permeated the foreign-born population, that it flourished among immigrants generally and appealed to hardly anyone else. One journalist admitted that a few of the Bolsheviks might be native-born but dismissed these as tame and innocuous. "The foreign element, on the other hand, is absolutely destructive. . . ." [80] Never before had anti-radical nativism stirred the public mind so profoundly. During 1919 and the early months of 1920 no other kind of xenophobia even approached it in terms of vogue and impact.

On all levels of government, authorities moved to crush the Reds. Local police made many raids and arrests on their own initiative. It was not uncommon, for example, for Russian workers of suspicious appearance to be seized, held overnight, and then released. A wave of repressive legislation swept through state legislatures. Fourteen of them in 1919 enacted criminal syndicalism laws, following or expanding upon the example which five states had set during the war. Under these laws a vigorous program of prosecutions for organizational membership or for opinion ensued; in a three-month period the state of Washington convicted eighty-six individuals of membership in the I.W.W., which was now regarded as an American appendage of the Bolsheviks.[81]

The federal government, however, had no similar powers to cast anyone into prison simply for his beliefs or associations. The Espionage and Sedition Acts had enabled federal officials to outdo the states in this respect while America was fighting Germany, but the authority conferred by these statutes lapsed with the end of hostilities. The United States government possessed only one legal instrument for stamping on the propaganda activities which the postwar radicals conducted. It could deport the foreigners who supposedly were causing all the trouble; or, rather, it could deport those who had not acquired citizenship. This limitation on federal power tended to accentuate the anti-foreign emphasis in the Red Scare, for the whole weight of the distinctively national attack on radicalism fell upon the immigrants.[82]

In 1919 the clamor of 100 per centers for applying deportation as a purgative rose to an hysterical howl. "Nothing will save the life of this free Republic if these foreign leeches are not cut and cast out," said Mrs. George Thacher Guernsey, president-general

of the Daughters of the American Revolution. Patriotic, veteran, and fraternal organizations demanded more vigorous federal action and sterner legislation. The Farmers National Congress recommended to the United States Justice Department: "burn a brand in the hide of those fellows when you deport them so that if they ever dare return the trade mark will tell its tale and expose them." When the question arose as to where deportees could be sent, one Senator suggested that the North Pole would be a good place. "I do not care where they go, so they get out of here," he said. At the annual picnic of the North Dakota Association of Southern California a speaker advised: "These murderous wild beasts of our otherwise blessed republic should be given a bottle of water and a pint of meal and shoved out into the ocean on a raft, when the wind is blowing seaward." [83] Again, as during the war, a supernationalist public opinion urged the federal government along the path of coercion.

Although deportation was acquiring new significance as a technique of suppression and purification, administratively it was divorced from the domestic law enforcement agencies of the nation —a situation which from the outset hampered execution of a mass expulsion of alien radicals. The historic connection of deportation with the regulation of immigration placed jurisdiction in the hands of the Secretary of Labor, within whose department the Bureau of Immigration functioned. As a repressive agency the Department of Labor proved a weak and uncertain reed. On the one hand, the Commissioner of Immigration, Anthony Caminetti, had (despite his Italian parentage) the instincts of a 100 per center; it was he who had directed the roundup of alien Wobblies during the war and who had initiated action for the new deportation law of 1918.* The Secretary of Labor, on the other hand, was a Scottish-born labor leader named William B. Wilson with a liberal record and a distrust of the doctrine of guilt by association. A rubicund, good-natured man, Secretary Wilson paid far more attention to labor problems than to immigration, and his views on deportation were not always clear or consistent. But before anyone could

* Caminetti, a Californian, was the first Italian-American to be elected to Congress. His appointment as Commissioner of Immigration in 1913 had taken control of the bureau out of the hands of labor leaders and was undoubtedly an earnest of President Wilson's desire to placate the immigrants!

actually be sent out of the country, the Secretary had to sign a warrant ordering the step. Also, in cases arising under the 1918 law which authorized deportation on grounds of organizational membership, he had to certify the organization as subversive. Wilson did not regard mere I.W.W. membership as a crime against the nation, and he consistently refused to certify the I.W.W.[84]

Consequently a full-fledged deportation campaign was slow to develop. In February 1919, the Immigration Bureau rushed to Ellis Island thirty-nine of the alien Wobblies it had seized the year before, hoping to expel them immediately. The press hailed the move with wild rejoicing as the first federal blow against radicalism—a grand clean-up of "bewhiskered, ranting, howling, mentally warped, law-defying aliens." [85] The Secretary's attitude, however, compelled the immigration authorities to furnish evidence that each candidate for deportation had personally advocated revolution or sabotage. This was a difficult task and, together with other legal complications, forced the bureau to release all but a handful. Throughout the spring and summer the pursuit of individual aliens suspected of radical views continued, but only a trickle of deportations resulted.[86]

Meanwhile public opinion was growing daily more impatient for action. So was the Justice Department, with its strong and established predilection for 100 per cent policies. A new Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, took over from Gregory in March 1919. Palmer's bulldog jaw belied his simple, placid face. Once the implacable opponent of the political bosses and liquor interests in Pennsylvania, he approached the war against Germany with the same crusading belligerence. As Alien Property Custodian during the war, he showed his mettle in scourging the Hun and won national prominence. He was an ambitious man as well: his eye rested lovingly on the White House.[87] The failure of Palmer's agents to find the perpetrators of several bombing episodes in April must have exasperated him considerably, and when another infernal machine battered the front of his own home in June, Palmer was ready to go with the current. He appealed to Congress for a special appropriation, telling the frightened legislators that he knew exactly when the Reds were planning "to rise up and destroy the Government at one fell swoop." [88] The appropriation became available during the summer, and with it Palmer created a new division

of the Bureau of Investigation for the war against radicalism. In anticipation of a peacetime sedition law, the division proceeded to assemble data on all revolutionary activities; for more immediate action it offered its services to the Department of Labor. The latter agreed to the participation of Justice agents in carrying out a program of deportation, and inasmuch as Secretary Wilson's scruples about guilt by association did not extend to a radical organization of Russian immigrants, the Union of Russian Workers, this was chosen as the first target.

On November 7, 1919, the second anniversary of the Bolshevik régime in Russia, Palmer's men descended on Russian meeting places in eleven cities and seized hundreds of members of the organization. Screening for once was swift. Little more than a month later 249 aliens, most of them netted in the November raids, were on a specially chartered transport en route to Finland. From there they traveled overland to Russia through snows and military lines. Some had to leave behind in America their wives and children, at once destitute and ostracized.[89]

Palmer, by this dramatic move and by a simultaneous injunction crushing a national coal strike, filled a power vacuum. Woodrow Wilson lay helplessly ill, a broken and exhausted President, and the Attorney General emerged as the strong man of Washington. For a moment he seemed almost to be converting 100 per cent Americanism into a system of government.[90] Certainly, with fewer powers than his wartime predecessor, he applied more single-mindedly the principle of securing conformity by calling in the police.

Basking in the popularity of his anti-Russian raid, Palmer now prepared a mightier blow. On January 2 the Department of Justice, aided by local police forces in thirty-three cities, carried out a vast roundup of alien members of the two communist parties. Officers burst into homes, meeting places, and pool rooms, as often as not seizing everyone in sight. The victims were loaded into trucks, or sometimes marched through the streets handcuffed and chained to one another, and massed by the hundreds at concentration points, usually police stations. There officials tried to separate out the alien members of radical organizations, releasing the rest or turning them over to the local police. Many remained in federal custody for a few hours only; some lay in crowded cells

for several weeks without a preliminary hearing. For several days in Detroit eight hundred men were held incommunicado in a windowless corridor, sleeping on the bare stone floor, subsisting on food which their families brought in, and limited to the use of a single drinking fountain and a single toilet.[91] Altogether, about three thousand aliens were held for deportation, almost all of them eastern Europeans.

The brazenness of these proceedings (executed through the closest cooperation between the Justice Department and the Bureau of Immigration) is all the more striking in view of the fact that the Secretary of Labor had not yet formally declared membership in either the Communist party or the Communist Labor party a deportable offense. Indeed, Secretary Wilson was largely incapacitated by illness during the winter of 1919-20. He yielded grudgingly to pressure from Caminetti and Palmer in authorizing warrants of arrest for the January raids. Once they occurred, he accepted the accomplished fact and decided that membership in the Communist party fell under the ban of the deportation law of 1918. The Assistant Secretary of Labor, Louis F. Post, was made of sterner stuff, however. In March, while final deportation action was still pending, Post temporarily became Acting Secretary of Labor and set himself athwart Palmer's path.

Post, a seventy-one-year-old liberal with sad eyes and a scholarly Vandyke beard, had been a crotchety reformer ever since he read Tom Paine as a child. He was a leading single-taxer, a Swedenborgian, and a defender of academic freedom. With the ardor of another Voltaire he undertook a meticulous review of each of the cases at hand. Wherever evidence of party membership seemed faulty or wherever the government lacked proof that the man knew what he was doing when he joined the party, Post canceled the deportation order and freed the immigrant. When Secretary Wilson returned to office, he upheld Post's policy, and by July 2,202 prospective deportees had been set loose. Post endorsed the deportation of 556 others, and in time most of these went their exiled way,[92] but the drive to purge the alien radical had suffered a mortal setback. Palmer fumed at Post for coddling and encouraging Bolsheviks, and a group of 100 per cent American Congressmen tried to impeach him for disloyalty. The public hysteria, however, was breaking. Before a Congressional committee, Post turned

on his critics with a savagely brilliant defense. Instead of unanimously excoriating him, many newspapers commended the pugnacious old liberal for simply doing his duty.[93]

Actually the Big Red Scare was nearly over, Post's personal intervention coinciding with much larger changes. First of all, the seething labor unrest of 1919, which formed the social basis of the anti-radical spirit, faded early in 1920. The great steel strike collapsed in January amid the wreckage of labor's postwar dreams, and the unions passed to the defensive. The return of industrial peace dissipated the fear of imminent revolution. Especially among industrialists, many of whom had joined in the cry of alarm, the easing of class tensions produced a deep reaction. Now that the immigrant seemed docile again, his bosses recalled his economic value. In purely business terms, a rampant anti-radical nativism could cut off industry's best source of manpower. A number of business leaders began actively defending the foreign-born from the charge of radicalism. The Inter-Racial Council, which was a mouthpiece for some of America's biggest tycoons—men like Cleveland H. Dodge, E. G. Grace, Thomas W. Lamont, and Daniel Willard—came out flatly in April 1920 against the common association of immigrants with unrest, demanded a reform of deportation proceedings, and urged the public to take a friendly attitude toward ethnic minorities. Its chairman, T. Coleman du Pont, asserted that native Americans created most of the industrial disturbances and that the immigrant's critics were suffering from "sheer Red hysteria, nothing more." The head of the National Founders Association took the same view. The American Constitutional Association, an organization of a thousand West Virginia business leaders formed in 1920 to defend the interests of the coal operators and to promote the open shop, said, "Bolshevism was conceived in America by Americans." [94]

Just at the moment when industrial strife was abating, the Red-hunters were overreaching themselves. In their zeal to repress radicalism they were ranging farther and farther from the orbit of nativism. As long as anti-radicalism kept its link with nationalism and struck chiefly at groups on the fringes of American life, it awakened no significant protest. But by the early months of 1920 the repressive spirit was beginning to threaten the heart of American political processes. Throughout the fall Palmer had been pushing hard for a peacetime sedition law which would enable him to punish citizens as well as aliens for their opinions and associations. In January such a bill passed the Senate. A number of conservative groups such as the American Newspaper Publishers Association instantly turned their fire on so general an abridgement of freedom. At the same time the New York legislature evicted five of its duly elected members simply because they were Socialists. This unconstitutional abrogation of the decision of an electorate seemed to many a danger to American political institutions and thus a very different matter from the simple hounding of foreigners. The Bar Association of the City of New York, led by Charles Evans Hughes, sparked a reverberating protest.[95]

The Attorney General's best efforts to keep the Red Scare alive came to nought. In April he announced that a gigantic bomb plot and general strike would erupt on May Day. Nothing exploded except the jeers of Palmer's now vociferous critics. Twelve of the leading jurists in the United States issued a statement declaring that the Justice Department's illegal practices had stirred up more revolutionary sentiment than any group of radical propagandists could have created. A subcommittee of the Republican National Committee advised against further repressive measures. Congress did enact one more anti-radical law in June, forbidding aliens under pain of deportation to possess revolutionary literature; but a general sedition law ceased to be a political possibility. Although Palmer veered toward a more cautious course, his political prospects rapidly waned. In 1924 the *Saturday Evening Post* could look back with amusement at the nation's former concern over radicals, dismissing it as "nothing but the last symptom of war fever." [96]

By then anti-radical nativism had indeed shrunk to minor significance. Nevertheless the *Post* was dead wrong in assuming that the United States had recovered from the distempers of 1915 to 1919. The specific fevers of war and revolution passed; but a hardy virus was still at work. As social conditions changed—different in 1919 than in 1918, and altered again in 1920—they modified the expression of nationalism but preserved its inner spirit. Nothing occurred in 1920 to destroy the ongoing force of 100 per cent Americanism. In spy-hunting and in Red-hunting it assumed only the first of its evolving forms.

Chapter Nine

Crusade for Americanization

> "Maybe if we'd season th' immygrants a little or cook thim thurly, they'd go down betther," I says. . . . "But what wud ye do with th' offscourin' iv Europe?" says he. "I'd scour thim some more," says I.
>
> —Mr. Dooley

> Nation building is to be in the future a deliberate formative process, not an accidental . . . arrangement.
>
> —Frances Kellor

Until the twentieth century, native Americans had not supposed that national homogeneity depended, necessarily or desirably, on special pressures to assimilate the immigrants. Surely assimilation would follow readily enough from the general institutions and atmosphere of American society, unless of course an especially vicious immigration appeared on the scene; and in that case America could restrict its entry or its influence. Thus virtually the whole American response to foreign minorities was contained in two general attitudes: on the one hand, rejection and withdrawal; on the other, a confident faith in the natural, easy melting of many peoples into one. When fearful of disruptive influences, the Americans sought to brake the incoming current or to inhibit its political power; otherwise they trusted in the ordinary processes of a free society.

In contrast, some of the multinational states of Europe had adopted a third approach to unity. In Russia and in Hungary, for example, dominant nationalities tried to force or stimulate absorption of entrenched minorities. Drives to impose a unitary national

culture by repressing minority languages, churches, and names created storms and stresses from which the United States long and happily escaped. Part of the difference was due to the more fluid character of America's ethnic groups. In Europe most minorities were fixed in place and rooted in the soil of an ancient culture they were determined to preserve. But immigration brought the United States uprooted peoples who wanted to share in large degree in the new national life; cohesion developed without coercion. Equally important, nineteenth century Americans did not really demand a high level of national solidarity. Their country had achieved its own loose kind of homogeneity in the very course of accepting a variety of peoples and institutions. And since the American concept of freedom sanctioned a various and flexible ethnic pattern, a large measure of diversity was taken for granted.

Yet America did not forever avoid a version of the European experience. When neither a preventive nativism nor the natural health of a free society seemed sufficient to cope with disunity, a conscious drive to hasten the assimilative process, to heat and stir the melting pot, emerged. From its tiny beginnings at the end of the nineteenth century to its height in the First World War, the movement for Americanization was another indication of the growing urgency of the nationalist impulse. Americanization brought new methods for dealing with the immigrants; it significantly altered the traditions of both nativism and confidence. At the same time, the movement embraced the underlying spirit of both traditions. Within the crusade for Americanization the struggle between nativistic and democratic instincts persisted.

Prewar Origins

The institution, above all others, on which nineteenth century Americans relied to further such ethnic unity as they required was the common school. "Education," declared a New York high school principal with characteristically American faith in that commodity, "will solve every problem of our national life, even that of assimilating our foreign element." [1] The education to which he referred, however, consisted of the standard regimen applied to all children alike. The schools made almost no effort to single out the immigrants for special attention. Although a few eastern

cities in the latter part of the century opened special night school classes in English, and sometimes civics, for foreigners, such programs functioned on a very modest scale.[2] As an organized, articulate movement, Americanization did not receive its primary impetus from educators. The impulse came from two civic-minded groups who had little in common with one another except a felt need for closer social unity. From different points of view both groups reacted to the stresses of urban, industrial conditions, which were forcing America's peoples into increasing interdependence.[3]

The social settlements faced the problem from a humane perspective. There a whole generation of humanitarians discovered how deep was the cultural gulf dividing the people of the slums from the rest of society. Beginning in the 1890's, the settlements undertook the first practical efforts toward social integration of the new immigrant nationalities with the older America. Yet places like Hull House and the University Settlement aimed at Americanization only in the loosest sense of the term. They laid no special emphasis on English or civics classes. They tried to bind together and complete a neighborhood, not to make a nation. On the whole they did more to sustain the immigrant's respect for his old culture than to urge him forward into the new one. One of the great lessons the settlements discovered was that the normal, assimilative influences in America often worked too harshly. Immigrant families were divided; the children developed a brassy, swaggering Americanism in their yearning for acceptance. The settlements, therefore, sought to temper as well as improve the ordinary course of assimilation by providing a receptive environment for Old World heritages. Preaching the doctrine of immigrant gifts, Jane Addams and her fellow workers concentrated less on changing the newcomers than on offering them a home.[4]

A second, and closer, approach to Americanization came from another side of the 1890's: not from its hopes of reform but from its nationalist anxieties. Since the whole Americanization movement reflected a demand for a more tightly knit nation, it was characteristic that the campaign got its essential start from the new patriotic hereditary societies.

Led by the Daughters of the American Revolution, several of these societies embarked on programs of patriotic education designed to indoctrinate the adult foreigner with loyalty to America. In 1898 the Buffalo chapter of the D.A.R. prepared lectures on American history and government to be delivered in foreign languages to men who would soon be voting. Other chapters joined in the work of teaching the "spirit of true Americanism," some directing their attention to immigrant children.[5] The Society of Colonial Dames in 1904 launched a somewhat more extensive program, including scholarships to train experts for such patriotic educational work, the sponsorship of lectures and civics classes, and the preparation of appropriate literature. The Sons of the American Revolution, stirred into action by the assassination of President McKinley, soon outdid the ladies' groups. By 1907 the S.A.R. was devoting half of its income to the job of making aliens into good citizens. Its main achievement was a pamphlet purveying to immigrants advice and information about America. A million copies were printed in fifteen languages and distributed by employers, night schools, and other organizations, and even by the United States Department of Commerce and Labor, which endorsed the project and bore part of the printing expenses.[6]

Throughout their Americanizing efforts the patriotic societies preached a loyalty that consisted essentially of willing submissiveness. Above all, in the words of the D.A.R., they "taught obedience to law, which is the groundwork of true citizenship."[7] The main object of such self-constituted champions of America was to combat the danger of immigrant radicalism or discontent; their chief motive, fear. The settlements, on the other hand, had acted in response to a human need, rather than a political or economic threat; their gentler kind of assimilation arose from sympathy, not from dread. One program drew support from nativistic groups and emotions, the other from the tolerant, cosmopolitan traditions of American democracy.

These were the two sides of the Americanization movement. The impulse of fear and the impulse of love ran throughout its whole course, clashing in principle though in practice sometimes strangely blended. One current tended to soften the movement, orienting it toward the welfare of the immigrant; the other steeled it to an imperious demand for conformity. Out of fear, the Americanization movement fostered a militant nationalism, and by this means it eventually made its widest, most fervent appeal to the native-born public. But Americanization worked most successfully

upon the immigrants through love. It was part of the paradox of the movement that the side which evoked the most ardent American response produced the slightest positive results.

During the confident years at the beginning of the century, when ethnic fears did not cut deeply, the kind of Americanizing which some of the patriotic societies attempted elicited only a moderate interest; the general public attitude remained indifferent. On the other hand, the atmosphere of Progressive America encouraged the settlement approach toward immigrants. Although Americanization never became a major issue in the Progressive era, it made most headway by enlisting the support of urban progressives who had an awakened social conscience and a cosmopolitan view of democratic tasks. Under the promptings of sympathy, Americanization broadened into a drive to combat neglect and exploitation; it merged into the pattern of reform. Significantly, the first appearance of the issue in national politics was in the 1912 platform of the Progressive party. For the first time a political party denounced "the fatal policy of indifference and neglect which has left our enormous immigrant population to become the prey of chance and cupidity," and proposed federal action "to promote their assimilation, education and advancement." [8]

Social workers were responsible for the Progressive plank, and social workers played a key role in fostering ethnic integration, though they did not characteristically call it Americanization. Lillian Wald, for example, defined the task as one of "fusing these people who come to us from the Old World civilization into . . . a real brotherhood among men." [9] A similar spirit increasingly permeated the Protestant Social Gospel. For liberal Protestants the cause had a special attraction as an essential preliminary to evangelization. They chided the churches for maintaining an attitude of snobbish aloofness toward the alien and called for an expanded and democratized home-missions campaign.[10] Perhaps the most successful of the efforts under religious sponsorship came from the Young Men's Christian Association which during those years was turning from missionary work to a program of social service. Under the direction of Peter Roberts, a trained sociologist, the "Y" began in 1907 to organize evening classes in English and civics for foreigners. Roberts developed his own system for teaching practical English conversation to foreign-born adults, and by 1914 his volunteer instructors had some thirty thousand students.[11]

To Roberts, as to many of the humanitarian Americanizers, the immigrant seemed a blessing if redeemed and uplifted but a danger if left alone. A call to preserve American ideals was fairly commonly interwoven into pleas for service to mankind.[12] In fact, the individual who emerged in the last years of the Progressive era as the presiding genius of the still amorphous movement for Americanization combined to a unique degree the reformer's passion for social improvement with the nationalist's insistence on a single loyalty. Frances A. Kellor, half reformer, half nationalist, represented both sides of the Americanization movement. She gave it as much central direction as it was ever to receive, and through it she made her main contribution to American history.

A crisp, authoritative young lady with an instinct for order and organization, Frances Kellor took a law degree at Cornell before turning to sociology and social work at the University of Chicago and the New York Summer School of Philanthropy. At the turn of the century she plunged into the teeming tenements of New York as a fellow of the College Settlement. In 1904 she wrote *Out of Work*, a muckraking investigation of employment agencies exposing especially their victimization of women and immigrants. Employed thereafter by the Inter-Municipal Research Committee, Miss Kellor kept prying into the facts of urban social problems, drafting remedial legislation, and lobbying for its passage. More and more, the outcast state of the immigrant outraged her sense of justice.

By 1906 she had won the ear of Theodore Roosevelt, who was learning to value her advice on immigration laws.[13] For her part, Miss Kellor's devotion to Roosevelt's leadership grew with the years; in 1912 she became head of the Progressive party's research and publicity department. Also, her ideas increasingly reflected a Rooseveltian "New Nationalism." Always an apostle of industrial efficiency, she abhorred the chaos and waste of *laissez faire*. Through social research and national planning she hoped to organize and emancipate America's human resources, to rationalize opportunity, and to build a more unified nation. In one breath she preached social welfare and national discipline.[14]

Frances Kellor's direct involvement in Americanization began in

1908 when Governor Charles Evans Hughes, prompted by Lillian Wald, appointed the New York Commission on Immigration to inquire into the condition of aliens in the state. As secretary of the commission, Miss Kellor spent months visiting slums and vermin-infested labor camps, studying immigrant education and taking testimony on the exploitation of foreigners by employers and by their own fellow countrymen. The result was the first thorough, official state investigation of alien living conditions. It led to the establishment of a permanent state Bureau of Industries and Immigration under the direction of Miss Kellor. This agency supervised the newcomers' reception and distribution by hearing their complaints, preventing fraud, disseminating advice, and conducting continuing investigations. In time, the bureau's studies engendered further protective legislation regulating immigrant lodging houses, bankers, and steamship agents.[15]

Miss Kellor's work as a public servant (she was said to be the first woman to head a state bureau) by no means exhausted her restless determination to force justice and order upon American ethnic relations. Like any American with a cause, she needed an organization. It happened that one was at hand. In 1908 a group of public-spirited New England businessmen had launched in Boston the North American Civic League for Immigrants. Its founders, though not unmoved by sympathy, were chiefly concerned with protecting the status quo from the menace of ignorant, incendiary foreigners without resorting to immigration restriction. The league, therefore, combined aid with propaganda; it hired agents who advised new arrivals about jobs, housing, and transportation, and it sponsored widely publicized patriotic lectures in foreign languages in the evening schools. Miss Kellor, supported by a group of wealthy New Yorkers, organized a New York branch of the North American Civic League in December 1909.

But the branch and its parent soon parted ways. The New Yorkers developed a much broader, more imaginative program under Miss Kellor's direction. They employed all sorts of ingenious devices to stimulate education for immigrants and, most important, exerted constant pressure on the mid-Atlantic states for protective legislation.[16] While the New York effort followed a liberal direction, emphasizing state-supported social welfare, the parent league became increasingly reactionary. After the Lawrence

textile strike of 1912, the Boston group, subsidized by New England industrialists, concentrated on sending agents into foreign communities to act as industrial spies and leaders of anti-strike movements. Early in 1914, therefore, the New Yorkers broke away completely to form the Committee for Immigrants in America, with Frances Kellor as vice-chairman and guiding spirit.[17]

Meanwhile the kind of governmental action which New York state had pioneered, and which the Kellor group did much to encourage elsewhere, was spreading. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and California undertook investigations into immigrant life on the model of the original New York inquiry, and some of those states followed through with permanent agencies. The most vigorous action came from California, whose Commission on Immigration and Housing was directed by Simon Lubin. The commission began work by exposing the dreadful living conditions underlying the Wheatland hop fields riot of 1913; in time its recommendations led to public regulation of labor camps, a unique program of home teachers in foreign districts, and the most complete tenement and lodging house laws in the country.[18] At the same time the larger American cities were expanding their evening school classes in English for immigrants; by 1915 Chicago had 13 per cent of its total non-English-speaking population enrolled in school.[19] In all these ways the progressive conscience was reaching new dimensions.

Nevertheless, these uncoordinated local, state, and voluntary efforts left Frances Kellor unsatisfied. The New Nationalist within her clamored for centralized, federal action; Americanization was floundering "without a *national* goal or consciousness." Her new Committee for Immigrants in America set itself up, therefore, as a central clearinghouse to aid, advise, and unify all public and private agencies interested in the problem throughout the country. It sought both "a national policy . . . to make of all these people one nation" and a federal bureau to lead the way. At the moment the best Miss Kellor could get from the federal government was the enthusiastic interest of the Bureau of Education, which had little power and scant appropriations. Nothing daunted, the Committee for Immigrants persuaded its own well-to-do backers—people like Frank Trumbull, the railroad president, Felix Warburg, the banker, and Mrs. E. H. Harriman—to put up the money

for establishing a Division of Immigrant Education within the Bureau of Education. The committee then provided this new unit with a staff of workers who proceeded to publicize the need for educational Americanization. Throughout its five-year life, the Division of Immigrant Education remained the subsidized creature of Miss Kellor's private pressure group.[20]

100 Per Cent Americanized

Molded by the social conscience and the growing national aspirations of the Progressive era the Americanization movement took definite form. It developed a broad program and a vigorous leadership. In a small way it was undoubtedly beginning to have some effect on the immigrants. What it lacked chiefly was followers: It failed signally to awaken a mass response in the American people. Then the war transformed it. In a few months Americanization blossomed into a great popular crusade. And as it swelled on the waves of wartime sentiment, the character of the movement subtly but profoundly changed.

"With startling suddenness," wrote one authority in 1916, "the effects flowing out of the war have brought to public attention aspects of immigration that heretofore have been regarded with unruffled complacency. It has consciously become all of a sudden of the very greatest importance to us as a nation that the immigrants whom we have welcomed into our society . . . should be an integral part of that society and not foreign to it. We have found that our forces for assimilating this foreign element have not been working. . . . We have suddenly been made to realize that . . . many of these . . . are not strangers to the hand that stabs in the dark or the lips that betray with a kiss." [21] Spurred by fear of the hyphen, the drive for national solidarity, the deepest force underlying Americanization, now reached far beyond its earlier demands.

Americanization pushed dramatically into the public eye in the spring and summer of 1915. The United States Bureau of Naturalization, set up in 1906 to supervise and standardize the admission of aliens to citizenship, had already begun before the European war to consider ways to encourage civic education for aspiring citizens and to make naturalization ceremonies more impressive.

As a publicity device the bureau persuaded the city fathers of Philadelphia to hold a great public reception for thousands of newly naturalized citizens on May 10, 1915. President Wilson came to the city of brotherly love for the occasion and delivered an important neutrality speech containing one of his noblest affirmations of the cosmopolitan sources of American nationality.

The event caused so much interest that the Committee for Immigrants in America eagerly seized upon the idea. It established an auxiliary, the National Americanization Day Committee, which organized similar receptions throughout the country on the Fourth of July, designating that holiday "Americanization Day." In a whirlwind campaign, Frances Kellor and her associates enlisted the cooperation of mayors, school authorities, churches, and civic groups, prepared data for speakers, and distributed suggested programs, buttons, and posters. When the Fourth arrived, 107 cities celebrated it as Americanization Day, and the country resounded with the committee's slogan, "Many Peoples, But One Nation." [22]

The tone was still liberal, and the emphasis still rested on social welfare; but the impulse behind the new interest in Americanization was fear of divided loyalties. The popular support which the movement had never had as a reform, now, with the waning of progressivism, poured out of an apprehensive nationalism. In this climate of opinion the leadership of the movement underwent a similar reorientation. The National Americanization Day Committee dropped the "Day" out of its title, largely absorbed the functions of the Committee for Immigrants in America, and continued the latter's role as the brain trust of Americanization. Still led by Frances Kellor, the group never entirely abandoned a humanitarian sympathy for the alien, but after the summer of 1915 it shifted its emphasis to a program of stimulating naturalization, breaking the immigrant's ties with the Old World, and teaching him an American culture. The earlier social objectives faded into the background. Loyalty was contrasted with "dual citizenship." The slogan "Many Peoples, But One Nation" gave way to a new one, "America First." Also, the National Americanization Committee deliberately tried to link its own objectives to the more powerful preparedness movement by interpreting Americanization as the civilian side of national defense. Miss Kellor appeared before the National Security League to warn of the internal peril

from foreign influences. In the same year, 1916, her most breathless book, *Straight America*, pleaded for military preparedness, industrial mobilization, universal service, and Americanization as coessential to a more vital nationalism.[23]

The Americanizers were now gaining fresh recruits daily. The General Federation of Women's Clubs put its maternal shoulder to the wheel; the D.A.R. girded itself for more strenuous efforts; fraternal organizations saw an opportunity for patriotic service; educators, under pressure both from the Bureau of Naturalization and the Bureau of Education, revised their teaching methods and expanded their classes.

Significant support came from business organizations. In addition to patriotic motives and the desire to forestall unrest, many businessmen had good economic reasons to encourage Americanization. Just when a flood of Allied purchase orders turned the depression of 1914 into a rousing boom, the war cut off industry's supply of new manpower. For the first time since the Civil War the American economy was hurtling into flush times with no fresh stream of immigrant labor on which to draw. Confronted with the novel problem of labor conservation, many an employer saw in Americanization a means of increasing the efficiency, cooperation, and output of his present workers.

The Detroit Board of Commerce showed the way in 1915 with a massive civic campaign to get non-English-speaking foreigners into the night schools. Henry Ford, who was just then launching a spectacular experiment in welfare capitalism, set up his own Ford English School and compelled his foreign employees to attend it before and after work two days a week. Both the National Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce then commended Americanization to their members. The chamber, which was led by some of the same people who were active in the National Americanization Committee, entered jointly with the latter into a general campaign for business support. (The ubiquitous Frances Kellor emerged as assistant to the chairman of the Immigration Committee of the Chamber of Commerce.) As a result, a good many businessmen inaugurated factory classes, distributed civics lessons in pay envelopes, and even subsidized public evening schools. A substantial segment of employers regarded these operations as quixotic, but those who did participate

in them commonly thought that Americanization paid dividends in productivity and morale.[24]

America's entry into the war keyed up the whole agitation which had been developing over the preceding two years to a more intense and frantic pitch. Since victory itself might depend on the loyalty of the vast foreign population, a note of urgency and a plea for haste sharpened the entreaties for national solidarity. Furthermore, the crusade provided an outlet for civilian America's tremendous hunger to "do something" to help win the war. In a global encounter which touched off the most strenuous appeals for "service," Americanization took its place along with Liberty bond campaigns, food conservation, Red Cross work, the detection of disloyalty, and a dozen other voluntary drives as a way of enlisting on the home front. In some ways, Americanizing the alien was perhaps more satisfying than merely spying upon him because success seemed to depend on the same type of moral exhortation which sustained so much of the war effort. To a nation charged with evangelical impulses, Americanization was a mission of redemption; to a country of salesmen, it offered an adventure in high pressure salesmanship.

The movement had now grown too large and chaotic to conform to any central leadership. Although the National Americanization Committee kept issuing directives and recommendations and continued to exert much influence, enthusiasm overflowed the bounds of all authority or direction. Thousands of agencies were in some measure engaged: schools, churches, fraternal orders, patriotic societies, civic organizations, chambers of commerce, philanthropies, railroads, and industries, and—to a limited degree—trade unions. There was much duplication, overlapping, and pawing of the air. Many harassed their local school superintendents; others deluged the foreign-born with patriotic leaflets. Now that the preparedness movement was past, the National Security League and the American Defense Society developed a program of war propaganda which included public meetings in immigrant neighborhoods. Other groups dispatched speakers to instruct their fellow citizens on the duty "to go among our alien residents and to see that they understand the desirability of becoming citizens [and appreciate] the debt they owe to the country which is pro-

tecting them." [25] Among women's clubs there spread the practice of paying friendly, Americanizing visits to immigrant homes.

On one such occasion, according to a story current in Washington at the time, a group of Americanizing ladies was met by a Bohemian tenement dweller with the plea that they wait and come back next week.. "What!" they protested. "You mean that you . . . want to put *off* your entrance into American life?"

"No, no!" the agitated Bohemian woman replied. "We're *perfectly* willing to be Americanized. Why, we never turn *any* of them away. But there's nobody home but me. The boys volunteered, my man's working on munitions, and all the rest are out selling Liberty bonds. I don't want you to get mad, but *can't* you come back next week?" [26]

The confusion was multiplied and exacerbated by competition between several federal agencies for primacy in the movement. The Bureau of Education, backed by continuing subsidies from the National Americanization Committee, worked very hard not only to foster immigrant education but also to mobilize all the forces interested in Americanization. The bureau, and its *alter ego*, the N.A.C., did manage in some degree to dominate the Americanization work which sprang up through the loose machinery of the Council of National Defense. The latter, acting on the recommendations of the N.A.C., urged the various state councils of defense to support the program of the Bureau of Education. In line with this objective, the state councils proceeded to create further machinery to "coordinate" the work of local, voluntary agencies; but little uniformity resulted. All this aroused the jealousy of the Bureau of Naturalization, which was pushing its own narrower program of citizenship classes in the public evening schools. The Bureau of Naturalization got the National Council of Defense to endorse its campaign too and then lobbied for legislative authority to absorb control over all federal aspects of Americanization.

At this point, in the spring of 1918, the Bureau of Education advanced suddenly into new terrain. The N.A.C. turned over its entire New York office and office force to the Bureau of Education. There Frances Kellor developed for the bureau a network of direct contacts with immigrant groups through foreign-language propaganda and through conferences with representatives of the several nationalities. Thus the bureau passed beyond the

practice of coaching Americans in Americanization and began to work on the immigrants themselves.

But meanwhile the Committee on Public Information, the new federal agency for psychological warfare, was doing exactly the same thing quite independently. Through another social worker, Josephine Roche, the C.P.I. proved remarkably successful in directing advice and patriotic propaganda at more than a score of immigrant nationalities and giving them a sense of participation in the nation's cause.[27]

The organizational confusion in wartime Americanization was one mark of the feverish spirit which the movement now displayed; another was its prevailing ideology. The war carried much further the shift from sympathy to fear, from cosmopolitan democracy to jealous nationalism, which had displayed itself in the preparedness period. In large measure the Americanizers were swept up in the current of 100 per cent Americanism. Most of them gave themselves over to more or less the whole range of 100 per cent ideas: the insistence on a conformist loyalty intolerant of any values not functional to it; the demand for a high sense of duty toward the nation; the faith in a drumfire of exhortation and propaganda to accomplish desired social objectives; and the ultimate reliance on coercion and punishment. In short, by threat and rhetoric 100 per cent Americanizers opened a frontal assault on foreign influence in American life. They set about to stampede immigrants into citizenship, into adoption of the English language, and into an unquestioning reverence for existing American institutions. They bade them abandon entirely their Old World loyalties, customs, and memories. They used high-pressure, steamroller tactics. They cajoled and they commanded.

The drillmasters of Americanization made an appearance as early as the preparedness period. General Leonard Wood, one of the leading advocates of preparedness, suggested that universal military service would itself offer the best means of making unassimilated groups "understand that they are Americans." [28] There was some talk of applying economic compulsions to naturalization by giving job preferences to citizens, and Henry Ford's compulsory English School represented a pioneering attempt to apply the 100 per cent philosophy to education. The first thing that foreign-speaking employees learned in the Ford school was how to say,

"I am a good American." Later the students acted out a pantomime which admirably symbolized the spirit of the enterprise. In this performance a great melting pot (labeled as such) occupied the middle of the stage. A long column of immigrant students descended into the pot from backstage, clad in outlandish garb and flaunting signs proclaiming their fatherlands. Simultaneously from either side of the pot another stream of men emerged, each prosperously dressed in identical suits of clothes and each carrying a little American flag.[29]

With America's entry into the war, of course, 100 per cent Americanization picked up momentum. Various official and semi-official agencies foisted patriotic articles on foreign-language newspapers. Schoolteachers in New York City made use of the immigrants' children to circulate loyalty pledges for the signature of their parents. The Cincinnati City Council closed down poolrooms operated by aliens, on the theory that such establishments kept foreigners apart from American influences. The Governor of Iowa issued a proclamation banning any language except English in all schools, church services, conversations in public places or over the telephone.[30] Congress struck its hardest blow in the Revenue Act of 1918, which imposed on "non-resident" aliens an income tax rate twice as heavy as that for citizens and "resident" aliens. The definition of a "non-resident" alien was never entirely clear, but the act had the effect of driving thousands of foreign workers to declare their intention to become citizens.

Meanwhile private individuals and groups often exerted sterner pressures. Although few industrialists could afford to fire their unnaturalized employees, many adopted and publicized a compromise policy of promoting only citizens or those in process of becoming citizens; scores of manufacturers in Chicago posted such an announcement in their plants.[31] A more extreme threat was that of deportation, the ultimate sanction of the 100 per center. What better fate, indeed, did anyone who resisted assimilation deserve? Accordingly a bill to deport all aliens who would not apply for citizenship within three months was introduced in Congress in 1916, and during the war the idea of expulsion as an alternative to assimilation was frequently discussed, though it could not yet be implemented.[32]

Nothing better illustrated the drift of wartime Americanization

than the views of Frances Kellor and her National Americanization Committee, still the chief claimants for leadership of the movement. Already pulled part way from its original course by the anxious militancy of the preparedness period, the committee in 1917 embraced much of the 100 per cent philosophy. So far had Miss Kellor and her wealthy associates swung from their early emphasis on reform that now they stressed the protection of the economic status quo. As a New Nationalist, Miss Kellor had always stood for rationalizing the business system instead of attacking it. Since her interest in efficiency and discipline never flagged, she slipped easily from the concepts of the welfare state to those of welfare capitalism once wartime apprehensions muted progressive aspirations.

Above all, the N.A.C. now urged the suppression of unrest and disloyalty, the elimination of conditions under which "anti-American" influences flourished, and the dissolution of minority cultures. To prevent strikes or other disaffection, the committee recommended a constant surveillance of aliens by means of a semiannual registration of the whole population. It established a Man-Power Engineering Service which advised employers how and where to use alien enemies in their plants and how to guard against sabotage. ("Let us insist frankly," the committee warned, "that a man born on another soil has to *prove* himself for America.") It demanded internment wherever proof of "anti-American sympathy" existed. ("There is no use temporizing.") And it proposed requiring all aliens to learn English and apply for citizenship within three years, or face deportation.[33] A note of sympathy remained, strangely blended with the sense of menace: the committee still criticized social discriminations and barbaric working conditions. But against an ounce of accommodation it balanced a pound of coercion.

Although 100 per cent Americanization constituted a major break from the old, easygoing confidence in assimilation, in comparison to similar movements in other countries it was mild indeed. Aside from the discriminatory tax law of 1918, the federal government and almost all of the state governments confined themselves to moral suasion in aiding Americanization; they did not, with the rarest exceptions, resort to force. All of the more extreme proposals of private zealots remained unrealized: deportation, a time limit on naturalization and adoption of the English language,

suppression of the foreign-language press, mass internments, the denial of industrial employment to aliens. In part, this comparative restraint reflected the pressure of a democratic heritage; in part, however, it was due to the limits which the war itself imposed on 100 per cent Americanism. The need for immediate national unity was too pressing to permit a thorough indulgence in tactics which would surely breed wide resentment among aliens, thus intensifying their alienage. Too violent an assault on the immigrant would defeat the aim of speedily transforming him.

Nor were the inhibitions which the war laid upon wartime nationalism merely negative and expediential. Through military service and through countless voluntary community projects, the peoples of America drew together into a closer union than any they had known before. In dedication to a common cause, they found a good deal of the unity for which they sought. The cohesive sympathies of 1917 and 1918 certainly did not satiate the craving for conformity; but who can doubt that the fund of good will which most minorities enjoyed during those years softened the blows that fell upon them?

The International Nationalists

The forces that restrained the mailed fist of the 100 per center upheld the beckoning hand of the humanitarian; what checked one released the other. Although wartime fears diverted Americanization from predominantly liberal channels, the sunny side of the war spirit lent a certain encouragement to the liberal approach. The strategy born in the social settlements, though no longer the controlling strategy, got wide support from the fraternal idealism of a common cause. Americanization still pulled two ways.

Liberal Americanization did not pass from peace to war entirely unchanged. An early zeal for reforming the immigrant's environment had to give place, like all programs of social reconstruction, to the immediate exigencies of victory. Furthermore the democratic, cosmopolitan school shared a heightened national consciousness. By taking seriously the importance of *national* integration as well as *human* integration, the liberals entered more fully into a nationalist mood; they talked less about reform and more about America. Their Americanism, however, contained the same humane values that had been central to their reformism. They remained the keepers of the cosmopolitan traditions of American democracy.

In contrast to the high-pressure salesmen of Americanization, this group pleaded for appreciation of the immigrants' cultural heritages. The concept of "immigrant gifts," which the settlement founders had first preached to the immigrants themselves, served to define an ideal of nationality which could be set against 100 per cent theories. The latter, according to the liberal view, would deprive the nation of sources of strength and enrichment. One ideal called on America to enlarge its national character by accepting contributions, the other to protect that character by a quarantine on infections. One pictured the nation as great in the universal range of its ties and sympathies, the other as great in the purity of its separateness. One looked toward the future growth of a still unfinished nationality; the other looked back to the past perfection of a completed pattern.

During the war, as before, liberal Americanization drew its main support from social workers, from liberal clergymen, and from educators and intellectuals alert to the social implications of democracy. In terms as vague in their own way as those of the 100 per centers, a school superintendent appealed for a policy of Americanization which "welcomes the best of the culture, the arts, and the crafts of the Old World, that . . . we may be enriched with this spiritual inheritance"; Professor John Erskine deplored the tendency of Americans to impoverish their national character by too readily abandoning their various pasts; and John Dewey, a philosopher whose own sense of democracy had broadened through association with Jane Addams at Hull House, pleaded for "a unity created by drawing out and composing into a harmonious whole the best, the most characteristic, which each contributing race and people has to offer." [84]

These cosmopolitan views received a special stimulus from the idealistic internationalism that swept through the ranks of liberal intellectuals as the United States joined battle with Germany. Pacific and largely isolationist before the war, most of them embraced Woodrow Wilson's interpretation of American intervention as an altruistic dedication of the nation to the cause of mankind. Repudiating isolation as a myth in an interdependent world,

they now insisted that America's universal ideals could be realized only through participation in the world community. Linking nationalism explicitly with internationalism, they argued that "the measure of national greatness is to be found in international service." [35] In a sense, the Wilsonian liberals applied the cosmopolitan attitudes they had shown toward the immigrants to the society of nations. Consequently they regarded liberal Americanization as the domestic equivalent of a federated world, and they believed the United States uniquely qualified to realize both goals. Some thought that the two endeavors depended upon each other.[36] Woodrow Wilson himself struck this note. He liked to argue that America's cosmopolitan nationality gave her a consciousness of touching elbows and hearts with all men everywhere and set for her a special vocation of world leadership. But Wilson's feeling for the immigrants was too abstract, too little a flesh-and-blood awareness of people in travail, to remain consistent. When immigrants seemed stubbornly unimpressed by America's mission to gird for war or to join the League of Nations, Wilson lashed out at them fiercely. "Hyphens are the knives that are being stuck into this document," he often charged in defending the Versailles Treaty.[37]

Insubstantial and prettily unreal as the cosmopolitan outlook often was, it did control the policies followed by some Americanizing agencies, thereby serving as an operative check on 100 per cent tendencies. The Delaware Service Citizens, for example, organized evening classes at which twenty-one nationalities sang their own songs and danced their native dances in native costumes. In Springfield, Illinois, a "Gifts of the Nations" class gave immigrants an opportunity to tell others about their homelands. The city of Cleveland, guided by Professor Raymond Moley of Western Reserve University, adopted one of the broadest of such programs, but when it tried to bring foreign and old-stock groups together in a common theater project, it found that good intentions and an appreciation of cultural gifts did not, alas, make people mingle.[38] Among federal agencies the liberal approach was most consistently applied by the Committee on Public Information. By emphasizing the Wilsonian war aim of national self-determination, the committee encouraged immigrant nationalities to associate the "best interests" of their homelands with the American cause; and on July

4, 1918, the C.P.I. organized throughout the United States gigantic demonstrations at which immigrants paraded their "gifts" and affirmed their loyalty.[39]

Whatever effectiveness these devices may have had during the war was soon lost when hostilities ended. The vitality of liberal Americanization depended very much on the high degree of actual national unity that existed during the war period. Once the centripetal pull of the war effort ceased, that sense of dedication to a common national purpose broke down. Among native-born liberals, Americanization, understood as a conscious fostering of nationalism, no longer seemed important after the war. Instead of identifying themselves with the nation, liberal intellectuals felt an increasing alienation from it as reaction followed victory. Instead of clinging to an idealistic, cosmopolitan nationalism, many of them in bitterness and disillusion repudiated all nationalisms, voluntary or coercive, international or parochial. Insofar as they still interested themselves in the immigrant's assimilation, they now thought of it on the whole as a social and economic problem which would pretty largely take care of itself under conditions of social and economic justice. The contributions theory formed the point of departure, for example, for an ambitious project of cooperative research into methods of Americanization which the Carnegie Corporation of New York initiated in the spring of 1918; but the volumes that finally came out of this inquiry in the early twenties said little or nothing about immigrant gifts. Instead, they analyzed the difficulties which immigrants faced in the United States in realistic, sociological terms. And in a book which presumed to speak for the postwar liberal mind, Frederic Howe, who had played an active part in Americanization in its early, progressive phase, now dismissed the problem of the alien as essentially a problem of reestablishing economic democracy.[40]

The decline of a spirit of national unity after the war weakened the sympathetic school of Americanization in another way too. The same sense of solidarity that had enlivened the interest of native liberals in patriotic causes had also helped to make the immigrants receptive to the movement as long as the war lasted. Liberal Americanizers, because they relied on voluntary incentives, very much needed evidence that the alien was well disposed and responsive to their appeal. During the war the immigrants reacted

favorably or at least acquiescently to the advances of their mentors. They marched in parades, trooped to class, endured the patronizing attitude that sometimes accompanied liberal Americanization, and dared not protest against the lash of the 100 per centers. Once the crisis ended, however, a long-suppressed resentment burst loose. In recoiling from threats and pressures, the more articulate immigrant leaders often denounced anything that went by the name of Americanization. You threaten to outlaw our speech and memories, they said in effect, and at the same time coax us to deck ourselves out like exhibits in a circus and entertain you with our quaint dialects. An Italian editor summed it up bluntly. "Americanization," he wrote, "is an ugly word." [41]

The minority revolt against Americanization, a revolt accentuated by all of the other manifestations of 100 per cent Americanism, hurled large blocs of immigrants into compensatory chauvinisms of their own. Like the pan-African ferment among American Negroes, Zionism became a mighty force in American Jewish life, and among other European minorities nationalist organizations multiplied, each asserting its own defiant group consciousness.[42] Thus while old-stock liberals were turning anti-nationalist, immigrants were to an unprecedented degree trying to build their own separate nationalisms. Both began to look upon any effort at stimulating American national unity with distrust or even scorn. The cosmopolitan ideal of American nationality as a harmonious fusion of immigrant gifts lived on, to be sure, but not as a significant force. Stripped of most of its functional importance and partially discredited by a more realistic sociology, the gifts idea lingered in story and sentiment. It survived as a genteel tradition.

Meanwhile the decline of the cosmopolitan school of Americanization after the war left the 100 per centers very largely in possession of the field. Undaunted by the immigrants' increasing antagonism, they moved grimly into the breach.

Last Phase: Antidote to Bolshevism

In 1919 and 1920 the crusade for Americanization entered a final convulsive phase. Much creditable work continued to be done, with humanity and understanding, in teaching English to foreigners, especially through the development during and after the war of college courses which trained teachers specifically for such work.[43] But as a general movement Americanization now took on its most frightened and feverish aspect. Swept into the postwar era by an unspent longing for national unity, Americanization cast off some of the restraints imposed by wartime conditions and responded aggressively to the social schisms which opened as those restraints dissolved. The context within which the movement now functioned was the Big Red Scare. Americanization served, in fact, as the positive side of the 100 per cent program during the Red Scare, while anti-radical nativism formed the negative side. Through repression and deportation on the one hand and speedy total assimilation on the other, 100 per centers hoped to eradicate discontent and purify the nation.

The strategy of their campaign was little changed; it was simply more fully articulated. The war had taught them the power of propaganda and had suggested also the supplementary value of governmental coercion. They were prepared to indulge in the one fully and to employ the other with less hesitation. It seemed only fair and sensible to put every ounce of pressure possible behind Americanization in order to salvage the merely ignorant aliens and separate them from the vicious ones. The country could then, with a clear conscience, expel those who remained resistant.[44] The degree to which the patrioteers of 1919-1920 relied on Americanization as a weapon against unrest is indicated by the fact that New York state's Committee on Seditious Activities (the famous Lusk Committee that hounded liberals and radicals alike) devoted almost half of its 4,500-page report to Americanization. Similarly a United States Senate committee investigating the great steel strike of 1919 urgently prescribed Americanization as a means of preventing such conflicts in the future.[45]

In the vanguard now, sounding their alarms and rallying their hosts, were the patriotic societies. Two especially, both products of the war, clutched for leadership. The National Security League, the most powerful of the preparedness societies, had broadened its scope during the war to include Americanization in a general campaign of nationalistic agitation. In December 1918, it shifted gears, moving into a country-wide drive against Bolshevism; and Americanization leaped to the top of its agenda. "The battle to make the country safe is not won," it announced. "The enemy but wears a

different guise." [46] The league, which was led by a group of excited corporation directors, was strictly a propaganda organization; it had great faith in the power of organized patriotism to uphold the economic status quo. Counting on deportation to take care of the "irreconcilable radicals," the league concentrated on preaching the 100 per cent ideal of patriotic docility to "the great mass, not yet hopeless, of aliens . . . neither speaking nor thinking American." Accordingly it formed a "Flying Squadron" of hundreds of speakers, who invaded the foreign quarters "to contradict the lies of agitators to ignorant aliens." It circularized employers to organize patriotic meetings in their factories; it set up a program to train teachers for Americanization work; and it vainly sought permission from the federal government to undertake the semiofficial role of investigating all applicants for citizenship.[47]

The American Legion, in its early years the supreme embodiment of the 100 per cent philosophy, leaned more toward the nativist side of the Red Scare and favored repressive tactics more than did the league. But the legion by no means neglected Americanization. At its first national convention in 1919 it established a National Americanism Commission with the particular task of stepping up the tempo of Americanization work in the schools and inciting them to a more vigorous inculcation of the legion's philosophy. Declaring that radicalism came mostly from the "non-American speaking population," the veterans also put pressure on Congress to require all aliens to learn "the American language." This done, the legion was sure that in the next generation foreign colonies would disappear and American ideals of government become secure.[48] Other patriotic societies, both old and new, took much the same view. In the Pacific Northwest the Constitutional Government League combined Americanization and anti-strike propaganda. In Chicago the United Americans enrolled 150 speakers, who kept track of radical meetings and sent a rival orator to the nearest corner whenever a meeting was held. The Daughters of the American Revolution issued in some fifteen languages a manual for immigrants, advising them to distinguish between liberty and license, learn the American way of living, revere the Constitution, save their earnings and pay their taxes, and refrain from dropping papers and rubbish in the streets.[49]

Industrialists too remained active in Americanization after the

war, and though some of them gave way to hysteria, a substantial number avoided the extremities of the 100 per cent approach. They shared, to be sure, the anxious fear of Bolshevism, the reliance on patriotism to counteract it, and the association of loyalty with conformity. But as employers of immigrant labor, many of the big industrialists knew that it was to their own self-interest to deal gently with men already resentful at being pushed around; and as converts to "welfare capitalism" an increasing group of business leaders felt an obligation to cultivate the good will of their workers, both native and foreign. Consequently they shied away from tactics too overtly coercive, recommending a humane and kindly approach rather than an overzealous arrogance. "Imagine *yourself* adrift in a foreign-speaking land," declared the organ of the West Virginia coal operators; other manufacturers vaguely endorsed the golden rule.[50] On the whole those employers of foreign-born labor who took a serious interest in Americanization tried to practice it with a certain humanity; they tried to implement a set of 100 per cent assumptions, but diplomatically.

To no small extent their policy reflected the guidance of Frances Kellor, who gave up after the war her hopeless attempt to control and direct the whole Americanization movement and concentrated on working through business channels. Her associations with business leaders had increased during the war, as her contact with progressive reform had diminished. By the time the war ended and the specter of Bolshevism came to the fore, Miss Kellor was looking much more to business than to government for national unity and protection. Her National Americanization Committee's long-standing subsidization of the United States Bureau of Education ceased in March 1919. The connection would shortly have become illegal under a statute prohibiting the federal government from accepting financial aid from private organizations;[51] but Miss Kellor was already absorbed in another project. To replace the N.A.C. she was organizing a new society, of, by, and for American industry.

Its beginnings went back to a quiet dinner at Sherry's Restaurant in New York late in November 1918, at which Frances Kellor addressed fifty of the biggest employers of foreign-born labor in the United States. She warned them that Americanization had thus far had little success and that they would now face great un-

rest, with minority nationalisms sucking many foreign workers back to their homelands and Bolshevism spreading among those who remained. She proposed a somewhat oblique propaganda campaign by which industry might strengthen its grip on its labor force and "break up the nationalistic, racial groups by combining their members for America." With an initial subscription of $100,000, Miss Kellor soon launched the Inter-Racial Council.[52] The inclusion of a number of "racial members" (conservative representatives of immigrant groups) gave the council the appearance of a cooperative enterprise and supplied it with minority contacts, but essentially it consisted of much the same group that had sponsored the National Americanization Committee. The millionaire T. Coleman du Pont became chairman, and the council soon enlisted the support of hundreds of industrial corporations.

In the interest of stabilizing industrial conditions, the Inter-Racial Council earnestly besought its followers to avoid strong-arm tactics of Americanization. It counseled "spontaneous Americanization, which, by indirect methods can be delicately but effectively stimulated." [53] The stimulated spontaneity amounted, however, to a veiled coercion. While furnishing its industrial members with pro-American films and advice on their labor problems, the council gave its main attention to dominating the foreign-language press. A unique opportunity arose in December 1918. The crafty Louis Hammerling, who had manipulated foreign-language papers for a decade, was discredited by a Senatorial exposé of services he had performed for liquor interests and for the German government. Some of the leading backers of the Inter-Racial Council seized the occasion to buy Hammerling's American Association of Foreign Language Newspapers and to install Frances Kellor as its new president. The association, which handled practically all of the national advertising in the immigrant press, then became the organ of the Inter-Racial Council. Miss Kellor eliminated the chicanery and political partisanship of Hammerling's régime, while continuing to use the association to control the policies of its member newspapers. The association's stranglehold on national advertising enabled it to flood immigrant editors' columns with patriotic articles, admonitions against emigration to Europe, and anti-radical propaganda.[54]

If the leading industrial Americanizers, tempering fanaticism

with self-interest and fear with sympathy, avoided overt compulsions, it is also significant that the whole Americanization movement remained primarily a venture in persuasion. It continued to rely much more upon ideological pressure than upon the coercive power of government. Even for the most rabid 100 per centers, the force of law was ancillary to that of propaganda. After the wartime restraints on 100 per cent Americanism broke down, it still had to work within limits set by a hallowed distrust of state power and official regimentation. Indeed the general postwar reaction brought this distrust sharply in focus. Consequently, in 1919-1920, when the Red Scare gave a new urgency to Americanization, its legislative achievements were still modest. To be sure, a remarkable number of statutes were now enacted to add force to the crusade. But every effort to put new federal sanctions behind Americanization failed, and most of the laws passed by the states encouraged persuasion while stopping short of coercion.

A sustained campaign for broad federal support of Americanization began in 1918 and extended into 1920. The Bureau of Naturalization sponsored one bill, the Bureau of Education another and more extensive one. The latter measure provided for substantial federal aid to the states, on a dollar-matching basis, to finance the teaching of English to aliens and native illiterates. In behalf of this plan, Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, organized national conferences and bombarded Congress with pleas for a common language as imperative to national self-protection. After the war there was much sentiment for making such a program of educational Americanization compulsory for all aliens, and in the form in which the bill finally came before the Senate in January 1920, it offered a federal grant only to those states which would require all adult aliens under forty-five to attend the course.[55] Congress, however, was in no mood to embark on new expenditures or to invest the federal government with new powers. The Bureau of Education had to withdraw from Americanization after its subsidy from the Kellor group ended, leaving the Bureau of Naturalization the sole federal agency still active. The latter continued, on a progressively reduced scale, its customary supervision of citizenship classes in the public schools.

Without federal aid, the states in 1919-1920 rushed in to press the crusade for Americanization. A deluge of legislation designed

to counteract Bolshevism with nationalism poured out of state legislatures. As always, the principal effort centered on immigrant education. More than a score of states passed laws authorizing or strengthening night school classes in English for foreigners. Some gave local governments considerable financial support for such work; some also took over the propaganda activities which the state councils of defense had conducted among the foreign-born. At least two states, Idaho and Utah, yielded to the coercive spirit by requiring non-English-speaking aliens to attend Americanization classes.[56] Others went farther along the path of 100 percentism, accompanying their educational laws with certain legislative inhibitions on foreign influences. In 1919 fifteen states decreed that English must be the sole language of instruction in all primary schools, public and private. Several states followed the lead of New York in insisting that all public schoolteachers be citizens. Nebraska extended the same requirement to private schools and also stipulated that all meetings except religious or lodge meetings must be conducted in English.[57] Oregon, in the interest of Americanization, came close to outlawing the foreign-language press by requiring that all foreign-language publications display prominently a literal English translation of their entire contents. Two years later, in 1922, the same state passed what was perhaps the last and certainly one of the most severe of the Americanization laws, declaring that all children had to be educated in public rather than private elementary schools. Meanwhile, in 1920, California struck directly at alienage by ordering every adult male alien to register and pay a special annual poll tax of $10. Both the California poll tax and the Oregon school law were declared unconstitutional.[58]

With these statutes, the Americanization movement reached and passed its zenith. As a workaday endeavor to teach English and civics to foreigners in the public evening schools, the program had taken permanent root, and it endured. There, in the schools, it had its major institutional impact, and its most lasting effect was to give a powerful stimulus to all phases of adult education. (During the twenties a number of the agencies set up to supervise immigrant education became departments or divisions of adult education.)[59] But as a major expression of American nationalism, Americanization faded swiftly in the latter part of 1920 and in 1921.

Even before, signs of its approaching breakup were manifest. The defection of many of the liberal Americanizers once the war ended had already largely deprived the crusade of the spirit of sympathy so essential to its earlier successes. Then, in the fear-ridden atmosphere of the Red Scare, the movement lost in coherence as it gained in hysteria. To its most zealous proponents, Americanization began to seem a grander and more comprehensive thing than a simple effort to transform the immigrant. Like the 100 per cent Americanism behind it, the movement now appeared as an antidote for every kind of dissent and a panacea for all of the nation's ills. Men flushed with enthusiasm for the systematic inculcation of patriotism talked more and more in 1919-1920 about "the Americanization of America," rejoicing that the campaign was broadening into one that would "fortify the American Government through implanting and fostering a higher ideality in the individual citizen, whatever his birth." [60] This increasing diffuseness enabled all sorts of special interests to appropriate the idea for their own ends. Evangelical churches adopted the slogan, "Christianization and Americanization are one and the same thing"; the Americanization Fund of Los Angeles, established by ultraconservative businessmen, subsidized campaigns for the open shop and against the initiative law; an Athletes' Americanization League worked to provide free athletic equipment for every American youth on the theory that sports were "the logical antidote for unrest." [61] Abandoned as a reform and balked as a movement for speedy, wholesale assimilation, Americanization was losing contact with the immigrants.

Finally, in the course of 1920, two events—the onset of economic depression and the passing of the Red Scare—delivered the *coup de grâce*. The depression cut off much of the financial support. During the war and postwar boom, businessmen, by organizing factory classes, subsidizing propaganda campaigns, and contributing to the largest Americanization societies, had invested heavily in a movement that promised them a more efficient as well as a more American labor force. Now, however, as production levels slumped, as labor shortages eased and unemployment soared, Americanization no longer seemed worth the expense or effort. Factory classes folded up; even Henry Ford stopped stirring the melting pot. The rich income of the Inter-Racial Council dwin-

dled, and after 1920 it disappeared from sight, bringing to a close Frances Kellor's long career as chaperone of the immigrants.[62] Yet funds were less basic to the vigor of the Americanization movement than were fears. Above all, the crusade came to an end because the collapse of the Big Red Scare dried up its emotional wellsprings. Once the specter of an imminent Bolshevik revolution dissolved, the crusade lost all urgency, lost, in fact, its whole immediate and pressing object.

This is not to say that foreigners no longer seemed a national menace after the early months of 1920. The sense of danger was still vivid; the 100 per center's thirst for conformity remained unslaked. But his conception of the foreign peril changed so profoundly that Americanization became wholly irrelevant to it. From fear of a radical danger, nationalists reverted in 1920 and thereafter to a racial bias. Radicalism, and the hyphenism that preceded it, had been ideological infections; presumably one might set up ideological defenses against them. But the racial danger was in the blood. Why try to educate men inherently incapable of receiving American ideals? Why try to change people who are biologically unchangeable? Why, the influential *Saturday Evening Post* now asked, try to make Americans out of those who will always be Americanski? [63] Why, indeed, put much faith in ideals at all? As early as February 1920, an extremely popular writer declared: "The whole theory of Americanization is one which J. J. Rousseau and T. Jefferson would call perfectly lovely if they were alive. It goes in well with a lot of these mentally subjective theories about altruism and democracy, which in my belief have pretty much brought America to ruin. . . ." [64]

The comment had perhaps a certain grain of truth. Americanization, even in its most coercive aspect, involved an appeal to the foreign-born. It rested, therefore, on a faith in the power of ideals and in the capacity of at least a good share of foreigners to respond to them. It was a venture in conversion and uplift. It drew, to be sure, on nativistic impulses and suspicions, but it served in a way to contain them. It turned part of the new fears of foreign influence which came out of the war into a positive program of emancipation rather than a wholly negative one of exclusion.

The dissolution of the movement left 100 per centers with a sense of failure and disillusion. Had they not tried their best to

bring the great mass of newcomers into the fold? Did not the experiment prove the incorrigibly unassimilable nature of the material on which they had worked? America's task, 100 per centers now realized, was much simpler. Instead of struggling to transform the foreign-born, nationalists must concentrate on keeping them out. Thus, while the movement for the redemption of the alien ebbed in 1920, the old drive for the rejection of the immigrant passed all previous bounds.

distinctive contribution of the Immigration Commission; *Survey*, XXV (1911), 519. For Boas's related ideas see his *Race and Democratic Society* (New York, 1945), esp. 87-92, 168-71.

60. Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, 1951-1954), III, 254-55; Marcus Braun to Samuel S. Koenig, September 13, 1911, in William Howard Taft Papers, Presidential Series 2, File 77 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
61. Arthur Koppell to Taft, January 29, 1912, and J. C. Delaney to C. D. Hilles, January 15, 1912, in Taft Papers, File 423; Robert E. Park, *The Immigrant Press and Its Control* (New York, 1922), 377-411.
62. *Who Was Who in America, 1897-1942*, p. 1024; Charles Bernheimer, ed., *The Russian Jew in the United States* (Philadelphia, 1905), 257-63; Philip Cowen, *Memories of an American Jew* (New York, 1932), 190-91, 257-58; Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, June 22, 1906, p. 16; Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, 411, 659 n. For an indication of how the Republicans won Jewish support by anti-Russian diplomatic gestures see Tyler Dennett, *John Hay: From Poetry to Politics* (New York, 1934), 396-97.
63. "William R. Hearst the Democratic Candidate," *Outlook*, LXXXIV (1906), 402; New York *Evening Journal*, July 8, 1912; William Z. Ripley, "Races in the United States," *Atlantic Monthly*, CII (1908), 751; *Collier's Weekly*, XLVII (June 10, 1911), 10.
64. Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, V, 439-40, 453-54.
65. Edward Lauterbach, "Keeping the Door Open: The Story of the National Liberal Immigration League," *American Citizen*, I (1912), 286-88; *Immigration: Address of L. J. Ellis of New York Representing the National Liberal Immigration League Before the Immigration Association of Missouri* (n.p., 1906), 2-3.
66. Oscar Straus to Cyrus Adler, May 28, 1906, and to Cyrus Sulzberger, June 14, 1906, in Oscar Straus Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress). See also letters from William Russell, Adler, Edward Lauterbach, and Nathan Bijur in this period.
67. Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, V, 285-86, 360-61; Blair Bolles, *Tyrant from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with Personal Power* (New York, 1951), 71-72.
68. *Cong. Rec.*, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 9152, 9156, 9195; Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, June 24, 1906, p. 11, and June 26, 1906, pp. 1, 8.
69. Bolles, *Tyrant*, 75-76.
70. M. F. Behar, *Our National Gates: Shut, Ajar or Open?* (New York, 1916), 6; *American Jewish Year Book*, 1907-08, p. 537.

Notes to Chapter Six

1. Roy Harvey Pearce, *The Savages of America: A Study of the Indian and the Idea of Civilization* (Baltimore, 1953), 5-11, 20-26; Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1934), I, 209-15.
2. Earl W. Count, "The Evolution of the Race Idea in Modern Western Culture During the Period of the Pre-Darwinian Nineteenth Century," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, VIII (1946), 139-65; John C. Greene, "Some Early Speculations on the Origin of Human Races," *American Anthropologist*, LVI (1954), 31-41, and "The American Debate on the Negro's Place in Nature, 1780-1815," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XV (1954), 384-96.

3. William Z. Ripley, "Geography as a Sociological Study," *Political Science Quarterly*, X (1895), 636-43.
4. Daniel C. Gilman, "Science in America," in Nathaniel S. Shaler, ed., *The United States of America: A Study of the American Commonwealth* (New York, 1894), II, 385; Stow Persons, ed., *Evolutionary Thought in America* (New Haven, 1950), 18, 273-74, 282-84. One exceptionally speculative American anthropologist, Daniel G. Brinton, championed the white race but made little effort to define particular branches of it; see his *Races and Peoples: Lectures on the Science of Ethnography* (New York, 1890).
5. *The Age of Steel* quoted in *Public Opinion*, I (1886), 355.
6. T. T. Munger, "Immigration by Passport," *Century Magazine*, XXXV (1888), 792-98. See also his *On the Threshold* (16th ed., Boston, 1885), 104-105; and (for the circumstances of the above article) Munger's letters to Richard Watson Gilder, September 17, 1886, and November 17, 1887, in The Century Collection (New York Public Library).
7. Josiah Strong, *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis* (New York, 1885), 171; James K. Hosmer, *A Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom: The Polity of the English-Speaking Race* (New York, 1890), 313, 321-27. See also Charles Morris, *The Aryan Race: Origins and Achievements* (Chicago, 1888), 311-12. For unqualified paeans to racial fusion see *Public Opinion*, II (1887), 429; and New England Society, *Anniversary Celebration*, 1886, p. 29.
8. A. Cleveland Coxe, "Government by Aliens," *Forum*, VII (1889), 599-603; *Dictionary of American Biography*, IV, 484.
9. Edward N. Saveth, *American Historians and European Immigrants, 1875-1925* (New York, 1948), 42-48, 137-40; John W. Burgess, "The Ideal of the American Commonwealth," *Political Science Quarterly*, X (1895), 406-11; Henry Cabot Lodge, *Early Memories* (New York, 1913), 203-209; John H. Denison, "The Survival of the American Type," *Atlantic Monthly*, LXXV (1895), 16-28.
10. United States Bureau of the Census, *Immigrants and Their Children, 1920*, Census Monograph No. 7 (Washington, 1927), 14; Barbara Miller Solomon, "The Intellectual Background of the Immigration Restriction Movement in New England," *New England Quarterly*, XXV (1952), 47-59.
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12. Nathaniel S. Shaler, "European Peasants as Immigrants," *Atlantic Monthly*, LXXI (1893), 647-55; Shaler, *United States of America*, II, 613. Shaler's general, Darwinian assumptions about race and environment are in his *Nature and Man in America* (New York, 1891).
13. Henry Cabot Lodge, *Speeches* (Boston, 1892), 45-47.

14. Lodge, "The Distribution of Ability in the United States," *Century Magazine*, XLII (1891), 687-94; *Congressional Record*, 54 Cong., 1 Sess., 2819. Cf. the transitional point of view that Lodge expressed in "The Restriction of Immigration" and "Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration," *North American Review*, CLII (1891), 27-35, 602-12.
15. *Cong. Rec.*, 54 Cong., 1 Sess., 2817-20; Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Peoples* (reprint, New York, 1924).
16. Francis A. Walker, *Discussions in Economics and Statistics* (New York, 1899), II, 308-13, 317, 445-47; Francis A. Walker, "The Tide of Economic Thought," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, VI (January-March, 1891), 37. In attacking the natural selection argument, Walker was expanding an observation that Richmond Mayo-Smith had made in "Control of Immigration," *Political Science Quarterly*, III (1888), 76.
17. Walker, *Discussions*, II, 415-26. Curiously, this population theory was anticipated many years earlier by one M. J. Dee, "Chinese Immigration," *North American Review*, CXXVI (1878), 519-22, but the idea fell on barren ground and no one seemed to recall it when Walker's essay appeared.
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20. Albert Shaw, *Political Problems of American Development* (New York, 1907), 65-74; Frederick William Chapman, "The Changed Significance of 'Anglo-Saxon,'" *Education*, XX (1900), 364-69. See also Brander Matthews, *The American of the Future and Other Essays* (New York, 1910), 11-22; and Society of Mayflower Descendants in the State of Illinois, *Publication No. 1* (Chicago, 1900).
21. Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore, 1935), 314-18, 367-69; Thomas B. Wilson, "The Asiatic Giant," *Overland Monthly*, XLVI (1905), 39-41; and James E. Free, "A War Cloud," *Overland Monthly*, XLIX (1907), 137-38.
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23. See note 31, Chapter VII.
24. George Edward Woodberry, *The Torch: Eight Lectures on Race Power in Literature Delivered Before the Lowell Institute* (New York, 1912), 4-6; Monroe Royce, *The Passing of the American* (New York, 1911); Albert Bushnell Hart, "Is the Puritan Race Dying Out?" *Munsey's Magazine*, XLV (1911), 252-55; *Literary Digest*, XLVI (1913), 767; Providence *Bulletin*, February 29, 1908, quoted in Files of the Immigration Restriction League, Box 1 (Houghton Library, Harvard University).

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26. Edward A. Ross, "The Causes of Race Superiority," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XVIII (1901), 85-88, and "The Value Rank of the American People," *Independent*, LVII (1904), 1061-63.
27. Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1931), 471-72; Alfred Henry Lewis, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Speeches of Theodore Roosevelt, 1901-1905* (Washington, 1906), I, 548. A deeper insight into Roosevelt's mind is supplied in Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, 1951-1954), V, 19-20, VI, 959-63.
28. *Harper's Weekly*, XLIX (1905), 419; M. S. Iseman, M.D., *Race Suicide* (New York, 1912), 5-6; Lydia Kingsmill Commander, *The American Idea: Does the National Tendency Toward a Small Family Point to Race Suicide or Race Development?* (New York, 1907). See also John R. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America* (New York, 1907), 200-208; Robert Hunter, *Poverty* (New York, 1905), 302-308, 315; *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*, II (1905-1909), 1819-20.
29. William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXIX (1952), 483-504.
30. Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 523, IV, 795, 832. For another example see Thornton Anderson, *Brooks Adams, Constructive Conservative* (Ithaca, 1951), *passim*.
31. Henry James, *The American Scene* (New York, 1907), 85-86, 125, 138. See also Elizabeth Robins, "Embryo Americans," *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, CIII (1901), 602; New England Society, *Anniversary Celebration*, 1903, pp. 43-45; Eliot Norton, "The Diffusion of Immigration," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXIV (1904), 163.
32. See the illuminating account of these trends in Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860-1915* (Philadelphia, 1945), 133-45.
33. Karl Pearson, *The Life, Letters and Labours of Francis Galton* (Cambridge, 1914-1930), IIIA, 217-42; Francis Galton, "Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope and Aims," *American Journal of Sociology*, X (1904), 1-25.
34. President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (Washington, 1933), 428.
35. Oscar Riddle, "Charles Benedict Davenport," in National Academy of Sciences, *Biographical Memoirs*, XXV (1949), 75-91; Charles B. Davenport, *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics* (New York, 1911), iv-v, 270-71;

Race Betterment Foundation, *Proceedings of the First National Conference on Race Betterment*, 1914, p. 455.

36. L. C. Dunn, ed., *Genetics in the 20th Century* (New York, 1951), 60-65; American Breeders' Association, *Report of the Meeting*, 1907, pp. 137-38.
37. Race Betterment Foundation, *Proceedings*, 1914, pp. 487-88; Robert DeCourcy Ward, "National Eugenics," *North American Review*, CXCII (1910), 59-64; Edward McNall Burns, *David Starr Jordan: Prophet of Freedom* (Stanford, 1953), 72-73. Davenport's own animus centered on the eastern European Jews; Davenport, *Heredity*, 216.
38. *Cong. Rec.*, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 206; Thomas W. Salmon to Woodrow Wilson, January 16, 1915, in Woodrow Wilson Papers, File VI-B, sec. 292 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
39. The latter phrase is in *Scientific American*, CVI (1912), 324. See also Portersville (California) *Messenger*, October 19, 1912; *Literary Digest*, LIII (1916), 887-88; *Cong. Rec.*, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 2617, 2714.
40. Prescott Farnsworth Hall, *Immigration and Its Effects upon the United States* (New York, 1906), 99-101; National Conference of Charities, *Proceedings*, 1906, pp. 280-82.
41. "Records of the Executive Committee I.R.L.," March 30, 1908, December 14, 1911, May 9, 1912; *American Breeders Magazine*, III (1912), 20-25, 75; *Journal of Heredity*, V (1914), 297; Race Betterment Foundation, *Proceedings*, 1914, p. 542.
42. Ward, "National Eugenics," 56-67, and "Our Immigration Laws from the Viewpoint of National Eugenics," *National Geographic Magazine*, XXIII (1912), 38-41; *Immigration and Other Interests of Prescott Farnsworth Hall* (New York, 1922), 33, 52-66; *Reports of the Immigration Commission: Statements and Recommendations Submitted by Societies* (61 Cong., 3 Sess., Senate Document No. 764, Washington, 1911), 106-107.
43. Davenport, *Heredity*, 221-24. And see the nebulous statements in Edwin G. Conklin, *Heredity and Environment in the Development of Men* (Princeton, 1915), 416-18.
44. Alfred P. Schultz to Prescott F. Hall, July 21, 1911, in Files of the I.R.L., Box 7; Schultz, *Race or Mongrel* (Boston, 1908); Telemachus T. Timayenis, *The Original Mr. Jacobs: A Startling Exposé* (New York, 1888); Carlos C. Closson, "Social Selection," *Journal of Political Economy*, IV (1896), 449-66. Although Closson wrote several articles for reputable scholarly journals recapitulating the racist anthropology of the French scientist, G. Vacher de Lapouge, I cannot discover that anyone paid serious attention to him. Houston Stewart Chamberlain's *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* was belatedly translated into English (from German) in 1911 and made a strong impression on Prescott F. Hall; but according to Chamberlain's disciple Schultz, the book caused no more than a ripple. Thus the belief that many Americans were attentively reading European racist writers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seems unwarranted. Lodge stands out almost alone.
45. William Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe: A Sociological Study* (reprint, New York, 1923), v, 121, 597. See also Ripley, "Geography," 636-55, and *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, XXXII, 65.

46. Ripley, "Races in the United States," 755. For the then existing state of knowledge on this question see J. Arthur Thomson, *Heredity* (New York, 1908), 125, 133-43, 524. There is an indication of the alarmed newspaper comment on Ripley's address in Arthur I. Street, ed., *Street's Pandex of the News*, November 28, 1908. See also Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, VI, 1435. On the new appreciation of reversion that resulted from Mendelian principles see American Breeders' Association, *Report*, 1907, p. 133.
47. New York *Times*, May 31, 1937, p. 15; New York *Times Magazine*, November 20, 1949, p. 15; Society of Colonial Wars, *Constitution and By-Laws, Membership*, 1893, p. 76.
48. Madison Grant to William Howard Taft, November 22, 1910, in Taft Papers, Presidential Series No. 2, File 77 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress). Some of the sources of Grant's thinking are suggested in his *The Passing of the Great Race or The Racial Basis of European History* (New York, 1916), xx-xxi, 229-32, while a fuller indication is provided in the Supplement included in the 1921 edition.
49. In his private letters to Prescott F. Hall, Grant almost always got around to the Jews. See especially Grant to Hall, October 21 and December 19, 1918, in Files of the I.R.L., Box 1.
50. This conception of racism and its earlier appearance in European thought are elucidated by Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven, 1946), 225-47, and with wayward brilliance by Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951), 158-84 and *passim*. For an analysis and criticism of Grant as a political theorist see David Spitz, *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought* (New York, 1949), 137-62.

Notes to Chapter Seven

1. *United States Census, 1910*, Vol. I: *Population*, 174-75; Roy L. Garis, *Immigration Restriction: A Study of the Opposition to and Regulation of Immigration into the United States* (New York, 1927), 205.
2. New York *Tribune Index*, 1902, pp. 178-79. Out of 74 entries for the year under the heading "Italians," 55 are obviously accounts of crime and violence.
3. Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York, 1921), 241-58; Arthur I. Street, ed., *Street's Pandex of the News*, 1908, pp. 30-31; *Hearings* (House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 60 Cong., 1 Sess., Washington, 1908), 10.
4. Theodore A. Bingham, "Foreign Criminals in New York," *North American Review*, CLXXXVIII (1908), 383-94; *American Jewish Year Book*, 1909-10, pp. 62-63.
5. The chief anti-Semitic incident of the period between 1896 and 1913 was a funeral riot on New York's East Side in 1902, an affair which apparently pitted Jews against Irish. Philip Cowen, *Memories of an American Jew* (New York, 1932), 289.
6. The best treatment is Abraham Cahan's novel, *The Rise of David Levinsky* (New York, 1917). For unfriendly comments see Burton J. Hendrick, "The Great Jewish Invasion," *McClure's Magazine*, XXVIII

(1907), 307-21; and Ralph Philip Boas, "The Problem of American Judaism," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXIX (1917), 147-51.

7. Norman Hapgood, "Jews and College Life" and "Schools, Colleges and Jews," *Harper's Weekly*, LXII (1916), 53-55, 77-79; Charles S. Bernheimer, "Prejudice Against Jews in the United States," *Independent*, LXV (1908), 1106-1107; Alexander Francis, *Americans: An Impression* (New York, 1909), 84-85, 187.
8. A. J. Severson, "Nationality and Religious Preferences as Reflected in Newspaper Advertisements," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (1939), 541-43; Cyrus Adler, *Jacob H. Schiff: His Life and Letters* (New York, 1928), I, 363.
9. Park and Miller, *Old World Traits*, 51, 255.
10. *Compiled Laws of Michigan*, 1897, p. 439; *Session Laws State of Wyoming*, 1899, p. 60, and 1911, p. 61; *Session Laws of Arizona*, 1907, p. 138; *Laws of the State of New York*, 1908, I, 337, and 1909, II, 1324; *Callaghan's Michigan Digest*, I, 244; *Revised Laws of Minnesota: Supplement*, 1909, p. 622; *General Laws of Nebraska*, 1909, p. 2919; *A Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas*, 1921, p. 2151; *Digest of Pennsylvania Statute Law*, 1920, pp. 1117-18; *Acts and Resolves Passed by the General Court of Massachusetts*, 1910, p. 428.
11. "Records of the Executive Committee of the Immigration Restriction League," May 13, October 2, and November 16, 1905, and January 20, 1906, in Files of the Immigration Restriction League (Houghton Library, Harvard University); Boston *Herald*, December 18, 1905, and June 26, 1906.
12. This is frankly an impression of mine, rather than a statistical fact; but for suggestive data see William Z. Ripley, "Race Factors in Labor Unions," *Atlantic Monthly*, XCIII (1904), 306; Selig Perlman and Philip Taft, *A History of Labor in the United States, 1896-1932* (New York, 1935), 13-19.
13. *Report of Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor*, 1905, pp. 75-76, 101-102, 238; Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, June 4, 1906, p. 16; *Congressional Record*, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 9171, 9189; *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918* (New York, 1925), II, 204. See also *The Carpenter*, January, 1906, pp. 9-10; *Machinists' Monthly Journal*, XVII (1905), 394, 1113; *Appeal to Reason* (Girard, Kansas), April 1, August 12, and September 2, 1905.

    Of course the unions that did have a large number of new immigrants among their members were hesitant to join in the drive. The United Mine Workers, for example, clung to the old, equivocal distinction between voluntary and assisted immigration; *United Mine Workers' Journal*, August 23, 1906.
14. Samuel Gompers, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor* (New York, 1925), II, 167, 171; *Selections from Correspondence of Roosevelt and Lodge*, II, 158.
15. *Cong. Rec.*, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 551-55, 7293-95. For a much later indication of Lodge's failure to realize how profoundly southern opinion on immigration was changing see Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, May 10, 1912, in Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Box 286 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).

16. Asiatic Exclusion League, *Proceedings*, February, 1908, pp. 19, 71, and December, 1908, pp. 17, 19; James N. Davis to Robert DeCourcy Ward, January 10, 1914, in Files of the I.R.L., Box 7; *Cong. Rec.*, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 9187, and 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 4782. For the vote in 1912 cast by Congressmen from Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, and Montana, see *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 5023, and 62 Cong., 3 Sess., 864. Anti-Japanese sentiment was, of course, very strong throughout the Rocky Mountain area.
17. Thomas A. Bailey, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises* (Stanford, 1934), 67-72, 108-109; Eleanor Tupper and George E. McReynolds, *Japan in American Public Opinion* (New York, 1937), 62-63.
18. *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 5023, and 62 Cong., 3 Sess., 864. This was the first recorded vote on the literacy test since 1898, Cannon's maneuvers having prevented a recorded vote in 1906. For typical southern thinking about European immigration see *Cong. Rec.*, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 9192, and 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 2623; *Reports of the Immigration Commission: Statements and Recommendations Submitted by Societies* (61 Cong., 3 Sess., Senate Document No. 764, Washington, 1911), 124.
19. John Higham, "The American Party, 1886-1891," *Pacific Historical Review*, XIX (1950), 38; San Francisco *Argonaut*, January 9 and April 3, 1886. For a typical example of how California's race-feeling dissociated the Chinese from European immigrants see C. T. Hopkins, *Common Sense Applied to the Immigrant Question* (San Francisco, 1869), esp. 20-22. In the twentieth century William Randolph Hearst perpetuated this old Californian combination of sympathy for European immigration and hatred for Oriental. See the platform of his Independence party in Kirk H. Porter, ed., *National Party Platforms* (New York, 1924), 292-93.
20. *Cong. Rec.*, 51 Cong., 2 Sess., 2948, and 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 583, and see the roll call vote, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 689. The Anglo-Saxon nativism of a Knoxville lawyer, Joshua W. Caldwell, was exceptional. See his "The South Is American," *Arena*, VIII (1893), 610-15.
21. *Cong. Rec.*, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 2624.
22. *Reports of the Immigration Commission: Abstracts* (61 Cong., 3 Sess., Senate Doc. 747), I, 645-53; *United States Census, 1910: Abstract*, 197. See also Jack London, *The Valley of the Moon* (New York, 1913).
23. Rowland T. Berthoff, "Southern Attitudes Toward Immigration, 1865-1914," *Journal of Southern History*, XVII (1951), 332-36; *United States Census, 1910: Abstract*, 197. In 1910 the new immigration constituted 1 per cent of the white population in the South and 5.6 per cent in the Pacific states.
24. Frank Tannenbaum, *Darker Phases of the South* (New York, 1924), 177-78; Ray Stannard Baker, *Following the Color Line* (New York, 1908), 295; Norman Walker, "Tallulah's Shame," *Harper's Weekly*, XLIII (1899), 779. Southern Congressmen repeatedly referred to the mixed blood of southern Europeans and pointed to the further mixing

of Latins and Negroes occurring in South America as an object lesson for the United States; *Cong. Rec.*, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 9155, 9174.

25. Booker T. Washington, "Races and Politics," *Outlook*, XCVIII (1911), 264; Berthoff, "Southern Attitudes," 348.
26. A cross section of anti-Chinese sentiment can be studied in Elmer C. Sandmeyer, *The Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Urbana, 1939), and in *Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration* (Report No. 689, 44 Cong., 2 Sess., Washington, 1877), esp. 1044-51.
27. C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913* (Baton Rouge, 1951), 324-26, 350-55. On the sectional response to imperialism see Richard Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," in Daniel Aaron, ed., *America in Crisis* (New York, 1952), 181, 187-189.
28. Paul H. Buck, *The Road to Reunion, 1865-1900* (Boston, 1937), 306-307.
29. *Hearings Relative to the Further Restriction of Immigration* (House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 62 Cong., 2 Sess., Washington, 1912), 49-50. See also *Cong. Rec.*, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 9174; 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 2623-27; 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3040.
30. Carey McWilliams, *Prejudice: Japanese-Americans, Symbol of Racial Intolerance* (Boston, 1944), 19; Bailey, *Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises*, 9-11; Tupper and McReynolds, *Japan in American Public Opinion*, 33. In this respect too the anti-Japanese movement contrasts with the older anti-Chinese movement. Neither China nor any other nation posed a direct, international threat to the secure and isolated America of the seventies and eighties.
31. Homer Lea, *The Valor of Ignorance* (New York, 1909), esp. 124-28. See also his *The Day of the Saxon* (New York, 1912). For all of his militarism and racial nationalism, Lea was no ordinary anti-Oriental bigot. He became a general in the Chinese army and showed no sympathy for the popular indignities inflicted on the Japanese in America.
32. Joan London, *Jack London and His Times: An Unconventional Biography* (New York, 1939), 212-13; Jack London, *Revolution and Other Essays* (New York, 1910), 267-89, and *South Sea Tales* (Cleveland, 1946), 235-39.
33. Jack London, *Valley of the Moon*, 102-103, and *The Mutiny of the Elsinore* (New York, 1914), 197-201. See the comments on these books in Charmian London, *The Book of Jack London* (New York, 1921), II, 258, 274.
34. Charles B. Barnes, *The Longshoremen* (New York, 1915), 8-9; William M. Leiserson, *Adjusting Immigrant and Industry* (New York, 1924), 71-72.
35. Ira Kipnis, *The American Socialist Movement, 1897-1912* (New York, 1952), 278-88. Ernest Untermann of Idaho was apparently the moving spirit. For another indication of the infectiousness of the anti-Oriental movement see an article by an eastern physician, Albert Allemann, "Immigration and the Future American Race," *Popular Science Monthly*, LXXV (1909), 586-96.
36. Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, June 27, 1906; *Harper's Weekly*, XLVIII (1904), 1980; Ernest Hamlin Abbott, "Sectional Misapprehension," *Outlook*, LXXX (1905), 237-41; John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom* (New York, 1948), 435-36.

37. *Outlook*, LXXXI (1905), 956; John R. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America* (New York, 1907), 3-17, 39-62; *Christian Science Monitor*, September 27, 1913.
38. National Council, Junior Order United American Mechanics, *Official Proceedings*, 1907, p. 57, and 1914, p. 168; *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 3531. The Junior Order's nearest competitor, the Patriotic Order Sons of America, was still surviving in the East in 1912 but was much less active; *ibid.*, 3531, 3535.
39. *Cong. Rec.*, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 9174; Asiatic Exclusion League, *Proceedings*, February, 1908, pp. 55, 57; *Hearings* (House Committee on Immigration, 62 Cong., 2 Sess.), 6, 16.
40. The most nativistic of progressive intellectuals, Edward A. Ross, may also be understood in part as a product of the Far West. His fascination with the immigration issue dates from his turbulent years at Stanford University, and his first polemic on the subject was an attack on the Oriental. Edward Alsworth Ross, *Seventy Years of It: An Autobiography* (New York, 1936), 69-70.
41. *The Tradesman* (Chattanooga), July 15, 1905; "Immigration Clippings Collected by Prescott F. Hall" (Widener Library, Harvard University), VI, 220.
42. *Cong. Rec.*, 61 Cong., 1 Sess., 1526; *Hearings* (House Committee on Immigration, 62 Cong., 2 Sess.), 3-23; *Mississippi Union Advocate*, June 15, 1910; *The National Field*, January 15, 1914.
43. Francis Butler Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman, South Carolinian* (Baton Rouge, 1944), 490; *Acts and Joint Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina*, 1909, pp. 14, 194; National Liberal Immigration League, *Proceedings of the General Meeting* (New York, 1908), 9; *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 3536.

    Those writers (Berthoff, Handlin, and others) who have maintained that the immigration promotion activities of the southern states were brought to an end by their inherent failure or by adverse federal regulations are, I am convinced, mistaken. It is true that the immigration law of 1907 and a new administrative ruling of the same year narrowed somewhat the possible functions of the state bureaus by forbidding them to pay an immigrant's passage with privately donated funds or to promise him a specific job, but the states were still free to advertise for immigrants and to subsidize immigration with public money. It was the rise of popular opposition within the South that stopped them from doing so. *Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration*, 1907, pp. 66-67, and 1908, p. 133.
44. For an indication of how lightly the most ardent nativist could take the danger of immigrant radicalism in the mid-1900's see Prescott F. Hall, *Immigration and Its Effects upon the United States* (New York, 1906), 183-87.
45. Scrapbook entitled "Johnson Politics, 1912" (Hoquiam Public Library, Washington), 64-65, 72, and *passim*. For additional biographical facts see "One Who Must Be Shown," *Saturday Evening Post*, CXCV (May 19, 1923), 92, 97.

46. J. H. Patten to Executive Committee, December 10, 1913, in Files of the I.R.L., Box 7; Johnson scrapbook entitled "Personal 1913" (Hoquiam Public Library), 61, 66, 84. Johnson was urging Asiatic exclusion and total suspension of European immigration except for close relatives of American residents.
47. *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 4793-94. See also *ibid.*, 3538-40, and 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 741, 3056; *Literary Digest*, XLVII (1913), 197; *Christian Science Monitor*, June 13, 1912; David F. Houston, *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920* (New York, 1926), I, 128. For background on the Lawrence strike and on the I.W.W. approach to immigrants see William M. Leiserson, *Adjusting Immigrant and Industry* (New York, 1924), 179-83, 203-205; *The Strike at Lawrence, Mass.* (Hearings, House Committee on Rules, 62 Cong., 2 Sess., Washington, 1912), 34-35, 75, 155; *Solidarity*, April 11, 1914.
48. Washington Gladden, "The Anti-Papal Panic," *Harper's Weekly*, LIX (July 18, 1914), 55-56; Jeremiah J. Crowley, *Romanism: A Menace to the Nation* (Aurora, Mo., 1912); J. W. Gibson and E. E. Miller, *Modern Americanism* (Chicago, 1911), 105-107.
49. William G. Bean, "Puritan Versus Celt, 1850-1860," *New England Quarterly*, VII (1934), 70-89.
50. *Watson's Magazine*, IV (1910), 277-82. For further complications in the "Fairbanks incident," involving Theodore Roosevelt, see *The New International Year Book*, 1910, pp. 635-36.
51. *Watson's Magazine*, XX (1914-15), 338-39; see also pp. 110, 193, and *passim*. C. Vann Woodward's excellent biography, *Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel* (New York, 1938), underestimates, I think, the persistence in Watson of a radical impulse.
52. Walter B. Stevens, *Missouri The Center State, 1821-1915* (Chicago, 1915), III, 514-17, IV, 536; *The Menace*, November 25 and December 9, 1911, April 20, 1912, and November 15, 1913; *N. W. Ayer & Son's American Newspaper Annual and Directory*, 1914, p. 497.
53. *The Menace*, January 27, 1912; Charles W. Ferguson, *Fifty Million Brothers: A Panorama of Lodges and Clubs* (New York, 1937), 302-307. Apparently this oath made its debut in 1912 in a pamphlet entitled *The Church of Rome in American Politics; Literary Digest*, XLV (1912), 152-53.
54. *The Menace*, November 25, 1911, January 13, June 8, October 19, and November 23, 1912, and April 12, 1913.
55. Knights of Columbus, *Report of Commission on Religious Prejudices*, 1915, pp. 11, 17, 19-20, and 1916, pp. 30-31; New York *Times*, October 29, 1914, p. 10.
56. Although a careful sociological analysis of the Know-Nothing movement is yet to be made, two studies of New York state agree: "In the country districts . . . nativism had no enduring basis in general public sentiment." Louis D. Scisco, *Political Nativism in New York State* (New York, 1901), 252; Whitney R. Cross, *The Burned-Over District: The Social and Intellectual History of Enthusiastic Religion in Western New York, 1800-1850* (Ithaca, 1950), 231-32.
57. Knights of Columbus, *Report*, 1916, pp. 11-12; *The Menace*, January 27, 1912, and circulation figures in the issue of November 15, 1913.

58. Watson was anti-clerical and attacked Protestant foreign missions; *The Menace* started out with Protestant religious overtones, but before long it was appealing explicitly to agnostics as well as believers; *The Menace*, November 30, 1912.
59. J. G. Crites, Secretary Democratic Central Committee, Ransom County, North Dakota, to Woodrow Wilson, February 12, 1915, in Woodrow Wilson Papers, File VI-B, sec. 292 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress). On the character of progressivism I am indebted especially to Woodward, *New South*, 371-95, and George E. Mowry, *The California Progressives* (Berkeley, 1951), 86-104.
60. Knights of Columbus, *Report*, 1915, pp. 22-23; B. O. Flower, ed., *The Patriot's Manual: Dealing with the Irrepressible Conflict Between Two Mutually Exclusive World Theories of Government* (Fort Scott, Kan., 1915), 224-32.
61. *The Menace*, January 20 and March 23, 1912; *Independent*, LXXIII (1912), 103-104; *Reveille: Lieut. Gen. Nelson A. Miles to All Guardians of Liberty* [New York, 1915]; Form letter from Committee on Lecturers, National Court, Guardians of Liberty, n.d. (Wisconsin Historical Society).
62. New York *World*, December 28, 1914, quoted in *Solidarity*, January 9, 1915.
63. New York *Times*, December 5, 1914, p. 16, and March 2, 1915, p. 1; Christopher G. Tiedeman, *A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States* (St. Louis, 1900), I, 331; Thomas Reed Powell, "The Right to Work for the State," *Columbia Law Review*, XVI (1916), 99-114.
64. Knights of Columbus, *Report*, 1915, pp. 21-22; *The Menace*, March 20 and April 17, 1915. Eventually the hysterical propaganda campaign *The Menace* launched to "defend" itself came under the direction of Benjamin O. Flower, a reformist editor who had labored for many causes, including populism and Christian socialism.
65. *Current Opinion*, LVIII (1915), 347-48.
66. The campaign may be followed in the New York *Times*, esp. October 27, 1914, p. 18, and November 7, 1914, p. 6; *The Menace*, October 24, 1914; Theodorus Van Wyck, Headquarters, American party, to Theodore Roosevelt, June 26, 1914, in Roosevelt Papers.
67. Charles H. Watson, "Need of Federal Legislation in Respect to Mob Violence in Cases of Lynching of Aliens," *Yale Law Journal*, XXV (1916), 561-67. For an absorbing account of the region's earlier feuds between natives and attacks on Negro strikebreakers see Paul M. Angle, *Bloody Williamson: A Chapter in American Lawlessness* (New York, 1952).
68. New York *Times*, February 18, 1914, p. 3, June 23, 1915, p. 10, and August 20, 1915, p. 4. For a general account see C. P. Connolly, *The Truth About the Frank Case* (New York, 1915).
69. Atlanta *Georgian*, November 1, 1913; *B'nai B'rith News*, VI (April, 1914), 5; New York *Times*, February-May, 1914.
70. New York *Times*, August 20, 1915, p. 4; Woodward, *Tom Watson*, 437-42; *Watson's Magazine*, XX (1915), 139-63, 278.

71. New York *Times*, June 22-26, 1915; *Watson's Magazine*, XXI (1915), 296.
72. *Watson's Magazine*, XXI (1915), 293, 296. Before this belated outburst of generalized, race-conscious anti-Semitism, Watson's attitudes were somewhat mixed. In January 1915, he had called Frank a "typical young libertine Jew." In March he said that every race and nation has men like Frank, who "was false to the higher standards of his race." Although the Frank articles boosted Watson's circulation greatly, it is worth noting that anti-Catholicism remained his principal issue. The presumption is strong that Watson was following public opinion on the Frank Case more than he was making it.
73. Anon., *White American* [San Francisco, 1914].
74. Henry Weismann, "Immigration: Its Value to the Country," *American Industries*, XII (1912), 30-31; *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 3 Sess., 2311, and 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3062; Youngstown *Vindicator*, January 13, 1915.
75. National Liberal Immigration League to Members, December 8, 1913, in Gustav Scholer Papers (Manuscript Division, New York Public Library); *Cong. Rec.*, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3045-47. See also various league pamphlets in the Wisconsin Historical Society.
76. *The American Leader*, I (February 29, 1912), 32-33, 58; File 77, Presidential Series No. 2, William H. Taft Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
77. *Hearings Relative to the Dillingham Bill, S. 3175* (House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 62 Cong., 2 Sess., Washington, 1912); *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 3 Sess., 2032, 3268-69, 3420-21, and 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3022-23; *Literary Digest*, XLIV (1912), 1089; Telegram to President Taft, May 8, 1912, File 77, Taft Papers.
78. *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 3 Sess., 2027, 2305-06; T. J. Brennan, "The Literacy Test," *Catholic World*, CV (1917), 224-28.
79. Prescott F. Hall, "The Recent History of Immigration and Immigration Restriction," *Journal of Political Economy*, XXI (1913), 737-40, 747-50; "Records of the Executive Committee I.R.L.," July 2, 1907, in Files of the I.R.L.; Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, 1951-1954), VI, 1096-97; John Lombardi, *Labor's Voice in the Cabinet: A History of the Department of Labor from Its Origins to 1921* (New York, 1942), 125-27, 131.
80. Lombardi, *Labor's Voice*, 60, 144-46; Gompers, *Seventy Years*, II, 167-69; Hall, "Recent History," 742.
81. A.F.L., *Proceedings*, 1911, pp. 66-67; *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 3709-10, and 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 3531, 3536, 10418; Prescott F. Hall to John L. Burnett, June 24, 1912, and Burnett to Hall, July 16, 1912, in Files of the I.R.L., Box 7.
82. *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 3 Sess., 2302; Tacoma *Ledger*, October 22, 1912; New York *Sun*, July 29, 1912; *Campaign Contributions: Testimony* (Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, 62 Cong., 3 Sess., Washington, 1913), I, 404.
83. Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House* (Princeton, 1947), 382-87, 493-99; *Cong. Rec.*, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 1546-47, 1550.
84. Frank J. Bruno, *Trends in Social Work as Reflected in the Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work, 1874-1946* (New York, 1948), 221-22; Porter, *Platforms*, 347-48; letters from Frances Kellor to Theodore Roosevelt, 1911-1913, in Boxes 269-70, Roosevelt Papers.
85. John Palmer Gavit, *American by Choice* (New York, 1922), 354. An anti-Roosevelt circular distributed by the Junior Order on election eve is enclosed in William B. Griffith to Elihu Root, January 9, 1913, in Elihu Root Papers, Box 258 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress). For further evidence on Roosevelt's appeal to new immigrant voters see Link, *Wilson*, 499-500; Louis Hammerling to President Taft, August 28, 1912, in Taft Papers, File 77; Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch, *Neighborhood: My Story of Greenwich House* (New York, 1938), 175.
86. Taft to Theodore E. Burton, February 10, 1913, in Taft Papers, File 77; Taft to A. Lawrence Lowell, November 6, 1910, in Files of the I.R.L., Box 7; Hall, "Immigration Clippings," X, 73.
87. Otto Heller, ed., *Charles Nagel: Speeches and Writings, 1900-1928* (New York, 1931), I, xiii-xxii; Walter B. Stevens, *St. Louis: History of the Fourth City, 1763-1909* (Chicago, 1909), II, 72-73; Henry Steele Commager, ed., *Documents of American History* (New York, 1946), No. 387.
88. See maps in Frank Julian Warne, *The Tide of Immigration* (New York, 1916), 292-94; and also *Publications of the Immigration Restriction League*, No. 63.
89. *Cong. Rec.*, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 2590-96; New York *Times*, February 3-5, 1914.
90. Undated clippings in Archives of the American Jewish Committee, Box 63 (New York); Madison Grant to George Shiras, February 6, 1914, and to Prescott F. Hall, December 13, 1913, in Files of the I.R.L., Box 7; John L. Burnett to Hall, February 11, 1914, *ibid.*
91. Woodrow Wilson to E. D. Smith, March 5, 1914, and to John Sharp Williams, January 7, 1915, in Wilson Papers, sec. 292.
92. New York *Times*, March 11, 1914, p. 10, and March 13, 1914, p. 11; Chicago *Post*, March 19, 1914; Brooklyn *Standard-Union*, August 23, 1914; "Records of the Executive Committee I.R.L.," May 1, September 24, and October 9, 1914, in Files of the I.R.L.
93. *Cong. Rec.*, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 261-62, 787; Cyrus Adler to Roland S. Morris, December 10, 1913, and N. I. Stone to Cyrus Adler, February 23, 1914, in A.J.C. Archives, Boxes 61 and 63. On Wilson's interest in this phase of the question see Charles P. Nixon to Joseph Tumulty, January 27, 1915, in Wilson Papers, sec. 292; and *Outlook*, CIX (1915), 321.
94. Commager, *Documents*, No. 404.
95. *Cong. Rec.*, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3077-78; Boston *Transcript*, January 28, 1915; "Records of the Executive Committee I.R.L.," January 29, 1915, in Files of the I.R.L.

Notes to Chapter Eight

1. One Progressive, Harold Ickes, in criticizing Wilson for pusillanimity, wrote: "Our people just now are stale on questions of industrial justice and social betterment: they simply aren't interested. . . . I find

that my chief interest at this time is in the relationship of the United States to the present European situation. I feel ashamed for my own country and I don't like to feel that way. . . . This nation has got to set to work to rebuild its own character. . . . There is a great depth of moral indignation in the country today that must find expression along moral and altruistic lines"; Ickes to Theodore Roosevelt, December 17, 1915, in Roosevelt Papers, Box 261 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress). On some of the links between progressive idealism and anti-Germanism see Ralph H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought* (New York, 1940), 357-65; and Robert Endicott Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 1953).

2. The estimate of the Census Bureau in 1917 was 2,349,000; New York *Times*, June 18, 1917, p. 9. See also United States Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945* (Washington, 1949), 32.
3. Frederick A. Bushee, *Ethnic Factors in the Population of Boston* (New York, 1903), 154; H. B. Woolston, "Rating the Nations," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXII (1916), 381-90. See also Josiah Flynt, "The German and the German-American," *Atlantic Monthly*, LXXVIII (1896), 655-64; Kate Holladay Claghorn, "Our Immigrants and Ourselves," *Atlantic Monthly*, LXXXVI (1900), 536; *Harper's Weekly*, XLVIII (1904), 857-58; H. B. Grose, *Aliens or Americans?* (New York, 1906), 126; Price Collier, *Germany and the Germans from an American Point of View* (New York, 1913), x-xi.
4. Acting Commissioner of Labor Statistics to Assistant Secretary of Labor, December 5, 1917, in General Records of the Department of Labor, File 16/595 (National Archives); *Reports of the Immigration Commission: Abstracts* (61 Cong., 3 Sess., Senate Document No. 747, Washington, 1911), I, 468-69.
5. Clifton James Child, *The German-Americans in Politics, 1914-1917* (Madison, 1939), 4-7, 43-55.
6. New York *Times*, February 1, 1915, p. 8. A succession of revealing letters to the editor follows in the issues of February 5, 7, 11, 17, and 20. For indications of the very widespread character of similar comments see *Independent*, LXXXI (1915), 265-66; *Literary Digest*, L (1915), 299-301; *Nation*, C (1915), 134.
7. New York *Times*, August 11, 1915, p. 5, and August 25, 1915, p. 10; Child, *German-Americans*, 87-88, 90-94, 178.
8. *Literary Digest*, LI (1915), 944. See also George Creel, "The Hopes of the Hyphenated," *Century Magazine*, XCI (1916), 350-63.
9. Theodore Roosevelt, *America for Americans* (n.p., 1916), 3, 11, 15; *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt* (National Ed., New York, 1926), XVIII, 278-79; Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, 1951-1954), VIII, 897. The last phrase quoted is from Roosevelt to Charles Evans Hughes, August 11, 1916, in Hughes Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress). On Roosevelt's attitudes in the nineties see *Works*, XIII, 20-24.
10. Frederick L. Paxson, *American Democracy and the World War* (Boston, 1936-1939), I, 335, 348-50, 359; Child, *German-Americans*, 143-49; Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, VIII, 1099, 1111, 1121.

11. John Bach McMaster, *The United States in the World War* (New York, 1918-1920), I, 133-36, 233; Paxson, *American Democracy*, I, 199-202, 248. In 1913 Gardner ran for governor of Massachusetts largely on the issue of immigration restriction; *Congressional Record*, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3073-74.

    For insight into the ideology of preparedness see Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest*, 130-38, 199-222.
12. Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy* (New York, 1926), I, 423-25; Walter Millis, *Road to War: America 1914-1917* (Boston, 1935), 237-39. It is true, as Frederick L. Paxson has pointed out, that Wilson spoke of hyphens in May 1914, but not, I think, in a significant way. The term was an old one, and Wilson's emphasis at the time was on the success of the melting pot.
13. Millis, *Road to War*, 304-305.
14. *The Menace*, April 17 and May 8, 1915, and subsequent issues; Knights of Columbus, *Report of Commission on Religious Prejudices*, 1916, p. 27. See also Michael Williams, *The Shadow of the Pope* (New York, 1932), 121-22.
15. Aleš Hrdlička, "Study of Old Americans," *Journal of Heredity*, VI (1914), 509, and "The Old White Americans," *Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Congress of Americanists*, 1915, pp. 582-601; Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race, or The Racial Basis of European History* (New York, 1916), 200. The *Book Review Digest* lists only three reviews at the time of publication.
16. Mercer Green Johnston, *Patriotism and Radicalism: Addresses and Letters* (Boston, 1917), 179-85; Frank Perry Olds, "Kultur in American Politics," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXVIII (1916), 384; Hartley Burr Alexander, *Liberty and Democracy and Other Essays in War-Time* (Boston, 1918), 155-65 (an essay written in 1916).
17. G. Stanley Hall, *Life and Confessions of a Psychologist* (New York, 1923), 565-67.
18. Kate Holladay Claghorn, *The Immigrant's Day in Court* (New York, 1923), 308-309, 315-16. On the evolution of these provisions see *Cong. Rec.*, 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 2081, and 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 2596, 2610; Tacoma *News*, December 29, 1913.
19. Frank Julian Warne, *The Tide of Immigration* (New York, 1916), 327-41; Colorado Springs *Gazette*, April 7, 1916; *Cong. Rec.*, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 12763. For statistics see *Survey*, XXXV (1916), 524; United States Census Bureau, *Historical Statistics*, 33.
20. *Immigration Journal*, I (1916), 20; *World's Work*, XXXI (1916), 601; Fall River *Globe*, June 30, 1916; *Cong. Rec.*, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 11792; Chicago *Tribune*, January 11, 1917.
21. *Cong. Rec.*, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 12767, 12923-44; Boston *Journal*, August 23, 1916. The bill had passed the House in March.
22. *Cong. Rec.*, 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 316, 2443, 2456, 2629; *Literary Digest*, LIV (1917), 392; *Policies of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America* [Washington, 1925], 43-44.

23. Roy L. Garis, *Immigration Restriction: A Study of the Opposition to and Regulation of Immigration into the United States* (New York, 1927), 123-38. On the Oriental provision see New York *Times*, February 3, 1914, p. 2, and February 4, 1914, p. 14.
24. "Records of the Executive Committee of the Immigration Restriction League," February-March, 1917, in Files of the Immigration Restriction League (Houghton Library, Harvard University).
25. McMaster, *U. S. in World War*, I, 351.
26. H. L. Mencken, *The American Language* (New York, 1946), 174, names Theodore Roosevelt as the inventor or at least the propagator of this potent phrase. I have not found in Roosevelt's published writings any evidence that he ever used the phrase, though he embraced a good deal of the point of view it connoted.
27. In education this point of view resulted in the belief that the war had supplied America with one all-purpose criterion by which every school subject might henceforth be evaluated. Arthur D. Dean, *Our Schools in War Time—and After* (Boston, 1918), 17. For a scornful account of the submission of Christianity to nationalism see Ray H. Abrams, *Preachers Present Arms: A Study of the War-Time Attitudes and Activities of the Churches and the Clergy in the United States, 1914-1918* (Philadelphia, 1933).
28. Roosevelt, *Works*, XIX, 181-82, 254-55; *Education*, XXXVIII (1918), 793-94; Dean, *Schools in War Time*, 44.
29. Lafayette Young, ed., *Fifteen Patriotic Editorials from the Des Moines Capital* (n.p., n.d.).
30. During the war the word "propaganda" was first coming into widespread use, testifying to a wholly new respect for the susceptibility of the average mind to the manipulations of the trained opinion-maker.
31. Henry Landau, *The Enemy Within: The Inside Story of German Sabotage in America* (New York, 1937), 310; Carl F. Wittke, *German Americans and the World War (with Special Emphasis on Ohio's German-Language Press)* (Columbus, 1936), 128-42.
32. Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker: America at War* (New York, 1931), I, 100-102; Wittke, *German-Americans*, 144. A friend has reported to me that his mother, a Texan, affirms the ground-glass story to this day.
33. New York *Times*, March 31, 1918, p. 16; *World's Work*, XXXV (1918), 237; Emerson Hough, *The Web* (Chicago, 1919), 63-69.
34. Minute Mayor's Advisory Committee, April 20, 1917, in Gustav Scholer Papers (Manuscript Division, New York Public Library); *Literary Digest*, LVII (May 11, 1918), 12; McMaster, *U. S. in World War*, II, 67.
35. *Literary Digest*, LVI (March 30, 1918), 29-31; United States Bureau of Education, *Biennial Survey of Education*, 1916-18, I, 120-21; Wittke, *German-Americans*, 181-86; *The American Defense Society: History, Purpose and Accomplishments* (New York [1918]). Theodore Roosevelt was the honorary president of the society; Madison Grant was one of its trustees.
36. Roosevelt characteristically coupled this recommendation with a warning that loyal Americans must not be discriminated against because of their national origin; *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, VIII, 1207-1208.

37. Abrams, *Preachers Present Arms*, 120-22; Wittke, *German-Americans*, 188-96; National Civil Liberties Bureau, *War-Time Prosecutions and Mob Violence* (New York, 1919), 6-12.
38. Thomas W. Gregory to T. V. Taylor, April 15, 1918, in Gregory Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress); G. H. Walker and Sterling E. Edmonds to National Directors, American Protective League, April 3 and 5, 1918, in General Records of the Department of Justice, File 186751 (National Archives). See also George Creel, *How We Advertised America* (New York, 1920), 444.
39. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States* (Cambridge, 1941), 36-39, 45-49.
40. W. C. Hunter, "Alien Rights in the United States in Wartime," *Michigan Law Review*, XVII (1918-19), 33-39; James W. Garner, "Treatment of Enemy Aliens," *American Journal of International Law*, XII (1918), 38-42, 54; *Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States*, 1917, p. 56.
41. Chafee, *Free Speech*, 39-41, 50-79; Homer Cummings and Carl McFarland, *Federal Justice: Chapters in the History of Justice and the Federal Executive* (New York, 1937), 424-26. It is worth noting that the growth of the government's repressive powers caused no general alarm or even uneasiness. James R. Mock, *Censorship 1917* (Princeton, 1941), 45-54.
42. *Annual Report of the Attorney General*, 1918, pp. 27-35, 39, 746-47; 1919, p. 25.
43. Thomas W. Gregory to Fred Feigl, July 18, 1917, and to A. M. Briggs, November 16, 1917, in Justice File 186751; Abrams, *Preachers Present Arms*, 119-20.
44. Hough, *The Web*, *passim*. (Quoted from pp. 441-42 by permission of The Reilly and Lee Company.) This extraordinary book is the best single revelation of the 100 per cent mind. On the quality of A.P.L. reports see A. Mitchell Palmer to James M. Cox, April 30, 1919, in Justice File 186751. On the number of A.P.L. units see A. B. Bielaski to John L. O'Brian, November 5, 1917, *ibid.*
45. See various reports in Justice File 186751; Gregory to Woodrow Wilson, September 9, 1918, in Gregory Papers; *The Spy Glass*, January 25, 1919. For a vivid portrait of strong-arm tactics suggestive of the A.P.L. see Edward A. Steiner's novel, *Sanctus Spiritus and Company* (New York, 1919), 289-96.
46. *Annual Report of the Attorney General*, 1918, p. 15.
47. New York *Times*, June 18, 1917, p. 9; Niles Carpenter, *Immigrants and Their Children, 1920* (United States Bureau of the Census Monograph No. 7, Washington, 1927), 262.
48. Acting Commissioner of Labor Statistics to Assistant Secretary of Labor, December 5, 1917, in Labor File 16/595; Franklin H. Martin, *Digest of the Proceedings of the Council of National Defense During the World War* (73 Cong., 2 Sess., Senate Document No. 193, Washington, 1934), 346.
49. Samuel Hopkins Adams, "Invaded America," *Everybody's Magazine*, XXXVII (March, 1918), 55-56.

50. Leon E. Aylsworth, "The Passing of Alien Suffrage," *American Political Science Review*, XXV (1931), 114-16. President Wilson wished to stop enemy aliens from voting by executive order but found that he lacked the authority to do so; see Justice File 72-100-4.
51. National Americanization Committee, *Memorandum to the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense Concerning a War Policy for Aliens* (New York, 1917), 9, 28; *Cong. Rec.*, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 6379, 6492, and 2 Sess., 745, 3881; *Second Report of the Provost Marshal General . . . on the Operations of the Selective Service System* (Washington, 1919), 93.
52. *Hearings: Proposed Deportation of Aliens Who Surrendered Their First Papers in Order to Escape Military Service* (House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., Washington, 1919).
53. Palmer, *Baker*, II, 162.
54. W. D. Jones to Thomas W. Gregory, April 25, 1917, in Gregory Papers; W. S. Sutton, "The Assault on the University of Texas," *Educational Review*, LIV (1917), 390-409.
55. Elin Anderson, *We Americans: A Study of Cleavage in an American City* (Cambridge, 1937), 183-84. See also Lee Levinger, *A Jewish Chaplain in France* (New York, 1921), 214. For a perceptive comment on a similar condition in World War II see W. Lloyd Warner, *Democracy in Jonesville: A Study in Quality and Inequality* (New York, 1949), 288.
56. Robert M. Yerkes, ed., *Psychological Examining in the United States Army*, Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 15 (Washington, 1921), 693. The difference was due to the higher percentage of young males in the immigrant than in the native-born population.
57. Reproduced in Thomas Burgess, *Foreign Born Americans and Their Children: Our Duty and Opportunity for God and Country from the Standpoint of the Episcopal Church* (New York, 1923), 17. See also J. B. W. Gardiner, "Our Share in the Military Victory," *World's Work*, XXXVII (1919), 271; *Second Report of Provost Marshal General*, 86; Creel, *How We Advertised*, 171-73, 177-78; National Conference of Social Work, *Proceedings*, 1918, pp. 450-51.
58. George Creel, *Rebel at Large: Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years* (New York, 1947), 201; New York *Times*, July 5, 1918, p. 1; Wittke, *German-Americans*, 153-54. And see Roosevelt, *Works*, XIX, 303-304.
59. *Missionary Review of the World*, XLI (1918), 803.
60. Thomas G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918* (New York, 1927), 218-24, 235-62; New York *Times*, June 7, 1918, p. 12, and June 30, 1918, sec. 2, p. 2; Robert E. Park, *The Immigrant Press and Its Control* (New York, 1922), 201, 207-10.
61. *Literary Digest*, LV (December 29, 1917), 21-22; Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace* (New York, 1927), I, 19-20, 140.
62. *America: A Catholic Review of the Week*, XIX (1918), 636.
63. Cf. Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race, or The Racial Basis of European History* (2nd ed., New York, 1918), 83, 88, 231-32, with first edition; William S. Sadler, *Long Heads and Round Heads or What's the Matter with Germany* (Chicago, 1918); *The American Weekly*, June 2, 1918. Osborn, the president of the American Museum of Natural History, was a close friend of Grant's.

64. Mock, *Censorship*, 148-51; Frank B. Kellogg to Theodore Roosevelt, April 6, 1918, in Roosevelt Papers, Box 270.
65. See especially James A. B. Scherer, *The Nation at War* (New York, 1918); Hough, *The Web;* and *Hearings: Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda* (Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., Washington, 1919).
66. "The I.W.W. Develops into a National Menace," *Current Opinion*, LXIII (1917), 153-54; George L. Bell to Council of National Defense, July 19, 1917, in Labor File 20/77. For background see John S. Gambs, *The Decline of the I.W.W.* (New York, 1932), 35-38.
67. Bell to C.N.D., July 19, 1917, in Labor File 20/77; Thomas W. Gregory to Charles Warren, July 11, 1917, and Gregory to United States Attorneys, July 17, 1917, in Justice File 186701; National Civil Liberties Bureau, *War-Time Prosecutions*, 38; Gambs, *Decline of I.W.W.*, 26-27; Claghorn, *Immigrant's Day in Court*, 336-40.
68. Scherer, *Nation at War*, 161; *Grizzly Bear*, XXV (July, 1919), 5; Arnon Lyon Squiers, ed., *One Hundred Per Cent American: Addresses Delivered by Famous Patriots* (New York, 1918), 53.
69. Claghorn, *Immigrant's Day in Court*, 315-16, 339-42; *Cong. Rec.*, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 8107-27, 8938-40, 11037. The genesis of this statute may be followed in Justice File 192538.
70. *The American City*, XX (1919), 319.
71. New York *Times*, 1918: July 7, p. 12, July 28, sec. 4, p. 4, August 11, sec. 2, p. 2, August 29, p. 5, September 9, p. 4, and September 15-21; *Hearings: Brewing and Liquor Interests* (Senate Subcommittee on Judiciary, 66 Cong., 1 Sess.), II, 2669 ff., and III, *passim*.
72. Clayton R. Lusk, "Radicalism under Inquiry," *American Review of Reviews*, LXI (1920), 167-68; *Literary Digest*, LXIII (November 22, 1919), 15; *Cong. Rec.*, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 3367-68; Interchurch World Movement of North America, *Public Opinion and the Steel Strike* (New York, 1921), 98-99, 109-10. When Attorney General Palmer's home was bombed in June 1919, an Anti-Saloon League official advanced the theory that the act "was inspired by Germans with wet tendencies"; George McGinnis to A. Mitchell Palmer, June 12, 1919, in Justice File 202600.
73. See various correspondence in Justice File 186751, November, 1918-March, 1919, and in Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, File 27671-6184 (National Archives).
74. Richard Seelye Jones, *A History of the American Legion* (Indianapolis, 1946), 23-29, 40; Marcus Duffield, *King Legion* (New York, 1931), 156-71, 193-222. Membership rose to 845,186 in 1920—a point which it did not reach again until 1930; Dorothy Culp, *The American Legion: A Study in Pressure Politics* (Chicago, 1942), 1.
75. *Investigation Activities of the Department of Justice* (66 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Document No. 153, Washington, 1919), 12-13; New York *Times*, December 31, 1918, p. 4; Frederick Lewis Allen, *Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the Nineteen-Twenties* (reprint, New York, 1946), 61-67.

76. James Oneal and G. A. Werner, *American Communism: A Critical Analysis of Its Origin, Development and Programs* (New York, 1947), 43-45, 52-53; Jerome Davis, *The Russian Immigrant* (New York, 1922), 173.
77. William M. Leiserson, *Adjusting Immigrant and Industry* (New York, 1924), 74-75, 204; Claghorn, *Immigrant's Day in Court*, 271-72, 278-81; New York *Times*, January 20, 1919, pp. 8-9; Interchurch World Movement, *Public Opinion*, 95 ff.
78. Emerson Hough, "Round Our Town," *Saturday Evening Post*, CXCII (February 21, 1920), 102; New York Legislature, Joint Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, *Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics* (Albany, 1920), III, 3098; Jerome Davis, *The Russians and Ruthenians in America* (New York, 1922), 109; Claghorn, *Immigrant's Day in Court*, 272-76, 414.
79. New York *Times*, February 7-11, 1919; John M. Blum, *Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era* (New York, 1951), 206.
80. Arthur Wallace Dunn, "The 'Reds' in America," *Review of Reviews*, LXI (1920), 166; Lynn Ford, "The Growing Menace of the I.W.W.," *Forum*, LXI (1919), 70; Hough, "Round Our Town," 106; "Dealing with the 'Red' Agitators," *Current History*, XII (1920), 703.
81. Claghorn, *Immigrant's Day in Court*, 359, 388-89, 416-17; Eldridge Foster Dowell, *A History of Criminal Syndicalism Legislation in the United States* (Baltimore, 1939), 48-50, 147-48; L. L. Thompson to Louis F. Post, April 3, 1920, in Labor File 167/255.
82. *Review of Reviews*, LXI (1920), 123; *Investigation Activities* (66 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Doc. 153), 6-8.
83. National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution, *Report*, 1919-20, p. 21; Farmers National Congress to A. Mitchell Palmer, November 12, 1919, in Justice File 202600; *Cong. Rec.*, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3116; Nelson Van Valen, "The Bolsheviki and the Orange Growers," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXII (1953), 49.
84. Claghorn, *Immigrant's Day in Court*, 340-45; memorandum for the Assistant Secretary, February 28, 1918, and Louis F. Post to L. L. Thompson, December 10, 1919, in Labor File 167/255. On the origin of the 1918 law in the Immigration Bureau and for an indication of Secretary Wilson's vagueness about its provisions see Justice File 192538.
85. New York *Times*, February 10, 1919, p. 1; *Literary Digest*, LX (March 1, 1919), 16.
86. New York *Times*, June 29, 1919, p. 1; New York *World*, November 25, 1919.
87. William T. Ellis, "The 'Fighting Quaker' of the Cabinet," *American Review of Reviews*, LXI (1920), 35-38; Donald Wilhelm, "If He Were President," *Independent*, CII (1920), 65.
88. Louis F. Post, *The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty: A Personal Narrative of an Historic Official Experience* (Chicago, 1923), 36-40, 48-49; Robert D. Warth, "The Palmer Raids," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, XLVIII (1949), 2-3.

89. Claghorn, *Immigrant's Day in Court*, 359-73; Harriet Stanton Blatch to Newton D. Baker, January 1, 1921, and W. B. Wilson to Newton D. Baker, January 6, 1921, in Labor File 167/255A.
90. *New Republic*, XXII (1920), 260.
91. Frederick R. Barkley, "Jailing Radicals in Detroit," *Nation*, CX (1920), 136.
92. *Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, 1920, pp. 32-34, 1921, p. 14; William B. Wilson to Joe Tumulty, January 17, 1921, in Labor File 167/255A; Francis F. Kane, "The Communist Deportations," *Survey*, XLIV (1920), 143. Wilson took heart in May and decided that the Communist Labor party did not fall under the prohibitions of the deportation law; his action resulted in automatic release of about three hundred of those arrested in January.
93. New York *Times*, 1920: April 16, p. 4, May 1, p. 12, May 8, p. 24; *Literary Digest*, LXV (May 22, 1920), 25.
94. Inter-Racial Council, *Proceedings National Conference on Immigration* (New York, 1920), 9, 12; T. Coleman du Pont, "Does America Want Immigration or Emigration?" *Current Opinion*, LXIX (1920), 179; William H. Barr, "Plain Facts About Immigration," *Blast Furnace and Steel Plant*, VIII (1920), 422; *The American Citizen*, June 1, 1921.
95. Chafee, *Free Speech*, 168-69, 269-82; New York *Times*, 1920: January 13, p. 2, January 17, p. 11, January 23, p. 3.
96. Warth, "Palmer Raids," 20; *The New International Year Book*, 1920, pp. 697-98; *United States Statutes at Large*, XLI, 1008-1009; *Saturday Evening Post*, CXCVI (March 22, 1924), 28. For a survey of editorial reaction to the May Day episode see *Dearborn Independent*, XX (May 29, 1920), 6.

Notes to Chapter Nine

1. John T. Buchanan, "How to Assimilate the Foreign Element in Our Population," *Forum*, XXXII (1902), 691. See also Lawrence A. Cremin, *The American Common School: An Historic Conception* (New York, 1951), 44-47.
2. New York City, which undoubtedly had the most extensive program, was teaching 1,376 foreign students in special evening classes in 1879 and 36,000 in 1905; Gustave Straubenmueller, "The Work of the New York Schools for the Immigrant Class," *Journal of Social Science*, XLIV (1906), 177. See also Charles Hirschfeld, *Baltimore, 1870-1900: Studies in Social History* (Baltimore, 1941), 112.
3. In this chapter I pass over as a separate matter the occasional Americanizing activities conducted by immigrant organizations among their own nationalities. The most extensive of these organizations was probably the Educational Alliance, a Jewish agency operating in New York's Lower East Side from 1891 on. For an amusing picture of Jewish children in the classrooms of the alliance, singing patriotic songs while waving little American flags in each hand, see H. G. Wells, *The Future in America* (New York, 1906), 148-50. See also Paul Abelson, "The Education of the Immigrant," *Journal of Social Science*, XLIV (1906), 163-72.

4. See Chapter V, note 49; University Settlement Society, *Report*, 1896, p. 26, 1898, pp. 27-28; *Hull-House Bulletin*, I (October 15, 1896), 1-2, 7; Hale House, *Eleventh Annual Report*, 1908, p. 10.
5. *Report of the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution*, 1898-1900, pp. 156-57, 196-97, 213, and 1905-06, p. 23; *American Monthly Magazine*, XXVI (1905), 407.
6. Edward G. Hartmann, *The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant* (New York, 1948), 31-36; *Immigrants in America Review*, I (1915), 63; Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Americanization Section, File 27671-1828 (National Archives).
7. D.A.R., *Report*, 1905-06, p. 23; Sons of the American Revolution, *National Year Book*, 1902, pp. 174-80, and 1914, pp. 137-38.
8. Kirk H. Porter, ed., *National Party Platforms* (New York, 1924), 347-48.
9. R. L. Duffus, *Lillian Wald: Neighbor and Crusader* (New York, 1939), 147.
10. Leroy Hodges, "The Church and the Immigrants: A Record of Failure and the Remedy," *Missionary Review*, XXXV (1912), 167-72; H. B. Grose, *The Incoming Millions* (New York, 1906), 106-17; Mrs. D. B. Wells and others, *Conservation of National Ideals* (New York, 1911), 105-22; Charles Stelzle, *American Social and Religious Conditions* (New York, 1912), 112-16; *New Americans for a New America* [n.p., 1913], 7.
11. Hartmann, *Movement*, 28-29; *Immigrants in America Review*, I (1915), 18-23.
12. See, for example, Peter Roberts, *The New Immigration* (New York, 1913), viii, 306-307; Elias B. Sanford, ed., *Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America: Report of the First Meeting*, 1908, p. 98; Wells, *Conservation*, 12, 103.
13. Helen Christine Bennett, *American Women in Civic Work* (New York, 1915), 167-70; Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, 1951-1954), V, 523-24.
14. Among Frances Kellor's early writings see especially "New Spirit in Party Organization," *North American Review*, CXCIX (1914), 879-92; "Who is Responsible for the Immigrant?" *Outlook*, CVI (1914), 912-17; *Straight America: A Call to National Service* (New York, 1916). For her admiration of Roosevelt see Kellor to Roosevelt [December, 1912], in Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Box 269 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
15. Hartmann, *Movement*, 53-55, 68-71; Lillian D. Wald, *The House on Henry Street* (New York, 1915), 293; *Immigrants in America Review*, II (July, 1916), 3.
16. Hartmann, *Movement*, 38-49, 56-63; and see the *Annual Reports* of North American Civic League for Immigrants, 1908-1912.
17. N.A.C.L., *Annual Report*, 1912-13, p. 6, 1913-14, p. 4, and 1914-15, pp. 9-10, 16; *Immigrants in America Review*, I (1915), 16-17. For an illuminating report of how N.A.C.L. agents broke a strike see *Immigration Journal*, I (1916), 69-70.
18. Hartmann, *Movement*, 71-87; *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work*, 1919, pp. 753-55, and 1921, p. 474.
19. Immigrants' Protective League, *Annual Report*, 1916, p. 10.

20. *Immigrants in America Review*, I (1915), 3-4, 15; Frances Kellor and Joseph Mayper, *Recommendations for a Federal Bureau of Distribution Department of Labor* (New York [1914]); Hartmann, *Movement*, 97-101.
21. Frank Julian Warne, *The Tide of Immigration* (New York, 1916), 358-59. (Quoted by permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.)
22. This story is best followed in *Immigrants in America Review*, June-September, 1915.
23. Hartmann, *Movement*, 124-29; National Security League, *Proceedings of the National Security Congress*, 1916, p. 202; Kellor, *Straight America, passim.*
24. For business views of Americanization see Frances A. Kellor, "Engineers and the New Nationalism," *Engineering Record*, LXXIV (1916), 12-13; Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, *Immigration Committee Bulletin*, April 1, 1916, p. 2; Chamber of Commerce, *Fifth Annual Meeting . . . 1917: Report of Committee on Immigration*, 2; *American Industries*, XVI (October, 1915), 26; *Proceedings of the National Conference on Americanization in Industries*, 1919, pp. 28-32; Board of Education of the City of Chicago Cooperating with the Chicago Association of Commerce, *A Year of Americanization Work, July 1918-July 1919* (n.p., n.d.). On the initial effort in Detroit see Gregory Mason, "'Americans First,'" *Outlook*, CXIV (1916), 193-201; National Education Association, *Proceedings*, 1916, pp. 910-17.
25. "A Three Minute Talk on Americanization," in Records of the Council of National Defense, File 13J-A3 (National Archives); Howard C. Hill, "The Americanization Movement," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIV (1919), 613-16, 642.
26. George Creel, *Rebel at Large: Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years* (New York, 1947), 198-99. (Quoted by permission of G. P. Putnam's Sons.)
27. Hartmann, *Movement*, 188-215; Hill, "Americanization," 624-27; James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words That Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919* (Princeton, 1939), 216-30. See also the wry comment in the General Report of the Department of Educational Propaganda, September 11, 1918, in the Records of the Council of National Defense, File 13J-A3: ". . . the work is still vague and ineffective notwithstanding the progress made in organizing it. We, with the State Councils Section, are only pushing the plan of the Bureau of Education, and that plan is not well worked out."
28. Quoted in John Dewey, *Characters and Events: Popular Essays in Social and Political Philosophy* (New York, 1929), II, 466.
29. Mason, "'Americans First,'" 197; N.E.A., *Proceedings*, 1916, p. 915; *Independent*, LXXXV (1916), 294.
30. Arthur D. Dean, *Our Schools in War Time—and After* (Boston, 1918), 22; *The Survey*, XLII (1919), 279; Creel, *Rebel at Large*, 197.
31. Kate Holladay Claghorn, *The Immigrant's Day in Court* (New York, 1923), 300-304; Peter Roberts, *The Problem of Americanization* (New York, 1920), 77; William A. Bond, *Practical Americanization: A Business Man's View* [n.p., 1919], 7.

32. *Immigration Journal*, I (March, 1916), 8; *Congressional Record*, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 745.
33. National Americanization Committee, *Memorandum to the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense Concerning a War Policy for Aliens* (New York, 1917), 20-22; Memo from N.A.C., January 7, 1918, in Roosevelt Papers, Box 272; Frances Kellor, *Neighborhood Americanization* (New York, 1918), 7-8.
34. N.E.A., *Proceedings*, 1916, pp. 185, 937; John Erskine, *Democracy and Ideals: A Definition* (New York, 1920), 34-58. On Dewey and Addams see Paul Arthur Schlipp, ed., *The Philosophy of John Dewey* (Evanston, 1939), 29-30. For other examples of the liberal theory of Americanization see Horace J. Bridges, *On Becoming an American* (Boston, 1918), 131-48; National Federation of Settlements, *Eighth Conference*, 1918, p. 25.
35. James A. Beebe, "The Christianization of Patriotism," *Methodist Review*, LXXVIII (1918), 236; Walter Lippmann, *The Stakes of Diplomacy* (New York, 1915), 173-79; Shailer Mathews, *Patriotism and Religion* (New York, 1918), 41-43; W. B. Pillsbury, *The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism* (New York, 1919), 278-309.
36. N.E.A., *Proceedings*, 1917, pp. 125-28; National Conference of Social Work, *Proceedings*, 1918, pp. 441-54, and 1919, pp. 730-33; Charles Alvin Brooks, *Christian Americanization: A Task for the Churches* (n.p., 1919), 8-10.
37. Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace* (New York, 1927), I, 319-21, II, 77-79, 368-69, 389, 400.
38. Horace M. Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples* (New York, 1924), 140-42; National Conference of Social Work, *Proceedings*, 1919, p. 477; Cleveland Americanization Committee of the Mayor's War Board, *Americanization in Cleveland* (Cleveland, 1919).
39. Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, 221-30; Creel, *Rebel at Large*, 195-201.
40. The tone of the Carnegie Americanization Studies may be judged from the first and best volume in the series: Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York, 1921). Howe's essay, "The Alien," is in Harold E. Stearns, ed., *Civilization in the United States: An Inquiry by Thirty Americans* (New York, 1922), 337-50.
41. Hartmann, *Movement*, 254-58; M. E. Ravage, "The Immigrant's Burden," *New Republic*, XIX (1919), 211.
42. Eric F. Goldman, *Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform* (New York, 1952), 299-303.
43. In 1916 the United States Bureau of Education was able to find only fourteen institutions which had special courses in immigration. By 1921 almost every university and teachers college was offering training in some phase of Americanization. *Immigration Journal*, I (1916), 110; N.E.A., *Proceedings*, 1921, p. 656.

44. *American Legion Weekly*, II (January 30, 1920), 10; N.E.A., *Proceedings*, 1919, pp. 553-54; Charles S. Thomas, "The Evils in Our Democracy," *Forum*, LXI (1919), 51-52.
45. New York Legislature, Joint Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, *Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics* (Albany, 1920), III, 2283-92; *Investigating Strike in Steel Industries* (66 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Report 289, Washington, 1919), 27.
46. National Security League, *The Flying Squadron of Speakers* (New York, 1919), 4; New York *Times*, December 2, 1918, p. 9.
47. National Security League, *A Square Deal for the Public: A Working Program for Crushing the Radical Menace* (New York, 1919); National Security League, *Annual Report of Charles D. Orth, President*, 1920; National Security League to Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, February 1920, in Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, File 27671-4618 (National Archives).
48. American Legion, *Summary of Proceedings of the National Convention*, 1919, pp. 39-42, 46.
49. "Constitutional Government League," Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, File E-10428; *Foreign-Born*, July 29, 1920; Elizabeth C. Barney Buel, *Manual of the United States for the Information of Immigrants and Foreigners* (rev. ed., n.p., 1923), 10-11, 17, 20, 52-55.
50. *American Citizen*, April 1, 1921; National Conference on Americanization in Industries, *Proceedings*, 1919, pp. 8-9 and *passim;* Bond, *Practical Americanization*, 10; John E. Otterson, "Decreased Immigration—Less Production," *Iron Age*, CV (1920), 1133.
51. Hartmann, *Movement*, 101 n, 225-26.
52. Frances Kellor to Theodore Roosevelt, November 27 and December 18, 1918, in Roosevelt Papers, Box 272; *Hearings: Presidential Campaign Expenses* (Senate Privileges and Elections Committee, 66 Cong., 3 Sess., Washington, 1921), II, 2682.
53. T. Coleman du Pont, "Does America Want Immigration or Emigration?" *Current Opinion*, LXIX (1920), 179. The anatomy and policies of the I.R.C. are best explained in *Hearings: Proposed Restriction of Immigration* (House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 66 Cong., 2 Sess., Washington, 1921), 90-121, but see also *Literary Digest*, LXII (July 26, 1919), 96.
54. Miss Kellor declared in 1919 that she was not seeking to dictate editorial policies but only to disseminate "pro-American" advertisements paid for by the Inter-Racial Council. Nevertheless at least one immigrant editor charged in 1920 that propaganda articles were being forced on the foreign-language papers, and du Pont acknowledged that this was indeed the intention. Cf. Robert E. Park, *The Immigrant Press and Its Control* (New York, 1922), 451-57; *Foreign-Born*, January-February, 1920, p. 20; *Hearings: Presidential Campaign Expenses* (66 Cong., 3 Sess.), II, 2683-84.
55. *Cong. Rec.*, 66 Cong., 2 Sess., 1650-51; *Hearings: Americanization Bill* (Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., Washington, 1919); Hartmann, *Movement*, 229-32. The National Education Association came out for the compulsory idea; see its *Proceedings*, 1919, p. 25.

56. Hartmann, *Movement*, 233-52.
57. Harry Rider, "Americanization," *American Political Science Review*, XIV (1920), 111-14; *Laws State of New York*, 1918, p. 749.
58. *New Republic*, XXII (1920), 262; André Siegfried, *America Comes of Age* (New York, 1927), 65; *Harvard Law Review*, XXXV (1922), 469. The Oregon School Law, aimed especially at parochial schools, grew out of the new wave of anti-Catholic nativism as well as the declining spirit of Americanization.
59. Robert T. Hill, "From Americanization to Adult Education," *Survey*, LXII (1929), 366-67; National Conference of Social Work, *Proceedings*, 1924, p. 577. The National Education Association changed its Department of Immigrant Education into a Department of Adult Education in 1924; N.E.A., *Proceedings*, 1924, p. 566.
60. Sons of the American Revolution, *National Year Book*, 1919, p. 122; American Legion, *Summary*, 1919, p. 42; Bessie Louise Pierce, *Citizens' Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth* (New York, 1933), 52-55; N.E.A., *Proceedings*, 1921, pp. 38-42, 760; *Literary Digest*, LXIV (February 21, 1920), 90.
61. *Literary Digest*, LXV (May 8, 1920), 52; *Nation*, CX (1920), 128; *Athletes' Americanization League* (n.p., n.d.). In an unpublished paper Edwin Layton has shown that the Americanization Fund of Los Angeles was actually a subsidiary of the Better America Federation, a propaganda organization of ultra-conservative businessmen.
62. N.E.A., *Proceedings*, 1922, pp. 953-55, 968; Hartmann, *Movement*, 265.
63. *Saturday Evening Post*, CXCIII (May 14, 1921), 20; Arthur Sweeney, M.D., "Mental Tests for Immigrants," *North American Review*, CCXV (1922), 609-10; Prescott F. Hall, "Immigration and the World War," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (1921), 192; Clinton Stoddard Burr, *America's Race Heritage* (New York, 1922), 6; David Starr Jordan quoted in *American Jewish Year Book*, 1922-23, p. 54.
64. Emerson Hough, "Round Our Town," *Saturday Evening Post*, CXCII (February 21, 1920), 102.

Notes to Chapter Ten

1. New York *Times*, August 6-8, 1920.
2. Although West Frankfort is just north of the Williamson County line, this event would have fit well into Paul M. Angle's *Bloody Williamson: A Chapter in American Lawlessness* (New York, 1952).
3. Carey McWilliams, *Prejudice: Japanese-Americans, Symbol of Racial Intolerance* (Boston, 1944), 57-61.
4. C. Vann Woodward, *Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel* (New York, 1938), 463-74; Charles P. Sweeney, "Bigotry in the South," *Nation*, CXI (1920), 585; *General Laws of the Legislature of Alabama*, 1919, pp. 881-83.
5. Jacob Zeitlin and Homer Woodbridge, *Life and Letters of Stuart P. Sherman* (New York, 1929), II, 476, 482-83; *Saturday Evening Post*, CXCIII (May 7, 1920), 20.

6. "The New Tide of Immigration," *Current History*, XII (1920), 704-705; *Literary Digest*, LXII (July 26, 1919), 96, LXV (June 5, 1920), 32, LXVI (September 11, 1920), 18, LXVII (December 18, 1920), 9, and LXVII (December 25, 1920), 14.
7. *Literary Digest*, LXIII (December 27, 1919), 14.
8. Frank Bohn, "The Ku Klux Klan Interpreted," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXX (1925), 399; Stanley Frost, "When the Klan Rules," *Outlook*, CXXXVI (1924), 262; Pauli Murray, ed., *States' Laws on Race and Color* (n.p., 1950), 123, 259, 290, 378, 423, 504, 524. Without attempting a systematic coverage, this volume contains the Wyoming statute and similar ones passed by six other states, all within the period 1921-1925.
9. Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal* (New York, 1945), 47, 153, 201-204, 225-26, 266, 273-74, 289-90; John M. Blum, *Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era* (Boston, 1951), 254.
10. On anti-alien legislation see Chapter XI, note 1. Good examples of the connection between anti-League and anti-foreigner attitudes are in Ira E. Bennett, *Editorials from The Washington Post 1917-1920* (Washington, 1921), 420, 569-75; *Grizzly Bear*, XXV (September, 1919), 6, and XXVI (April, 1920), 5.
11. New York *Times*, May 31, 1937, p. 15.
12. *Ibid.*, February 20, 1921, p. 2; *Saturday Evening Post*, CXCIII (May 7, 1920), 20.
13. *American Industries*, XX (October, 1919), 18; American Constitutional Association, *American Ideals* (Charleston, W. Va. [1924]), 5; Albert Greene Duncan, *The Spirit of America* (University of Rochester Bulletin, Ser. XVI, No. 3, November, 1920), 15; James M. Beck, *The Constitution of the United States, Yesterday, Today—and Tomorrow?* (New York, 1924), 206-209, 288-309.
14. "Aristocracy and Politics," *Journal of Heredity*, X (1919), 166. Hall was deeply impressed by Grant's book, though he had already come to roughly the same point of view through his own studies of European racist literature. Grant, in turn, thought well of Hall and was an active member of Hall's Immigration Restriction League as early as 1905. The relation between the two men may be traced in the Files of the Immigration Restriction League (Houghton Library, Harvard University).
15. Harry Huntington Powers, *The American Era* (New York, 1920), 184; Frances Rumsey, "Racial Relations in America," *Century Magazine*, XCVII (1919), 786; Theodore Lothrop Stoddard, *The Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under Man* (New York, 1922).
16. *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy* (New York, 1920), 166 and *passim*.
17. Charles W. Gould, *America, A Family Matter* (New York, 1920); Clinton Stoddard Burr, *America's Race Heritage* (New York, 1922), 208; Kenneth Lewis Roberts, *Why Europe Leaves Home* (Indianapolis, 1922), 22. On Roberts see also John Tebbell, *George Horace Lorimer and the Saturday Evening Post* (New York, 1948), 90-91.
18. Paul Popenoe and Roswell Hill Johnson, *Applied Eugenics* (New York, 1918), 300-306, 424-27.