



WHITENESS OF A
DIFFERENT COLOR

*European Immigrants and the
Alchemy of Race*

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meant not only to illustrate the changeable character of race, but also to trace the circuitry of race from the various historic encounters that generate this mode of ascribing "difference" to the uneven patterns of racial recognition which such encounters leave in their wake; and to the localized, even individualized experience of literally seeing, or not seeing, racial "difference" where such difference depends upon the play between social consciousness and literal vision. Whereas Chapter 4 focuses upon the power of history in the formation of race, Chapter 5 bears down more directly upon social consciousness and observable racial "fact"—upon the vagaries of race and the eye of the beholder.

Part one has sketched a succession from one racial paradigm to another across 175 years of American history; part two now examines the resulting discrepancies and the symptoms of uncertainty in the seeming fixity of race, as one regime gives way only imperfectly to the next. ~~Competing discourses of race rise and fall in salience. Each is keyed to a different aspect of the unfolding national epic of encounter, conquest, enslavement, and emancipation, and immigration, each offers a different version of the polity and its divisions; and each is subject to the concerns of the moment. One's view and interpretation of various real-life bodies, then—the bodies of Hebrews or of Celts or of Caucasians, for instance—is thus intimately aligned with one's comprehension of the body politic.~~

"Have you any objections to a foreigner?" [Mrs. Tristram] continued, addressing Newman. . .

"No Irish need apply," said Tristram.

Newman meditated awhile. "As a foreigner, no," he said at last; "I have no prejudices."

"My dear fellow, you have no suspicions!" cried Tristram. "You don't know what terrible customers these foreign women are; especially the 'magnificent' ones. How should you like a fair Circassian, with a dagger in her belt?"

Newman administered a vigorous slap to his knee. "I would marry a Japanese, if she pleased me," he affirmed.

"We had better confine ourselves to Europe," said Mrs. Tristram.

—Henry James, *The American* (1877)

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1877: *The Instability of Race*

Midway through *The American*, Valentin de Bellegard introduces his brother to James's prototypical American, remarking, "My brother is a great ethnologist." "An ethnologist? Ah," the American returns, "you collect negroes' skulls, and that sort of thing."¹ Although the reference to ethnology passes fleetingly as a textual oddity, James's concern throughout the novel is fundamentally "ethnological," and his ethnology is fundamentally racial. As the American makes his way through a maze of bewildering European social codes, he scans every face for clues as to proper bearing and deeper meaning. Likewise, as he seeks, then woos, and ultimately loses an aristocratic bride, the question of "pedigree"—his and hers—overwhelms the text. James becomes quietly preoccupied with race, and the narrative proceeds according to a kind of physiognomical surveillance by which every human face is made to tell. Of Lord Deepmere, for instance, the narrator remarks, "His physiognomy denoted great simplicity, a certain amount of brutishness, and a probable failure in the past to profit by rare educational advantages." ("Is he Irish?" Christopher Newman wants to know.)²

The racialist tensions within *The American*—the tension, for instance, between the sentiments “No Irish need apply” and “We had better confine ourselves to Europe” in Newman and the Tristrams’ conversation about a suitable bride for the American—along with other cultural articulations from 1877, illuminate the instability of race as both an idiom of power and a category of perception. Not only do certain groups undergo a process of racial redefinition as shifting social and political circumstances require, but varying systems of “difference” can coexist and compete with one another at a given moment. ~~One set of racial perceptions does not clearly give way to the next.~~ This was evident in the discussion of “Celtic” savagery and “Caucasian” entitlements during the draft riots of 1863; it was reflected in various court battles between the 1870s and the 1930s over who qualified as “free white persons” in naturalization law; and it was reflected in George Schuyler’s deliberate dismantling of the Caucasian race in *Black No More* and in Laura Z. Hobson’s conflicted view of racial Jewishness in *Gentleman’s Agreement*.

There is nothing singular about the year 1877 when it comes to the discrepancy in racial classification, in other words. But given the problems of excavating archaic ways of seeing races, 1877 does provide an apt focal point for investigation. During that year race questions surfaced in every region of the country (and much of the wider world as well); the discourse of race addressed a range of pressing social and political questions; and the systems of race framing one debate did not necessarily suit the contours of the next. The Caucasians in one political context or in one locale might reappear, deeply divided, as Anglo-Saxons, Celts, and Hebrews in another.

~~Here is some of what was attracting racial attention in 1877: Reconstruction collapsed in the South, raising new questions about the relations among whites and blacks in an era of black Emancipation and the re-integration of the South into national political life. In the aftermath of Custer’s demise the year before, the Great Sioux Wars ended with the defeat of the Minneconjou Sioux; Sitting Bull escaped to Canada, and Crazy Horse surrendered to federal troops. A vocal and often violent anti-Chinese movement coalesced in the West, particularly in California, where white workers decried the labor competition of “Mongolians” and insisted upon a “white man’s republic.” The East and Midwest, meanwhile, were wracked by labor unrest which raised questions in some quarters about the white immigrant working class itself. Members of the radical Irish Molly Maguires were on trial for murder in Pennsylvania; and~~

reverberations of the Tweed scandal in New York continued to raise doubts about the Celtic proletariat there. Jewishness became a matter of intense debate following a Saratoga hotel’s decision to bar Joseph Seligman, a prominent Jewish banker. A series of skirmishes (variously called “riots” and “raids”) erupted between Mexicans and Americans along the nation’s southwestern border. And, on the international scene, the Russo-Turkish war in the Caucasus (“the traditional cradle of the race,” as Harper’s put it) produced a rash of commentary on the “races of the Danube,” while Henry Stanley’s reports from Africa aroused tremendous popular enthusiasm for the white-over-black adventure of taming “the dark continent.”³

In a discussion of the ideological power of travel writing as a genre, the sociologist Howard Winant has aptly noted, “We might usefully think of a racial *longue duree* in which the slow inscription of phenotypical signification took place upon the human body, in and through conquest and enslavement, to be sure, but also as an enormous act of expression, of narration.”⁴ As should be clear from this quick catalogue of the year’s events, this glacial process has left in play multiple, contradictory racial understandings of who is who: competing “phenotypical significations” are etched upon the body (and the body politic) not only by the residual power of prior events and renewing acts of their cultural representation, but also by the untidiness of history itself.

A range of social, political, and economic encounters have been racially comprehended in U.S. history, and they carry, in their turn, a power to further define U.S. history in terms of race. These include European exploration (which generated and sustained a division between the white Christians of Europe and the nonwhite “heathens” of Africa, Asia, and the Americas); the conquest of North America (which similarly divided “white” rulers from subjugated “nonwhites,” and “civilized” Europeans from “savage” Indians and “mongrelized” Mexicans); slavery and Emancipation (which divided white self-possessed citizens from black chattel, whites who were “fit” from blacks “unfit” for self-government); and immigration (which generated and sustained a division between those North and West Europeans who represented good material for citizenship from those South and East Europeans and Asians whose republican credentials were suspect).

Although these racial encounters do generally trace the nation’s history as it unfolded across time in some semblance of succession, one phase never smoothly gave way to the next. Like any narrow sliver of time,

then, the year 1877 is not simply a one-dimensional, static moment during the period of America's rapid industrialization. Rather, it embodies Winant's "slow inscription of phenotypical signification" in its entirety—European exploration (Stanley in Africa) and conquest (Miles and the Sioux, the Mexican border skirmishes) and slavery-Emancipation debates (the "redemption" of the South) and immigration (California's anti-Chinese agitation, the troubles with the Mollies, the flap over Seligman, the dramatic strike of "white" laborers in cities from Baltimore to St. Louis), all in the encompassing framework of capitalist development. And each of these historical stages, now contending at a single instant, produced its own particular patterns for seeing and understanding the world racially—its own racial mythologies, its own rivalries, and its own categories.

If race as a conceptual category is indeed a theory of history, then race as a *perceptual* category embodies that history in all its complexity and contradiction.⁵ The racial conceptions of peoplehood generated during conquest—in California, say—may be partially effaced by secondary and tertiary inscriptions created by the anti-Chinese campaign or by the question of black-white segregation; but so may the initial inscription be reinforced by traditional narrations and ritual repetitions of the history of conquest, or rejuvenated by similar conquests in later periods. The "degenerate Mexicans" of 1840s imagery might become honorary "Caucasians" in the context of school segregation later in the century, only to be reinscribed as a dangerously shiftless and unassimilable element when Pancho Villa rides (or when intolerance of undocumented immigrants mounts in Pete Wilson's California).

Race is a palimpsest, a tablet whose most recent inscriptions only imperfectly cover those that had come before, and whose inscriptions can never be regarded as final. Contradictory racial identities come to coexist at the same moment in the same body in unstable combinations, as the specific histories that generated them linger in various cultural forms or in the social and political relationships that are their legacies. Thus it was, for instance, that Henry James drew his fateful racial line of exclusion both *within* and *around* Europe in his quest for a proper bride for the American: "No Irish need apply," "We had better confine ourselves to Europe."

Through the Lens of Race

Among the most telling snapshots of the complex, overlapping systems of racial differentiation at this moment is Charles Dudley Warner's two-

volume sequence recounting his journey through northern Africa and the Near East, *Mummies and Moslems* (1876) and *In the Levant* (1877). Although Warner is now remembered almost exclusively for his collaboration with Mark Twain on *The Gilded Age*, his travel writings were widely read and frequently commented upon in the press at the time. Although the narrative is far removed from the American scene, Warner deployed a distinctly American—which is to say, racial—understanding of "difference," of the relationship among the world's peoples, of history and human progress, and of power, potentiality, and merit.

Warner's narrative is a rich, protracted musing on "difference." Like James's prototypical American, Warner himself is ceaselessly scanning the human landscape, and both *Mummies and Moslems* and *In the Levant* become not geographical travelogues merely, but physiognomical tours of the region's "shifting kaleidoscope of races, colors, and graceful attitudes."⁶ Indeed, Warner's fascination with skin color, features, physiognomy, and body type is tireless, "such a display of bare legs and swarthy figures" does this part of the world offer up. "Look! that's an East Indian, that's a Greek, that's a Turk, that's a Syrian-Jew? No, he's Egyptian, the crooked nose is not uncommon to Egyptians."

And what a cosmopolitan place [Alexandria] is. We meet Turks, Greeks, Copts, Egyptians, Nubians, Syrians, Armenians, Italians; tattered derweeshes, "weelies" or holy Moslems, nearly naked, presenting the appearance of men who have been buried a long time and recently dug up; Greek priests, Jews, Persian Parsees, Algerines, Hindoos, negroes from Darfoor, and flat-nosed blacks from beyond Khartoum.

"The complexions exhaust the possibilities of human color," Warner exclaims.⁷

Warner thus offers a remarkably unself-conscious portrait of an American racial sensibility. From the opening pages onward any discussion is apt to come to rest on the image of "a stalwart, wild-eyed son of the sand, coal-black," "a yellow-skinned, cunning-eyed conjurer," "a fat negress . . . whose jet face has taken an incredible polish; only the most accomplished bootblack could raise such a shine on a shoe," a "pathetic-eyed little Jew [who] makes me feel that I am oppressing his race," "a negro, who puts all the fervor of the tropics into his [praying] . . . his black skin shines with moisture; there is, too, in his swaying and bowing, an *abandon*, a laxity of muscles, and a sort of jerk that belong only to his sympathetic race," "a perfect Congo negro in features and texture of skin—lips pro-

truding and nose absolutely level with his cheeks; as faithful and affectionate as a Newfoundland dog," "antic crews of Nubians whose ebony bodies shine in the sun," "a company of Arab acrobats and pyramid-builders, their swarthy bodies shining in the white sunlight," "sharp-faced Greeks, impudent Jews, fair-faced women from Bethlehem, sleek Armenians," "light-haired barbarians from the Caucasus, dark-skinned men and women from Moscow . . . simple, rude, honest, clumsy boors," or "[Albanian Gypsy women, who] preserve, in their swarthy complexions, burning black eyes, and jet black hair, the characteristics of some savage Oriental tribe . . . it was a wild beauty which woman sometimes shares with the panther."⁸ Warner's judgment concerning Jerusalem fairly captures his overall assessment of the peoples encountered throughout his trek: "Now and then . . . we saw a good face, a noble countenance . . . but the most whom we met were debased, misbegotten, the remnants of sin, squalor, and bad living."

Undergirding these observations all along is a tacit theory of history by which physical facts presumably reflect underlying principles and grand historical forces. The glistening dark skins, hooked noses, and jet black eyes of Africa and the Levant all offer eloquent, indisputable comment on larger themes of civilization, barbarism, and savagery. To be "debased" is to be "misbegotten," in Warner's view, and "begetting" always denotes lineage-as-race. Race thus provides the necessary legend for mapping human history, even as it provides the physical proof that, when it comes to questions of relative merit of the world's peoples, history does not lie. That the inhabitants of modern Egypt suffer from a profound social and cultural stasis, for example, is intimately related to the "facts" attending their lineage: "Here the mongrel subjects of the Khedive, a mixture of ancient Egyptian, conquering Arabian, subject Nubian, enslaved Soudan, inheritors of all civilizations and appropriators of none, kennel amid these historic ash-heaps, caring for neither their past nor their future." The modern Greeks, too, are but "mongrel inheritors of the ancient [Greek] soil," "unappreciative possessors" of the ruins of what was once a "splendid civilization."¹⁰ There is perhaps no worse crime than to be a "mongrel"—or to be, in Warner's own recurring phrase, "hopelessly mixed"—but, conveniently, to be a mongrel entails its own harsh historical punishments.

Ultimately, all racial logic leads back to the United States. If Warner himself seems most interested in "Oriental" physiognomy as a reflection of "Oriental" debasement, the text continuously evokes narrator and reader as a collective Euro-American "we" whose own physiognomy and

history are normalized through the constant measurement of Levantine and African "difference." Significantly, though, this "we" is itself unstable, sometimes "white," sometimes "Caucasian," sometimes "English." Warner renders the Levant *through* the multiple lenses of American racial thinking, in other words; and in doing so he recreates his ("white") narrator-reader as precisely the racial palimpsest which is a product of the race-inscribing process of American conquest, enslavement, emancipation, and immigration.

~~The central reference point in Warner's cosmology of "difference," not surprisingly, is the distinction between "civilization" on the one hand and "barbarism" or "savagery" on the other, always keyed to whiteness and its Others.~~ Upon meeting a certain European on his travels, Warner comments, "We were civilized beings, met by chance in a barbarous place." He renders the rhythmic chant of Nubian oarsmen as a "weird, barbarous refrain." At a certain African marketplace "the crowd hustles about us in a troublesome manner, showing special curiosity about the ladies, as if they had rarely seen white women . . . we learn that the natives 'not like you.' The feeling is mutual, though it is discouraging to our pride to be despised by such barbarous half-clad folk."¹¹

Layered atop this general concern for shades of skin color and shades of "civilization" is an attention to lineage—musings upon the relative authenticity, purity, or contamination of a given people, linked to their racial history (most often a history of decline) and to their current moral or social condition (usually a condition of abjection). Thus some dancers encountered in Egypt "claim to be an unmixed race of ancient lineage; but I suspect their blood is no purer than their morals. There is not much in Egypt that is *not* hopelessly mixed." The "Levantines" of Smyrna are "descendants of the marriage of Europeans with Greek and Jewish women . . . But the race is said to be not self-sustaining, and is yielding to the original types."¹² In this vein, as noted above, the population of modern Greece comes in for harsh treatment, as mongrelized squanderers of a rich tradition.

Another tier in Warner's ideological edifice consists of a web of exegesis by which the human spectacle of Africa and the Levant seems to exist solely for the comment it offers upon the United States—upon its innate superiority as a civilization, and upon the troubling inferiority of some of its inhabitants. Observing a group of Bedouin dancers, for instance, Warner remarks that "their eyes shine with animal wildness." "It seems to be precisely the dance of North American Indians," he concludes. On

a group of Moslem mourners, again, "You would not see in farthest Nubia a more barbarous assemblage, and not so fierce an one. In the presence of these wild mourners the term 'gentler sex' has a ludicrous sound . . . most of them were flamingly ugly, and—to liken them to what they most resembled—physically and mentally the type of the North American squaws." On another encounter down the Nile, "This group composes as barbaric a picture as one can anywhere see. I need not have gone so far to see such a miserable group; I could have found one as wretched in Pigville (every city has its Pigville?). Yes, but this is characteristic of the country. These people are as good as anyone here."¹³

Peoples encountered along the way thus highlight the incomparable civilization of the United States by their stunning contrast to it, or they evoke the few truly unfortunate elements within the United States ("North American squaws," the people of "Pigville"). But in conjuring the image of America's "savages," the sight of the Bedouin or Moslem yet again redoubles the overall sense of U.S. superiority, for *here* in the region of the Nile such a wretched level of existence "is characteristic of the country." Warner looks upon Africa and the Levant with a racial gaze that is distinctly American, then offers up a narrative version of these regions as objective proof of the very "truths" of American life that had created his racial gaze in the first place.

Most telling in the present connection are Warner's remarks not about "squaws" or "savages" but about those populations who by custom (and law) were "white" in the United States. His brief reflection on the Irish in the United States as he observes a street scene in Cairo is symptomatic. After describing at some length the physique and the occupation of a *sais*—a "slender handsome black fellow, probably a Nubian," who runs before carriages in order to clear the way through the busy thoroughfares—he pauses to consider whether such a custom could be established back home. "If they could not be naturalized in Central Park," he muses, "it might fill some of the requirements of luxury to train a patriot from the Green Isle to run before the horses, in knee breeches, flourishing a shillalah. Faith, I think he would clear the way."¹⁴ The turn of mind by which Warner so effortlessly moves from the body of the "Nubian" to the "patriot of the Green Isle" underscores the racial niche the Irish occupy in his thinking, just as the simplicity with which he "naturalizes" the Irish *in place of* the "Nubian" for duty in Central Park underscores his overarching sense that "whiteness" and "Americanness" are inextricably entwined.

As are "whiteness" and Christianity. This becomes clear in Warner's lengthy passages on the Jews of the Levant. Seeking a glimpse of "real Jews of the type that inhabited [Jerusalem] at the time of our Lord," for instance, Warner discovered that "the persons whom we are accustomed to call Jews . . . have the Assyrian features, the hook nose, dark hair and eyes, and not at all the faces of the fair-haired race from which our Savior is supposed to have sprung."¹⁵ One member of the "tribe of Benjamin," as Warner identifies him, is "the most unpleasant human being I have ever encountered . . . a dark, corkscrew, stringy curl hanging down each side of his face, and the appearance of nasty effeminacy which this gives cannot be described." "If this is a specimen of the restoration of the Jews," he concludes, "they had better not be restored any more." Simply put, "we find it easier to feel that Christ was born in New England than in Judea."¹⁶

His mercurial assessment of Greeks, too, hints at the instability of whiteness within this overarching framework of "civilization" and "savagery." On the one hand, "it would puzzle one to say of what race the person calling himself a modern Greek is." Judging by "types of face" alone, modern Greeks' relation to ancient Athenians seemed "no stronger than that of Englishmen to the ancient Britons." (Here he goes on to pass judgment on their mongrelization.) But on the other hand, when the context shifts the Greek can stand in for an unalloyed white "purity" worthy of D. W. Griffith or Louisiana's White League. Upon meeting the Greek wife of a Syrian merchant, Warner gushes, "Her fair complexion was touched by the sun and radiant with health. Her blue eyes danced with the pleasure of living . . . After our long regimen of the hideous women of the Nile, plastered with dirt, soaked in oil, and hung with tawdry ornaments, it may be imagined how welcome was this vision of a woman, handsome, natural, and clean, with neither the shyness of an animal nor the brazenness of a Ghawazee."¹⁷

As the Irish, Jews, and Greeks pass through their vicissitudes in the kaleidoscopic racial setting of Africa and the Near East, so, too, do Warner's idealized, disembodied readers—his imagined community of narrative fellow-travelers. Who is the "we" constituted by the racial syntax of Warner's narrative? "In the vales of the Caucasus, we are taught," he remarks, "our race has attained its most perfect form; in other days its men were as renowned for strength and valor as its women for beauty."¹⁸ Elsewhere, however, he finds local anti-English sentiment to be "rather humiliating to us Americans, who are, after all, almost blood-relations of

the English; . . . we are often taken for *Inglese*, in the villages where few strangers go."¹⁹ "We" refers, by turns, to men who are "white" and who are jealous of "our" white women; to Europeans and Euro-Americans *excluding Jews, Greeks, and Irish*; to "Caucasians" who find their perfect form attained "in the vales of the Caucasus"; or to those who are "almost blood-relatives" of the English and are often mistaken for "Inglese." Such discrepancies throughout *Mummies and Moslems* and *In the Levant* are not inconsistencies, exactly: they faithfully replicate the palimpsestic inscriptions of race upon both the body and the imagination in American culture at large, as year upon year of exploration, conquest, slavery, emancipation, and immigration has multiplied the meanings of race.

The Encounter with Africans on Two Continents

A satirical piece entitled "The Origin of Man, by Darwin" that appeared in *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* in September 1877 exposes the bedrock, white-over-nonwhite assumptions undergirding the various American schemes of "difference" and differentiation. In response to her daughter's lament that their family was different from everyone else in the "tribe," a chimpanzee mother explains with great portent that this "difference" is not a mark of shame but a badge of pride. "It is a distinction. We are a higher race," she explains. "We are advancing, my dear. *You are whiter than I am.*"²⁰ The crude Darwinism and the blatant white supremacy of this piece were common enough in far more serious venues. According to an early *Visitor's Guide* to the newly opened American Museum of Natural History, for instance, the text of the Hall of Mammals began with this brief lesson in biology: "In deference to Man's superior estate he may well be left free from classification. It is, however, well to observe in this connection some of the lower examples of the human race." Casing number one exhibited "the Australians, represented by several skeletons." (The next several cases contained gorillas, orang-outans, and gibbons.)²¹ Anthropologists at the time likewise reported fresh research comparing the surfaces of the brain among the "Gorilla," "Chimpanzee," "Orang," "Bush-woman," and the "European."²² ~~And in a section entitled "The Races of Man," *Intermediate Geography* (1877), a text for grade-school children, reported rather matter-of-factly that "the white race is superior to all others"; "the nations of western Europe, and their descendants in all parts of the world, are the most highly civilized."~~²³ ~~The fundamental distinction between civilization as whiteness and savagery~~

~~as nonwhiteness retained tremendous power~~, even centuries after the original encounter.

Americans in 1877 could vicariously participate in the original phase of encounter through heavily romantic popular accounts of white explorations around the globe—in the Caribbean and the Pacific, in South America, and particularly in Africa. In March the *New York Herald* recounted a fierce conflict between "natives" and "white men" aboard a New York schooner in the Congo. The violence ended when the agent of a Dutch trading house "and about ten other Europeans or white men, all well armed, came over with about a hundred Kroomen and drove the natives out of the ship."²⁴ Whereas scholars like David Spurr and Michael Hunt have illuminated the influence of race thinking on colonial power, I am most interested here in the secondary power of imperialism to generate and regenerate races themselves. If imperial power and imperial wealth were the work of such expeditions, the manufacture of "Europeans or white men" (as consanguine with one another and as superior to the rest) was the central ideological work of popular journalistic accounts of them.

In this vein Colonel C. Chaille Long's *Central Africa* promised to deliver the "naked truths of a naked people." As one reviewer noted of "the dismal repulsiveness of the people" described in Long's account, "The hope of evangelizing Africa which Livingstone had awakened is dimmed by reading of the barbaric hospitality of M'Tse."²⁵ Similarly, middle-class journals like *Atlantic Monthly* and *Harper's* took readers on periodic excursions to "Barbadoes," "Among the Atlantic Islands," or "Across Africa." Here readers learned, for example, that "the Barbadian negro is *sui generis*; there is nothing like him on earth, above it, or under it. He will lie, cheat, and steal beyond all comprehension. He is impudent to a degree hardly to be understood by an American"; the Azores are characterized by "spectacles of human degradation and misery"; and the "men of Man-yuema" in Africa, "although endowed with many good qualities . . . are cannibals, and most filthy cannibals."²⁶

The most avidly followed accounts of the era were the dispatches from Henry Stanley in Africa to the *New York Herald*. Here, under subheads such as "Stanley the First White Man on the Ubwari Hills," *Herald* readers could enjoy descriptions of the "impenetrably savage countries west of the Burton Gulf."²⁷ Though focusing primarily upon the geographical "mysteries" of the region, Stanley's accounts and other dispatches from the Congo did offer American readers access to the peoples of "dark Africa": in Stanley's case, a prolonged history of European attempts to dis-

cover the source of the Nile led to a meditation on the comparative epistemologies of Europeans and Africans, as he found himself so much at the mercy of local knowledge. As Stanley explained, "native and Arab" statements were "not to be understood, by any means, as conveying accurate and exact information. Even the most intelligent of Arabs, Wau-guana, Wasawhili, and Central Africa natives, as if they were originally taken out of the same matrix, have a prurient palate for exaggeration." This discussion (which appeared under the telling subhead "Native Statements and Explorer's Facts") ended with the sober judgment, "The best weapon an explorer can arm himself with is distrust."²⁸

But distrust was decidedly *not* the "best weapon" an explorer might carry, according to these same accounts—indeed, actual warfare and the weapons required became the point of most dispatches. (The very page of the *Herald* that contained Stanley's musings on European and African regimes of knowledge also contained a spectacular report under the heading "New York Schooner Plundered and Burned by Savages on the Congo River.") Stanley's dispatches later in the year dramatically raised the specter of "Terrible Tribes of Cannibals." Commenting upon Livingstone's earlier confusion over whether a certain stretch of the Lualaba (Congo) River had been the Nile, Stanley asserted that an explorer of Livingstone's reputation "certainly wouldn't attempt the foolhardy feat of following it in canoes, and risk becoming black man's meat," unless he had thought it as grand a discovery as the Nile itself. The sensational prospect of becoming "black man's meat" was among the recurring motifs in *Herald* reportage. On the Wabroire tribe and the "warlike Bakusu," Stanley surmised that "the approaches of a whole congress of bishops and missionaries could have no effect, except as native 'roast beef.'" Or again, the *Herald's* favorite quotation attributed to Livingstone, "You may say there are cannibals who will eat me. It may be true; but I have one comfort, they cannot eat me before they kill me. Can they?"²⁹

- Cannibalism is but one recurring image in a broader theme of irreconcilable human differences. As Stanley renders this "region of fable and mystery—a continent of dwarfs and cannibals and gorillas" for readers in Europe and the United States, his subtext becomes the tremendous gulf separating whites from the rest of the world's peoples. This gulf is evoked by the specter of cannibalism, and by the degree of immutable "difference" implied by the very language of description—the Wenya, for instance, are "singularly cowardly, but also singularly treacherous and crafty." Further, when Stanley tallies the losses incurred by the expedition,

he reports, "Our losses in men are one European and thirty-four Wanguana." (Here and elsewhere he launches into a prolonged obituary of that "one European.") Or again, "difference" is evoked by the Europeans' own "curious" appearance, reflected back to them in the "natives'" reactions: "We were allowed to proceed without violence, more as strange curiosities than anything else," Stanley reports, perhaps because they had come from the direction of "wild lands whither the white people had never ventured before." In a later encounter with "ferocious savages," "the natives had never heard of white men . . . neither could they possibly understand what advantage white men or black men could gain by attempting to begin an acquaintance."³⁰ The impassable gulf separating white from black became starker still in November, under the *Herald* banner, "Desperate Encounters with Swarms of Cannibals . . . A Picture of Savage Warfare." "We soon became acquainted with the worst side of the natives," reported Stanley, "and they presently demonstrated their wildness." This was to be the explorers' "initiation to savage warfare": "They came to fight. The cruel faces, the loudly triumphant drums, the deafening horns, the launched spears, the swaying bodies, all proved it." Stanley's men defeated these tribes and then plundered their temple for ivory.³¹

The original phase of Winant's long-enduring process of racial inscription—exploration and encounter—left as its legacy certain social relations pertaining to slavery on the one hand and conquest on the other, and in the United States these social relations were now perpetually buttressed by the ideological framework of "civilization" and "savagery," whiteness and its Others. Popular accounts like Henry Stanley's thus participated in live questions of political economy in significant ways. It is not merely a passing curiosity, for instance, that the *Herald's* rendition of Stanley's "Picture of Savage Warfare" was directly adjacent to an article on Sitting Bull and the Sioux Wars. Nor is it of small consequence that explorers' depictions of "darkest Africa" appeared at a moment when the question of Negro citizenship in the United States was so hotly contested. ~~Within the context of contemporary American political culture, the unstated but obvious ideological portent in these travel accounts was their comment upon African Americans' fitness for self-government, or the "proof" they offered of how much better off Africans were in America, centuries of slavery notwithstanding.~~

~~Domestically, the white-over-black dynamic of racial inscription that animated Stanley's African adventures was most pressing as the Reconstruction South rapidly became the post-Reconstruction South upon the~~

withdrawal of Northern troops and amid a rising national rhetoric of conciliation and reunion. "With respect to the two distinct races whose peculiar relations to each other have brought upon us the deplorable complications and perplexities which exist in those [Southern] states," intoned Rutherford B. Hayes in his inaugural address in March, "[ours] must be a government which guards the interests of both races carefully and equally." "It is my earnest desire to regard and promote . . . the interests of the white and of the colored people, both equally," he reiterated, ". . . and to put forth my best efforts on behalf of a civil policy which will forever wipe out in our political affairs the color line and the distinctions between North and South."³² As we now know, over time the effacement of "distinctions between North and South" was accomplished in part through a *perpetuation* of the "color line," despite Hayes's plea for "the united and harmonious efforts of both races."³³ Political alignment and conduct in the South in 1877, and the fractious contests over the region's political fate, demonstrate the power of the white-black dyad to frame social relations and to determine Americans' social imagination.

Among the more painstaking contemporary examinations of Reconstruction, its legacies for the Southern polity, and its collapse—and thus among the more complete accounts of race as the enduring organizing principle of the New South—was the 1877 congressional investigation of fraud in Louisiana's 1876 elections. The Democrat Tilden had won Louisiana by a margin of 80,831 to Hayes's 74,426 (even though Republicans claimed that "the excess colored over white voters in Louisiana is one thousand"), and so questions arose concerning the integrity of the election supervision and the real political freedom of the state's "colored" voters. As one legislator put it, "Long years of misgovernment, such as that which has existed in Louisiana, with the disorder growing out of the late war, left many reckless and evil-disposed persons in the State, who have little regard for the rights of white and still less for the rights of black men."³⁴ The binary logic of a polity thus divided into "white" and "black" would have a greater and greater purchase on the nation's political life from the post-Reconstruction era on; and obviously this was of no little consequence for those "whites" who, like Charles Dudley Warner's Jews, were said in other contexts to have "not at all the faces of the fair-haired race from which our Savior is supposed to have sprung."³⁵

The majority and minority reports of the House Special Committee on the Louisiana Elections present a tapestry of election-time violence. Taken together, the reports testify to "whipping and other violence"; "intimi-

dation"; acts of "unjustifiable mischief" (including whites' "firing several shots in the evening against a colored church"); the organization of rifle clubs; and the nightriding activities of white-supremacist "bulldozers" and "regulators" carrying out "bloody and cowardly massacres," "whipping, hanging, shooting, and driving off colored Republicans."³⁶

More telling still, however, are these reports' competing, race-based theories of the workings of the Southern polity in the wake of the Civil War. ~~Even more than the descriptions of racial violence contained within them, the reports' interpretations of that violence demonstrate the power of race in framing the political life of the post-Reconstruction South.~~ The majority report, highly sympathetic with the Louisiana Democrats (and thus with the agenda of white supremacy), ~~interpreted the election-time violence as either black assaults on white Democrats, or, more often, white Republicans' assaults on black Democrats.~~ According to this version, blacks' initial postwar "delusion of '40 acres and a mule'" had given way to "stern realities"; and thus, quite rightly, through disenchantment and impatience many blacks were now simply "no longer Republicans." The villains of this story of intimidation, then, are white Republican leaders who claimed a "proprietary right in the vote of the colored man. They regarded him as a mere political machine of their own invention." Black voters had properly rebelled against such political subservience. In this scenario, recent violence could be attributed to a cynical and rapacious Republican party: "Prominent Republicans considered the killing of a black man in Louisiana as equivalent to fifty thousand dollars of a campaign fund for the party . . . Every homicide in which a colored man chanced to be the victim was seized upon with avidity, telegraphed over the North, and reckoned as a substantial addition to their party strength." Thus the House committee held white—and some black—Republicans accountable for "intimidation" practiced against "the inoffensive colored man" who had merely tried to break a vicious, Reconstruction-era Republican monopoly.³⁷

The committee's minority report, by contrast, set election-time violence in a context of white-supremacist resistance to the aims of Reconstruction, stressing white-supremacist terror for (Democratic) political purposes. The minority recalled the rise of the Knights of the White Camelia in 1868, and their "distinctly bloody and cowardly massacres of colored people . . . for political purposes and political effect," violent antiblack outbreaks at Saint Landrey, Bossier, Caddo, Jefferson, and Saint Bernard resulting in more than seven hundred Negro deaths. It recounted as well

the emergence of the "White League" in 1874, an association of white Democrats "united for the express purpose of asserting the superiority of the white race in political matters." In his appearance before the committee, one witness testified that pre-election terror was so intense that "the plan of these people was to get the colored people so badly cowed before the election that they would do anything that they told them."

Q: Your idea is that on election day it was not necessary to have any intimidation?

A: No, sir; I never saw a more quiet election.³⁸

In substantiation of this interpretation, the minority recounted the dramatic rising of the White League in New Orleans, which had effectively driven the Reconstruction government out of the Capitol: "More than two thousand men answered the summons and fell into line of battle with the promptness and accuracy which only drill and experience in arms can give." This well-trained white army then went on to take over the city's chief political and military institutions, demonstrating "the deliberate and settled determination of the white people, acting in the name of democracy, not to permit the exercise of political power by the blacks." "Educated whites look upon negro citizenship as a badge of humiliation," argued this second report; others "find free negro labor in constant and damaging competition." Thus the terror surrounding Louisiana's election was plain in its motivations and obvious in its source. In response to the majority report's assertion that most of the violence had been carried out against black voters eager to defect from the Republican party, the minority flatly declared,

Neither bribery, nor interest, nor soft words, nor condescension, nor proof of misrule by local officers, nor even violence, can shake the deep-rooted love of the liberated black man for the party whose greatest achievement was universal emancipation and universal citizenship . . . The instant he is let alone, the moment the load of fear is taken off, the moment he dare stand up in his own right and his own strength, free to think, free to act, and free to choose, that moment he stands up ready and willing to vote the Republican ticket. For the negro, although unlearned, is no fool.

Representative Charles Joyce of Vermont concluded that, "had the colored people in those parishes been left free to vote as they pleased, the

Republican majority would have reached at least fifteen hundred or two thousand upon the most liberal count for the Democratic ticket."³⁹

Although the Democrats of the solid South most often employed the rhetoric of "white men's government," it is worth noting that the heightened, self-conscious diction of "Caucasian" identity and supremacy did cross over from scientific discourse into street-level, vernacular usage in parts of the South as early as the 1860s. As one Louisiana newspaper had framed the matter in 1868, "Inducements to negroes to vote, involving directly or indirectly a promise of future advancement, are pregnant with future disaster and disgrace. *The Caucasian needs not to kneel to any other race.*" In Louisiana itself the Knights of the White Camelia, a forerunner of the White League, drew upon both racial designations in its "Charge to Initiates." The order's

main and fundamental object is the MAINTENANCE OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE WHITE RACE in this republic. History and physiology teach us that we belong to a race which nature has endowed with an evident superiority over all other races . . . And it is a remarkable fact that as a race of men is more remote from the Caucasian and approaches nearer the black African, the more fatally that stamp of inferiority is affixed to its sons, and irrevocably dooms them to eternal imperfectability and degradation.⁴⁰

As the umbrella organization of the Knights of the White Camelia waned in 1869, many local groups changed their name to "Caucasian Clubs." As had been the case with New York's white coalition behind the banner of the *Weekly Caucasian* during the Civil War, the diversity of the region's "white persons" perhaps explains the political appeal of a scientifically based appellation like "Caucasian." Louisiana was, in one historian's words, "the most heterogeneous place in the South."⁴¹ But whether "white" or "Caucasian," antiblack forces in the South—like the national debate about their reentry into national life—tended sharply to divide the polity into two races, neither more nor less, precisely after the fashion of Stanley's popular accounts of latter-day "encounters" with the African in "darkest Africa." *~ ~ ~*

Frontier Encounters with Indians, Mexicans, and Asians

An organized police power is "clearly necessary in the Indian country and on the Mexican frontier," warned *Harper's* in a typical piece entitled "The

Regular Army." While whites sought to wrest any semblance of political liberty from the recently liberated blacks of the Southern states, legislators, cavalrymen, and the "white" settlers of various "frontier" communities in 1877 wrestled with the practical questions attending the tensions, skirmishes, and outright warfare between whites and nonwhites in the West. As a popular ballad from the era of the Mexican War had warned, "the savage is over the border, / the savage is over the border." This "savage" remained as important as the border itself in marking the compass of the American nation. Frontier contingencies combined with rhetorical indulgences to invest American nationalism with perpetual appeals to "civilization" and "savagery," to "white" conquest and the defeat of the (always dark) Other. The comprehension of frontier realities, like the comprehension of the post-Reconstruction South, rested upon a racial syntax of simple whiteness and its others.⁴²

As one *Harper's* piece on the nation's newest frontier—Alaska—remarked, the Eskimo "is a very different fellow in most respects from the savage with whom we are all pretty well acquainted."⁴³ The combination of their presumed "savagery" and the extent to which "we are all pretty well acquainted" with them renders "savages" important figures in the ideology of American nationalism and narratives of national belonging. By both their geographical position along the (white) republic's frontiers, and their ethnological position somewhere beneath the capacity for civilization, "savages" mark precisely the point where the American polity leaves off and the realm of degeneracy and chaos begins. Indeed, the "savages" only redemption lies in their approximating whiteness itself—tribes may be suffered within our national boundaries, so long as they can "live like white men," as one 1877 treaty put it.⁴⁴

As the Forty-fourth Congress considered an Indian Appropriation Bill concerning "contingent expenses of the Indian Department" and "treaty stipulations with various Indian tribes," debate repeatedly fell to the question of what "barbarous" or "savage" peoples need, and hence their comparison with "whites." As Senator Bogy of Missouri asked with unconcealed contempt, "What do these [Osage] Indians want? They have their ponies, their guns, their ammunition. Was it liquors or oysters or what?" He later asserted, "A white man, a hunter, could make a living in that country at any time under any circumstances." Later in the same debate, federal spending on the Osages pivoted on a heated exchange over whether Osages were in fact "the wealthiest community upon this continent, whether white, black, or any other color," or whether "it is non-

sense to talk about their being a civilized tribe . . . They are wild as almost any Indians." "There is not a full-blooded Indian among them who wears white men's clothes," asserted one legislator; "they are in a state of barbarism." (But the Pawnees, he did have to concede, "are well advanced for Indians.")⁴⁵

Similarly, one treaty which Congress took under discussion provided that the Sioux "may eventually become self-supporting and acquire the arts of civilized life." To that end, five Sioux delegates were to visit Indian Territory, and if they liked it, the tribe would move there within a year. "The Government may provide for them in the selection of a country suitable for a permanent home, where they may live like white men," the treaty read, although one senator did object to establishing these "wild Indians" where they might threaten slightly more "civilized" tribes who were "assimilating as near as their nature will admit to [the habits] of their white brethren."⁴⁶

Security along the Mexican border represented yet another "frontier" concern of the Forty-fourth Congress. In August an armed band broke into a Starr City, Texas, jail to release two Mexican prisoners, killing the jailor and his wife. For the Texas delegation this was clearly a racial issue. These bandits were "of Mexican blood," observed Congressman Maxie; "perhaps there is not within the broad limits of civilized nations a more accursed population." "We know that the people over there are aliens to us in blood, aliens to us in their social habits and political education, aliens to us in every sense of the word." In response the Texans wanted a greater military appropriation on the part of Congress: "True economy tells us, in dealing with Mexicans and Indians, who respect nothing but visible physical power, place enough of that power in sight, overawe them and thus prevent war." Recent events offered the most persuasive argument imaginable, as far as the Texans were concerned, and they did not hesitate to lay the corpses of the white martyrs of Little Bighorn at the doorstep of Congress itself: "Had the Indian frontier been defended properly . . . there would have been no massacre of General Custer and his men . . . These men [Indian or Mexican savages] fear power, and it is all they do fear." Later in this discussion of military necessity, Maxie implored his colleagues to "give ample protection from the tomahawk of the savage" by placing military personnel "along the entire Indian line, wherever they are needed for protection of the frontiersmen, their wives and their children."⁴⁷ Most interesting is the conflation of Mexicans with Indians—and the powerful ideological effect this blanket notion of sav-

making
of many
people
savage

agency has in homogenizing the imagined community of a white, "civilized" United States.

Change linked to murder, tests, transplants, etc.

~~The Chinese Question in California and the West led Congress still further into a consideration of the legacies of conquest and the social relations of encounter. As scholars like Stuart Creighton Miller and Su-cheng Chan have argued, imperialism itself is the proper context within which the history of Chinese immigration must be situated and understood. Ideologically, white Americans came to "know" the Chinese through the images and reports provided by the missionaries, merchants, and diplomats engaged in the early "opening" of the "Orient." Materially, migration was encouraged and made possible by the dislocations in Asia associated with an increasing Western economic presence, by the new steam routes and the accessibility of travel, and by American continental expansionism and the industrialization of the West—particularly the rise of the railroad, the single largest employer of Chinese labor.⁴⁸ As yet, the presence of a sizable nonwhite population raised concerns over the workings of the self-governing republic and the boundaries of the polity.~~

On February 28, 1877, the House received the "Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration." The document is at once a reaffirmation of the 1790 principle that republican institutions require a "white" polity, and an endorsement of popular labor arguments for the primacy of "white" interests in the marketplace. In its uneven rhetoric of race the document moves from a competition between "Chinese" and "whites" to one between "Asiatics" and "Caucasians." The report's authority thus comes finally to rest upon the principle of "Caucasian" superiority.

The report begins with standard assertions of the economic yellow peril and its menacing implications for "white" laborers: Chinese workers "have reduced wages to what would be starvation prices for white men and women," "there is a lack of employment for whites," unabated Chinese immigration threatens to "degrade all white working people to the abject condition of a servile class." ~~It then goes on to assert that, economics aside, "the safety of republican institutions requires that the exercise of the franchise shall be only by those who have a love and appreciation for our institutions, and this rule excludes the great mass of the Chinese from the ballot as a necessary measure for public safety."~~ As discussion moves to the political demands of a smoothly functioning republic, the appellation "Chinese" quietly gives way to the ethnological category

"Mongolian": ~~"The Mongolian race seems to have no desire for progress and to have no conception of representative and free institutions."~~ *Some of Gandhi's 1890s N.C. ing. 1890s*

Testimony was further taken upon the question of any radical differences existing between the Asiatic and Caucasian races, and in the evidence will be found much valuable information upon this point peculiarly interesting to the ethnologist. The deduction from the testimony taken by the committee on this point would seem to be that there is not sufficient brain capacity in the Chinese to furnish motive power for self-government. Upon the point of morals, there is no Aryan or European race which is not far superior to the Chinese as a class.⁴⁹

As Alexander Saxton has documented, many anti-Chinese agitators in California and elsewhere were Irish, including one of the movement's most vocal leaders, Dennis Kearney. Thus even sympathetic treatments of Chinese immigrants in the popular press tended to embody their own brand of nativism. The *Argonaut*, for instance, would later decry "the refuse and sweeping of Europe, the ignorant, brutal, idle off-scourings of civilization, [who] meet weekly upon the Sand Lot in San Francisco, to determine whether respectable, industrious foreign-born citizens and native-born Americans shall be permitted to treat Chinese humanely and employ them in business ventures, or unite with this idle and worthless foreign gang in driving them into the sea."⁵⁰ Another observer of West Coast politics later recalled:

Anger for Chinese, West Coast

There appeared on the scene [in Seattle] an Irish agitator from California, who proceeded to harangue the laboring people, and to organize them into lodges of the Knights of Labor . . . We had turned loose on us one wild Irishman, and out of his communistic heart has sprung a phantom whose shadow has darkened the whole Northwest coast, and whose tread has made our whole young city shake with terror. The mayor of Tacoma . . . is a German liquor-dealer, who can only make the blindest stagger toward speaking the English language. His family is yet in Germany, and all his money not spent on beer or anti-Chinese demonstrations goes back to the Fatherland.⁵¹

Hence the rhetoric and visual lexicon of pan-white supremacy had a particular appeal in the political culture of the West from the 1870s onward. According to an 1870 tract by John Swinton, for instance, "the

ground of race" was among the chief reasons for opposing Asian immigration. Race, by this account, "is at once the beginning of history and the summing up of history." "The people of the United States are of the white European race, the Japhetic stock, from which have sprung the Germanic, Celtic, and Latin varieties—all immediately related to each other by historical terms . . . the life, genius, and power of the American republic is with the European race."⁵² Although Swinton did not refer to "Caucasians," he did lay the groundwork for a scientific, racial discussion of the immigration question that would pit "Mongolians" (a term he did use) against "white Europeans"—this latter constituting one consanguine "stock" encompassing a number of "varieties." ~~The central question in the ensuing debate over Chinese immigration, then, was "blood," as when ex-Governor Horatio Seymour of New York told a rally of anti-Chinese workers, "Europeans do not overthrow our customs, religion, or civilization. They do not bring here any strange blood."~~⁵³ An *Atlantic Monthly* piece in 1871, too, worried that in recent years "while the rate of Caucasian immigration was decreasing, that of the Mongolian was increasing . . . the steady gain of the percentage of the latter over the former was not an auspicious portent."⁵⁴ The "Caucasian race" was a construction that crossed well into the popular, even in cases where it was a term of sardonic opprobrium, as when, in "Wan Lee, the Pagan," Bret Harte wrote that the boy delighted to walk to school with a certain classmate and to carry her books, "a service always fraught with danger to him from the little hands of his Caucasian Christian brothers."⁵⁵

By April 1877 the anti-Chinese movement was rising to high tide, and the press was abuzz with the emergence of a new secret political order in San Francisco, The Order of Caucasians, whose professed aim was to "drive Chinese out of California." The order represented but a late development in a fierce campaign that had been mounting among California's "white" workers since early in the 1870s. As the order's byzantine by-laws announced, "Each camp and every individual Caucasian, and every encampment, pledges to each and every merchant, manufacturer, and trader, traveler, mechanic, and laborer . . . all their combined influence, power, advertisement, and patronage; and shall oppose to annihilation by every manner and means within the thin gauze of the law all others." This pledge amounted to the "bounden and solemn duty" of every Caucasian to "pursue and injure" two classes of "enemies": class A (persons who hire or rent to "Mongolians" or who "countenance their

existence in any way") until he has been removed from the list of public enemies; and class B ("Mongolians")—"forever."⁵⁶

~~As should be clear from the foregoing sketch, the notion of "white" or "Caucasian" consanguinity retained terrible power in American political culture in 1877. Frontier clashes with Indians and Mexicans, conflicts over the political future of the bi-racial South, dispatches from Africa, and the logic of the Chinese Question all tended fatally to divide the polity between a monolithic whiteness and its Others. But as should also be clear from the anti-Irish and anti-German valences of much pro-Chinese commentary, "white Europeans," too, could be pariahs, immigrants representing the refuse and sweeping of Europe, the ignorant, brutal, idle off-scourings of civilization—though perhaps white—were also seen in some quarters as distinct racial types in their own right. In describing a "mob" during the St. Louis general strike in July, J. A. Dacus reported crowds composed "largely of negroes," joined in some cases by "sorry specimens of the Caucasian race."⁵⁷ As often as not in this kind of account, "sorry specimens" were fully ostracized from the "Caucasian race," enumerated instead as "Celts" or "Mediterraneans" or "Hebrews," notwithstanding the power of indivisible whiteness in contexts where "white" was counterpoised against "Negro," "Indian," "Mexican," or "Mongolian."~~

The White Races in 1877

A playful joke in *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* revealed an important underlying truth about the keen interest in the "ethnological differences" dividing "whites." Noting the horrendous stench aboard ship in an article on walrus hunting, the journal remarked, "Heroism in the presence of hideous smells is one of the characteristics of the Scandinavian. Perhaps the power of the northern nose is dulled, just as the exterior color is deepened, by the cold. This is a matter which deserves to be investigated by ethnologists."⁵⁸ Although a light-hearted remark, certainly, "ethnological investigations" of one sort or another were precisely what *Harper's* proved most adept at in its reportage; and statements as to the racial character, the history, the traits, or the physical type of this or that white race were literary staples. Indeed, race seems among the organizing principles of the worldview at once demonstrated and reinforced by the magazine's format.

Perhaps it is not surprising that, as a product of the literary establish-

how are these things structured?

construction of whiteness in relation to whiteness

ment of the Northeast, where the showdown between Celt and Anglo-Saxon was among the most salient racial rifts in the polity, the journal should devote so much space to the differences among "the white races." A feature on Westminster Abbey pauses to note, "The Anglo-Saxon race [is] mistress of the ocean by its commerce rather than its navy, master of the world by its civilization rather than its arms." An ethnographic piece on the population of Peru notes, "Within semi-historic times they were divided into different tribes or races, differing from each other somewhat as Latins differed from the Gauls or the Normans from the Saxons." A travel piece on Turkey reminiscent of *In the Levant* catalogues the local types such as "an olive-hued, beaknosed Armenian of a blood unmixed for thirty centuries," "a Jewish candy-vendor, descended from a people unsurpassed in the antiquity of their lineage," "a handsome, lithe, but fierce and treacherous-looking Albanian," "a fair-skinned Circassian"—each "preserving their national traits with jealous care, never intermarrying."⁵⁹ Elsewhere reference is made to "Huns" and "Hunnish warriors," to "a well-to-do real estate dealer of Teutonic descent," to operas enjoying "great popularity among the Teutonic races of Europe," and to the "Prussian Wends," a group marked not only by heritable traits but by a physicality notable for its divergence from the "Saxon."⁶⁰ In pages devoted to current scholarship, too, *Harper's* eagerly followed the developments in ethnology, including one scholarly debate "on the name Mediterranean as applied to the Aryan races."⁶¹ Of course the magazine was lavishly illustrated with racial caricatures of these various peoples, in addition to the simian Irish who frequented its humor pages.

Nowhere was the depth of this conception of variegated whiteness more pronounced than in a *Harper's* feature on French art. "These French art students are a curious medley of seemingly discordant elements," the piece averred, noting their peculiar blend of "intense enthusiasm," "wonderful ability," and "brutal and disgusting" conversational habits and manners.

One hears a great deal about honor in France, but I know of no country where its true meaning is so little understood. And yet these untamed and untamable art students will dazzle one with their eye for form and color. The man has not yet been found who has proved himself wholly capable of analyzing the French character and assigning it its true position in civilization. Our own opinion is that alone, it is a dangerous element in society, but that, by mixing it with other races, the good qualities predominate, and an admirable result will

be achieved. The Huguenots in England and the United States who have intermingled with the Saxon stock have developed some of the finest race qualities to be found on either continent.⁶²

Racial conceptions of peoplehood also typically framed popular discussion of the Russo-Turkish War, "the contest that shakes the historic Danube and echoes among the Caucasus and around the traditional cradle of the race." Indeed, it was probably this conflict's racial portent that fueled popular interest in it in the first place. Ethnological accounts of the region included Eugene Scuyler's *Turkistan*, presenting "a people whose character and civilization is but little known to Anglo-Saxon people." (Scuyler identified and charted thirteen "races" of Turkey: Turks, Circassians, Armenians, Jews, Gypsies, foreigners, and six subraces of Arabs.) *Harper's* tracked a heated anthropological debate over the relationship between Europeans and Turkey's "Sarmatae" peoples (were the Sarmatae "Aryans" or "Sclavs"?), and greeted a new volume on the racial "resume of the Russian people" (whose "stocks" were said to include "Lithuanians, Sclaves, Germans, Greco-Roumanians, Iranians, Iberians, Caucasians, Finns, Turks, Mongolians, etc.").⁶³

Popular concern over the outcome of the war likewise hung on racial hopes, fears, and aspirations. The *Nation* identified Russia as a crucial "civilizing agent" in the region, for example; and in a piece for the *Atlantic Monthly*, "The Races of the Danube," John Fiske identified the Mussulman Tartars as the most dangerous kind of racial spoilers—"a race politically unteachable and intellectually incurious, which has contributed absolutely nothing to the common weal of mankind," even while it has thwarted "the normal development of a more worthy community." In the service of his interpretation of current events along the Danube, Fiske offered a "comprehensive view" of European history—a kind of racial big bang, by which all of European history began with the clash of "two very different races," "Aryans" and "Iberians." It was owing to the mixture of these "strongly contrasting races that the peoples of Europe present such marked varieties of complexion."⁶⁴

Nor were such assessments of racial variegation within whiteness limited to armchair ethnologists among the contributors to *Harper's*, *Atlantic Monthly*, or the *North American Review*. In July 1877, in what was to become a momentary cause célèbre in the popular press, the (Hilton) Grand Union Hotel in Saratoga Springs barred Joseph Seligman, a Bavarian Jewish immigrant who had risen to prominence in American bank-

ing. Carey McWilliams has called this the first major act of overt anti-Semitism in American history, and both he and John Higham have stressed the economic foundations of the perceptible rise in anti-Semitism in 1877 and after. Jewish elites had begun to challenge traditional "status hierarchies" in Gilded Age America, this argument runs, and so various social exclusions of the type Seligman suffered at Saratoga represent a concerted effort on the part of Gentile elites to reassert their social prerogatives. The period's shifting economic circumstances and rivalries represent the material base for what Higham calls "discriminatory" (as distinct from "ideological") anti-Semitism.⁶⁵

Whatever its basis in economics, however, Higham and McWilliams have occluded the extent to which popular reportage and discussion of the clash at Saratoga drew upon a language and a logic of race. Hilton himself initially explained his rejection of Seligman on the grounds of Jews' "vulgar ostentation," "puffed up vanity," "overweening display of condition," and "lack of those considerate civilities appreciated by good American society."⁶⁶ The *Commercial Advertiser* cast this as a simple question of black and white: invoking the Civil Rights Act passed two years before, this journal wanted to know, "Has the hotel-keeper the authority of law to exclude from his bed and board whom he pleases? Have the colored population rights that the white man [that is, the Jew] has not?"⁶⁷

But the Jew's "ostentation" and lack of "civility" were themselves widely interpreted as racial traits, and popular discussion of the affair from the outset more often than not cast this as a drama of racial significance. In a rather supercilious summary of the popular response to the affair, the *Nation* remarked that, though Seligman's "influence on the attitude of the American people on race questions is admitted on all hands to be very small," nonetheless sympathizers in some quarters had elevated the affair to "a question of whether the Jewish race 'had no rights under the constitution.'" An unfortunate and silly inflation, in this journal's view. But despite the *Nation's* lament that this teapot had generated such a tempest, for the magazine the question *was*, at bottom, a decidedly racial one: the Jews' "tendency to gaudiness in dress or ornament we suspect has its roots deeper than modern history goes, and testifies to the purity of the race and the freshness with which its eye still retains the Oriental passion for brilliancy of costume, though the effect in our climate is barbaric and coarse, instead of being . . . picturesque."⁶⁸

This was not an idiosyncratic reading. The *Daily Graphic* argued that

"the average American Jew can hardly be recognized in a company by anything save a cast of features which nothing but centuries of intermarriage with other races will change." (Despite this journal's fundamental sympathy with Seligman, the piece did contend that the verb "Jewed" was well earned by "the excessive sharpness of that race in business transactions.")⁶⁹ The *Evening Post*, too, put forward a philo-Semitic, but nonetheless racial, argument: recalling the tremendous bloodshed occasioned by the proscription of the Negroes, a race widely held to be inferior, this journal now asked, will Americans "tolerate the proscription of a race whose equality with the foremost races . . . is nowhere disputed?"⁷⁰

Under the headline "No Jews Need Apply" (a direct reference to another European pariah group, the Irish), the *New York Tribune* rather weakly asserted that the only "dignified and sensible" response of those who "feel they have been insulted at the Grand Union on account of their race or religion is to withdraw quietly."⁷¹ Thus leaving open the question of the basis of Jewish exclusion—a matter of *either* race or religion, precisely as was the case with the social doctrine of "No Irish Need Apply"—the *Tribune* in its initial coverage redoubled Anglo-Saxon hegemony by simply wishing that the pariah would be "dignified" and disappear. But this interpretation shifted overnight, and the *Tribune* went on to give the fullest racial interpretation of the episode extant. "Ostracism of a Race," the *Tribune* now called the affair (June 21); "Excluded Hebrews Indignant." Hilton's actions were a "direct insult to the Jewish race," according to one editorial; and in a man-in-the-street interview, one interviewee compared social even-handedness with Jews to "the employment of Chinese labor . . . or the cultivation of Southern lands by negroes." The *Tribune* elaborated a week later, under the banner "Not a Question of Religion": "Religion had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject"; "we presume a Christian Hebrew is as obnoxious to Mr. Hilton as one of Jewish belief."

Social distinctions of race and color are bound to exist here as elsewhere . . . While politically all such distinctions may be ignored, they cannot be socially. Half the nation spent its blood and treasure to give freedom to the Negro, but it has left him to win his own social equality . . . Prejudices of race forbid equally the free social intercourse of Teuton, Latin, and Mongolian. It does not argue the superiority of either to recognize that the natural affinity between the Anglo-Saxon and the Hebrew is extremely weak. Nature is to blame

still
und-

primarily, though peculiarities of different civilizations and different tendencies of distinct systems of education have increased this dislike between the two races.⁷²

Under the headline "Race Prejudice," *Harper's Weekly* conveyed most succinctly both the distinctness and the affinity-in-whiteness of the Anglo-Saxon and the Hebrew. "There are undoubtedly disagreeable Hebrews or Jews, as there are disagreeable people of all other races"; and yet the exclusion at Saratoga was "monstrous." At least Hilton's "monstrous" act of race prejudice had the "good effect of showing how sincere and universal is the protest against the indulgence of a race prejudice against white skins. We beg to remind the protestants that a race prejudice against black skins is quite as despicable."⁷³

Jews
white
but still
hebrews

Nor were Jews the only victims of "race prejudice against white skins" during the summer of 1877. Amid a trial of several members of the Irish Molly Maguires for murder in Pennsylvania, the New York *Tribune* opined, "The Mollies belong to a race with a more wholesome and probably unreasonable terror of law than any other. It has, unfortunately, been whipped into them for centuries. The cunning of resistance has been whipped into them, too." Then, borrowing language typical of the American discourse on the Indian Wars, the journal mused, "If the Pennsylvanians intend to civilize them by terror, it will need other and more wholesome slaughters than that of last week to do it. Is there no other way to civilize them?" The *Tribune* went on to advocate missionary activity among the Mollies in order to "humanize" them.⁷⁴ Indeed, in *The Molly Maguires* (1877), the first book-length study of the organization, F. P. Dewees grounded the troubles in Pennsylvania in a much longer history of unrest between "the Anglo-Saxon race" (which had kept the aim of constitutional freedom in view ever since the Magna Charta) and the "Celt" (who remained ever unsympathetic to such ideals).⁷⁵

As Richard Slotkin has amply documented, the rhetoric of "civilization" and "savagery" likewise framed discussion of the great railroad strike that spread from Baltimore and Pittsburgh to St. Louis and New York in July. To urban elites, as Slotkin puts it, this outbreak of labor agitation was a case of Indian Wars coming "home" to the metropolis. Slotkin treats this as a matter of pure metaphor, noting that in this instance "the working-class 'hostiles' were predominantly white and largely American-born." "Thus," he argues, "the race war and Indian war provided a language for interpreting the class struggles attendant on the de-

velopment of industry and served the ideological function of linking striking workers with racial aliens and primitive savages." For the urban elites of this account, "perhaps the savage-striker metaphor was literally true, and neither tribesman nor workingman was truly capable of self-government."⁷⁶

Slotkin's analysis thus rests on various notions of metaphor and metonym, upon rhetorical confluences of class and race, underlying ideological "linkages" between radicalism and savagery, or "associations" of alien class ideologies with "biological-ethnic alienness." But given the extent to which many American-born observers did believe that the emergent, conscious, and militant working class literally was a class of foreigners, this literally *was* a "race war." Although the language of "civilization" and "savagery" has indeed been deployed metaphorically to great effect in American culture (and no one has revealed this as thoroughly as Slotkin himself), there is a second, absolutely literal dimension to these racial interpretations of the 1877 strike and of the unfitnes of the strikers for self-government. If the myth of the frontier was among the cultural forms authorizing immigrants' whiteness in the latter phases of America's long-enduring period of racial inscription, these immigrants nonetheless did embody a kind of "savagery" that was neither rhetorical nor metaphorical. reborn in fiction

Much of Slotkin's own evidence points in this direction. E. L. Godkin's *Nation* remarked upon the "vast additions . . . to our population" who "carry in their very blood traditions which give universal suffrage an air of menace to many of the things which civilized men hold most dear." It is not merely a metaphor, but race itself, that links the notions of "vast additions" to the population via immigration, traditions carried in the "very blood" of these peoples, and the resulting "menace" to the ideals of "civilized men." Godkin's plea for a restriction on universal suffrage is thus an early expression on the eugenic theme of degenerate races and their unfitnes for self-government. Godkin had elsewhere decried a regimen of philanthropy toward the Indians that would "debauch white men of any race; no wonder it debauches savages."⁷⁷ That "white men" were divisible into so many distinct "races" was fundamental to his worldview, and so contiguous questions of "blood," "civilization," and the degree of "menace" immigrants posed to free institutions were linked by far more than mere metaphor.

As *Harper's Weekly* put it, again in reference to the unnamed European races presumed to be behind the labor agitation along the B & O Rail-

road, "What is the difference between civilization and barbarism, between America and Central Africa, but law, and the redress of grievances . . . by prescribed legal methods?" "The country has learned the necessity of a thorough and efficient local armed organization. The strikers have learned the hopeless folly of struggling against the unconquerable instinct of a race."⁷⁸ The *Daily Graphic* similarly argued for an enhanced militia, since the railroad capitalists had not been successful "in implanting in the breasts of the inferior race sentiments of respect and gratitude."⁷⁹ "We shall make a dreadful mistake," the New York *Tribune* chimed in,

. . . if we allow ourselves to be deceived as to the real character of a good many of the lower classes in our large cities, in the coal and iron towns, and on the lines of railway. In becoming the refuge for the oppressed of all nations our country accepted a noble mission, but that mission has its perils and difficulties. The oppressed are not always the virtuous. We have taken into our body politic the refuse of the Paris Commune, incendiaries from Berlin and Tipperary, some hundreds of thousands of European agitators, who are always at war with every form of government thus far known among civilized nations.⁸⁰

Here Anglo-Saxondom trumped mere whiteness in laying claim to civilization and to racial supremacy. And ~~by its violation of "civilized" standards of conduct, conversely, immigrant radicalism offered incontrovertible proof of the immigrants' troubling racial pedigree.~~ Like the Molly Maguires in Pennsylvania, Joseph Seligman at Saratoga Springs, Fiske's races of the Danube, or the French art students so reviled in *Harper's*, the strikers of 1877 were in whiteness but not of it, so to say. Their presence in the republic was doubly troubling from a racial standpoint: if their essential racial inferiority as non-Anglo-Saxons posed difficulties for the workings of a free republic, then their whiteness gave that inferiority as wide a field as possible to wreak real havoc. Godkin's ruminations on the "air of menace" attending "universal suffrage" in this context of mass immigration put the problem most succinctly: ~~whiteness may have been indispensable in dividing the fit from the unfit in the earlier stages of the nation's history—in dividing civilized Europeans from savage Indians and blacks or degenerate Mexicans and mestizos—but in the era of mass immigration whiteness was no longer a guarantee of civilization at all.~~

To return, briefly, to Henry James and *The American*: early on Mrs. Tristram refers to Christopher Newman as "the great Western Barbarian." "I

am not a barbarian, by a good deal," objects Newman; "I am very much the reverse. I have seen barbarians; I know what they are." "I don't mean that you are a Comanche chief, or that you wear a blanket and feathers," returns Mrs. Tristram. "There are different shades."⁸¹ As it unfolds, *The American* turns out to be precisely about these "different shades"—both the figurative shades of barbarism and civilization (or overcivilization) that define national character, and the literal shades of physiognomy perceived as race—just as American political culture itself was increasingly fixing upon the different shades of barbarism and civilization among "free white persons," and the different shades of a theretofore undifferentiated whiteness.

James's ethnological interest is announced in the opening paragraphs, when we are told that the American's "physiognomy would have sufficiently indicated that he was a shrewd and capable fellow"; he is a "powerful specimen of an American," having "a very well-formed head, with a shapely, symmetrical balance of the frontal and occipital development." By contrast, Valentin de Bellegard, for instance, "was a foreigner to his fingertips," although "there was something in his physiognomy which seemed to cast a sort of aerial bridge over the impassable gulf produced by difference of race." (Valentin's brother, too, was a familiar type despite his Gallic racial origins: he "looked much like an Englishman.") From the outset the novel moves along the twin tracks of race as a force in history ("Old trees have crooked branches . . . old races have odd secrets") and physiognomy as the key to social interpretation ("Mademoiselle Noemie's jealous votary was a tall robust young man with a thick nose, a prominent blue eye, a Germanic physiognomy").⁸²

This ethnological and physiognomical quality unites *The American* with many other narrative productions of the moment—Warner's *In the Levant*; *Harper's* sketches on Alaskan mining, Barbadian travel, and French art; *Tribune* and *Nation* editorials on Hilton's anti-Semitism and the B & O strike; congressional reports on Louisiana polling practices and Chinese immigration. Flowing from precisely this racial consciousness, James's competing cautions regarding the proper bride for the American—"No Irish Need Apply" and the "Let us confine ourselves to Europe"—likewise capture a contradiction which lay at the heart of American political culture, not just in 1877, but for several decades to come. European identities became increasingly racialized in the context of immigration, labor struggle, and continuous scientific inquiry into human typologies and difference; and so the pan-white, *Herrenvolk* egalitarianism of "Let us confine ourselves to Europe" clashed with the rising

Struggle
Stick to
Europe
V.
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no apply
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sentiment. "No Irish Need Apply." Both palimpsestic inscriptions remained discernible for some time.

The discrepancy in racial usages such as "white," "Celt," and "Caucasian," then, do not denote a mere sloppiness or imprecision in the language of race; such contradictions do not in every case represent insignificant choices among interchangeable synonyms. Rather, ~~they reflect the contending racial schemes in the air at a given moment and the multiplicity of available categories that the culture has generated and is capable of sustaining.~~ In unpacking the ideology of race and its power in American life, in other words, we are on surest ground if we conclude, not that, because "Caucasian" and "Anglo-Saxon" can coincide, the distinctions between them are trifling, but rather, that their ~~coexistence signifies the unceasing tendency of the culture to suggest race in perception and to etch race on bodies.~~ We are better off not passing over such unstable categories as mere inconsistencies in usage, but investigating them for the fossilized power relationships embedded within them. The inherent instability of race becomes plain when a figure walks out of one context and into another—imagine the pariah Joseph Seligman on a Louisiana election day, or think of the Molly Maguires striking out West and joining The Order of Caucasians in San Francisco.

Culture, as a creature of history, destabilizes race by layering different conceptual schemes atop one another in response to shifting social and political circumstances. The palimpsest of race maps the terrain of ascription, perception, and subjectivity for a number of immigrant groups whose "American experience" has scarcely been recounted as a *racial* experience at all.

The Jew can be unknown in his Jewishness. He is not wholly what he is. One hopes, one waits. His actions, his behavior are the final determinant. He is a white man, and, apart from some rather debatable characteristics, he can sometimes go unnoticed . . . One has only not to be a nigger. Granted, the Jews are harassed—what am I thinking of? They are hunted down, exterminated, cremated. But these are little family quarrels.

—Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952)

I like the idea of having a Jewish officer—what's his name, Jacobs—in Burma. See that you get a good clean-cut American type for Jacobs.

—Jack Warner's casting instructions for *Objective Burma* (1945)

5

Looking Jewish, Seeing Jews

When Johann Blumenbach sat down to delineate *The Natural Varieties of Man* in 1775, he lighted upon the "racial face" of the Jews as the most powerful example of "the unadulterated countenance of nations." The principle of stable racial types was illustrated "above all [by] the nation of the Jews, who, under every climate, remain the same as far as the fundamental configuration of face goes, remarkable for a racial character almost universal, which can be distinguished at the first glance even by those little skilled in physiognomy."¹

The racial character of Jewishness in the New World ebbed and flowed over time. The saga of Jewishness-as-difference in North America properly begins as early as 1654, when Peter Stuyvesant wrote to the Amsterdam Chamber of the Dutch West India Company that Christian settlers in New Amsterdam had "deemed it useful to require [Jews] in a friendly way to depart." Stuyvesant went on to pray "that the deceitful race,—such hateful enemies and blasphemers of the name of Christ,—be not allowed further to infect and trouble this new colony."² In the early republic Jewishness was most often taken up as a matter not of racial dif-

Still appears
palimpsest with
approach



THE MANUFACTURE OF CAUCASIANS

If it was not a foregone conclusion that the hierarchically ordered white races ever would become a single, consanguine race of Caucasians in popular estimation, then what circumstances account for the transformation? What are some of the social, political, and cultural forces that moved the white races so decisively in the direction of "Caucasian" whiteness?

The chapters of part three examine three critical areas in this re forging of a unified whiteness. ~~American imperialism conferred its benefits by a logic of pan-white supremacy, even if it was carried out under the banner of "Anglo-Saxon" entitlement; naturalization case law upheld the logic of the "free white persons" clause of 1790 just as agitation for immigration restriction was challenging the notion of white consanguinity; and civil rights politics eclipsed the lingering divisions among the white races as it pressed an agenda of racial justice defined by the binary logic of the Jim Crow South.~~ In each case a powerful counterlogic of white-over-black, of color/not-color, mitigated for non-Anglo-Saxons the effects of narrowly conceived Anglo-Saxon supremacism, revising the subordinate position that the regime of Anglo-Saxondom had reserved for these "inferior" white races.

~~Hence though conceptions of racial "difference" and hierarchy among the peoples of Europe were ascendant between the 1840s and the 1920s,~~

~~the discourse of empire and the conservative racial logic of naturalization law stabilized and kept afloat the otherwise battered notion of monolithic indivisible whiteness. Similarly, in the decades following the 1924 immigration legislation, emergent civil rights agitation—a new politics of black and white—was among the social and political phenomena that hastened the reunification of whiteness or papered over its presumed faultlines.~~

These chapters exhaust neither the social practices contributing to the reconsolidation and ideological survival of "Caucasian" whiteness, nor the sites at which such whiteness was constructed and maintained. Others might include cultural forms like segregated baseball and integrated boxing, the legal and medical discourses of sexuality and "miscegenation," or the Jim Crow practices of labor unions and real estate brokers. Rather, the chapters that follow point up a few of the ways in which American political culture reconciled competing racial schemes for dividing the polity; and it suggests some of the reasons that the racial "sameness" of today's so-called white ethnics was one outcome of this competition.

We too, even though we are not Anglo-Saxons, believe in "manifest destiny" and—we add for the benefit of the nativists—"manifest destiny" also believes in us.

—Julius Frobel, *Aus America* (1857)

Probably the majority of Americans would prefer to be excused from loading this country with another "negro problem." We may swallow a small black morsel like Hawaii; but if we must expand largely, our acquisitions should be civilized Caucasian communities, such as can adapt to our democratic system. Barbarian dominions can never be amalgamated with the American republic, and we want no such satrapies.

—*Catholic Citizen*, 1898

» 6

The Crucible of Empire

In Edgar Allan Poe's *Narrative of A. Gordon Pym* (1838) the line manager aboard ship, Dirk Peters, undergoes a transformation much like Teague O'Regan's metamorphosis from "bog-trotter" to "white" ambassador in Brackenridge's *Modern Chivalry*. Peters is first introduced as "the son of an Indian squaw of the tribe of Upsorokas," "one of the most purely ferocious-looking men I ever beheld." Pym further marks him racially and phrenologically, noting an indentation on the crown of his head "like that on the head of most Negroes." He is described as a "hybrid" whose own racially mixed identity and whose lusty stories of the South Pacific entice the mutinous crew with visions of a sexual pleasure more luring than the monetary profits of a whaling voyage. Ultimately, however, this adventure whitens the line manager: once they find themselves amidst a "savage" people whose "complexion was a jet black, with thick and long woolly hair," Pym regards himself and Peters as "the only living white men upon the island."¹

The volatility of race in American culture has derived in part from the effects of expansionism into territories peopled, as in Pym's narrative, by

"savages." For the *Catholic Citizen* in 1898, to cite a case, it was partly by juxtaposition to the "small black morsel" of Hawaii that the Celtic community in the United States became so comfortably "Caucasian." As the sociologist Howard Winant has observed, "Just as the noise of the big bang still resonates through the universe, so the overdetermined construction of world 'civilization' as a product of the rise of Europe and the subjugation of the rest of us still defines the race concept."² ~~In racial figurations in the United States, this historic rise of "European civilization" was compressed, as it were, and tortuously convoluted, in the years between the 1840s and the 1920s. During that time, continual expansion and conquest pulled for a unified collectivity of European "white men," monolithic and supreme, even while nativism and the immigration question fractured that whiteness into its component "superior" and "inferior" parts.~~

In the preface to *Warpath and Bivouac*, his 1890 account of the "stirring events" of the Plains Indian Wars a decade and a half earlier, John Finerty noted, "Stories of Indian warfare . . . have ever been popular with people of all nations, and more particularly with the American people, to whom such warfare is rendered familiar both by tradition and experience."³ Finerty here indicated a powerful subterranean current in American political culture: the self-renewing quality of American expansionism, both as a periodic reality and as a perpetually narrated (and thus ever-present) past. The "experience" and the "tradition" are fused in such a way that to be "American" is in some sense to locate oneself on a map whose coordinates are determined by a national narrative whose chief themes (in Finerty's rendition, though one might as easily cite Francis Parkman, George Bancroft, John Fiske, Theodore Roosevelt, or Frederick Jackson Turner) include ~~advancing our banner in the wilderness of the West, "subduing the savage and sanguinary tribes that so long barred the path of progress in our Territories," braving the "terrors of fiendish torture and mutilation in case of capture by the savages," exposing oneself to "the most cunning and merciless of all existing human races"—all for the extension of our peaceful borders."~~⁴

That the "savage" resides at the borders of our imagined national community has textured American political life from the Indian Wars to the Gulf War: debates over actual policies regarding actual "savages" work a kind of homogenizing magic on the homefront, just as experience itself—as soldier, nurse, or captive—casts the racial character of citizenship in stark relief. For most Americans it is not Finerty's "experience" but his

~~"tradition" that exerts its force. American national history is narrated in such a way—Americans receive their historical sense of place in such a way—that citizenship itself interpolates "the American" as the antithesis of that "savage" on the border. For African-, Latino-, and Asian-Americans this has been a matter of some consternation and conflict. For members of the probationary white races of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—John Finerty included—it was a matter of some moment. As one German immigrant announced in the late 1850s, "We too, even though we are not Anglo-Saxons, believe in 'manifest destiny.'" And, he added portentously for the benefit of the nativists, "'manifest destiny' also believes in us."~~⁵

Expansionism and Public Debate

~~The history of nineteenth-century American expansionism had a racial contradiction at its core: while U.S. conquests across North America and the Pacific at once enacted and reinforced a principle of white supremacy, between at least the 1840s and the early twentieth century they were carried out under an ideological banner of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. This is not a question of mere semantics. Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana, for example, was among the most outspoken enthusiasts for "Anglo-Saxon" expansion: in his famous "March of the Flag" (1898) he lauded "the Anglo-Saxon impulse" whose "watchword [in Jefferson's time] and whose watchword throughout the world today is 'Forward!'" The notion of an ever-advancing Anglo-Saxondom was attached to a specific phenotype as well. Reviewing the army of advance ("these thoroughbred soldiers from the plantations of the South, [and] from the plains and valleys and farms of the west"), Beveridge fixed upon a distinctly racial male aesthetic:~~

The fine line is everywhere. The nose is straight, the mouth is sensitive and delicate. There are very few bulldog jaws. There is, instead, the steel-trap jaw of the lion. The whole face and figure is the face and figure of the thoroughbred fighter, who has always been the fine-featured, delicate-nostriled, thin-eared, and generally clean-cut featured man.⁶

In lingering upon the physiognomical details of the American soldier, Beveridge was distinguishing the Anglo-Saxon not merely from the Malay

and Negrito enemy of the moment, but also from the many non-Anglo-Saxon elements within U.S. borders.⁷

~~The designation "Anglo-Saxon" had crossed over from scientific discourse into American vernacular in the 1840s, within a context of both Mexican conquest in the West and Celtic immigration in the East.~~ As a racist unit of meaning, then, "Anglo-Saxon" performed two distinct, exclusionary functions within the feigning ideology of American nationalism: ~~it separated racially "pure" Americans from "mongrelized" and "degenerate" Mexicans on one front; and it divided virtuous, self-governing Anglo-Saxon citizens from pathetic Celtic newcomers on another.~~ But, as street-level social practices and legal codes (laws governing citizenship, voting, jury service, and officeholding, for example) included even those problematic Celts within the ranks of the conquerors, "Anglo-Saxondom" itself was an unstable and hotly contested terrain. The "Anglo-Saxon" mission of subduing the continent and reaching across the Pacific thus both destabilized and shored up immigrants' whiteness: it excluded them (as the wrong kind of citizens) from the glories of national destiny, and yet conferred upon them (as citizens nonetheless) the fruits of white-supremacist conquest.

Simple whiteness was not always foremost on the minds of those who discussed and debated expansionist policy. As Reginald Horsman has argued, the idea of Anglo-Saxon racial integrity existed in high discourse on "liberty" and "law" even as early as the Revolutionary generation; that enlightenment vision gradually became "an ideology of continental, hemispheric, and even racial destiny for a particular chosen people" in the nineteenth century. Increasingly by mid-century "our nation" referred to an "Anglo-Saxon" people; and in the context of Texan annexation and the war with Mexico, "our national destiny" referred to a distinctly racial agenda.⁸ Thus in the 1840s James Buchanan could remark of Texas's independence from Mexico and eventual annexation to the United States, "The Anglo-Saxon blood could never be subdued by anything that claimed Mexican origin." The *Southern Quarterly Review* chimed in on "the imperial Anglo-Saxon race, whose mission on earth is like that of the Jews in Canaan, 'to subdue the land and possess it.'" John O'Sullivan (the *Democratic Review* editor who coined the phrase "Manifest Destiny") observed of California, "The irresistible army of Anglo-Saxon emigration has begun to pour down upon it, armed with the plough and the rifle, and marking its trail with schools and colleges, courts and representative halls, mills and meeting houses." James Gordon Bennett, too, added

his voice to this Anglo-Saxonist chorus in the New York *Herald*: "Assigned to the dominion of republicanism on this continent, the pioneers of Anglo-Saxon civilization and Anglo-Saxon free institutions, now seek distant territories . . . The arms of the republic . . . must soon embrace the whole hemisphere."⁹

~~This conception of Anglo-Saxon peoplehood and genius was still at play later in the century, when Hawaii, Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Samoa succeeded Mexico as the territories in question.~~ Most outspoken in this regard was Josiah Strong, who predicted in the 1880s that the world was about "to enter upon a new stage of its history—the final competition of races for which the Anglo-Saxon is being schooled. If I do not read amiss, this powerful race will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and beyond." "Is there any room for reasonable doubt," Strong asked elsewhere, "that this race . . . is destined to dispossess many weaker races, assimilate others, and mold the remainder, until . . . it has Anglo-Saxonized mankind?"¹⁰

Politicians like Albert Beveridge and Theodore Roosevelt, too, inclined to such Anglo-Saxon rhapsody; and in 1898, New York's *Irish World* took note of the "Anglo-Maniac Chorus" attending the Spanish-Cuban-American War and the prospect of an Anglo-American entente. It included one clergyman who identified England as "bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh," and another who identified Anglo-Saxons as "the one great race to whom God has given the endowment to civilize the world." It also included Reverend Thomas Dixon, whose understanding of proper American sentiment regarding English-Russian tensions rested on the belief that "the Slav and the Anglo-Saxon have nothing in common."¹¹

~~The peculiar status of many immigrants as both supreme whites and non-Anglo-Saxon Others is readily apparent in the response to imperialism registered in the immigrant press around the time of the Spanish-Cuban-American and Philippine-American Wars. On the one hand, in the context of Asian penetration and the labor migrations it threatened to generate, even a socialist journal like the Yiddish *Abend Blatt* could easily speak of "the Caucasian [*koi-kazish*], white race."~~ Similarly, in a piece introducing its readers to the Philippine Islands in 1898, the *Abend Blatt* would offer a racial portrait of the archipelago, broken down into "Malays" (some of whom are "mixed together with a Chinese element"), "Negritos," "Tagalogs" ("they are built well, but we wouldn't regard them as very beautiful, because they have high cheekbones, flat noses, thick lips"),

and "Igolots" (who "look very dirty and savage"). Another ethnological catalogue entitled "The Wild Tribes of the Philippines" noted that "the wild Indians" remained "in the same state of savagery that the Spaniards found them in."¹³ This was a judgment shared by journals like the *Catholic Citizen* and the *Irish American*. According to the latter, most Filipinos "are in a state of barbarism but little removed from their condition at the time when Columbus revealed America to the eyes of Europe, and gave to Spain the opening of an empire."¹⁴

~~On the other hand, however, immigrant editors (and especially Celts) were quite sensitive to the narrow racial patriotism of Anglo-Saxons and to its troubling historical residues.~~ As T. St. John Gaffney remarked,

The "Anglo-Saxon race," which, according to the best informed ethnical students, is but one-tenth of the population of this country, is accredited with a much larger portion of the upbuilding of this Republic than it deserves . . . The moment a Teuton or a Celt achieves fame in the world of letters, art, or professional life, the moment he wins a victory on land or sea, he is hailed as a new product of "Anglo-Saxon" civilization! But if he winds up in the police court in the morning, he is regarded simply as a drunken German or Irishman.¹⁵

Wherever these commentators came down on the question of Filipino rights or the prospect of Philippine sovereignty, they did protest an ascendant American brand of Anglo-Saxon supremacism. "Shall we add 10,000,000 Malays . . . and set out to 'civilize' them by means of lynching and Ku-Kluxism for the benefit of a new brood of Carpet-Baggers?" asked James Jeffrey Roche in the *Boston Pilot*. "Or is it not about time to halt the mad career of Anglo-Saxonizing the world?" Patrick Ford's *Irish World* complained of a public school curriculum that taught "each rising generation of Irish, German, French, Scandinavian, Polish, Italian and other children that they were the descendants of a class of commercial marauders in England styling themselves the great 'Anglo-Saxon race.'"¹⁶

Nor, again, were these merely rhetorical flights of racial fancy. The notion of a racial distinction between Anglo-Saxons and Others gave shape to much immigrant commentary on world affairs at this moment. As a *Boston Pilot* piece on European rivalries in Samoa declared, "If this is to be an 'Anglo-Saxon' war [German immigrants] will beg to be excused. They are quite right. They are not Anglo-Saxons."¹⁷ "You are not of the self same race / Nor blood of the self same clan," the *Irish World* proclaimed in a poem protesting Anglo-Saxon grandiosity. "But Celt and

Teuton face to face / Talk back to you man to man."¹⁸ Elsewhere, in response to popular talk of an Anglo-American alliance and "patriotism of race," Patrick Ford urged "a coming together of Americans of all races and antecedents in opposition to the Anglicized set who would emasculate the virility of American nationality and reduce it to a British colony . . . The one enemy of the honor of the Republic on American soil . . . is the presumptuous and intolerant Anglo-Saxon."¹⁹ A letter-writer to the *Irish World*, signing "Celto-Teutonic," advocated an alliance of Irish and German immigrants to combat "the virus of Anglo-mania"; and another to the *Boston Transcript* chided, "Possibly when the Celt grows stupid and muddy-brained he may grow British"; in the meantime he is able "to love America and despise Britain simultaneously."²⁰

But if the language and logic of an "Anglo-Saxon mission" in the Pacific complicated the political location of these "free white persons" who happened not to be Anglo-Saxons, the white-over-nonwhite dynamic of the imperialist project did exert tremendous ideological pull. Even while the *Irish American* decried the sorry example of "Saxon Civilization" in the Soudan (John Bull is "the same brutal savage, today, that he was when he burned the French heroine, Joan of Arc"), on the very same page the editor could castigate the "Filipino Banditti," blithely arguing that "powder and lead . . . are the only arguments that will bring such savages to their senses."²¹

The extent to which even non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants could participate in the festival of racial self-aggrandizement attending trans-Pacific expansion became clear enough in the pro-imperialist arguments of various immigrant journals. The orthodox *Yiddishes Tageblatt* tacitly positioned the Jews of the Lower East Side as natural allies of the Anglo-Saxons in its rendering of the conflict in Manila: "The Filipino revolutionaries are half wild men about whom every barbaric action can be believed." In letters to the editor many of the *Tageblatt's* readers responded with their own renditions of the "wild, uncivilized," or "half wild" Filipinos, or assertions that the Philippines was a "wild country of mulattoes." Echoing the editor's view that the Filipinos were like the Levites who so misguidedly revolted against the wiser guidance of Moses, one letter-writer declared that the rebellious Filipinos were "like a sick child who will not take the medicine the doctor prescribed."²²

Kuryer Polski, a Polish journal in Milwaukee, too, identified the Filipinos as a "half savage people," comparing their prospect of independence to the "negro republic of Hayti" (where, by this account, whites were

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murdered in the most terrible manner, where every moment gave birth to a new revolutionary government, where each new dictator murdered a thousand opponents, and where corruption reigned). Under these circumstances, to be a protectorate of the United States would be "beneficial." Whereas some might have sympathized with the Philippine independence movement on the basis of its parallels with the case of partitioned Poland (as, indeed, *Kurier Polski* had early on), the editor Michael Kruska ultimately naturalized his pro-expansionist sympathies in most pithy fashion: "In regard to civilization, the Polish nation stands higher beyond comparison than the Filipinos."²³ ~~Imperialism, then, fostered a pan-European, pan-white political sensibility that countervailed the otherwise divisive logic of Anglo-Saxon supremacy dominating other arenas of public discourse.~~

Often, paradoxically, it was not imperialism but *anti-imperialism* that rested upon the more virulently racist logic of civilization, sovereignty, and self-government. There was good precedent for this. In the era of the War with Mexico, the *Democratic Review* had asserted that the "very virtues of the Anglo-Saxon race made their political union with the degraded Mexican-Spanish impossible." On the floor of the Senate one southerner had worried aloud that the nation would be "compelled to receive not merely the white citizens of California and New Mexico, but the peons, negroes, and Indians of all sorts, the wild tribe of Comanches, the bug-and-lizard-eating 'Diggers,' and other half-monkey savages in those countries as *equal citizens of the United States*."²⁴ As Christopher Lasch has shown, American anti-imperialism in the 1890s, too, most often reflected not sympathy with the Filipino independence movement, but a racial fear for the republic should Emilio Aguinaldo and his "savage" followers gain entrance to the halls of self-government via annexation. For prominent anti-imperialists like "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman of South Carolina, in other words, their patent inferiority was reason enough to let the Filipinos alone.²⁵

The Yiddish *Abend Blatt*, echoing the anticoolie arguments of the 1870s, worried about the possibility of Filipinos' gaining American citizenship, competing with American workers, or even attaining employment as scabs. The discussion was cast in an ethnological account of the half-Filipino, half-Chinese "mixtures" [*mishlungen*], and of the Malays themselves: "how many long years," Philip Krantz wanted to know, would it take to make them over into "intelligent people"?²⁶ A writer in the Polish *Dziennik Chicagoski* likewise worried that the Philippine "Ma-

lays" [*malajczycy*] would have the right to come to the United States in search of work: "The inhabitants of these islands, Malays, numbering over eight million, are a nation which, in respect to their manner of life, differ very little from the Chinese."²⁷ This was perhaps the strongest analogy possible in America's late-nineteenth-century racial lexicon: whatever was being said of Indians, African-Americans, and European immigrants, in the wake of the Chinese Exclusion Act the notion that *this* particular group was uniquely unsuited to the rigors of American citizenship was the nearest thing contemporary discourse offered to a settled national will.

Humphrey Desmond's *Catholic Citizen* was most outspoken in its racist anti-imperialism. By Desmond's reckoning in late 1898, if the United States annexed the Philippines, then the "unripe fruit of victory" in the war with Spain would finally have to include "barbarism," "Chinese emigration," "Malay citizenship," "miscegenation," and "a general transformation of our democratic system."²⁸ The *Catholic Citizen's* reasoning is worth examining in some detail: this Catholic, largely immigrant and second-generation journal reproduced in its anti-imperialism precisely the racist-republicanist arguments that characterized the immigration restriction movement. "The inhabitants of the Philippine Islands include . . . Kanakas and Malays who are half civilized and in rebellion; canny Chinese and shrewd Japanese and—in the interior—thousands of naked negroes, wild and untamed as the red aborigines," the journal announced in the fall of 1898. "How can a system of self-government be extended to such a people?"²⁹ By displacing the standard concern for a non-Anglo-Saxon Other with a concern for an Asiatic Other in its rhetoric of self-government, the *Catholic Citizen* illustrated the alchemy that imperialism could work upon the maligned European immigrant. "The successful working of the American system," wrote Desmond,

demands a civilized Caucasian people and an educated democracy. In the southern states the black population hamper and clog the working of the American system of government . . . The annexation to this country of nine million native Malays residing in the Philippine Islands—many of them savages, and most of them illiterate—is a proposition that is full of danger . . . If we expect to amalgamate these millions, so utterly foreign to us in race and civilization, why should we exclude the Chinese?³⁰

Later in the year, in a manifesto entitled "Why We Don't Want the Philippines," Desmond explained, "It means that American citizenship is

anti-imperialist
racist
(Kruska, not Tillman)

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Aguinaldo etc.

to be diluted by an infusion of Malay citizenship, and that American democracy is to stand the test of working itself out among inferior peoples." (Interestingly, Desmond went on to quote an *obiter dictum* from the *Dred Scott* decision regarding the federal right to establish or maintain colonies. Although this is quite a separate issue, given the substance of his argument against "Malay citizenship" and "inferior peoples," it is not surprising that *Dred Scott* came to Desmond's mind.)³¹ Desmond's outlook on Pacific expansion affords a dramatic view of that ideological magic by which imperialism could reinvent the *Catholic Citizen's* readership as an unquestioned part of "a civilized Caucasian people and an educated democracy." Unlike writers such as James Jeffrey Roche, who tended to regard such racist republicanism as a slander against the Filipinos (as it was against the Irish in America and against the Irish in Ireland), Desmond embraced the exclusionary logic of racial "fitness for self-government," but neatly folded his polyglot, non-Anglo-Saxon readership—as "Caucasians"—into the racial ranks of the "fit."

Even for writers like Roche, however, whose sympathies were with the Filipinos and whose enmity was directed against the "Anglo-Saxons," the imperialism debate had an inexorable power to redraw racial lines along strict color lines. His poem "The White Wolf's Cry," for instance, is a self-critical lament for the political misdeeds of a nation of marauders "whose skin—like the leper's—is white!"³² Although the anti-imperialism that derived from his Irish nationalism allowed Roche to cross racial lines in his empathy for the Filipinos, these sympathies whitened him and his compatriots nonetheless. In response to the Boston *Evening Record's* remark that "the 'brown man,' be he American Negro, Filipino, dervish or Chinese, is going to the wall with a velocity that is appalling, and yet, what has he done?" Roche asked sarcastically, "Hasn't he done enough to deserve extermination, in being born black, yellow or brown?"³³ Or again, "Where is this madness of foreign conquest to end," Roche asked,

and how many drops of American and other blood must be shed in order to attain the result of civilizing the Asiatics and conferring on them such blessings as other red and black men enjoy under the beneficent rule of the superior race, here at home in the land of the free? We have accounted, in part, to Heaven for our treatment of the black man. We have yet to account for our treatment of the red man. With such unsettled and halfsettled accounts to our debit, it would seem to be foolish to open another with the brown man.³⁴

when does fear of
misanthropy → embrace

Symptomatic of the inexorable whiteness of Roche's anti-imperialism was his response when Senator George Frisbee Hoar remarked that the Filipinos were "aliens in race and religion." "The United States has no national religion," wrote Roche. "The Fathers of our country were too wise for that."³⁵ The lapse was an unusual one for Roche; but his tacit acceptance of the racial dimension of Hoar's comment hints at his underlying acknowledgment that there was in fact a "national race"—not Anglo-Saxon, but white. Even if the historical record reads like so many debits which "we" must pay and so many sins for which "we" must atone, atonement itself reinforces a pan-white "we" which, given the division between Celts and Anglo-Saxons in the 1890s, could not at all be taken for granted.

As the *Irish American* remarked regarding the prospect of U.S. annexation of Samoa, such a project "is altogether antagonistic to the American idea of union—aside from the fact that the people of these islands are of a race altogether distinct from those composing the population of the United States."³⁶ The key here resides in the phrases "altogether distinct" and "those [races] composing the population." There is "difference," and then there is "difference." In 1898 even the maligned Celt could endorse the bottom-line proposition that race reliably defined legitimate participation in national political life. Howard Winant's racializing "big bang," resonating throughout the turn-of-the-century polity in the form of the imperialism question and its attention to "civilization" and "savagery," underwrote the unifying concept of "free white persons" even at a moment when the notion of unity-in-whiteness was under such vigorous assault by the Immigration Restriction League and the incipient eugenics movement. Although in such violent disagreement on the imperialism question itself, immigrant expansionists like Khasriel Sarasohn and anti-imperialists like James Jeffrey Roche, Humphrey Desmond, and Stefan Barszczewski quietly implied their kinship with one another and even with Anglo-Saxons in a reified whiteness constituted by its contrast to the "sav-
age" on the border.

Narrating the Nation

During the debate in early 1899 over the proper disposition of Spain's former colonies, the *Yiddishes Tageblatt*, Sarasohn's influential orthodox daily, was optimistic about the assimilation of the Philippines: "The United States, which was able to educate the Indian and the Negro, will also be able to educate the Filipino."³⁷ This Eurocentric formulation of a "United States" standing in opposition to both "the Indian" and "the Negro" in-

dicates the influence of empire in the racial formation of "white" Europeans. It is not simply that the Philippine question posited yet another "savage" on the border whose presence influenced the racial dynamics within U.S. boundaries. Standard narratives of American history had already provided racial roles for the various actors in this drama: "the Filipino" stands in for "the Indian" and "the Negro," uncivilized groups who can be *in* the United States but never *of* it; the nation itself, meanwhile, becomes a monolith of civilization which is by implication "white." Not least, the Semitic readers of the *Tageblatt* silently gather into this fold of a monolithic European community. Not just the Philippine issue per se, but the whole weight of European expansion is brought to bear on the definitions of peoplehood that surfaced at this imperialist moment.

If the slippage between expansionism's "Anglo-Saxon" mission and its "white" supremacism destabilized the relationship among the white races, a powerful stabilizing counterforce was at hand in popular conceptions of American history itself: quite aside from the national romances of a James Fenimore Cooper, standard historical narratives emphasized a pan-European conquest of an otherwise "savage" continent. From the Whig historians on down, ~~both popular and academic versions of U.S. history ratified the logic of the 1790 naturalization law and its emphasis upon a polity of "free white persons."~~ As one *Federal Textbook on Citizenship Training* (1924) announced in "Our Nation / Lesson 1": "Our nation is made up of many millions of people who have come from every land. We have not always had people from so many countries making their home here. Until almost 1500 A.D. very little was known about this part of the world, because people were then afraid to travel very far out upon the unknown sea."³⁸ A peculiar convolution is at work here: the nation consists of a "we" who lay timeless claim to the land ("We have not always had people from so many countries . . ."), and yet this "we" can only be conceived to have arrived on American shores on some kind of journey from Europe. This is an awesome combination, and it provides a particularly powerful "lesson" with which to begin "training" aspiring American citizens. Europe's natural, God-given claim to North America is fundamental to the very idea of the nation, just as "Americanness" is naturalized as Europeanness-in-migration.

Horace Kallen, the nation's foremost theorist of pluralism, unself-consciously remarked upon the power of precisely this kind of history lesson. Professing that the moral education of the Passover seder and the story of Egyptian bondage had a profound effect on him, Kallen went on:

The textbook story of the Declaration of Independence came upon me, nurtured upon the deliverance from Egypt and the bondage in exile, like the clangor of trumpets, like a sudden light. What a resounding battle cry of freedom! And then, what an invincible march of Democracy to triumph over every enemy—over the English king, over the American Indian, over the uncivilized Mexican, over the champions of slavery betraying American freedom, over everything, to the very day of the history lesson!³⁹

The inclusion of "the American Indian" and "the uncivilized Mexican" in this catalogue of "Democracy's" vanquished Others says more than Kallen might have liked about American citizenship and the limits of pluralism. This pride in the legacy of conquest is integral to American nationalism and national belonging; and it is a pride constantly regenerated not only in the perpetually expansive spirit of actual state policy, but in the less formal and more pervasive telling of the tale.

Racialism was among the theoretical mainsprings of much American historiography in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. (Without the clue of race, wrote Henry Adams, "history was a nursery tale.")⁴⁰ Theodore Roosevelt's *Winning of the West* (1889–1896) opened with a deep past of "Germanic Wanderings," "Frankish and Visigothic invasions," and infusions of "Celtic" blood, all in order properly to situate the sturdy stock who eventually conquered North America.⁴¹ Frederick Jackson Turner's "Significance of the Frontier in American History" (1893) was a self-conscious reworking of the "germ theory" of history that had emphasized "Germanic origins." His thesis depicted a revised "social evolution" in which "the wilderness masters the colonist."⁴²

A generation earlier, Francis Parkman's *Conspiracy of Pontiac* (1851), too, had proceeded from certain racial verities: "Nature has stamped the Indian with a hard and stern physiognomy. Ambition, revenge, envy, jealousy, are his ruling passions . . . A wild love of liberty, an utter intolerance of control, lie at the basis of his character, and fire his whole existence." Asserting that the Indian's intellect is "as peculiar as his moral organization," Parkman went on to link Indians' bleak fate to their racial essence:

Some races of men seem moulded in wax, soft and melting, at once plastic and feeble. Some races, like some metals, combine the greatest flexibility with the greatest strength. But the Indian is hewn out of rock . . . Races of inferior energy have possessed a powerful expansion and assimilation to which he is a stranger; and it is this fixed

and rigid quality which has proved his ruin. He will not learn the arts of civilization, and he and his forest must perish together.⁴³

More than its grounding in up-to-the-minute racial thought, ~~the very narrative line of American historiography holds a formidable racial-ideological power.~~ In the opening paragraph of *A Larger History of the United States* (1886), Thomas Wentworth Higginson reflected upon his experience sailing up "some great Southern river" during the Civil War: "I was for the first time enabled to picture to myself the American Continent as its first European visitor saw it."⁴⁴ Higginson here identifies the essential gaze of American historiography. ("We may imagine how Columbus felt," he wrote in *Young Folks' History of the United States* [1876], "when, at daybreak, he was rowed ashore, with waving banners, and to the sound of music, and when he stepped upon the beach where no European had ever before landed!")⁴⁵ American history becomes a grand romance of arrival, settlement, conquest, and expansion, all against the backdrop of a mysterious, mute, and "savage" land.

The narrative customarily begins with an "encounter" distinctly viewed from the European side. Francis Parkman opens *The Conspiracy of Pontiac* with the rapt observation, "Primitive America, with her savage scenery and savage men, opens to the imagination a boundless world, unmatched in wild sublimity."⁴⁶ Turner's famous essay on the frontier identifies American history as "the history of the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development."⁴⁷ Roosevelt's opening gambit in *The Winning of the West* is to define "the spread of the English-speaking peoples over the world's waste spaces" as the "most striking feature in the world's history."⁴⁸ And the Yiddish writer Abraham Cahan announces in the opening of his two-volume *Historie fun die fereynigte shtaaten* (1910-1912), "The history of the present day American peoples begins not in America, but in Europe."⁴⁹

Such beginnings, of course, are the product of a fierce teleology. The narrative arc of Parkman's *Pontiac*, to take just one, ends with "The Death of Pontiac": "Neither mound nor tablet marked the burial place of Pontiac. For a mausoleum, a city has risen above the forest hero; and the race whom he hated with such burning rancor trample with unceasing footsteps over his forgotten grave."⁵⁰ This triumphant narrative line is standard fare. In *A Book of American Explorers* (1877), Higginson remarked

that explorers' narratives had always seemed to him "as interesting as 'Robinson Crusoe,' and indeed . . . very much like it."⁵¹ Under Higginson's pen American history itself becomes pure romance—and starkly racial romance at that. "Who were the very first men and women that ever trod the soil of North America?" he asks in *Young Folks' History*. "Of what race were they, of what color, of what size?" Higginson's earliest European arrivals find the Atlantic coast "occupied by roving tribes of men very unlike Europeans in aspect. They were of a copper-color, with high cheekbones, small black eyes, and straight black hair." The Indians may not have been "commonly equal to the Europeans in bodily strength," but still "their endurance was wonderful." Within the first twenty-five pages, building upon this initial, racial encounter, Higginson's narrative has already indicated its trajectory along the same line as Parkman's *Pontiac*:

When first visited by Europeans, the Indians were said to be already diminishing in number, through war and pestilence . . . At first they were disposed to be friendly with the white men; but quarrels soon arose, each side being partly to blame. The savages often burned villages, carried away captives, and laid whole regions to waste . . . to this day some of the western settlements of the United States live in constant fear of attack from Indian tribes. But this race is passing away . . . Only those tribes will survive which have adopted, in part, the habits of civilization.⁵²

Higginson's outlook is not pan-European at every turn. The maturing nation has succeeded in its mission in spite of "the annual arrival of many thousand immigrants, wholly untrained in republican institutions," for instance; nor was it a mere slip by which, in *Larger History*, Higginson wrote of the "modern American [who] makes a pilgrimage . . . to the English village church *at whose altars his ancestors once ministered*." But ~~the prevailing enmities in the epic of American history finally eclipse intra-European rivalries and render them but moot distinctions.~~ The powerful enmity of "white man" and "Indian" culminates, for Higginson, in "The Great Western March" that is the glory of American history—"the crowning pride of an American citizen, that the States of the Union are spread from the Atlantic to the Pacific." He revels in "the great transfer of population" from east to west along the turnpike of the Mohawk Valley and the National Road farther south, and applauds the U.S. Census, which

has documented this romantic triumph. "Progress" itself is measured by the "depth of the strip of civilization" from the Atlantic inland.⁵³

Thus, on one level, ~~the historiography of American expansion justifies American expansion by a combined logic of race, righteousness, and civilization.~~ The United States won lands from the Indians, according to Roosevelt's *Winning of the West*, "as much by treaty as by war" and paid "many times what we would have paid any civilized people whose claim was as vague and shadowy as theirs." But, by Roosevelt's reckoning in one of the most remarkable passages in American historiography, this magnanimity is immaterial: precisely *how* whites came to possess the land—whether by treaty or by conquest—did not matter, "so long as the land was won."

All men of sane and wholesome thought must dismiss with impatient contempt the plea that these continents should be reserved for the use of scattered savage tribes, whose life was but a few degrees less meaningless, squalid, and ferocious than that of the wild beasts with whom they held joint ownership . . . The most ultimately righteous of all wars is a war with savages, though it is apt to be also the most terrible and inhuman. The rude, fierce settler who drives the savage from the land lays all civilized mankind under a debt to him. American and Indian, Boer and Zulu, Cossack and Tartar, New Zealander and Maori,—in each case the victor . . . has laid deep the foundations for the future greatness of a mighty people.⁵⁴

Roosevelt's epic song of the "race-important work" of the pioneers brings out the full meaning of the axiom "History is written by the victors." The dynamic relationship between actual policy-making and this kind of historical narrative is nowhere so clearly delineated as in Roosevelt's 1900 Foreword to *The Winning of the West*. "In the year 1898 the United States finished the work begun over a century before by the backwoodsman, and drove the Spaniard outright from the western world," writes the hero of San Juan Hill. He goes on to applaud the most recent burst of expansionist enthusiasm, to describe in Darwinian terms "the vigor and prowess shown by our fighting men" and the nation's "lift toward mighty things," and to scorn the "shortsighted and timid" people who had opposed wars for "the advance of American civilization at the cost of savagery."⁵⁵

The depth of expansionism as an ideological foundation for American national belonging is illustrated by John Finerty's *Warpath and Bivouac*

(1893), a memoir of his experiences during the plains wars of the 1870s. Finerty, an Irish nationalist who throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century had more than his share of troubles with "Anglo-Saxons" on both sides of the Atlantic, could nonetheless join the Anglo-Saxon with considerable enthusiasm when it came to confronting the Indians of the northern plains. By his account "the white man's government" had signed a treaty favorable to Sitting Bull, sparing most of the Black Hills region from "the daring, restless, and acquisitive Caucasian race." But soon the rumors of gold "fired the Caucasian heart with the spirit of adventure and exploration," and in the months and years immediately following George Custer's Black Hills expedition of 1874, nothing could stop "the encroachments of that terrible white race before which all other races of mankind, from Thibet to Hindostan, and from Algiers to Zululand, have gone down." That "terrible white race," he went on to elaborate, included among others "the Australian miner," "the worried and worn city clerks of London, Liverpool, New York, or Chicago," "the stout English yeoman," "the sturdy Scotchman," "the light-hearted Irishman," and "the daring mine-delvers of Wales and of Cornwall"—varied elements that, in other contexts, decidedly did not make up an indivisible race, either "terrible" or otherwise.⁵⁶

The rank and file of the United States Army, as Finerty recalled it, were largely "either of Irish or German birth or parentage, but there was also a fair-sized contingent of what may be called Anglo-Americans." But Anglo and Celt and Teuton were melted down in this "demon-peopled land," so that though a large proportion of the rank and file was made up of "the never war-absent Irish . . . and of Germans, whose slow bravery solidifies the Celtic ardor with Yankee coolness," it is their unifying whiteness that remains at the fore of Finerty's consciousness and his narrative.⁵⁷

But this western setting, the stage of national expansion, forged "Caucasians" in opposition to an implacable Indian enemy. For Finerty, coyotes are "next to the Indians the pest of the plains"; he asserts that "the average Indian" is still "the same mysterious, untamable, barbaric, unreasonable, childish, superstitious, treacherous, thievish, murderous creature . . . that he has been since first Columbus set eyes upon him at San Salvador." Thus "nothing better illustrated the dauntless spirit of the Caucasian race than to see . . . a log cabin inhabited by some daring whites, who were prepared to risk all their worldly interests against the Wild Sioux at the muzzles of their long and deadly rifles." Indeed, so taken is Finerty by his own sense of whiteness that, by his account, even the wildlife are apt to

comment on his racial identity: "Dozens of American eagles rose majestically from the rocks and soared proudly above us, screaming with all their might, for, doubtless, they had never seen white men before."⁵⁸

Even Finerty's (rare) pleas for justice posit an unbridgeable "difference" between the Indian and the Caucasian, rather than their common humanity:

We of the Caucasian race must confess, however reluctantly, that even the red Indian has some rights on the soil which bore him that the whites are bound to respect. The Indians have their vicious qualities, many of them borrowed, it is sad to be obliged to admit, from their invaders . . . Their misfortunes have been many, their crimes innumerable, but the honor of the American nation demands that this mysterious, indomitable, and interesting people should be protected against those of the white race who would not, if they could, leave an Indian a single rod of his native land, except for the purpose of sepulture.⁵⁹

As with Dirk Peters, John Finerty's own status as a "Caucasian" emerges amid the violent clash between Euro-Americans and "savages." And like *Pontiac, A Young Folks' History*, and *Winning of the West*, Finerty's treatment of the plains wars of the 1870s interpolates an imagined ~~American citizen for whom national belonging itself is predicated upon an emotional ideological participation in "subduing the savage and sanguinary tribes that so long barred the path of progress."~~⁶⁰

William McKinley termed his policy of imperialism in the Philippines "benevolent assimilation." The phrase is wonderfully suggestive not only of the power of paternalism to mask violent social and political realities, but also of the affinities in American discourse between subject peoples abroad and immigrants at home—problem populations whose "difference" stood in the way of successful republican citizenship. Racial discourse in both cases rendered "assimilation" as urgent as it was doubtful. ~~Republican ideology provided the terms by which racial Others were understood, and yet so was republicanism constituted by boundaries of public virtue marked off by those same Others. If racial notions of a superior Anglo-Saxon peoplehood promoted "large policies" abroad, so did they generate anxieties about the fate of a free republic that had taken on too many "undesirable" elements.~~

Census is itself states creation of race
~~In this context of expansion and immigration, census-taking in the United States took on a peculiar sense of drama.~~ A tension existed in nineteenth-century thinking on the question of how the continent was to be peopled. The grandeur of the narrative of conquest, by which the continent was to be inhabited by triumphant Europeans, was increasingly tinged by anxieties regarding the arriving throngs of precisely the wrong Europeans. The census held the key to both stories; and thus otherwise dry statistics and demographic data became the stuff of true romance (for Thomas Wentworth Higginson), tragedy (for Frederick Jackson Turner), or gothic horror (for eugenicists).

In a rhapsodic piece entitled "The Great Western March" (1886), Higginson identified the peopling of the continent (by Europeans) as the "crowning pride" of every American citizen. "The newly published volumes of the United States Census for 1880 give . . . the panorama of this vast westward march," he wrote.

The successive centres for the United States are here exhibited on a chart with a precision as great, and an impressiveness to the imagination as vast, as when astronomers represent for us the successive positions of a planet. Like the shadow thrown by the hand of some great clock, this inevitable point advances year by year across the continent, sometimes four miles a year, sometimes eight miles, but always advancing. And with this striking summary the census report gives us a series of successive representations on colored charts, at ten year intervals, of the gradual expansion and filling in of population over the whole territory of the United States. No romance is so fascinating as the thought suggested by these silent sheets, each line and tint representing the unspoken sacrifices and fatigues of thousands of nameless men and women.⁶¹

Turner, for his part, would see this not as a matter of romance but, in the wake of the 1890 census announcing the "close" of the frontier, as a matter of no little discomfort. "The free lands are gone," he wrote in 1896, "the continent is crossed, and all this push and energy is turning into channels of agitation . . . the conditions of a settled society are being reached with suddenness and with confusion."⁶² By the first decade of the twentieth century he had begun to worry that "classes are becoming alarmingly distinct," and this drama of population took a decidedly racial turn. Breaking down the arrivals of 1907 "by physical type," Turner found that "one-quarter of them were of the Mediterranean race, one-

quarter of the Slavic race, one-eighth Jewish, and only one-sixth of the Alpine, and one-sixth of the Teutonic."⁶³

The combination of urbanization and the changing racial make-up of the United States took the luster off of Higginson's romance of the "westward march." The eugenic thinking of the 1910s and 1920s echoed Turner's misgivings, but now in gothic-horrific tones. Recall the congressional eugenics committee's assertion, for instance, that "had mental tests been in operation, and had the 'inferior' and 'very inferior' immigrants been refused admission to the United States, over six million aliens now living in this country, free to vote, and to become the fathers and mothers of future Americans, would never have been admitted."⁶⁴ Having successfully conquered the continent, the nation now risked conquest by the immigrant.

~~But conquest of the continent and conquests across national boundaries proved a more powerful influence on the racial imagination than the prospective biological conquest of the nation by the immigrant. Like the discourse of naturalization law, which, as we shall see, upheld the racial logic of the "free white persons" of 1790, discourses of nationhood, savagery, and civilization throughout this period also gathered European immigrants—however grudgingly—into the community of European conquerors. The manufacture and maintenance of "Caucasian" whiteness depended in part, as Humphrey Desmond had it in 1898, upon national encounters with "barbarian dominions" even more problematic than the immigrants themselves—from constant (and constantly narrated) contact with "black morsels" like the nations of the plains, Mexico, Hawaii, Samoa, Cuba, Puerto Rico, or the Philippines.⁶⁵ Like the fictional Teague O'Regan and Dirk Peters before them, non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants thus attained racial parity with the nation's Anglo-Saxon stewards, partly in a domestic crucible of empire-building whose white-supremacist heat melted down the distinction between "superior" and "inferior" whites.~~

The court greatly hopes that an amendment of the statutes will make quite clear the meaning of the word "white" in section 2169.

—*In Re Mudarri*, 176 Fed 465 at 467, January 1910

Considering the profundity of these questions and the limited intelligence of legislators and jurists, it is not unnatural the confusion should be very great.

—George Schuyler, "Who is 'Negro'? Who Is 'White'?" 1940



Naturalization and the Courts

In handing down his decision on the petition for citizenship filed in 1914 by a Syrian immigrant named George Dow, a South Carolina judge complained that "to make the words 'white person' conform to any racial classification" is to plunge oneself into a "Serbonian bog."¹ A century and a quarter after the words "free white persons" had been written into the nation's naturalization law, their vagueness continued to generate contests over inclusion and exclusion in the polity. If the elasticity of the words continued to give hope to aspiring immigrants from Syria, India, Turkey, the Pacific, Mexico, Afghanistan, Japan, China, and the Philippines, this ambiguity was also a ready-made cudgel with which restrictionist judges might beat back these claimants. As the judge in *Dow* concluded, for instance, the framers of the original naturalization law "neither expected nor desired" immigration from anywhere on the globe but Europe—"certainly not from Syria."² A Syrian, therefore, must not be "white." This much was plain even to one mired in a "Serbonian bog."

The frankness with which the courts asserted the relationship between race on the one hand and "fitness for self-government" on the other is striking. If boundaries were ever in dispute, largely untouched and unquestioned was the core principle that only certain peoples were sound candidates for good citizenship. At once articulating and sustaining the prejudices of the lawmakers of 1790, one judge explained in 1921:

It is obvious that the objection on the part of congress [to admitting Asians to citizenship] is not due to color, as color, but only to color as an evidence of a type of civilization which it characterizes. The yellow or brown racial color is the hallmark of Oriental despotisms . . . It was deemed that the subjects of these despotisms, with their fixed and ingrained pride in the type of their civilization . . . were not fitted and suited to make for the success of a republican form of Government. Hence they were denied citizenship.

citizenship subject
 "The more homogenous the parts," such reasoning ran, "the more perfect the union."³ Thus it was not merely *citizenship* that was at issue in these cases but whiteness itself—its boundaries and its good republican substance.

Historically the courts had more than just an academic interest in whiteness. As the legal scholar Cheryl Harris has argued, race had been central to early Anglo-American legal conceptions of property. In the legal customs governing slavery, most notably, race alone separated people who could *own* property (whites) from those who could *be* property (blacks). Further, as European settlers sought to gain control of lands occupied but not legally "possessed" by American Indians, issues of deed, title, and rightful claim were also racialized along an axis of white-nonwhite. Since reigning notions of "liberty" itself were intimately related to "the pursuit of property," moreover, such racial conceptions of property rights brought race to the very core of American political culture. Whiteness itself, Harris argues, became such a social asset as to constitute a tangible *thing*—property—and the courts have historically regarded it and protected it as precisely that. W. E. B. Du Bois's "wage" of whiteness, then, is more than just an apt metaphor; it quite literally describes one dimension of the nation's social reality. Notions of possession, property as the signifier of a citizen's "stake in society," and *self*-possession all converge in race.⁴

The historian Michael O'Malley has advanced a similar argument, although cast in somewhat different terms. Tracing the intimate links between "specie" and "species" in the moral-political syntax of American debates in the late nineteenth century, O'Malley notes a kindred logic at work in assigning "value" either to peoples (especially freed slaves) or to currencies, and an identical anxiety in some quarters over the instability of "intrinsic" value in the face of "artificial" coinage. In this scheme, for instance, counterfeiting and racial passing both represent threats to stable systems of value. And the Reconstruction-era state encroached on long-

standing principles of intrinsic, unarguable economic and social value in both areas by its simultaneous experiments in issuing paper monies in the economic sphere and "coining" Negro citizens in the political. O'Malley focuses upon the question of blackness in this complex equation; but between the lines of his comments clearly lies an appreciation of whiteness as value in nineteenth-century social and political relations.⁵

This intrinsic value was precisely what was at stake in the naturalization cases that came before the courts in the 1870s and after, as petitioners from around the globe laid claim not only to citizenship, but to whiteness of the sort specified by the 1790 naturalization law, which still governed matters of inclusion and exclusion. A few aspects of this contest within the courts are worth underscoring at the outset. First, in defending both the border of national belonging and the border of certifiable racial whiteness, the courts gave legal, codified form to a complex of popular, street-level prejudices on the one hand and learned, scientific judgments on the other. These rulings drew upon a number of different sources in a wildly inconsistent fashion, but the power of the courts' decisions—like the power of race generally—resided in their withholding or extending favor *seemingly* by a fixed logic of natural, biological fact. There were, however, no "facts," as a District Court judge in Oregon discovered in sorting out the case of Bhagat Singh Thind (1920). This judge finally granted Thind citizenship, noting that although there were precedents running in both directions, those against the petitioner were "not in line with the greater weight of authority."⁶ The courts thus *created* authority, even in their feverish search for it.

Second, it is one of the paradoxes of legal logic that between the 1870s and the 1920s the courts consolidated and defended the idea "Caucasian" in their naturalization decisions just as popular and congressional debate over immigration itself was producing a contrary notion of Anglo-Saxon supremacy and Celtic, Hebrew, Slavic, and Mediterranean degeneracy. As portentous as these decisions were for petitioners who were either denied or admitted to citizenship, these cases shored up the whiteness of Europe's probationary white races by inflating the difference between the insiders and the outsiders of 1790, and at a time when the weight of so much other cultural authority was tending in the opposite direction. The bids for citizenship on the part of Chinese, Indian, Armenian, Syrian, or Filipino petitioners, in other words, were *part* of what kept the probationary white races from Europe white. Faced with the task of defining Syrian racial status, for instance, the judge in *Dow* could comfortably pro-

nounce, "The broad fact remains that the European peoples taken as a whole are the fair-skinned or light complexioned races of the world, and form the peoples generally referred to as 'white,' and so classed since classification based on complexion was adopted."⁷ Like the nation's frontier warfare and its perpetual narrations, then, these legal skirmishes along the borders of naturalized citizenship staked out a brand of monolithic whiteness which corroborated the reasoning of 1790 precisely in a period when that reasoning was undergoing massive revision.

The Legal Epistemology of Race

Whiteness, as defined by the courts, was a very slippery substance. Indeed, its very indeterminacy rendered it impossible for some to attain. As one California judge rather arrogantly put it in 1928, "What ethnologists, anthropologists, and other so-called scientists may speculate and conjecture in respect to races and origins may interest the curious and convince the credulous, but it is of no moment in arriving at the intent of Congress in the [naturalization] statute aforesaid." All anyone really needed to know about Feroz Din, the Afghan immigrant whose admissibility to citizenship was at issue in this case, was that "he is readily distinguishable from 'white' persons."⁸ No further explanation was required.

The indeterminacy of whiteness did raise problems for the courts, however, as most judges were eager to explain how a certain petitioner might be "readily distinguishable from 'white' persons." Between the 1870s and the 1920s the courts thus generated their own epistemology of race, a way of *knowing* that drew from scientific doctrine, from popular understanding, from historical reasoning as to this or that group's place in world events, from "commonsense" notions of color, from geographic conceptions of the world's peoples, and from legal precedent itself. Of course the very process here threatened to shatter the commonsense understanding of race as a system of natural demarcations: that a judge could decide on the spot whether or not a Syrian was "white," for instance, was evidence of the most concrete kind that race was a social convention, not a biological fact. But such an admission was intolerable. Just as this string of cases betrays the extent to which race functioned as an ideological tool in the allocation of social and political privilege, so does the language of these rulings demonstrate the requirement that ideology disguise itself as something else. Vested with all the authority in the world, the courts continually appealed to some "neutral" basis for arriv-

ing at judgments of racial demarcation. Rulings on the meaning of "free white persons" thus erected a fragile—though finally unassailable—edifice of authority regarding race itself.⁹

In the nation's legal epistemology of race, the "Caucasian race" traces its origins to *In re Ah Yup* (1878), "the first application made by a native Chinaman for naturalization" in the United States. Circuit Court Judge Sawyer's ruling in the case set an important precedent; as it was recalled and repeated over the years in response to a cavalcade of petitioners for naturalized citizenship, Sawyer's reasoning in the matter single-handedly established "Caucasians" as a legally recognized racial group. The terms of the initial naturalization law had been muddled in 1870, when post-Civil War legislation had made provisions for "aliens of African nativity, and . . . persons of African descent" without reiterating the initial language regarding "free white persons." A subsequent amendment in 1875 read, "The provisions of this title apply to aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity, and to persons of African descent." The question put before the court in *Ah Yup*, then, was whether a person of the "Mongolian race" qualified as a "white person." By what measure was white *white*?

Judge Sawyer was sensitive to the complexities here. "The words 'white person,' " he opined,

. . . constitute a very indefinite description of a class of persons, where none can be said to be literally white, and those called white may be found of every shade from the lightest blonde to the most swarthy brunette. But these words in this country, at least, have undoubtedly acquired a well settled meaning in common popular speech, and they are constantly used in the sense so acquired in the literature of the country, as well as in common parlance. As ordinarily used everywhere in the United States, one would scarcely fail to understand that the party employing the words "white person" would intend a person of the Caucasian race.¹⁰

Sawyer went on to cite Blumenbach (indirectly, via *Webster's Dictionary*) and his five-tiered scheme of races: "Caucasian" ("or white race," in Sawyer's words, comprising "the greater part of European nations and those of western Asia"), "Mongolian," "Ethiopian," "American," and "Malay." He discussed the competing scientific schemes offered by Linnaeus, Buffon, and Cuvier to demonstrate the disagreement within the scientific community, but pointed out that "no one includes the white, or

Caucasian, with the Mongolian or yellow race; and no one of those classifications recognizing color as one of the distinguishing characteristics includes the Mongolian in the white or whitish race."¹¹

Sawyer's construction would leave some room for questions: what is meant by "whitish," for instance? What is meant by the assertion that "the greater part of European nations" was included under the term "Caucasian"? These would be taken up in response to various suits over the next several decades. But two issues were settled authoritatively in Sawyer's decision, and *Ah Yup* exerted considerable force on later decisions when it came to these key issues: first, this decision reified "the Caucasian race" not simply as a schematic convention, but as a meaningful legal and scientific concept that clarified the vague phrase "free white persons." "I find nothing in the history of the country," Sawyer declared, "in common or scientific usage, or in legislative proceedings, to indicate that congress intended to include in the term 'white person' any other than an individual of the Caucasian race." (Here was a concept with some reach: decades later, in 1910, an Oregon court ruled that a certain Chinese husband was obligated to buy his Norwegian wife "Caucasian foods" rather than "rice, chop suey and noodles.")¹² Second, having established "Caucasian" peoplehood as a self-evident and natural fact, Sawyer left no question as to the relationship between alleged Caucasians and alleged Mongolians: noting that in 1870 Congress had revised the naturalization code by adding "African nativity" and "African descent" rather than striking the qualification "white," Sawyer concluded that "whatever latitudinarian construction might otherwise have been given to the term 'white person,' it is entirely clear that congress intended by this legislation to exclude Mongolians from the right of naturalization."¹³

Thus Sawyer cited several authorities in handing down this ruling on whiteness, including science, congressional intent, and, not least, "common" understanding. In the naturalization cases that followed in the wake of *Ah Yup*, Sawyer himself would be numbered among these various authorities. In the case of Frank Camille (1880), a Canadian immigrant of "half white and half Indian blood," an Oregon Circuit Court cited Sawyer's definition of "white person" in denying the application.¹⁴ In the Utah case of a petitioner simply referred to as Kanaka Nian (1889), a Hawaiian "of Malayan or Mongolian complexion," the court drew upon both Sawyer and Blumenbach in arguing that there was no basis for classing Hawaiians among "Caucasians."¹⁵ And in the New York case of the Burmese immigrant San C. Po (1894), the court first evoked literal color ("in color

he is a dark yellow"), but then rested upon the precedents of *Kanaka Nian*, *Camille*, and *Ah Yup* in holding that "white" really referred to the scientific classification "Caucasian" and that, scientifically considered, "the Burmese are Malays."¹⁶

Judge Sawyer's reasoning did not lose its purchase entirely on legal interpretations of whiteness for many years, but several cases between the 1890s and the 1910s did cloud the seeming ethnological clarity by which *Ah Yup*, *Camille*, *Kanaka Nian*, and *Po* had been decided. A Texas court in 1897, for instance, departed from the ethnological reasoning of *Ah Yup* in granting the application of Ricardo Rodriguez, ruling that "whatever may be the status of the applicant viewed solely from the standpoint of the ethnologist, he is embraced within the spirit and intent of our laws upon naturalization."¹⁷

The *Rodriguez* case raised some vexing questions. "As to color," the case noted, Rodriguez "may be classed with the copper colored or red men"—another race whose status was left in doubt by laws naming only "white persons" and persons of "African" nativity or descent. Thus the question before the court was precisely what it had been nineteen years earlier in the case of *Ah Yup*: could the petitioner be construed as "white"? A brief on behalf of the petitioner brought into question one of the keynotes of the *Ah Yup* decision, and so opened debate on a point that had been settled in the courts since 1878. "The term 'Caucasian,' " the counsel A. M. Paschal argued,

is now abandoned by all acknowledged writers on ethnology as too restricted a term to embrace all those races who first peopled and flourished on the shores of the Mediterranean, and [are] erroneously supposed to be a pure Caucasian stock. The term now applied is "Mediterraneans." These are now scattered over the whole world, and, as a species, have no equal, physically or mentally.¹⁸

As to the question of assimilability, Paschal found the "Mongolians" obviously wanting, and so acceded to that bit of exclusionary reasoning in the *Ah Yup* decision. The question, though, was whether or not the idea "Caucasian" was the proper tool for arriving at systems of inclusion and exclusion. Paschal had no question as to the civic capabilities of Ricardo Rodriguez. *Caucasian, not Mongolian*

Briefs for the opposition stressed whiteness as a phenotype, and elaborated upon the inner qualities that physiognomy allegedly revealed. One brief noted rather straightforwardly that Rodriguez could not possibly be

"white," since "the applicant has dark eyes, straight, black hair, chocolate brown skin, and high cheek bones." A second brief appealed to the racial history of U.S. debate over the Mexicans' fitness for self-government. Attorney T. J. McMinn invoked the Texas Declaration of Independence, which had characterized the Mexicans as "unfit to be free." He cited Sam Houston's remark "I have no confidence in them," and John C. Calhoun's caustic "They cannot govern themselves. Shall they govern us?"¹⁹

The court finally brushed aside both the commentary on phenotypes and the anti-Mexican declarations of earlier Texas patriots. According to the 1836 Texas constitution, "all persons (Africans, descendants of Africans, and Indians excepted) who were residing in Texas on the day of the declaration of independence" became *de jure* citizens upon the constitution's adoption.²⁰ The status of the Mexican in relation to the prototypical "free white person" of the 1790 law remained unclear, and the court made no effort to sort this out; but Mexicans had been singled out in much relevant legislation for inclusion. If exclusivity was a critical principle in the workings of the free republic, the category "Caucasian" was not in every case the appropriate tool for determining the boundaries. Thus, in extending the domain of "free white persons," *Rodriguez* identified a logic by which nonracial considerations (in this case, the history of Mexico and Texas) could supersede both ethnological authority and popular conventions of describing skin color.²¹

More vexed still was the Massachusetts case of *In re Halladjian* (1909). As in *Rodriguez*, the court here arrived at a construction of "white" that was inclusive enough to grant the application of the petitioners—in this case four Armenian immigrants. Unlike *Rodriguez*, however, *Halladjian* met the question of race head on. Remarkably ambitious in its scope, this ruling not only attempted to pinpoint the intent of the 1790 naturalization law and its wording, but in doing so addressed specific ethnological questions of racial taxonomy. Drawing upon an impressive array of colonial usages of the word "white," the court held, first, that the word "white" was *not* synonymous with "European," but was used to classify the inhabitants and to include all persons not otherwise classified. This argument was sweeping in and of itself: because Armenians had never been singled out and named for exclusion, we must presume their admissibility to citizenship; and the terms of their inclusion could only be the phrase "free white persons." "White" must be read as an *inclusive* category, not an exclusive one.²²

But the ruling went even further, maintaining that there was in fact no

"white" race as a distinctive class, nor a "yellow" race that comprised all the peoples of Asia. Hence "free white persons" included Armenians born in Asiatic Turkey and on the west side of the Bosphorus. *Halladjian* thus rendered a legal definition of race itself:

The term "race" primarily means an ethnical stock; a great division of mankind having in common certain distinguishing physical peculiarities, and thus constituting a *comprehensive class appearing to be derived from a distinct primitive source*. A second definition is a tribal or national stock; a division or subdivision of one of the great racial stocks of mankind, distinguished by minor peculiarities. The word "race" connotes descent.²³

The ruling thus imported into naturalization law the racial scheme that would shape the Dillingham Commission on Immigration, and yet in doing so it countered restrictionist arguments as to "tribal or national stocks" and their fitness for citizenship. Whereas arguments for immigration restriction tended to stress considerable differences among "tribal or national stocks," *Halladjian* identified this as merely a secondary definition of race and, further still, rendered the "peculiarities" of such races "minor."²⁴ This approach to legal whiteness was conservative in that it upheld the 1790 construction of "white persons" that had allowed for the massive immigration of many European races.

It is worth examining the reasoning in the *Halladjian* decision in more detail for its contribution to the legal epistemology of race in the early twentieth century. Although a lower court had identified the petitioners as "Armenian by race," the first resort to physical description seemed to favor their admissibility: "I find that all were white persons in appearance, not darker in complexion than some persons of North European descent traceable for generations. Their complexion was lighter than that of many south Italians and Portuguese." As such "borderline" cases had not before made their way into the courts, this court faced a novel task: the petitioners are "neither Chinamen nor Africans of any sort, and the court has here to decide whether they are white or not." The interference of a court clerk, who (rather imprecisely) urged the district attorney to "oppose the granting of naturalization to Hindoos or East Indians," signaled the prejudices surrounding this case.²⁵

The court gave many reasons for ruling on the Armenians' borderline whiteness. The heart of the United States' argument for exclusion was the contention that "'white' is the equivalent of 'European,' and is used to

white
European
in suits

'describe the variations of domicile or origin which are so closely associated with the mental development of a people.' " The court dispatched with this contention in quick order. Addressing the question of the alleged integrity of the "European" race and the ancillary argument that Armenians were racially "Asiatic," the court noted, first, that geography was rarely an essential or reliable factor in racial classification: "we speak of the Anglo-Saxon race, the Teutonic, the Celtic, the Slavonic, the Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Hebrew, the [N]egro, more commonly than of the Swiss race, the Austrian, the Spanish, or the Egyptian." European peoples are not "unmixed," moreover, and therefore there is no "European race" in a unified sense. Second, the court similarly challenged the contention that the petitioners belonged to the "Asiatic race": "They are no darker than many west Europeans, and they resemble the Chinese in feature no more than they resemble the American aborigines." The average man would understand Armenians to be white. The court rounded out this segment of the decision by citing the authority of intellectual tradition in matters racial, and, in so doing, returning to the realm of scientific authority with which this discussion had begun: "Armenians have always been classified in the white or Caucasian race, and not in the yellow or Mongolian"; scientists such as Cuvier had "expressly included Armenians as well as Hindoos, in the Caucasian race."²⁶

rely on
scientific
authority

Had the court stopped right here, this would have been as complete a discussion of the matter as was typical in cases of this sort. From this scientific discussion, however, the decision went on at great length to locate the established meaning of whiteness within American legal history and within the functioning of the state as well. The syntax is telling: this highly "liberal" ruling on the admissibility of Armenian immigrants is thoroughly grounded in the very history of white supremacy that the fact of racial indeterminacy *might* have been deployed to subvert. The court offered a long litany of colonial usages of "white" in census data to demonstrate that in the context of the times, "white" simply meant everyone who was neither "Negro" nor "Indian"—the only other racial designations specified in state documents of the era.²⁷

x The court went further still to defend its construction of "white persons" by invoking the authority of various segregation statutes from the Jim Crow South and West (including Arkansas, Florida, Virginia, Kentucky, and Oklahoma). In this body of statutory law, the court noted, anyone not legally "black" was legally "white": "A statute in Arkansas

requires separate accommodation for 'the white and African races,' and provides that all persons not visibly African 'shall be deemed to belong to the white race.' " The Oklahoma constitution, too, specified that, "whenever in this Constitution and laws of this state the words 'colored' or 'colored person,' 'negro,' or 'negro race' are used, the same shall be construed to mean to apply to all persons of African descent. The term 'white race' shall include all other persons." Thus was Jim Crow invoked in the name of a liberalized naturalization code. Like the creators of this fretwork of segregation codes, the framers of the naturalization law of 1790 neither cared nor knew about Turks and Armenians; but the original census shows that, to them, everyone but Negroes and Indians constituted "white persons."²⁸

Although *Halladjian* was far from the last word on the subject, this case did represent the bottom line in some important respects. As I will argue at greater length below, the *Halladjian* decision more than any other reveals the dual working of the legal construction of "white persons" as both a bulwark against undesirable Others without *and* a great crucible minimizing the perceived "difference" among the varied peoples and races within.

But the extent to which outright confusion persisted in matters of legal whiteness was manifest within a year. Notwithstanding the contention—cited in *Halladjian*—that "the average man in the street . . . would find no difficulty in assigning to the yellow race a Turk or Syrian with as much ease as he would bestow that designation on a Chinaman or a Korean," the court in *In re Mudarri* (1910), confronted with a petitioner who was "a Syrian by race," maintained: "The older writers on ethnology are substantially agreed that Syrians are to be classed as of the Caucasian or white race." "This court," moreover, "has long admitted Syrians to citizenship."²⁹ Although firmly settled in its own construction of Syrian racial identity, the court in *Mudarri* did call for a revision of existing codes to clarify the racial categories: "What may be called for want of a better name the Caucasian-Mongolian classification [meaning Armenians and Syrians] is not now held to be valid by any considerable body of ethnologists." More directly still, "The court greatly hopes that an amendment of the statutes will make quite clear the meaning of the word 'white' in section 2169."³⁰ Perhaps most striking about this "great hope" is that it is the first expression of its kind on the record, despite the tortuous logic by which whiteness had been contested and defended since *Ah Yup* in 1878. Here, at last, is an acknowledgement of epistemological crisis.

Legalized Racialisms, Racialized Legalisms

Clearly, then, knowledge of whiteness did not derive from any objective assessment of disinvested fact. The degree to which this is so is illustrated nowhere better than in a pair of federal cases from the early 1920s, the petitions of Takao Ozawa (1922) and Bhagat Singh Thind (1923). Taken together, the cases demonstrate how race has served as a powerful instrument for jealously guarding privilege rather than as a neutral, coolly biological basis for understanding the relationship among the world's peoples. Takao Ozawa, an immigrant from Japan, petitioned for U.S. citizenship in October 1922. His case was built on an assault on the principle that the qualification of "whiteness" necessarily excluded the Japanese from naturalized citizenship. This petition argued, first, that the spirit of the 1875 naturalization act that had extended citizenship to "Africans" was *inclusive*, not *exclusive*; indeed, the Chinese Exclusion Act had been passed and periodically renewed without mention of Japanese immigrants.

Second, certain precedents (most notably *Halladjian*) had held that "white," in the literal 1790 construction of the term, referred to anyone not black—"a person without negro blood." Third, the long history of U.S. expansionism and annexation had already brought into the national fold "vast numbers of members of races not Caucasian, including many Mongolians," most recently in Hawaii and Puerto Rico, for example. And fourth, "The Japanese are 'free.' They, or at least the dominant strains, are 'white persons,' speaking an Aryan tongue and having Caucasian root stocks; a superior class, fit for citizenship. They are assimilable." The petitioner Takao Ozawa himself was held up as sterling evidence of this last contention. Even a narrow insistence upon whiteness, in other words, would admit the likes of Ozawa, who was as white as any white person by any meaningful construction of that term.³¹

The U.S. counterargument, by contrast, rested upon a geographical, Eurocentric assumption of what "white" had to have meant in 1790:

The men who settled this country were white men from Europe and the men who fought the Revolutionary War, framed the Constitution and established the Government, were white men from Europe and their descendants. They were eager for more of their kind to come, and it was to men of their own kind that they held out the opportunity for citizenship in the new nation.

As it had exclusively been "European immigration which was desired and expected" among the Revolutionary generation, whiteness was not meant to be inclusive. Citizenship "could only be obtained by those to whom it was given, and the men of 1790 gave it only to those whom they knew and regarded as worthy to share it with them, men of their own type, white men."³²

In deciding the merits of these arguments, the court in *Ozawa* at once demonstrated the inadequacy of racial whiteness as a stable system of demarcation and insisted upon continued demarcation along racial lines. "[Color] differs greatly among persons of the same race," the opinion read,

even among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the fair blond to the swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of the brown or yellow races. Hence to adopt the color test alone would result in a confused overlapping of races and a gradual merging of one into the other, without any practical line of separation.³³

And yet courts since *Ah Yup* "in an almost unbroken line, have held that the words 'white person' were meant to indicate only a person of what is popularly known as the Caucasian race." Such a construction would tend undoubtedly to raise disputes among some borderline cases, such as Syrians or Armenians, the court conceded; but the appellant in this case "is clearly of a race which is not Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone [of dispute] on the negative side." Thus grounding its ruling in the authority of precedent and "popular" racial understanding, the court in *Ozawa* articulated three principles of import to the legal construction of whiteness. First, the term "white person" applies only to those who would have been recognized as racially white in 1790—that is, to "Caucasians." Second, this construction establishes a zone on one side of which are those undoubtedly eligible, and on the other undoubtedly ineligible, for citizenship; questionable cases within the zone itself must be determined as they arise. But third, Japanese immigrants, who are "clearly" not "Caucasian," cannot become citizens of the United States.³⁴ You may indeed be "white," in other words, but you are not "Caucasian."

In early 1923, only a few months after the *Ozawa* decision had been handed down, a ruling in the United States' appeal in the case of Bhagat

Singh Thind made almost comic nonsense of the authority by which Ozawa had been excluded. Thind, recall, had been granted citizenship in 1920 by a District Court in Oregon on the grounds that, though there were precedents running in both directions, those against the petitioner were "not in line with the greater weight of authority."³⁵ The United States, sued to reverse this decision on the whiteness of the "Hindu," and indeed won precisely such a reversal in *U.S. v. Thind*. If the court in *Ozawa* relied primarily upon the scientific concept of the "Caucasian," the court in *U.S. v. Thind* ruled that "Caucasian" was a bankrupt concept and that science itself was a bankrupt authority in matters racial. Not the scientist but the "average" man could best be counted on to determine whiteness. "It may be true that the blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity," this opinion read, "but the average man knows perfectly well that there are unmistakable and profound differences between them to-day."

The word "Caucasian" is in scarcely better repute [than "Aryan"] . . . [and] has come to include far more than the unscientific mind suspects . . . it includes not only the Hindu, but some of the Polynesians . . . the Hamites of Africa, upon the Caucasoid cast of their features, though in color they range from brown to black. We venture to think that the average well-informed white American would learn with some degree of astonishment that the race to which he belongs is made up of such heterogeneous elements.³⁶

You may indeed be "Caucasian," in other words, but you are not "white."

The *Ozawa* and *Thind* decisions demonstrate the ultimate function of race as an ideological tool and whiteness as property whose value was to be protected. As the court suggested in *Ozawa*, race is a "practical line of separation," not a natural one; and in social, economic, and political practice, separation is hierarchy. What would most "astonish" the average white person about the diminution of the "unmistakable and profound differences" between whites and Hindus, to take the language of the *Thind* decision, would be his or her own loss of standing as a result.

This principle of property-in-whiteness was upheld in less known cases as well. When another Syrian, Faras Shahid, petitioned for citizenship in South Carolina (1913), the court observed that "in color, he is about that of walnut, or somewhat darker than is the usual mulatto of one half mixed blood between the white and the negro races." Such an assessment did not bode well in South Carolina. The case quickly boiled down to the

simple but explosive question of race and hierarchy—whether "a very dark brown, almost black, inhabitant of India is entitled to rank as a white person, because of a possible or hypothetical infusion of white blood 30 or 40 centuries old." The court was confounded by the scientific aspects of racial designation, and the seeming contradictions. "What is the race or color of the modern inhabitant of Syria is impossible to say," the court confessed. Far easier, evidently, was the task of saying what the modern inhabitant of Syria was *not*: he or she was not "white."³⁷ As far as the court was concerned, the bar to whiteness of South Carolinians who had one, but only one, demonstrably white parent was decisive. Would it not be terribly inconsistent, the judge wondered, to deny property-in-whiteness to people of mixed parentage but to grant it to peoples—like Syrians—whose white parentage was merely theoretical? Thus was the superstructure of white supremacy—in the form of Jim Crow statutes and miscegenation laws—enlisted to protect South Carolinian whiteness from potential taint-by-naturalization.

More direct in its articulation of property-in-whiteness (and more egregious) was another South Carolina judge's reasoning in 1914. This judge, too, invoked Southern regional custom in portioning out whiteness in the case of George Dow. He did not stop with contemporary custom, however, but rather looked all the way back to the mentality of the slaveholding states of the 1790s.

The average citizen of the states was at that time firmly convinced of the superiority of his own white European race over the rest of the world, whether red, yellow, brown, or black. He had enslaved many of the American Indians on that ground. He would have enslaved a Moor, a Bedouin, a Syrian, a Turk, or an East Indian of sufficiently dark complexion with equal readiness on the same plea if he could have caught him.³⁸

The first Congress could not have intended that the likes of George Dow be protected in his "pursuit of property," that is, because to them he would have *been* property. Though slavery had been abolished, its logic remained suitable for framing naturalization decisions, just as Jim Crow had been summoned by another court in admitting the Armenian Haladjian.

The presumptions attached to property-in-whiteness did not necessarily work against a petitioner, however. Tom Ellis, a "Turkish subject" also identified as "Syrian," petitioned a court in Oregon in 1910. As the Dis-

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whiteness

○

strict Court judge viewed him, "ethnologically he is of the Semitic stock, a markedly white type of the race." This judge did not elaborate what he meant by the word "white," but he did spend some time puzzling over what the first Congress must have meant by it. If by "white persons" the drafters of the 1790 law had intended "Europeans," the judge opined, "it might have been far better expressed than to use the simple term 'white.'"

Not having been so expressed or particularized, the most reasonable inference would be that the word "white," ethnologically speaking, was intended to be applied in its popular sense to denote at least the members of the white or Caucasian race of people. If there be ambiguity and doubt, it is better to resolve that doubt in favor of the Caucasian possessed of the highest qualities which go to make an excellent citizen, as the applicant appears to be . . . If the word "white" in its popular sense is of too broad a signification, as applied to persons deemed suitable to become citizens of the United States, the remedy is easily at hand by an amendment of the law.³⁹

This decision is remarkable in several respects. Liberal though the decision appears to be, it nonetheless derives from a kind of pretzel logic whose very twists are defined by white supremacism. The matter before the court was whether or not Tom Ellis was a member of the "white" race, and what, precisely, "white" might be taken to mean. Since there was no compelling basis for interpreting the term so narrowly as to mean "European," the court reasoned, it must refer to "the members of the *white or Caucasian race of people*"—it must mean the very thing whose meaning was in question, in other words. White meant white. Should doubts arise as to "whiteness," these could safely be resolved in the petitioner's favor, so long as the petitioner was "Caucasian." Hence it is no small matter that Ellis was described early on as "a markedly white type" of the Semitic race—this casual observation (interpretation), indeed, turned out to be the basis for rendering a decision in his favor. Just as it boded ill for Faras Shahid that he appeared "somewhat darker than is the usual mulatto," so Ellis's whiteness was indispensable in proving that he was in fact a "white person."

In identifying Ellis as a "markedly white type," the judge appears to have intended Ellis's literal color, but he could have been referring to any of a number of things, and he was likely referring to much more than he knew—Ellis's social bearing, his proficiency in English, his dress, his man-

ner, his style, his demeanor, perhaps his class. In any case his reference to Ellis as markedly "white" and his inference that Ellis was a "white person" were very closely aligned. Ellis did not appear to the court to be the kind of person who should be excluded, therefore he could not be the kind of person who *must* be excluded. To fail to grant him citizenship would have been to do injury to Ellis's property-in-whiteness. Standing naturalization law might be too inclusive, it is true. But it was not for the courts to devalue the property-in-whiteness of any "Caucasian possessed of the highest qualities which go to make an excellent citizen."

Property-in-whiteness was a principle clearly recognized not only by those in power, moreover, but also by the petitioners themselves. Claimants in this long string of suits for citizenship never assailed the core premise that whiteness was a reasonable prerequisite for republican citizenship; nor did they suggest that such exclusivity was ill-founded. Rather, they uniformly argued that their rightful share in whiteness was being denied them. As contentious as this legal history was, in other words, combatants generally respected the value of whiteness, and in laying claim to its title they did nothing to challenge property-in-whiteness itself.

This underlying consensus is nowhere more apparent than in the case of George Dow, the Syrian whose case had led one South Carolina judge into a "Serbonian bog." In 1913 a lower court had relied upon a purely geographic definition of whiteness ("white" = "European") to deny Dow's admissibility to citizenship. A lower court had also debunked the idea of the "Caucasian" race, not in the process of pointing up the problem in the United States naturalization law, but in the process of exposing a central flaw in this petitioner's reasoning. The judge cited Huxley's remarks on Blumenbach to demonstrate the whimsicality of the category "Caucasian"—science's "oddest myth"—then went on to reason: "If there be no such race as the 'Caucasian race,' and the term Caucasian be incorrect as properly describing the white races, then the [petitioner's] whole argument based upon the Syrian being one of a Caucasian race falls to the ground."⁴⁰ Here, no less than in *Ozawa* and *Thind*, is race deployed as a blunt instrument of arrogant power.

An enraged Syrian community next appealed the decision (1914), protesting not so much the denial of the right to citizenship as the denial of a position in the "white race," and its attendant implication of inferiority to American blacks. Did not the case of "Semitic" Jews settle the matter in their favor? This 1915 appeal did yield a more liberal interpretation of

"white persons," and Dow was finally admitted. The higher court now cited the Dillingham Commission's *Dictionary of Races and Peoples*, which had asserted that Syrians "belong to the Semitic branch of the Caucasian race, thus widely differing from their rulers, the Turks, who are in origin Mongolian." The court also cited the "more liberal construction" of whiteness that had characterized rulings like *Halladjian* and *Ellis*.⁴¹

Similarly, in *U.S. v. Cartozian* (1925) an Oregon court, adopting the three-tiered scheme of European races favored by writers like Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, ruled that Tatos O. Cartozian and his Armenian compatriots were "Alpines" and therefore European—certainly not the most desirable of the European races, but not the least, either. Cartozian's counsel had called Franz Boas, who testified as to "the European origin of the Armenians and their migration into Asia Minor." "It would be utterly impossible," Boas declared, "to classify them as not belonging to the white race." The court dismissed the U.S. complaint against Cartozian, holding that Armenians "are white persons within the common usage of the term, and amalgamate readily with other white people."⁴² (The verb "amalgamate" is worth pausing over: it conjures the literal "consanguinity" among races mandated by a web of miscegenation codes whose very *raison d'être* was the protection of both white property and whiteness-as-property.)

That same year in Michigan the United States sued John Mohammad Ali, a "high-caste Hindu or Arabian," to revoke his citizenship. Ali's argument, too, is interesting for its acceptance of a bedrock racist principle: his ancestors were Arabs who had invaded India and "kept their Arabian blood-line clear and pure by intermarriage within the family," he claimed. Like Homer Plessy, like George Dow and the South Carolina Syrian community, like the Armenians who had requested the aid of Franz Boas, John Mohammad Ali seemed comfortable enough with the principle of exclusion on racial grounds—it was simply *his* exclusion on racial grounds that bothered him. (Whereas the court had been swayed by Cartozian's argument, Ali's exclusion stood: "his skin is certainly not white," this court ruled; "the most that could be claimed by him . . . would be membership in the Caucasian race." In the wake of the *Thind* decision, however, this "manifestly would avail him nothing.")⁴³ Thus did the racialized legalisms and the legalistic racialisms of both claimants and the courts conspire to protect property-in-whiteness and the core principle of "whites'" supreme claim to fitness for self-government.

nonwhite
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Presumed Caucasian

Between the 1870s and the 1920s the courts succeeded in normalizing and reinforcing the notion of a unified community of "white persons" that the 1790 law had articulated and decades of naturalization practice had established. Just as anxieties over the fate of the Anglo-Saxon republic in the face of an onslaught of inferior white races dominated popular discussion, the courts were busy minimizing the "difference" among these peoples by the very language they used to interpret the phrase "white persons." Thus whereas for some the phrase "white persons" became the instrument of exclusion, for others it became a powerful crucible whose exclusions based upon distinctions of color blurred other potentially divisive physical distinctions. This, indeed, is the melting pot. *relatively*

A Washington state court remarked in *Yamashita* (1902), "Whether the classification according to color is technically scientific or natural is not a proper subject of inquiry here. From its existence co-extensively with the formation of the American republic, it must be taken to express a settled national will."⁴⁴ Vigorous eugenic arguments against the qualifications of certain "white persons" and the inconsistency of the courts themselves in deciding the presumably simpler matter of who was and who was not white belie the contention that the national will actually was "settled" on this matter. But if the courts could not determine the "national will," they could in fact *create* it. Among the more portentous effects of this decades-long struggle over "Caucasian" identity in the courts was the normalization of unified whiteness. The fact that Hebrews, Celts, Slavs, Mediterraneans, Alpines, Iberics, or Latins had traditionally entered the polity under the legal banner "white persons" must, at any rate, demonstrate a matter of "settled national will." By the logic of the courts, everyone who had been admitted to citizenship as "white persons" became indispensable evidence of the *meaning* of the phrase "white persons," and they were thus cordoned off, logically, from those who had been excluded. The courts' endorsement of the traditional interpretations of the 1790 law cemented whiteness for the probationary white races; and again, problematic Europeans owed their inclusion to the exclusion of others. *inclusion based on exclusion*

This principle was articulated explicitly at various points. The decision in *Halladjian*, for instance, singled out "Hebrews" as an especially vexing instance when it came to making sense of the laws and practices around

naturalization. Hebrews, remarked the court, as a group racially "pure," represented an "extraordinary exception" in U.S. policy: they have sought

with unusual strictness to maintain that purity [of the blood] for 2,000 years at the least . . . both Hebrew history and an approximation to general type show that the Hebrews are a true race, if a true race can be found widely distributed for many centuries. Their origin is Asiatic . . . If "the aboriginal peoples of Asia" are excluded from naturalization, as urged by the United States, it is hard to find a loophole for admitting the Hebrew.⁴⁵

The court advanced these observations in service of the *inclusionary* argument that there was no unified "European race" (and hence no ethnological bar to the admittance of Armenians). Nonetheless, the tension admitted here between prevailing ethnological wisdom and traditional naturalization practices indicates the stakes involved in "Hebrews'" continued ability to lay claim to the status of "white persons." For the court in *Halladjian*, "Hebrews" represented the exception proving the inclusionary possibilities inhering in the term "white persons"; by implication, however, "Hebrews" in this discussion also became the exception proving the general rule of monolithic "whiteness." For instance, what becomes of problematic "Slavs" in this formulation? They slip silently into whiteness. The significance of such reasoning is unmistakable in the context of an insurgent and increasingly influential eugenic movement.

The question of ethnological "white races" and their relationship to the legal concept "white persons" was taken up even more forcefully the next year, in reference to the United States' case against the Parsee (Syrian) immigrant Bhicaji Franyi Balsara (1910). In response to the United States' contention that the phrase "free white persons" must be construed to mean what it did in 1790, the court remarked,

No immigration being then known except from England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Germany, Sweden, France, and Holland, Congress must be taken to have intended aliens coming from those countries only. The consequence of this argument, viz., that Russians, Poles, Italians, Greeks, and others, who had not theretofore immigrated, are to be excluded, is so absurd that the government extends the intention of Congress to all Europeans.⁴⁶

"If a Hebrew . . . had applied for naturalization in 1790," the court opined, "we cannot believe he would have been excluded on the ground

that he was not a white person." Congress must have had "principally in mind the exclusion of Africans, whether slave or free, and Indians," and not Parsees like the petitioner Balsara.⁴⁷ Similarly, in denying the petition of Albert Henry Young, an immigrant of half German and half Japanese descent (1912), a Federal Court in Washington state offered that "Caucasian" referred to "all European races around the Mediterranean Sea, whether they are considered as 'fair whites' or 'dark whites,' as classified by Huxley, and notwithstanding that certain of the southern and eastern European races are technically classified as of Mongolian or Tartar origin."⁴⁸ This comment did establish the whiteness of certain problematic European immigrants, even if it did not explain it.

Similarly, a Pennsylvania court detailed the various inclusions and exclusions inhering in whiteness in its ruling against the "Hindu" Sadar Bhagwab Singh (1917). The legal concept "white persons" had expanded over the decades to include many whom the framers could not possibly have imagined in 1790, explained the court. It had come to include "Spaniards and Portuguese, and later the Italian peoples, and broadly the Latin race"; "Hungarians, Poles, Russians, and many divisions of the Slavic race"; and "Hebrews, who have always been recognized as a distinct race." This was painted as a process of some begrudgement, but ever more liberal all the same. The court did find, however, that Congress and the courts had never made provision for "the race of people commonly known as Hindus." "White," then, as intended by Congress, must primarily be understood to connote a geographical class, "those who were like unto themselves in blood, previous social and political environment, laws, usages, customs, and traditions, what has been called the geographical test."⁴⁹ "Hindus" did not pass this test. Significantly, according to the ruling in *Singh*, many other groups did.

In a similar rendering of "Hindu" racial identity in *United States v. Ali* (1925), a Michigan court ruled that a "high-caste Hindu or Arabian [is] not [a] 'white person' within Naturalization law." Again, in arguing the unassimilability of the Hindu, the court pronounced rather sweepingly and unproblematically on certain other groups whose assimilability was very much in question: "The children of European parentage quickly merge into the mass of our population and lose the distinctive marks of their European origin, while the children born in this country of Hindu parents retain indefinitely the evidence of their ancestry." This is an especially striking assertion for 1925, a year after the Johnson Act had passed Congress on precisely the logic that "children of European par-

now justified in the name of assimilation

anybody
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entage" *would not* "lose the distinctive marks" of their origin or "quickly merge into the mass of our population."⁵⁰

In *Morrison v. California*, a case involving "conspiracy" to violate the state's alien land law in 1934, the court upheld the logic of *Ozawa* in defining the precise meaning of the terms "white" and "Caucasian": " 'White persons' within the meaning of the statute are members of the Caucasian race, as Caucasian is defined in the understanding of the mass of men."⁵¹ This casual blending of the scientific authority of "Caucasian" with the populist appeal to "the understanding of the mass of men" signals the end of an era in the legal battles over whiteness. The unconflicted tone suggests that the meaning behind the volatile phrase "white persons" had indeed become "a matter of settled national will." Indeed, only a handful of cases made their way through the courts between 1935 and the elimination of the phrase "white persons" in naturalization law in the early 1950s.⁵²

The rather peculiar divorce case of *Delavigne v. Delavigne* (1975) provides an apt coda to this long, contentious history of whiteness-in-dispute. Having lost custody of his children, the husband in a divorce suit now claimed that males, as a class, constituted the social and legal equivalent of a "race," and that therefore the courts' favoritism toward women in custody cases was tantamount to "racial discrimination." The court responded by blowing the dust off of Blumenbach's schematic in *Natural Varieties of Mankind* and offering a latter-day lecture on the five divisions of mankind, "based on ancestry, with relatively unchanging characteristics, now usually referred to as the black, brown, red, white, and yellow races."⁵³ Although the case called only for a broad definition of race itself, and not for any close distinctions among the races, still the court's easy reversion to the taxonomy of the 1790s indicates the extent to which Caucasian whiteness had become an unproblematic concept both in street-level vernacular and in the courts after a period of fractious and heated contest.

It is worth noting here that it was in response to a civil rights claim, of all things, that the court reflexively resorted to Blumenbach's scheme in *Delavigne*. Civil rights logic has been crucial to the twentieth-century chapter of this racial saga. Like the reverberating big bang of American expansionism and the subtle alchemy of American naturalization law, as we shall see, civil rights agitation around questions of Jim Crow in the

1930s and after has quietly but decisively ratified the racial logic of white-over-color, helping so many immigrant Hebrews, Letts, Celts, and Mediterraneans to become the Caucasians of our modern-day visual and conceptual lexicon.

- p. 72; President's Commission on Civil Rights, *To Secure These Rights* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947).
60. *Congressional Record*, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 98, part IV, pp. 4431-4432, 4441, 4409-4413, 4435, 4438.
61. David Reimers, *Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 63-90, 82.
62. Shohat and Stam, *Unthinking Eurocentrism*; Robert Rydell, *All the World's a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 65; Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, eds., *Cultures of U.S. Imperialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).
63. Robert Lang, ed., *The Birth of a Nation* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994).
64. Kenneth Jackson, *The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915-1930* (New York: Oxford, 1967); Nancy MacLean, *Behind the Mask of Chivalry* (New York: Oxford, 1993); Kathleen Blee, *Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 18; Michael Rogin, "His Sword Became a Flashing Vision: D. W. Griffith's *Birth of a Nation*," in Lang, *Birth of a Nation*, pp. 250-293; Michaels, *Our America*, p. 67.
65. Robert L. Carringer, ed., *The Jazz Singer* [1925, 1927] (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), pp. 94, 147. The reference to "Anglo-Saxon severity" is from the original short story upon which the movie is based, Sampson Raphaelson's "Day of Atonement."
66. *The Jazz Singer*, pp. 61, 63. On *The Jazz Singer* and whiteness, compare Michael Rogin, *Blackface, White Noise: Jewish Immigrants in the Hollywood Melting Pot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 45-70 and passim.
67. *The Jazz Singer*, pp. 80, 120.
68. *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 85, 117, 127, 50, 115.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 133, 41.
71. Jeffrey Melnick, *A Right to Sing the Blues* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming); Rogin, *Black Face, White Noise*; David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race in the Making of the American Working Class* (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 116-127; Eric Lott, *Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class* (New York: Oxford, 1993); Susan Gubar, *Racechanges: White Skin, Black Face in American Culture* (New York: Oxford, 1997), pp. 53-94; Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 165-182; Jean Baker, *Affairs of Party:*

- The Political Culture of Northern Democrats in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 225-243.
72. Schuyler, *Black No More*, pp. 30, 26, 28.
73. *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 48, 31-32, 179.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 60, 44, 86, 122, 134.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
78. Schuyler reiterated aspects of this critique in a piece for *Common Ground* in the fall of 1940. "No superstition is so prevalent in the U.S. as that pertaining to race," he began. "Who Is 'Negro'? Who Is 'White'?" *Common Ground*, Autumn 1940, p. 53.
79. Hobson, *Gentleman's Agreement*, pp. 64, 33, 34.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102, 196.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 184, 154, 35.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131, 122.
83. *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 67.
84. *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 96, 170-171, 179-180.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 138, 99.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
87. Jo Sinclair [Ruth Seid], *The Changelings* [1955] (Old Westbury: Feminist Press, 1985), p. 1.
88. *Blackboard Jungle*, MGM Studios, 1955.
89. Arthur Laurents, *West Side Story* [1957] (New York: Dell Publishing, 1965), pp. 137, 164-165, 178-179, 217, 167-168.
90. Herbert Simmons, *Corner Boy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 22, 259.
91. Benedict, *Race: Science and Politics*, p. 125.
92. Oscar Handlin, *Race and Nationality in American Life* (New York: Anchor, 1957), pp. 141, 145, 150, 175.
4. 1877: *The Instability of Race*
1. Henry James, *The American* [1877] (New York: Signet, 1980), p. 121.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.
3. Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988); W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880* [1935] (New York: Atheneum, 1992); Allen Trelease, *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971); Brian Dippee, *The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy* (Lawrence: Kan-

- sas, 1982); Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (New York: Bantam, 1970); James Welch, *Killing Custer: The Battle of the Little Bighorn and the Fate of the Plains Indians* (New York: Penguin, 1994); Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Gary Nash and Richard Weiss, eds., *The Great Fear: Race in the Mind of America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); Ronald Takaki, *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979); Sucheng Chan, *The Asian Americans: An Interpretive History* (Boston: Twayne, 1988); Carey McWilliams, "How Deep the Roots," *Common Ground*, Autumn 1947, pp. 3-5; David Roediger, "The So-Called Mob: Race, Class, Skill, and Community in the St. Louis General Strike," in *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness* (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 85-116; Tomas Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); John Fiske, "The Races of the Danube," *Atlantic Monthly*, April 1877, p. 401.
4. Howard Winant, *Racial Conditions: Politics, Theory, Comparisons* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 21.
 5. Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (London: Verso, 1990), p. 14.
 6. Charles Dudley Warner, *In the Levant* [1877] (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1901), p. 439.
 7. Charles Dudley Warner, *Mummies and Moslems* (Hartford: American, 1876), pp. 31, 32, 40, 41.
 8. *Ibid.*, pp. 40, 41, 59, 106, 121-122, 234; *Levant*, pp. 16, 40, 107, 544.
 9. *Levant*, pp. 63-64.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 502; *Mummies*, p. 110.
 11. *Mummies*, pp. 296, 234, 171.
 12. *Ibid.*, p. 213; *Levant*, p. 377.
 13. *Levant*, pp. 165, 177-178; *Mummies*, pp. 276-277.
 14. *Mummies*, p. 53.
 15. *Levant*, pp. 62-63.
 16. *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 64, 127-128.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 500; *Mummies*, p. 292.
 18. *Levant*, p. 460.
 19. *Mummies*, p. 390.
 20. *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, Sept. 1877, p. 637, emphasis added. (Hereafter HNMM.)
 21. *Visitor's Guide to the Hall of Mammals in the American Museum of Natural*

- History* (New York: William C. Martin, 1883), p. 2. The Hall of Mammals opened in 1877; this is the earliest guide extant.
22. HNMM, April 1877, p. 776.
 23. A. Von Steinwehr and D. G. Brinton, *An Intermediate Geography with Lessons in Map Drawing* (Cincinnati: Van Antwerp, Bragg, and Co., n.d. [c.1877]), p. 13.
 24. *New York Herald*, March 27, 1877, p. 3.
 25. HNMM, April 1877, p. 769.
 26. HNMM, Feb. 1877, p. 387; April 1877, p. 676; May 1877, p. 873.
 27. *New York Herald*, March 26, 1877, pp. 3-4.
 28. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
 29. *New York Herald*, Nov. 14, 1877, pp. 5-6; Nov. 24, 1877, p. 3.
 30. *Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1877, pp. 5-6.
 31. *Ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1877, p. 3.
 32. *New York Times*, March 6, 1877, p. 1.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 1. See, for example, Foner, *Reconstruction*; Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*; Nina Silber, *The Romance of Reunion: Northerners and the South, 1865-1900* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Joel Williamson, *A Rage for Order: Black-White Relations in the American South since Emancipation* (New York: Oxford, 1986).
 34. *Congressional Record*, 44th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. V, part 2, pp. 1404, 1405. On Louisiana in this period see also Foner, *Reconstruction*, pp. 262-264, 385-389, 550-555, 575-582; Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, pp. 451-484; A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., *Shades of Freedom: Racial Politics and the Presumptions of the American Legal Process* (New York: Oxford, 1996), pp. 88-93.
 35. Specific Louisiana "whites" who were presumably affected included Mayor Pastremski of Baton Rouge, Democratic supervisor O'Sullivan of La-Fourche parish, and Max Aronson, a "white" who was allegedly "killed by a band of unknown negroes." *Congressional Record*, 44th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. V, part 2, pp. 1409, 1416, 1425, 1429. On the power of Louisiana's binary racial scheme in this period from the standpoint of Louisiana Creoles, see Virginia Dominguez, *White by Definition: Social Classification in Creole Louisiana* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986), pp. 133-148.
 36. *Congressional Record*, 44th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. V, part 2, pp. 1409-1416.
 37. *Ibid.*, pp. 1432, 1429, 1407-1408.
 38. *Ibid.*, pp. 1444, 1445, 1463.
 39. *Ibid.*, pp. 1445, 1446, 1447, 1471.
 40. Trelease, *White Terror*, pp. xl, 93-94.
 41. *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 136.

42. HNMM, Oct. 1877, p. 776; *The Rough and Ready Songster: Embellished with Twenty-five Splendid Engravings Illustrative of the American Victories in Mexico* (New York: Nafis and Cornish, c.1848), Beinecke Library.
43. HNMM, Nov. 1877, p. 813.
44. Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), and *The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800-1890* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1985). See also Chapter 6 below.
45. *Congressional Record*, 44th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. V, part 2, pp. 1347-1348, 1355, 1356.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 1055, 1057.
47. *Congressional Record*, 45th Congress, 1st Session, vol. VI, pp. 391-392, 393.
48. Stuart Creighton Miller, *The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American Image of the Chinese, 1785-1882* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Chan, *Asian Americans*; Takaki, *Iron Cages*, pp. 215-249; Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines*, pp. 153-204; Patricia Nelson Limerick, *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West* (New York: Norton, 1987), pp. 259-269; Saxton, *Indispensable Enemy*; Tsai, *Chinese Experience*.
49. *Congressional Record*, 44th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. V, part 3, pp. 2004-2005.
50. Quoted in *Memorial: The Other Side of the Chinese Question; Testimony of California's Leading Citizens* (Woodward and Co., 1886), pp. 8-9.
51. Esther E. Baldwin, *Must the Chinese Go? An Examination of the Chinese Question* (New York: H. B. Elkins, 1890), pp. 60-61.
52. John Swinton, *The New Issue: The Chinese-American Question* (New York: American News Co., 1870), p. 6.
53. *New York Times*, Aug. 6, 1870, p. 5.
54. Stephen Powers, "California Saved," *Atlantic Monthly*, Nov. 1871, p. 601.
55. Wilhelmina Harper and Aimee M. Peters, eds., *The Best of Bret Harte* (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), p. 180.
56. *New York Times*, April 3, 1877, p. 4; Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines*, p. 170; Saxton, *Indispensable Enemy*, pp. 18, 196.
57. Roediger, *Abolition of Whiteness*, p. 88.
58. HNMM, Oct. 1877, p. 657.
59. *Ibid.*, July 1877, p. 185; Feb. 1877, p. 362; Oct. 1877, pp. 729, 730.
60. *Harper's Weekly*, Jan. 1877, p. 318; March 1877, p. 513; HNMM, June 1877, pp. 38, 50.
61. HNMM, June 1877, p. 153.
62. *Ibid.*, March 1877, pp. 487-488. On "French physiognomy," see also Dominguez, *White by Definition*, p. 133.

63. HNMM, Oct. 1877, pp. 784-785; Feb. 1877, pp. 467-468, 474; Jan. 1877, p. 312; July 1877, p. 321.
64. *Nation*, May 1877, p. 260; John Fiske, "Races of the Danube," *Atlantic Monthly*, April 1877, pp. 403, 404.
65. McWilliams, "How Deep the Roots"; John Higham, *Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America* [1975] (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), pp. 123-128, 117-152.
66. *New York Tribune*, June 20, 1877, p. 4.
67. *New York Commercial Advertiser*, June 19, 1877, p. 2.
68. *Nation*, June 28, 1877, p. 378.
69. *New York Daily Graphic*, June 21, 1877, p. 2.
70. *New York Evening Post*, June 20, 1877, p. 2.
71. *New York Tribune*, June 20, 1877, p. 4. (The headline "No Jews Need Apply" did capture a certain irony, as A. T. Stewart, whose estate now housed the Grand Union Hotel, was an Irish immigrant himself.)
72. *New York Tribune*, June 21, 1877, p. 8; June 27, 1877, p. 4.
73. *Harper's Weekly*, July 7, 1877, pp. 518-519.
74. *New York Tribune*, June 26, 1877, p. 4.
75. F. P. Dewees, *The Molly Maguires: The Origin, Growth, and Character of the Organization* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1877), pp. 9-13. The historian Walter Coleman endorsed this racial interpretation as late as 1936: in the coalmining regions of Pennsylvania "the growing numerical supremacy of the Irish . . . aroused the fears of the other groups and intensified the racial problems." *The Molly Maguire Riots: Industrial Conflict in the Pennsylvania Coal Region* (Richmond: Garrett and Massie, 1936), p. 20.
76. Slotkin, *Fatal Environment*, pp. 480, 482, 497.
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 495, 492.
78. *Harper's Weekly*, Aug. 18, 1877, p. 368.
79. Quoted in Slotkin, *Fatal Environment*, p. 485.
80. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 483.
81. James, *American*, p. 32.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 6, 83, 120, 105, 212.

5. Looking Jewish, Seeing Jews

1. Johann Fredrich Blumenbach, *On the Natural Varieties of Mankind* [1775, 1795] (New York: Bergman, 1969), p. 234.
2. In Morris U. Schappas, ed., *A Documentary History of Jews in the United States, 1654-1875* (New York: Schocken, 1950, 1971), pp. 1-2.
3. Henry James, "Glasses," *Atlantic Monthly*, Feb. 1896, p. 145; William Boelhower, *Through a Glass Darkly: Ethnic Semiosis in American Literature*

6. *The Crucible of Empire*

1. Edgar Allan Poe, *The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket* [1838] (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 84-85, 93, 189, 212; Dana Nelson, *The Word in Black and White: Reading "Race" in American Literature, 1638-1867* (New York: Oxford, 1993), pp. 100-101.
2. Howard Winant, *Racial Conditions: Politics, Theory, Comparisons* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 21.
3. John Finerty, *Warpath and Bivouac or the Conquest of the Sioux* [1890] (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), p. xix.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. xix-xx.
5. Quoted in Kathleen Neils Conzen, "German-Americans and the Invention of Ethnicity," in Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, eds., *America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three Hundred Year History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), vol. I, p. 136. On nonwhite responses to American empire, see Willard Gatewood, *Black Americans and the White Man's Burden, 1898-1903* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975); Amy Kaplan, "Black and Blue on San Juan Hill," in Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, eds., *The Cultures of US Imperialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 219-236.
6. Albert Beveridge, "March of the Flag," in Daniel J. Boorstin, ed., *An American Primer* (New York: Mentor, 1966), p. 647; Richard Welch, Jr., *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 101.
7. Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 191-192, 182-200.
8. Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 9-24, 77, 166-186, 174. See also Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 62-101; Ernest Lee Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 137-186; Patricia Nelson Limerick, *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West* (New York: Norton, 1987), pp. 259-292; Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building* (New York: Schocken, 1980), esp. part IV; Thomas Dyer, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), pp. 45-68; Thomas Gossett, *Race: The History of an Idea in America* (New York: Schocken, 1963), pp. 310-338.
9. Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, pp. 174, 219; Frederick Merk, *Mani-*

- fest Destiny and Mission in American History* (New York: Vintage, 1966), p. 46.
10. Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* [1944] (Boston: Beacon, 1955), p. 154; LaFeber, *New Empire*, pp. 72-80; Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*, pp. 166-167, 137-175 *passim*.
11. *Irish World*, May 21, 1898, p. 1.
12. *Abend Blatt*, Feb. 6, 1900, p. 4.
13. *Abend Blatt*, May 7, 1898, p. 2; July 21, 1898, p. 2.
14. *Catholic Citizen*, Oct. 1, 1898, p. 4; Feb. 18, 1899, p. 4; *Irish American*, Feb. 4, 1899, p. 4.
15. *Pilot*, March 25, 1899, p. 1.
16. *Pilot*, Oct. 1, 1898, p. 4; *Irish World*, June 11, 1898, p. 2.
17. *Pilot*, Feb. 4, 1899, p. 1.
18. *Irish World*, May 7, 1898, p. 1.
19. *Irish World*, March 5, 1898, p. 4; *Irish American*, April 8, 1899, p. 4.
20. *Irish World*, June 11, 1898, p. 2; *Transcript* quoted in *Pilot*, April 22, 1899, p. 4.
21. *Irish American*, March 4, 1899, p. 4.
22. *Yiddishes Tageblatt*, May 10, 1898, p. 1; Jan. 18, 1899, p. 7; Jan. 20, 1899, p. 7; Jan. 24, 1899, p. 7.
23. *Kuryer Polski*, April 22, 1899, p. 4; May 2, 1899, p. 4.
24. Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, pp. 244, 276.
25. Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialist as Racist," in Thomas Paterson, ed., *American Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism* (New York: Crowell, 1973), pp. 110-117; Richard Welch, Jr., "Twelve Anti-Imperialists and Imperialists Compared: Racism and Economic Expansion," in *Ibid.*, pp. 118-125; Robert Beisner, *Twelve against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Daniel Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Boston: Schenckman, 1972); Stuart Creighton Miller, "Benvolent Assimilation": *The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
26. *Abend Blatt*, Nov. 15, 1898, p. 4.
27. *Dziennik Chicagoski*, Jan. 23, 1899, p. 2.
28. *Catholic Citizen*, Nov. 12, 1898, p. 4.
29. *Catholic Citizen*, Sept. 10, 1898, p. 4. This sentiment was shared by Stephen Wise's *American Israelite*; see Jeanne Abrams, "Remembering the Maine: The Jewish Attitude toward the Spanish-American War as Reflected in *The American Israelite*," *American Jewish History*, LXXXVI:4 (June 1987), p. 454. See also David Noel Doyle, *Irish Americans, Native Rights, and National Empires* (New York: Arno, 1976).
30. *Catholic Citizen*, Aug. 27, 1898, p. 4.
31. *Catholic Citizen*, Dec. 10, 1898, p. 4.

32. James Jeffrey Roche, "The White Wolf's Cry," in *The V-A-S-E and Other Bric-a-Brac* (Boston: Richard Badger, 1900), pp. 59-60.
33. *Pilot*, July 1, 1899, p. 4.
34. *Pilot*, Feb. 25, 1899, p. 4.
35. *Pilot*, Dec. 24, 1898, p. 4.
36. *Irish American*, April 22, 1899, p. 4. See also Zgoda, May 5, 1898, p. 4; Aug. 25, 1898, p. 4.
37. *Yiddishes Tageblatt*, Jan. 16, 1899, p. 4.
38. U.S. Dept. of Labor, *Federal Textbook on Citizenship Training; Vol III: Our Nation* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1924, 1935), p. 1.
39. Quoted in Susanne Klingenstein, *Jews in the American Academy, 1900-1940: The Dynamics of Intellectual Assimilation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 40.
40. Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* [1905] (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp. 411-412.
41. Theodore Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West* [1889-1896] (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), vol. I, pp. 1-14.
42. Elsewhere he negotiated precisely the racial problems raised by urbanization and immigration, touching upon the "dull brains of the great masses of these unfortunates from southern and eastern Europe," or delineating the "Mediterranean," "Slavic," "Jewish," "Alpine," and "Teutonic" races among the growing population. Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" [1893], in *The Frontier in American History* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986), pp. 1-4, 11; Turner, "Pioneer Ideals" [1910], *Frontier*, p. 278; "Social Forces in American History" [1910], *Frontier*, p. 316.
43. Francis Parkman, *The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada* [1851] (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), Vol. I, pp. 41-44. For powerfully racialized interpretations of U.S. history, see also John Fiske, *American Political Ideas* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1885); *The Beginnings of New England: The Puritan Theocracy and its Relations to Civil and Religious Liberty* (London: Macmillan, 1889); *The Discovery of America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1892); and *A History of the United States for Schools* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1907).
44. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, *A Larger History of the United States of America* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1886), p. 1.
45. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, *Young Folks' History of the United States* (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1876), p. 37.
46. Parkman, *Pontiac*, vol. I, p. 1.
47. Turner, "Significance of the Frontier," *Frontier*, p. 1.
48. Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, vol. I, p. 1.

49. Abraham Cahan, *Historie fun die fereynigte shtaaten* (New York: Forverts, 1912), vol. I, p. 3.
50. Parkman, *Pontiac*, vol. II, p. 313.
51. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, *A Book of American Explorers* (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1877), p. v.
52. Higginson, *Young Folks' History*, pp. 1, 13, 14-15, 23-24.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 328-329; Higginson, *Larger History*, p. 192 (emphasis added), 406-430, 408, 415-416.
54. Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, vol. III, pp. 43-45.
55. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. xxxi-xxxvii.
56. Finerty, *Warpath and Bivouac*, pp. 16-17.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 165, 180. Elsewhere Finerty differentiates between the "mercurial temperament" and "Celtic dash" of the Irish soldier and the congenital "docile, cool" demeanor of the German; he likewise refers to "our cosmopolitan army," including "all the races of Europe" (pp. 306-307).
58. Finerty, *Warpath and Bivouac*, pp. 68, 69 (emphasis added), 238, 109.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. xix-xx.
61. Higginson, *Larger History*, pp. 415-416.
62. Turner, "The Problem of the West" [1896], *Frontier*, p. 219.
63. Turner, "Pioneer Ideals" [1910], *Frontier*, p. 280; "Social Forces in American History" [1910], *Frontier*, p. 316.
64. *Eugenical News*, IX:2 (Feb. 1924), p. 21.
65. *Catholic Citizen*, July 30, 1898, p. 4.

7. Naturalization and the Courts

1. *In re Dow* 213 F. 355, 364 (E.D.S.C. 1914).
2. *Ibid.* at 365.
3. *Terrace v. Thompson* 274 F. 841, 849 (1921).
4. Cheryl Harris, "Whiteness as Property," *Harvard Law Review* 106 (1993), pp. 1709-1791; A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., *Shades of Freedom: Racial Politics and the Presumptions of the American Legal Process* (New York: Oxford, 1996), pp. 108, 115; Pricilla Wald, "Terms of Assimilation: Legislating Subjectivity in the Emerging Nation," in Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 59-84; Derrick Bell, "Property Rights in Whiteness—Their Legal Legacy, Their Economic Costs," in Richard Delgado, ed., *Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), pp. 75-83; Ian Haney Lopez, *White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 197-202; Wilcomb Washburn, *Red Man's Land*

- White Man's Law: The Past and Present Status of the American Indian* [1971] (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994); Benjamin Ringer, "We the People" and Others: Duality and America's Treatment of Its Racial Minorities (New York: Tavistock, 1983); Mary Frances Berry, *Black Resistance / White Law: A History of Constitutional Racism* [1971] (New York: Penguin, 1994); Charles Lofgren, *The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation* (New York: Oxford, 1987); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., *In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process: The Colonial Period* (New York: Oxford, 1978).
5. Michael O'Malley, "Specie and Species: Race and the Money Question in Nineteenth-Century America," *American Historical Review* 99:2 (April 1994), pp. 369-395; Nell Irvin Painter, "Thinking about the Languages of Money and Race: A Response to Michael O'Malley, 'Specie and Species,'" *Ibid.*, pp. 396-408.
 6. *In re Thind* 268 F. 683, 684 (D.Or. 1920).
 7. *Dow* at 355, 364.
 8. *In re Feroz Din* 27 F. 2nd 568 (N.D.Cal. 1928).
 9. On law and the legal epistemology of race see also Lopez, *White by Law*; Virginia Dominguez, *White by Definition: Social Classification in Creole Louisiana* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986), pp. 23-55.
 10. *In re Ah Yup* 1 F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D.Cal. 1878).
 11. *Ibid.* at 223, 224.
 12. *Ibid.* at 224; *Los Angeles Times*, July 24, 1910, p. 3.
 13. *Ah Yup* at 224.
 14. *In re Camille* 6 F. 256.
 15. *In re Kanaka Nian* 6 Utah 259, 260 (Ut. 1889).
 16. *In re Po* 28 N.Y. Supp. 383, 384 (City Ct. 1894).
 17. *In re Rodriguez* 81 F. 337, 354-355 (W.D.Tex. 1897).
 18. *Ibid.* at 337-338, 340.
 19. *Ibid.* at 345, 347.
 20. *Ibid.* at 350.
 21. On the vagaries of Mexican "racial" identity in the United States, see Ian Haney Lopez, "The Social Construction of Race," in Delgado, *Critical Race Theory*, pp. 191-203; Tomas Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 45-104; Neil Foley, *White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Suzanne Obler, *Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives: Identity and the Politics of (Re)Presentation in the United States* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Martha Menchaca, *Mexican Outsiders: A Community History of Marginalization and Discrimination in California* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995); Douglas Monroy, *Thrown among Strangers:*

- The Making of Mexican Culture in Frontier California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Camille Guerin-Gonzales, *Mexican Workers and American Dreams: Immigration, Repatriation, and California Farm Labor, 1900-1939* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), pp. 51-75. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 1947 that Mexican children could not be segregated in California schools because they were "of the Caucasian race" and therefore did not come under the existing segregation law. *Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations*, May 1947; pp. 325-326.
22. *In re Halladjian* 174 F. 834, 844-845 (C.C.D.Mass. 1909).
 23. *Ibid.* at 845, 834.
 24. Contrast the Dillingham Commission, which—though classifying Armenians as an "Aryan" race—noted striking similarities between the Armenian and the "Malay." *Reports of the Immigration Commission: Dictionary of Races and Peoples* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 16. In 1919 M. Vartan Malcom would argue that modern historiography, philology, and anthropology all proved "beyond a question of doubt that the Armenians are Aryan and belong to the same racial stock as all European peoples." *The Armenians in America* (Boston: Pilgrim, 1919), pp. 7-8.
 25. *Halladjian* at 835, 837.
 26. *Ibid.* at 837, 840, 838.
 27. *Ibid.* at 842.
 28. *Ibid.* at 843.
 29. *In re Mudarri* 176 F. 465, 466 (C.C.D.Mass. 1910); *Halladjian* at 837-838.
 30. *Mudarri* at 466-467.
 31. *Ozawa v. United States* 260 U.S. 178, 180-185 (1922); Lopez, *White by Law*, pp. 80-86; James Lesser, "Always 'Outsiders': Asians, Naturalization, and the Supreme Court," *Amerasia* 12 (1985-86), p. 83.
 32. *Ozawa* at 187, 188.
 33. *Ibid.* at 195.
 34. *Ibid.* at 197, 198, 178.
 35. *Thind* at 683, 684.
 36. *United States v. Thind* 261 U.S. 204, 209, 211.
 37. *Ex parte Shahid* 205 F. 812, 813, 815 (emphasis added), 816 (E.D.S.C. 1913).
 38. *Dow* at 355, 365.
 39. *In re Ellis* 179 F. 1002, 1004 (D.Or. 1910).
 40. *Dow* at 355; 211 F. 486.
 41. *Dow v. United States* 226 F. 145, 147, 148 (4th Cir. 1915).
 42. *United States v. Cartozian* 6 F. 2nd 919, 920, 921, 922 (D.Or. 1925).
 43. *United States v. Ali* 7 F. 2nd 728, 732 (E.D.Mich. 1925).
 44. *In re Yamashita* 30 Wash 234, 238-239 (1902).
 45. *Halladjian* at 839. See also John H. Wigmore, "American Naturalization and the Japanese," *American Law Review* 28 (1894), pp. 818-827, 822.

46. *United States v. Balsara* 180 F. 694, 695 (2nd Cir. 1910).
47. *Ibid.* at 695-696.
48. *In re Young* 198 F. 715, 716 (W.D.Wash. 1912).
49. *In re Sadar Bhagwab Singh* 246 F. 496, 499, 500, 497-498 (E.D.Pa. 1917).
50. *United States v. Ali* 7 F. 2nd 728, 731 (E.D.Mich. 1925). See also *In re Mohan Singh* 257 F. 209 (S.D.Cal. 1919), which held that "the Hindus of India, as members of the Aryan branch of the Caucasian race, are 'white persons.'"
51. *Morrison v. California* 291 U.S. 82, 85 (1934).
52. Lopez, *White by Law*, appendix A, pp. 207-208.
53. *Delavigne v. Delavigne* 402 F. Supp. 363 at 367 note 4 (1975).

8. The Dawning Civil Rights Era

1. Quoted in Harvard Sitkoff, *A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue—the Depression Decade* (New York: Oxford, 1978), p. 62.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 50; Douglass Massey and Nancy Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 51-54.
3. James Ford, *Hunger and Terror in Harlem* (New York: Harlem Section CP, 1935), p. 13; New York University Tamiment Library, microfilm reel 1768, item 2336. (Hereafter, TL reel no.:item no.)
4. John LaFarge, S.J., *The Race Question and the Negro: A Study of the Catholic Doctrine of Interracial Justice* (New York: Longmans, 1944), p. 74; Louis Adamic, *From Many Lands* (New York: Harper, 1939), p. 301.
5. Sitkoff, *New Deal*, pp. 158-159.
6. Mark Naison, *Communists in Harlem during the Depression* (New York: Grove, 1983), pp. 5-10.
7. James W. Ford, *The Negro Industrial Proletariat of America* (Moscow: Red International of Labor Unions, n.d. [1928]), TL 1768:2338.
8. Naison, *Communists in Harlem*, pp. 17-19, 45-47; Robin D. G. Kelley, *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class* (New York: Free Press, 1994) p. 109; Sitkoff, *New Deal*, pp. 142-143, 139-168; James Smethurst, *The New Red Negro* (New York: Oxford, forthcoming), chapter 1.
9. James S. Allen, *Negro Liberation* (New York: International Publishers, 1932, 1938), pp. 4-5, TL 1744:87; Harry Haywood, *Black Bolshevik: Autobiography of an Afro-American Communist* (Chicago: Liberator Press, 1978), pp. 346-347.
10. Allen, *Negro Liberation*, pp. 13, 21, 29-30. As Earl Browder announced years later, blacks ultimately favored "their complete integration into the American nation as a whole." *Communists in the Struggle for Negro Rights* (New York: New Century, 1945), pp. 19-20. The Black Belt Thesis, it should

- be noted, had somewhat double-edged implications: if it trumpeted the importance of Negro liberation for the workers' struggle, it also limited legitimate black nationalism to a particular region of the South.
11. Earl Browder et al., *The Communist Position on the Negro Question* (n.l.: n.p., n.d.), p. 39, TL 1752:798; *Daily Worker*, Feb. 24, 1931, p. 4.
12. Allen, *Negro Liberation*, pp. 26, 27.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
14. Browder, *Communist Position*, pp. 45, 56-64; Communist Party, *Foster and Ford for Food and Freedom* (n.l.: n.p., n.d. [1932]), p. 12, TL 1768:2335; Earl Browder, *The Communist Party and the Emancipation of the Negro People* (New York: Harlem Section CPUSA, 1934), p. 2, TL 1752:795.
15. James S. Allen, *Smash the Scottsboro Lynch Verdict!* (New York: Workers' Library, 1933), pp. 11-12; Haywood, *Black Bolshevik*, pp. 358-363; James Goodman, *Stories of Scottsboro* (New York: Vintage, 1994), pp. 27-29, 47-52, and passim; Dan T. Carter, *Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), pp. 137-173.
16. Goodman, *Stories of Scottsboro*, p. 48. Although never as electrifying a cause for white Communists, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 became yet another occasion for "practical work" in interracial alliance and protest. James Ford noted with satisfaction that such antifascist demonstrations of "Negro and white people" and other interracial meetings had even included some Italian immigrants. James Ford, *Communists and the Struggle for Negro Liberty* (New York: Harlem Section, n.d.), p. 44, TL 1768:2332.
17. Haywood, *Black Bolshevik*, pp. 351, 352, 342-363.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 353; Interview with Maud White Katz, Oral History of the American Left, series I, no. 130, TL.
19. Allen, *Negro Liberation*, pp. 33, 42-43, 44; Browder, *Communist Position*, pp. 5, 11; George Blake, "The Ideological Struggle against White Chauvinism" (New York: New York State Communist Party, 1950), TL 1750:579; Harold F. Gosnell, *Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), pp. 340-342.
20. CPUSA, *Race Hatred on Trial* [1931], p. 4, collected in Bernard Johnpoll, ed., *A Documentary History of the Communist Party of the United States* (Westport: Greenwood, 1994), vol. II, pp. 393-440; Haywood, *Black Bolshevik*, pp. 349-358; Naison, *Communists in Harlem*, pp. 47-49.
21. *Race Hatred on Trial*, pp. 7, 8, 9-10.
22. *Daily Worker*, Feb. 25, 1931, p. 2.
23. *New York Times*, March 2, 1931, pp. 1-2; *Race Hatred on Trial*, p. 3.
24. *Race Hatred on Trial*, pp. 13, 16-22.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 32; Naison, *Communists in Harlem*, p. 48.
26. *Race Hatred on Trial*, p. 38.
27. *New York Times*, March 3, 1931, p. 12; March 4, 1931, p. 28; March 5,