

TO END ALL WARS

*Woodrow Wilson and the Quest
for a New World Order*

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The Political Origins of Progressive and Conservative Internationalism

Theodore Roosevelt was a man often ahead of his times. Within weeks of the outbreak of the European war, the former president became the first prominent American politician publicly to advocate the creation of some kind of league of nations. The general idea was not new for Roosevelt. In 1910, he had made an international league his main focus when he formally accepted the Nobel Peace Prize (for having mediated the Russo-Japanese War), at Christiania, Norway. During the fall of 1914, a series of thoughtful articles on the subject, in the context of the war, flowed from his pen. Of Belgium, he wrote in the *Outlook* in late September, "We have not the smallest responsibility for what has befallen her." Yet Germany's trampling of that country in the drive toward Paris raised serious issues for a neutral like the United States. Americans would not find their future well-being secure in disarmament or in milk-and-water "cooling-off" treaties, he was keen to say; rather, they would need to strengthen the country's military capabilities and put force behind arbitration (if that approach were to have any real worth). "Surely the time ought to be ripe for the nations to consider a great world agreement among all the civilized military powers to *back righteousness by force*," he concluded. "Such an agreement would establish an efficient world league for the peace of righteousness."¹

In November, in a piece for the *New York Times*, Roosevelt came as close as he ever would to condemning the concept of the balance of power (and to anticipating President Wilson). The alliance system, he declared, was "shifty and uncertain" and "based on self-interest." The kind of world league he dreamed of would show its true temper through "conduct and not merely selfish interest." The United States must brace itself "to take some chance for the sake of internationalism, that is of international morality."²

Roosevelt's mood and frame of mind underwent a dramatic change in late autumn. He soon became the country's most obstreperous pro-Allied extremist and the administration's most wrathful (some observers said "crazed") critic. His personal correspondence seethed with vituperation of the President and Secretary of State. Bryan was "a professional yodeler, a human trombone," and a "prize idiot," and Wilson was "a prime jackass" who had mastered the "hypocritical ability to deceive plain people." How could it be that destiny had placed these "preposterous little fools" in such positions of power at the very moment "when that great black tornado trembles on the edge of Europe?" he asked an intimate.³ The administration's failure to protest Belgium's fate—sheer partisanship, the Colombian treaty, and Wilson's handling of Mexico played large roles, too—ostensibly provoked Roosevelt's increasingly shrill public denunciations from November 1914 onward. His criticism of American neutrality had a consistent logic to it, and by his lights he had the country's interests at heart; but the manner and proportions of his antagonism, the public at large and even his friends knew, were inappropriate in the circumstances and unbecoming of someone of Roosevelt's stature.⁴ A man who had once revered him summed it up best: "The truth is," President Taft told a friend, "he believes in war and wishes to be a Napoleon and to die on the battlefield. He has the spirit of the old berserkers."⁵ Had Roosevelt, in 1914–15, put his immense prestige behind a movement for a league, the final chapter of his life and a part of American history would have been substantially different. Instead he let the opportunity pass. After 1914, he ceased any longer to exert a salutary influence in American politics.

One of the chief responsibilities of the President of the United States, Wilson believed, was to give purpose and direction to public opinion, particularly during times of stress and change.⁶ Throughout the first eighteen months of the war, however, most of Wilson's public utterances on foreign policy were aimed at justifying and maintaining neutrality, as public reaction to both the British blockade and German submarine warfare seemed to demand. His private deliberations and confidential diplomatic overtures notwithstanding, Wilson had done less than Roosevelt—which was not much—to cultivate public opinion on the question of an international league.

The great issue, though, had already begun to stir in American politics. Beginning in early 1915, several small but influential groups of new internationalists began to seek Wilson out, rather than the other way around. Theretofore, the American peace societies had demonstrated little more than intellectual bankruptcy in the war crisis. They had not begun to fathom the causes of the conflict, to define any goals for peace, to agitate for mediation, or to make contact with potential European allies, such as the Union of Democratic Control.⁷ A new American internationalist movement, however, soon came into being. It would transform American politics and diplomacy. Accommodating far more diverse perspectives than the long-established peace organizations, this movement was loosely composed of two divergent aggregations of activists—"progressive internationalists" and "conservative internationalists." Wilson's relationship with both of them was of fundamental importance.⁸

Feminists, liberals, pacifists, socialists, and social reformers of varying kinds, in the main, filled the ranks of the progressive internationalists. Their leaders included many of the era's authentic heroes and heroines, both the celebrated and the unsung: Jane Addams, the "Beloved Lady" of Hull House; Emily Greene Balch, Wellesley's controversial sociology professor whose future (like Addams') held the Nobel Peace Prize; Crystal Eastman, the industrial reformer and radical suffragist; her brother, Max Eastman, of the *Masses*; David Starr Jordan, president of Stanford University; Oswald Garrison Villard, crusader in the fledgling civil rights movement and editor of the *New York Evening Post* and, later, of the *Nation*; Paul Kellogg, the nonpartisan conscience of the *Survey*; Lillian Wald, founder of New York's Henry Street Settlement; and Louis Paul Lochner, secretary of the Chicago Peace Society.

The quest for peace provided a new frontier and logical common ground for many liberal reformers, pacifists, and socialists. For them, domestic politics and foreign policy had suddenly become symbiotic: Peace was essential to change—to the survival of the labor movement and of their campaigns on behalf of women's rights, the abolition of child labor, and social justice legislation in general. If the war in Europe were permitted to rage on much longer, then the United States could not help but get sucked into it; and not only their great causes, but also the very moral fiber of the nation would be destroyed. Thus the *raison d'être* of the progressive internationalists was to bring about a negotiated settlement of the war.

Jane Addams played a pivotal role in this wing of the internationalist movement; indeed, she personified its purposes and values perhaps better than anyone else. Dismayed by the failure of the established peace societies to show any muscle, Addams, with the help of Paul Kellogg and Lillian Wald, organized the Woman's Peace party in January 1915. The Wom-

an's Peace party distinguished itself as the first organization of its kind—unlike the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace or the World Peace Foundation—to engage in direct political action (and on a variety of fronts) in order to achieve its goals.⁹

Three thousand delegates attended the WPP's inaugural convention on January 10, 1915, in Washington, D.C. Guided by the principle of "the sacredness of human life," the platform committee produced the earliest, and what must be acknowledged as the most comprehensive, manifesto on internationalism advanced by any American organization throughout the entire war. Their "program for constructive peace" somewhat resembled the platform of the UDC. It called for an immediate armistice, international agreements to limit armaments and to nationalize their manufacture, removal of the economic causes of the war (that is, a reduction of trade barriers), democratic control of foreign policy, self-determination, machinery for arbitration, freedom of the seas, and, finally, a "Concert of Nations" to supersede the balance-of-power system and rival armies and navies. Significantly (and without extended debate), the party also assumed a strictly neutral position toward the belligerents and planned to agitate for "continuous mediation" by neutral nations as the best means of bringing about a cessation of hostilities. The party made sure that President Wilson received copies of all their recommendations.¹⁰

The ideas of the Woman's Peace party cut a wide swath among progressives and radicals. Within a year the WPP had an active membership of 40,000, while several kindred organizations sprang up and adopted its platform. Addams displayed a determination to press hard for the New Diplomacy in Europe as well. She became the dominating figure at the International Congress of Women, which met at The Hague during the last week of April 1915. After The Hague Congress endorsed the WPP platform and continuous mediation, she received authorization to plead the case before the leaders of every major European country. So esteemed was Addams in the eyes of world opinion that she and her associates were granted audiences with Asquith, Grey, Bethmann Hollweg, von Jagow, and Pope Benedict XV.¹¹ In mid-summer, however, she returned to the United States, not only to thunderous acclaim at Carnegie Hall, but also to opprobrium, owing in part to the impasse with Germany over submarine warfare. When Roosevelt was invited to welcome home the entourage of the woman who had seconded his nomination in 1912, he fairly spat, "They have not shown the smallest particle of courage; and all their work has been done to advance the cause of international cowardice; and anyone who greets them or applauds them is actively engaged in advancing that cause."¹²

But they were welcome at the White House. On several occasions after the women's congress at The Hague, Addams and Emily Balch met

with Wilson, Colonel House, and Robert Lansing, Bryan's successor as Secretary of State. On July 19, Addams appealed to House on behalf of continuous mediation but failed to persuade him. Balch had what she believed was a more productive session with Wilson a month later when she presented him with additional material on mediation. He assured her that he would seize "any opportunity to be of use" if it presented itself. Wilson, of course, could not divulge to Balch the nature of Colonel House's recent mission to Europe; nor did he care to be pressured on the subject.¹³ Hence, his polite evasions perplexed these progressive internationalists as they continued to advise him on the matter of continuous mediation. Their campaign nonetheless generated an extended correspondence within the administration. Wilson and his advisers regarded their interlocutors as well-intentioned, but impractical and naïve. As Robert Lansing put it, "The perversity and selfishness of human nature are factors which they have left out of the problem."¹⁴

Yet, if Wilson and progressive internationalists like Addams and Balch sometimes felt frustrated with each other, their relationship was rather well-tempered by mutual comprehension and admiration. "I have unlimited faith in President Wilson," Addams told a London reporter in the summer of 1915, and Wilson fully reciprocated in his personal regard for her.¹⁵ Moreover, although he doubted the wisdom of their approach to mediation, Wilson was deeply impressed with the other proposals of the Woman's Peace party's, especially their "program for constructive peace." Addams' personal record of one of her many interviews with Wilson is particularly enlightening: "He drew out the papers I had given him, and they seem[ed] to have been much handled and read. 'You see I have studied these resolutions,' he said; 'I consider them by far the best formulation which up to the moment has been put out by anybody.'" ¹⁶ This was an important admission. The fact was that the Woman's Peace party had furnished Wilson with a pioneering American synthesis of the New Diplomacy during the critical year in which his own thinking acquired a definite shape.

The Woman's Peace party was not, of course, the only organization that made a potent contribution to early progressive internationalism. The Socialist Party of America, too, formulated a momentous program for a "democratic peace." It also motivated a sizeable constituency to think about foreign policy in new ways and, significantly, enjoyed access to the White House.

No group suffered greater despair over the events of August 1914 than American socialists. For them, the most troubling thing of all was that every leading socialist party of Europe had put its own nation before the International. One by one, those parties had voted in favor of war

credits and mass human slaughter in their respective parliaments. Most American socialists found it extremely difficult to swallow the rationalizations, for example, of both the French Socialist party and the German Social Democratic party (however sincere the French and Germans' perceptions) that the actions of their incipient foes constituted wanton aggression, when they had all failed even to try to stop the war.¹⁷

Reeling under such blows to the cause of international worker solidarity, the American party scarcely knew which way to turn. In the circumstances, Eugene Debs, like the vast majority of his followers, advocated strict neutrality. The party leader also took it upon himself to prepare Americans for "the impending social revolution" by explaining why the war had happened.¹⁸ "Despotism in Russia, monarchic Germany and republican America is substantially the same in its effect upon the working class," he wrote in the *New Review* in October 1914. From the stump he thundered against capitalism, which monstrously and climactically had proved itself irredeemable. He denounced the ruling classes for having driven the workers into the hell of the Marne and Tannenburg in order "to extend the domination of their exploitation, to increase their capacity for robbery, and to multiply their ill-gotten riches."¹⁹ Yet Debs' assessment hardly explained his European comrades' defense of nationalism or their encouragement of army enlistees.

Clearly, the Socialist party could not afford to indulge any longer its historic indifference to foreign policy issues. The stakes had grown too high. Morris Hillquit and William English Walling, among others, saw the urgent need to take, not only "a leading place in the anti-war movement," but also a position distinguished by socialist principles as opposed to the simple "bourgeois pacifism" of liberal-reformist peace societies. In December 1914, the National Executive Committee drafted a "Proposed Manifesto and Program of the Socialist Party of America on Disarmament and World Peace." After heated debate the party revised and finally adopted the document the following May: although the chief author was Hillquit, its contents—in particular, unequivocal statements on disarmament and indemnities—reflected the ascendent influence of the left wing. The "manifesto" portion contained a sweeping analysis of the political and economic causes of the war. Specific peace terms included the following:

1. No indemnities.
2. No transfer of territories except upon the consent and by the vote of their people.
3. All countries under foreign rule to be given political independence if demanded by their inhabitants.
4. An international parliament with legislative and administrative powers over international affairs and with permanent committees, in place of present secret diplomacy.

5. Universal disarmament as speedily as possible.
6. Political and industrial democracy [that is, the nationalization of basic industries and improvement of working conditions].²⁰

The manifesto was accorded ample space in the pages of the country's major socialist publications, which meant that at least two million Americans read it. If they happened to place it alongside the platform of the Woman's Peace party, however, discerning readers could see that the Socialist party's official stand on the war presented few stark contrasts with that of America's foremost "bourgeois pacifist" organization (in which, it should be mentioned, many individual Socialist party members held leadership positions).²¹ The Socialist peace formula further echoed the WPP by calling on the President to convoke a congress of neutral nations and offer mediation to the belligerents. Morris Hillquit justifiably boasted in his memoirs that the plank on "no indemnities" anticipated by more than two years the comparable slogan of the Russian Council of Workers and Soldiers.²² But this was the party's sole (not to say, by any means, unimportant) radical supplement to the progressive internationalist program. Even bearing the patent of the party's left wing, almost all of the proclamation might have been written—though, as of May 1915, not for publication—in the seclusion of the Oval Office.

None of these observations is meant either to suggest that the work of Hillquit, Walling, and company lacked originality, or to diminish its significance. The Socialist party was second only to the Woman's Peace party in its impact upon both radicals and reformers (Wilson included) during the progressive internationalist movement's crucial formative stage. Then, too, it is impossible to gauge who exerted the greater influence on whom. Whereas the Socialist party officially kept its distance from groups like the WPP, many prominent Socialists (left, right, and center) worked closely on an informal basis with their otherwise radical friends, who earnestly believed that the endeavor to reform capitalism was meaningful and worthwhile.

The Socialist program came to Wilson's personal attention through official delegations commissioned to lobby the White House. Although the party propagated its peace terms with vigor, keeping the United States out of the war received the stronger emphasis throughout 1915. The National Executive Committee regarded continuous mediation (of the sort advocated by the WPP) as the best means of accomplishing that object. Meyer London of New York, the lone Socialist member of the House of Representatives, introduced a resolution in Congress that proposed that the President take the initiative for mediation now endorsed by several organizations.²³

Wilson received Meyer London, Morris Hillquit, and James Hudson Maurer, president of the Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor, on Jan-

uary 25, 1916. According to Hillquit's account, their host looked preoccupied and tired when they arrived but became deeply interested and animated once the conversation got under way. (Maurer, who interviewed Wilson on two other occasions, described him as "a good listener.") Congressman London read his resolution aloud, and the four men then proceeded for the next hour to discuss the other provisions of the Socialist party manifesto. Hillquit was somewhat surprised when Wilson, in confidence, "informed us that he had had a similar plan under consideration" and also "hinted at the possibility of a direct offer of mediation by the government of the United States." (This was privileged information he had not chosen to divulge to representatives of the WPP.) The meeting proved to be more encouraging and productive than London, Hillquit, and Maurer might have hoped. "[H]is sympathies were entirely with us," Hillquit told the *Appeal to Reason*. As the committee rose to take its leave, however, Maurer turned and said, "Your promises sound good, Mr. President, but the trouble with you is that you are surrounded by capitalist and militarist interests who want the war to continue; and I fear you will succumb to their influence." Placing a hand on Maurer's shoulder, Wilson smiled and replied, "If the truth be known, I am more often accused of being influenced by radical and pacifist elements than by the capitalist and militarist interest."²⁴

From their point of view, it remained to be seen whether Wilson's visitors could rest assured in his perception of which elements of the polity exerted the greatest influence on him—for progressive internationalists confronted formidable rivals. Indeed, conservative internationalists made up the largest and, generally speaking, the most influential segment of the broad American league movement. Unlike their liberal and left-wing counterparts, most leading conservative internationalists had helped found peace organizations—such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes—in the prewar years. They therefore benefitted from a financially secure base of operations and from the kind of respectability and power that came with membership in the establishment. Almost all of them had been ardent imperialists and champions of Anglo-American *entente* since the 1890s.

Many conservative internationalists—like Senator Elihu Root of New York, the first president of the Carnegie Endowment (formerly Secretary of War under McKinley and Secretary of State under Roosevelt) and Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University—were so-called legalists. Seeking stability rather than change in international relations, legalists viewed the concept of world peace primarily through the prism of international law. Conflicts between major powers, Root argued

throughout the 1910s, could best be ameliorated through the steady growth of international legal precedents established by a world court. Other conservatives, such as William Howard Taft, while not denying the value of strictly juridical procedures, put greater faith in compulsory arbitration of certain kinds of disputes sustained by coercive sanctions to compel the submission of a dispute to a tribunal (though not compliance with the arbitration decision itself). This approach suggested a form of collective security, an alternative that legalists like Root considered too extreme.²⁵

Conservative internationalists became a force to be reckoned with in the summer of 1915. Under the auspices of the New York Peace Society and Hamilton Holt, the editor of the *Independent* (and an internationalist who also traveled in progressive circles), some 120 conservatives prominent in the fields of business, education, law, and politics gathered in Philadelphia at Independence Hall and, on June 17, founded the League to Enforce Peace (LEP).²⁶ The executive board of the new organization included Taft; Theodore Marburg, who had served as minister to Belgium under Taft; and Abbot Lawrence Lowell, president of Harvard University. Their platform, entitled "Warrant from History," corresponded to the ideas of the Bryce Group, a British conservative internationalist roundtable that had been meeting quietly in London since late 1914.²⁷ The LEP's platform called for American participation in a postwar league in which representatives from all nations would assemble periodically to make appropriate changes in international law. Member nations would also be bound to submit "justiciable" disputes (questions pertaining to treaty obligations and international law) to a judicial tribunal or council of arbitration, and "non-justiciable" disputes (questions of national honor or vital national self-interest) to a board of conciliation. Finally, the plan would require signatories to bring economic and military force to bear against any state that made war on another signatory before submitting its grievance to the foregoing process.²⁸

Because of its prestigious charter membership, the League to Enforce Peace enjoyed considerable public attention and favorable editorial comment. Soon the LEP began to formally consult and coordinate activities with the Bryce Group as well as with the League of Nations Society, founded in Great Britain in May. By the end of 1916, it had established some four thousand branches in forty-seven states and had published thousands of pamphlets explaining its "Warrant from History." Although the LEP was not a Wilsonian enterprise, it nonetheless ultimately became the most influential pro-league organization in the United States and perhaps in the world.²⁹

When reporters asked Wilson about the conclave in Philadelphia, his response was noncommittal, almost to the point of indifference.³⁰ From the start, Wilson kept the conservative internationalists at arm's length.

He did so in part because of their connections with the Republican party—Taft was elected president of the LEP—and because he did not want to commit himself to a definite program that might later restrict his freedom of action. But, for now, the fairly limited recommendations and personal discretion of conservative internationalist leaders averted potential friction between them. Cordiality prevailed throughout the early stages of the relationship, mainly because the LEP's directors demanded nothing of the President.³¹

The influence of the conservative internationalists on Wilson would never be decisive in any case, but not only on account of partisan considerations or Wilson's desire to protect his options. Wilson surely realized that on certain points their platform converged with his own prescriptions, as well as with those of the Woman's Peace party, the Socialist party, and the Union of Democratic Control. But what the LEP omitted was as important as what it prescribed. On one hand, its recommendations for settling disputes squared with Bryan's cooling-off treaties, and its position on sanctions was roughly similar to Wilson's own thoughts about mutual guarantees of territorial integrity and political independence (which the progressive internationalists had yet to endorse explicitly). On the other hand, the LEP did not concern itself much with the economic causes of the war, with disarmament or self-determination, and certainly not with "democratic control" of foreign policy. Thus, even though the two wings of the American internationalist movement were very broadly constituted, the differences between them were substantial; in most respects, fundamental.

It is important to emphasize that, whereas they were absolutely vital, Wilson did not regard collective security and arbitration as adequate by themselves to prevent future wars. Self-determination, reduction of armaments, and free trade were equally important to the community of nations to come. Moreover, he and the progressive internationalists sought to mediate an end to the war and believed a fair peace settlement to be one based on a stand-off in Europe. In contrast, most conservative internationalists made no bones about their wish to see the Allies win a clear-cut victory. Significantly, the slogan, "The LEP does *not* seek to end the present war," appeared on their letterhead in the autumn of 1916.³² Finally, for progressive internationalists, a league of nations symbolized the confluence of other dreams and purposes. The ultimate objective of Wilson and the progressive internationalists was a lasting peace that would accommodate change and advance democratic institutions and social and economic justice; and a just peace was dependent on the synchronous proliferation of political democracy and social and economic justice around the world.

Few conservative internationalists could identify with the exalted as-

pirations of liberals, pacifists, and socialists. Leading conservative intellectuals like Taft, Lowell, and Root rarely entertained doubts about their Social-Darwinist views of human relations. Some were fit to rule; the vast majority were not; the poor were poor because they were poor. Worst of all, liberal reformers and socialists abetted each other's causes: together, they threatened to overturn the natural order of things by appealing, either inadvertently or overtly, to class differences. They strove toward a welfare state that would destroy basic constitutional rights of individual liberty and property.³³ Furthermore, conservative internationalists regarded diplomacy as unquestionably the province of an educated élite. Wilson might fit into the latter category, but they could take little comfort in reading newspaper stories about the regular flow into the White House of counselors committed to mob rule.

Neither could conservative internationalists see much good coming from a military stalemate in Europe. Because they considered the defeat of Germany as essential to peace, they often regarded Wilson's policies of neutrality as either wrongheaded or morally reprehensible. Then, too, whereas they advocated American participation in a league to enforce peace, they remained committed nationalists and resisted any diminution of American sovereignty or military strength. They believed that the United States should pursue international stability through the power of deterrence inherent in collective security, yet reserve to itself the right to improve its capacity to undertake independent coercive action against the forces of disorder that threatened the national interest.

Such divergent viewpoints within the burgeoning American league movement held serious implications for the subsequent course of the new crusade as well as for virtually every other major issue related to the war, including the climactic domestic debate over the Treaty of Versailles. For the time being, however, Wilson and the progressive and conservative internationalists seemed inclined to perceive their differences as more apparent than real. Throughout 1915, on the broad proposition of a league of nations, they observed an unstated political truce in deference to the greater common task of exploring the possibilities for a domestic consensus to underwrite such a basic change in American foreign policy.

From mid-1915 to mid-1916, the single most divisive issue in American politics was neither the league idea, nor the New Freedom, nor neutrality; it was, rather, the state of the nation's military preparedness. Not since the days of the early Republic had the question of the role of the military in American life driven so sharp a wedge into American politics. The Progressive era witnessed the opening phase of a larger controversy that would persist in various manifestations through the twentieth century to the present day. In its own immediate context, the preparedness contro-

versy would, among other things, reveal a subtle moldering within the American internationalist movement before it had reached its apogee.

During the autumn of 1914, the relentless advocates of a large navy and standing army had gained some momentum in Congress. Even before Germany had raised the specter of submarine warfare, Representative Augustus Peabody Gardner of Massachusetts, encouraged by his senior colleague and father-in-law, Henry Cabot Lodge, introduced a measure calling for an investigation into the nation's preparedness for war.³⁴ Wilson responded forcefully in his annual message to Congress, on December 8. "From the first we have had a clear and settled policy with regard to military establishments. We never have had, and while we retain our present principles and ideals, we never shall have a large standing army," he declared. "We shall not ask our young men to spend the best years of their lives making soldiers of themselves." He reminded the Congress that the country had a National Guard. The citizen soldier, a tradition compatible with democratic institutions, would suffice in the present circumstances. "More than this," he went on, "would mean merely that we had lost our self-possession." Then, looking directly at Senator Lodge, the President added, "We shall not alter our attitude toward it because some amongst us are nervous and excited."³⁵

This was not the first time that antimilitarists had heard such sweet music from the administration. The year before, William Jennings Bryan had caused a commotion when he spoke at a military camp in Texas and confessed that he could not understand how the men could prefer service in the Army to "a respectable civilian profession." Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, likewise, had raised some hackles. While casually talking with a couple of stokers during an inspection of a battleship, he upbraided the admiral escorting him for not following his example. "Do you think that you are too good to shake the hand of a sailor?" Daniels wanted to know. Then, too, there was the Carabao Affair, which had earned for the officers responsible for the notorious anti-Bryan theatricale a severe public reprimand from the President. "In military circles there is great astonishment and dismay over the proceedings of the Democratic regime," the Austrian naval attaché in Washington reported to Vienna. "Up till now the Democrats have done nothing to raise the esteem of officers. Indeed they have damaged the officers' own conception of their place in society."³⁶

Whether or not the Austrian attaché's judgment was accurate, Wilson's summoning of Congress to uphold America's venerable antimilitarist tradition won overwhelming public approval, and the Republican drive to expand the armed forces was easily quashed. Within a year, however, the incessant abuses of the Allied blockade, and, especially, German submarine warfare brought about a gradual shift in public opinion as well as

within the administration. The shift rapidly evolved into a marked conversion soon after May 7, 1915. On that day a German submarine had perpetrated one of the biggest public-relations disasters of all time when it torpedoed without warning the great British passenger liner *Lusitania*, which took down with her 1,198 men, women, and children—among them 124 Americans. In the United States the shock of this seemingly wanton murder of so many innocent civilians was so great that ten years later people remembered exactly where they were and what they were doing when they had heard the news, according to the findings of journalist Mark Sullivan.³⁷

Americans barely had the chance to digest this assault on their sensibilities when, during the next week, the British government released an official report on German atrocities, bearing the name and validation of Viscount James Bryce, the esteemed former Ambassador to the United States. The crescendo of a systematic propaganda campaign to overcome American neutrality, this document catalogued in the most lurid detail some 1,200 alleged acts of barbarism and cruelty committed by German soldiers, primarily against Belgians—including the crucifixion and decapitation of prisoners of war, the gang rape and sexual mutilation of women, the hacking off of children's fingers for souvenirs, and the bayoneting of infants.³⁸ Although much of it was later proved to be fictional, the Bryce Report created a sensation. Germany would never fully recover from the revulsion that swept the United States during these seven days in May.³⁹

Because it raised the distinct possibility of war, the *Lusitania* incident presented the real crisis. Yet cries for intervention, though loud as they could be, represented the voice of extremists. The vast majority of Americans, including the Congress, expected their president to keep his head and save them from Europe's awful mess. Three days after the tragedy, Wilson addressed an audience of newly naturalized citizens in Philadelphia. "The example of America must be a special example," he said. "The example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."⁴⁰

Such eloquent convictions notwithstanding, Wilson's subsequent demands that Germany cease submarine warfare against unarmed merchantmen were stern enough to compel the Secretary of State to resign in protest from the Cabinet in June. Bryan believed that the President's second note to Berlin, in particular, would lead to war. The outcome of these negotiations was still in doubt when, on the morning of August 19, 1915, two Americans were killed in the sinking of another British liner, the *Arabic*. "The worst worst [*sic*] thing that could possibly happen to the

world," Wilson wrote that evening to Mrs. Galt, "would be for the United States to be drawn actively into this contest,—to become one of the belligerents and lose all chance of moderating the results of the war by counsel as an outsider."⁴¹ In any case, he took firm action, threatening to sever diplomatic relations if Berlin refused henceforth to cease attacks on unarmed passenger liners without warning and without providing for the safety of those on board. The German government met Wilson's demands, and kept American neutrality alive, in the "*Arabic* pledge" of September 1, 1915. Consequently, tensions between the United States and Germany abated until the following spring.⁴²

Wilson's consistent example of self-possession and restraint throughout these protracted early crises made him something of a hero in the eyes of most progressive internationalists. The conclusion to the *Arabic* negotiations moved Oswald Garrison Villard, for instance, to break all precedents by running the President's portrait on the front page of the *New York Evening Post*, above the caption "The man who, without rattling a sword, won for civilization."⁴³ Yet if Wilson had "won for civilization," his stern notes, in the opinion of most Republicans, had not wrung enough meaningful concessions from Berlin. The Germans never admitted the illegality of undersea attacks on nonmilitary vessels, and the administration's demands did not require them to forego submarine warfare against Allied armed merchantmen. This ambiguity, along with the resounding impact of the *Lusitania* calamity, supplied preparedness advocates with all the ammunition they needed. Fortified by such organizations as the National Security League, the American Defense Society, and, eventually, the League to Enforce Peace, the movement now shifted into high gear.

Theodore Roosevelt had no peer in the preparedness crusade, and he beat the drum with both conviction and relish. Enraged by Wilson's comment about being "too proud to fight," he virtually called the President a coward and went so far as to hold him and Bryan personally responsible for the *Lusitania's* and the *Arabic's* misfortune. "It is our own attitude of culpable weakness and timidity—an attitude assumed under pressure of the ultra-pacifists—which is primarily responsible for this dreadful loss of life and for our national humiliation," he was still saying well into 1916.⁴⁴ The Colonel also called for a standing army of two million men, as well as for universal military training for adult males and drills and instruction for high school students. Soon the Governor of New York signed into law five preparedness bills, two of which provided for Roosevelt's training program in private and public schools. Huge preparedness parades marched down the avenues of all the nation's big Eastern cities. And a series of popular books and motion pictures, pandering to fears of invasion, flooded the nations bookstores and theaters.⁴⁵

Although the issue cut across party lines, the most vocal proponents

of preparedness and universal military training—Roosevelt, senators Lodge and Root, General Leonard Wood, and Taft—happened also to be Republicans. Lodge was no doubt sincere in the argument (one of infinite resilience in this century) that “there is no such incentive to war as a rich, undefended, and helpless country, which by its condition invites aggression.”⁴⁶ But politics informed conviction. Republicans portrayed themselves as the true patriots and the Democrats as the party of submission—the party that was “too proud to fight.” Preparedness seemed an altogether splendid charger upon which to ride to victory in 1916.

From the standpoint of politics, the President met the challenge masterfully. Most Americans had reluctantly concluded that the changed circumstances of the war required some degree of rearmament. By developing a measured response, the Democrats posed as something better than patriots—patriots with cool heads. On December 7, 1915, Wilson presented to Congress a program of national defense to increase substantially the size of the Army and the Navy. He then embarked upon a speaking tour of the Middle West to counter the Republicans and build support for “reasonable” preparedness among the many doubters within his own party.⁴⁷

The Republicans hoped to exploit the troubles that Wilson initially encountered within Democratic and progressive ranks (see below) and to make his alleged lack of leadership the keynote of their campaign in the forthcoming national election. But eventually Wilson marshaled both public opinion and a bipartisan congressional majority behind the administration’s program. Many Republicans—and many prominent conservative internationalists, including Taft, Root, and Lowell—regarded Wilson’s recommendations both as inadequate and as a characteristic example of the basest political opportunism.⁴⁸ Even harder to abide was the fact that, in the end, Wilson beat his opponents at their own game. Compromise and moderation robbed the Republicans of one of their most potent political issues. These were portentous complications in light of the Republican identity of the League to Enforce Peace, which had come into existence just as the preparedness controversy burst forth. Although Wilson managed to sustain a respectful correspondence with them, an important element of the conservative internationalists experienced the first stirrings of partisan bitterness toward the President.

Preparedness cut into the issue of a league of nations from another, potentially more acute, angle. Many progressive internationalists watched with alarm as their old collective nemesis—big-navy advocates, munitions makers, imperialists, big business, and all other manner of reactionaries—mounted what they viewed as an insidious offensive to thwart social and economic progress at home as well as disarmament, international cooperation, and the repudiation of war as an instrument of foreign policy. But

opponents of preparedness suffered the greatest blow to their morale when Wilson appeared to have surrendered to the enemy.

“The war in Europe is due to industrial strife, and the efforts of capitalists to further enslave the workingmen,” Socialist Helen Keller declared to the Labor Forum of New York. “If President Wilson had supported the policy of military preparedness which he recently sent to Congress, in 1913, the people would have demanded his removal to an insane asylum.”⁴⁹ In despair, Jane Addams, on behalf of the Woman’s Peace party, reminded her friend in the White House of his own noble expressions “that the United States might be granted the unique privilege not only of helping the war-torn world to a lasting peace, but of aiding toward a gradual and proportional lessening of that vast burden of armament which has crushed to poverty the peoples of the world.” She ended with a warning: increased war preparations would “tend to disqualify our National Executive from rendering the epochal service which this world crisis offers for the establishment of permanent peace.”⁵⁰ Shortly after the administration introduced its national defense bill, Lillian Wald’s Henry Street Group organized an “Anti-Militarism Committee.” It became the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM) in April 1916.⁵¹

The American Union Against Militarism represented one of the outstanding collaborations of liberal reformers and socialists of the Progressive Era. Its leaders and sympathizers included Addams and Wald, Paul Kellogg, Amos Pinchot, Frederick C. Howe, Crystal and Max Eastman, Rabbi Stephen Wise, Louis Lochner, Florence Kelley, Helen Keller, Oswald Garrison Villard, James Maurer, Hamilton Holt of the LEP, and many other friends and acquaintances of Wilson’s. Their movement was augmented by a cluster of Southern and Western Democratic congressmen and senators (some of whom considered the issue from an isolationist perspective), led by William Jennings Bryan; Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, the House Majority Leader; and William J. Stone of Missouri, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.⁵²

Within the year, the AUAM had established branches in every major city in the country. Members disseminated some 600,000 pieces of antipreparedness literature through a variety of publications and lobbied extensively on Capitol Hill and at the White House. To match Wilson’s swing around the circle, they hired the largest halls they could find and filled them to overflowing in New York, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, Detroit, Minneapolis, Des Moines, Kansas City, and St. Louis. “Jingo,” the papier-mâché dinosaur (who wore a collar bearing the label “ALL ARMOR PLATE—NO BRAINS”) won national fame as the AUAM’s mascot, while “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier” became a hit song.⁵³ Notable figures outside the AUAM—Bryan being the most prominent and effective—also went out on the hustings to drive the an-

tipreadiness message home. Eugene Debs, speaking for the majority of Socialists, did not mince words. If citizens succumbed to the current hysteria, he declared, the ultranationalists would "transform the American nation into the most powerful and odious military despotism on the face of the earth."⁵⁴ John Reed, too, devoted his talents to exposing widespread collusion between the National Security League and the munitions industry and to rebutting arguments that the United States was vulnerable to invasion by a European foe.⁵⁵ In almost all cases, the AUAM itself was careful to strike, not at Wilson personally, but rather at the dangers of militarism.

Not all liberals or socialists who advocated an internationalist foreign policy, however, contested increased military and naval appropriations. For instance, the editors of the *New Republic*—Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and Walter Weyl—followed an interesting, and rather tortuous, middle path. For them, the question was not preparedness, but "Preparedness for What?" Their point of departure was the complacency that they perceived in Wilsonian reformers once the New Freedom had been consummated by 1915. The influential voice of "pragmatic liberalism" searched for a way to overcome the nation's stultifying drift. Preparedness had the potential to restore the lost sense of national purpose, according to the *New Republic*, because it would at once strengthen the federal government's direction of the economy and advance the cause of social welfare. Properly bridled, the editors suggested, preparedness was a Trojan horse that carried within it the means to undermine special privilege and to restructure American society along democratic, collectivist lines.⁵⁶ Wilson, thus far, had failed to place the issue in this vital context. Nor could they depend on their favorite Bull Moose to set the tone. As William Allen White later observed, "social and industrial justice no longer interested Colonel Roosevelt. He had a war, a war greater than even he realized it would be, to engage his talents. He made a tremendous clamor for preparedness. He won back many of his old enemies, the big businessmen, who now saw eye to eye with him and applauded as the Colonel raged at Wilson."⁵⁷

Moreover (and ironically so, from the point of view of the *New Republic*), both Roosevelt's militant nationalism and the AUAM's militant pacifism, albeit from opposite poles, contributed to isolationist torpor. Since its first number, in November 1914, the *New Republic* had attempted to explain to its 15,000 readers (the President among them) that Jeffersonian drift and complacency made poor substitutes for Hamiltonian mastery over both domestic and foreign policy. The United States could not afford to float aimlessly in the isolationist backwaters of the nineteenth century—not if democratic institutions were to survive. The quality of Wilson's neutrality, then, was considerably strained. The United States had an *active* role to play in the service of international peace—perhaps through a

league of peace, they began to say in March 1915.⁵⁸ And for that task something more than a provincial constabulary was required to impress the great powers.

The editors of the *New Republic* probably had gotten to the pith with respect to foreign policy. Yet, as Christopher Lasch once pointed out, their analysis still "left the most important question of all, the question of war or peace, to the decision of the European powers."⁵⁹ Whereas, after the *Lusitania*, Croly and Lippmann in particular considered a German victory over the Allies a threat to American national interests, they would continue to balk at intervention until other related issues further clarified themselves. But if Wilson was adrift, they surely had not supplied much of a rudder. Then, too, their other criticisms—that the "pacifists" preferred to let the country go unprepared in an emergency and encouraged isolationism as well—utterly ignored the clear distinctions the AUAM made between militarism and "sane" preparedness. Even more important, the *New Republic* also overlooked the distinctly internationalist principles of the AUAM and the Woman's Peace party, not to mention those of the Socialist party. (One could make the case that these groups by 1915 had worked out far more advanced, coherent, and comprehensive proposals for addressing the general world crisis than the editors of the *New Republic* ever would.)

The *New Republic* nonetheless justifiably reproached Wilson in at least two areas. Was there a coherent relationship between neutrality (or, for that matter, his domestic agenda) and his advocacy of preparedness, or was he merely reacting to events? And what of the future, beyond his vague and platitudinous hopes of offering the services of the United States in the cause of peaceful counsel? Colonel House had not yet begun his famous courtship of the *New Republic* crowd, so no one there seemed to have a clue.⁶⁰

As we have seen, Wilson actually had, very early on, mapped out a rudimentary peace plan on his own. He also had closely studied the proposals of the Woman's Peace party and the Socialist party, and was familiar with those of the Union of Democratic Control and the League to Enforce Peace. Secretly, he pursued the Pan-American Pact, a model organization for the Western Hemisphere; and he and House, in late 1915, embarked on yet another undisclosed mediatorial exploration in Europe. (Either endeavor would have mitigated the concerns emanating from various progressive internationalist quarters.) But as late as January 1916, the President had not so much as dropped a hint, publicly, about the real direction of his thoughts. As the preparedness controversy reached its climax, he at last began cautiously to remedy the situation—though, again, not in an arena designed to gain a lot of attention. Rather provocatively, he chose to do so for the benefit of those to his left.

In the spring of 1916, the AUAM sent a distinguished delegation to the White House.⁶¹ The representatives included Lillian Wald, Paul Kellogg, Crystal and Max Eastman, Adolf Berle, Jr., Amos Pinchot, and Rabbi Wise. The delegation emphasized that the AUAM stood neither for "peace at any price" nor against "sane and reasonable" preparedness.⁶² But they were anxious about those numerous agents of militarism who were "frankly hostile to our institutions of democracy." Their deepest fear, Lillian Wald said to the President, was that "the acceptance by the American people of a big army or big navy would simply neutralize and annul the moral power which our nation ought, through you, to exercise when the day of peace negotiations has come."⁶³ Significantly, Wilson contended that some measure of military force was, in fact, essential to the vindication of moral force. "I am just as much opposed to militarism as any man living," he said, and he had a record to substantiate that claim. He went on at some length to explain how his program actually conformed to Wald's criteria—that it would provide adequate security "without changing the spirit of the country."⁶⁴ Then he addressed her observation about moral force and peace. "When you go into a conference to establish the foundations of the peace of the world, you have got to go in on a basis intelligible to the people you are dealing with. . . . And that means that, if the world undertakes, as we all hope it will undertake, a joint effort to keep the peace, it will expect us to play our proportional part in manifesting the force which is going to rest back of that. Now, in the last analysis the peace of society is obtained by force."⁶⁵

He continued: "Now, let us suppose that we have formed a family of nations, and that family says, 'The world is not going to have any more wars of this sort without at least the duty at first, though, to go through certain processes to show whether there is anything in the case or not.' And if you say we shall not have any war, you have got to make that 'shall' bite. The rest of the world, if America takes part in this thing, will have the right to expect from her that she contributes her element of force to the general understanding. Surely that is not a militaristic ideal. That is a very practical, possible ideal."⁶⁶

"Would that not, Mr. President, logically lead to a limitless expansion of our contribution?" Wald inquired. Wilson did not think so: "Now, quite the opposite to anything you fear, I believe that, if the world ever comes to combine its force for the purpose of maintaining peace, the individual contributions of each nation will be much less, necessarily, naturally less, than they would be in other circumstances, and that all they will have to do will be to contribute moderately and not indefinitely."⁶⁷

After the meeting, the members of the delegation adjourned to a nearby hotel. According to an account by Max Eastman, they agreed unanimously that "the President had taken us into his intellectual bosom."

The *Masses* editor was especially pleased that throughout the interview Wilson had "always referred to the Union Against Militarism as though he were a member of it," and had talked "of how 'we' could meet the difficulties of national defense without the risks of militarism." Speaking for himself, Eastman wrote, "I believe that he sincerely hates his preparedness policies."⁶⁸ Although the *New York Times* would miss the point in its brief account of the meeting, Eastman emphasized in the *Masses* the explicit connection between preparedness and "the idea of world-federation and the international enforcement of peace."

Moreover, during the colloquy, Amos Pinchot had asserted that the United States, in time, could become more aggressive than any other nation (in part because of its enormous economic might); and Wilson had said, "I quite see your point. It might very easily, unless some check was placed upon it by some international arrangement which we hope for." These comments, Eastman concluded for the consideration of the readers of his socialist monthly, placed Wilson "far above and beyond" his peers, especially Roosevelt. He could not help but wish "that the President might point the way to all as boldly as he did to our committee."⁶⁹

There is no evidence that Wilson ever read Eastman's appraisal in the *Masses*, a publication that boasted a readership more than thrice that of the *New Republic*.⁷⁰ But this conference at the White House was at least a minor historic occasion. In making a plausible case for stronger national defense to the AUAM, Wilson, for the first time, had not only discussed the role of force in the modern world; he had also articulated to persons other than absolute confidants his idea for "a family of nations." Not incidentally, as the tenor of Eastman's article suggests, Wilson had inadvertently scored several points with a number of doubting progressive internationalists who represented liberal and socialist constituencies of key political importance.

Throughout the preparedness controversy Wilson received countless other peace delegations. In November 1915, Jane Addams brought a group of women from The Hague to see him and had arranged to flood the White House with over twelve thousand telegrams from women's organizations across the country demanding mediation of the war.⁷¹ Earlier that month Louis Lochner of the Chicago Peace Society and President David Starr Jordan of Stanford University (progressive internationalists who occasionally worked in conservative internationalist circles) again presented arguments for continuous mediation and a conference of neutrals. Lochner related his experiences in Europe during the previous winter and made Wilson wince when he described how nurses in the field had accidentally snapped off the limbs of frozen soldiers while trying to remove them to burial sites. Three million men had already perished. Struggling coalitions

of liberals within the belligerent countries, Lochner and Jordan told him, were awaiting his summons. The President must act before another gruesome winter passed.⁷² By the end of the session Wilson was visibly moved. Jordan later reflected, "[N]ever have I seen him so human, so deferential, and so ready to listen. Usually he was difficult to talk to and rather haughty." Even so, Lochner found him inscrutable, and was convinced that he was "playing a lone hand."⁷³

Jordan and Lochner—indeed, all progressive internationalists, but particularly those who agitated for mediation and against preparedness—might have been slightly more sanguine had they been privy to recent conversations between Wilson and House. A few weeks before, Wilson—his hopes raised by the temporary resolution of the submarine issue—had begun anew to explore the possibilities for mediation.⁷⁴ On September 3, House wrote to Sir Edward Grey: "Do you think the President could make peace proposals to the belligerents at this time upon the broad basis of the elimination of militarism and navalism and a return, as nearly as possible, to the status quo [ante bellum]?" Grey wanted some specifics. "How much," he cabled back on September 22, "are the United States prepared to do in this direction? Would the President propose that there should be a League of Nations binding themselves against any Power which broke a treaty . . . or which refused, in case of dispute, to adopt some other method of settlement than that of war?"⁷⁵

Wilson could not have wished for more appropriately tailored questions. For a number of reasons, the moment seemed propitious for House to return to Europe, not only because of the relaxation of German-American tensions and the presumed tractability of Grey. Secretary of State Lansing and Ambassador Naón of Argentina were working on a revision of the Pan-American Pact, apparently to the satisfaction of everyone involved. Anticipating a breakthrough, Wilson now contemplated going public with the treaty—in part to prove to the British that the United States was serious about joining a larger postwar peacekeeping organization. But, perhaps most important of all, Grey's questions could be answered in the affirmative because of the activities of both wings of the new American internationalist movement. Their ongoing campaigns had begun to create a fairly substantial body of opinion—which had not existed at the time of House's previous mission—to support an American pledge to join a league of nations.

Wilson gave House instructions for his assignment on Christmas Eve, 1915. The United States should have nothing to do with the actual settlement; it was concerned only with the maintenance of the peace after the war. "The only guarantees that any rational man could accept are (a) military and naval disarmament and (b) a league of nations to secure each nation against aggression and maintain the absolute freedom of the seas,"

Wilson wrote. "If either party to the present war will let us say to the other that they are willing to discuss peace on such terms, it will clearly be our duty to use our utmost moral force to oblige the other party to parley, and I do not see how they could stand in the opinion of the world if they refused."⁷⁶ Thus the establishment of a postwar league of nations had at last become embedded as the central fact in Wilson's mediatorial diplomacy.

Yet if any of the progressive or conservative internationalists had known the range of Wilson's initiatives, they still might have asked him to act on the thoughts that he had once conveyed in an intimate letter to Ellen Axson some thirty years before—a confession of his ambition to so "communicate the thoughts of the great mass of the people as to impel them to great political achievements."⁷⁷ Since the beginning, Wilson had exhibited an extraordinarily broad understanding of the war and had entertained bold ideas and worthy plans that might avert another. But he had permitted caution to overcome his natural propensities to lead, to the extent that neither wing of the internationalist movement yet regarded him as their obvious leader. All of this was about to change, however, commencing in the first week of 1916—"a year of madness," as Wilson later called it, "a year of excitement, more profound than the world has ever known before."⁷⁸ And, from that point onward, the issue of a league of nations would become the suture of American politics and foreign policy.

The Turning Point

Only weeks before his resignation, William Jennings Bryan conveyed to Wilson his personal sense of urgency about the Pan-American Pact: "The sooner we can get this before the public the better, for the influence it may have across the Atlantic."¹ But, due to a combination of unfavorable circumstances—Chile's persistent doubts about the treaty and Wilson's preoccupation with the submarine crises after May 1915—a public announcement remained for some months highly problematical. In the autumn, Robert Lansing and Ambassador Naón of Argentina finally overcame Chile's objections (or so it seemed) by removing the cumbrous one-year time limit for the settlement of pending disputes. Their draft also satisfied Wilson's concern that the collective security guarantees be kept intact, if, as he put it, "these articles are indeed to serve as any sort of model for the action of any other nations."² Wilson's subsequent decision to unveil the Pact at the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress in early January was but the first indication that 1916 would be a crucial year in the history of the creation of the League of Nations.

Wilson was positively buoyant as he walked onto the stage to address the Scientific Congress on the evening of January 6. He and Edith Bolling Galt of Washington, D.C., had been married only three weeks before, and this was her first public event as First Lady. Since New Year's Day, ru-

mors had spread among the delegates that something big was in the offing. The President did not disappoint them. Before alluding to the Pan-American Pact, he offered some prefatory comments that riveted the attention of his audience. He had chosen to speak critically (perhaps even self-deprecatingly) about one of the shibboleths of American foreign policy. "The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority," he said. "[I]t has been fears and suspicions on this score which have hitherto prevented the greater intimacy and confidence and trust between the Americas. The states of America have not been certain what the United States would do with her power. That doubt must be removed." The removal of that doubt, he continued, "will be accomplished, in the first place, by the states of America uniting in guaranteeing to each other, absolutely, political independence and territorial integrity." Upon highlighting its other features, he announced that negotiations for the Pan-American Pact were under way and imparted his views of the higher historical imperative of these "very practical" proposals: "They are based on the principles of absolute equality among states, equality of right, not equality of indulgence. They are based, in short, upon the solid, eternal foundations of justice and humanity. No man can turn away from these things without turning away from the hope of the world. God grant that it may be given to America to light this light on high for the illumination of the world."³

The address was probably the most encouraging moment, for Wilson, in the entire mercurial evolution of the Pact. The delegates responded with a thunderous ovation. Editorial opinion was extremely generous. The *New York Times* endorsed the Pact on the front page and added, "The President's appearance before the congress was a great personal triumph." The *New Republic* also suggested that the administration had cause to rejoice: "Mr. Wilson's method of dealing with the other American states . . . has had the great merit of disarming their suspicions and winning their confidence. Our southern neighbors seem finally convinced of the good faith of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine no longer looks to them like . . . an imperialist policy."⁴ A. G. Gardiner, the English essayist and journalist, submitted the most ebullient and prescient review in late February. "Is it not possible," Gardiner asked in the *London Daily News*, "that in the President's scheme we have the seed of that larger peace that shall encompass the world?" Time and the experience of the war would eventually pull, not only the Americas, but also a reconstructed British Empire, France, Italy, Russia, and even Germany and the Hapsburg Empire "within the orbit of a common deliverance." Such was the mission of the New World, he wrote—"to help the old find the way out of the wilderness."⁵

It was no coincidence that A. G. Gardiner should have so vividly

conjured. Colonel House had arrived at Falmouth on the day before Wilson's address. His specific task, it will be recalled, was to work out terms among the belligerents for possible mediation based on the *status quo ante*, disarmament, and the establishment of a league of nations. After making the rounds in Paris and Berlin, however, he decided on his own to broach the subject of Pan-Americanism upon his return to London in February. His intention was to gain official British approval of the Pact, and he started his campaign by taking a number of London newspaper editors into his confidence.⁶ Then, on February 21, House told Sir Edward Grey about the treaty and asked whether he would be willing to express his support for it in Parliament, provided that Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, approved. When Grey agreed to do so, a second thought occurred to House. Great Britain should actually enter into the Pact by virtue of its New World territorial possessions! In House's opinion, this was "an opportunity not to be disregarded and its tendency would be to bring together an influence which could control the peace of the world."⁷

Virtually all scholarship on House's mediatorial diplomacy of 1916 overlooks this bold and unauthorized formulation of foreign policy. The mission is best known for a document which he and the Foreign Secretary initialed on February 22, the famous House-Grey Memorandum. It, too, ultimately played a part in the fortunes of the league issue in transatlantic diplomacy, as we shall see.

House had come away from his conferences in Berlin with the distinct impression that the pro-submarine faction within the German High Command was ascendant and therefore very likely to drive the United States into the war before long. For their part, the French were hardly more receptive to peace talk than the Germans, until such time as their foes were beaten back beyond the Rhine. Indeed, both Jules Cambon, the French Foreign Minister, and Grey had told him flatly that the President's terms were unacceptable. The Colonel now felt compelled to assure the French of American sympathy. Circumventing Wilson's instructions, he went so far as to tell Cambon that the United States would intervene against Germany before the end of the year, if the Allies could avoid stirring up American resentment over their commercial blockade. (House deliberately misled Wilson about the astonishing surety he had given the French. Instead, he sent back optimistic reports about the chances for mediation, which would have stood as the historical record to this day had Cambon not preserved his own account of the conversations.⁸) Even so, when he returned to Britain from the Continent in mid-February, House continued in earnest to discuss mediation with Grey and Asquith. As a kind of inducement to gain their cooperation, House, on the day after he raised the subject of British membership in the Pan-American

Pact, devised an agreement embodied in the controversial memorandum. The document stipulated that if the British and French asked him to, Wilson would summon a peace conference. If Germany refused to attend, then the United States would "probably" enter the war on the side of the Allies; if Germany agreed to attend but otherwise proved unreasonable about the terms of peace, then the United States also would "probably" enter war on the side of the Allies.⁹

The Colonel obviously had a lot of ground to cover when he briefed Wilson at the White House on March 6. Wilson accepted his Pan-American overture with little trepidation; his one concern was how Great Britain, technically, could sign a treaty that referred to guarantees under *republican* forms of government, since the Empire was not a republic. He considered the matter, however, not in terms of whether, but of how and when, Britain should become a party to the Pact. In any case, it is clear that, by this juncture, Wilson and House conceived of the Pact as both a potential foundation league from which to build outward and a model to show the Europeans in conjunction with their peace moves.¹⁰

The House-Grey Memorandum was a more hazardous proposition. For one thing, everybody concerned interpreted it to suit their own purposes. The British conceived of it as partial insurance against disaster; they would use it only as an alternative to abject defeat.¹¹ House privately believed that the memorandum would facilitate American intervention once the Germans resumed submarine warfare. Wilson himself realized that the terms carried the high risk of war. But, if, as House explained, Germany was bound sooner or later to renege on the *Arabic* pledge and the Allies only required the assurances stipulated, then the gamble was worthwhile; moreover, Wilson could not conceive of the peoples of Europe permitting the renewal of hostilities once they had ceased. Therefore, after inserting the "probablys," Wilson approved the memorandum because it seemed to be the best available means of bringing the war to an end, short of belligerency, and of moving forward with work on some kind of league. Unfortunately, Wilson's strategy for achieving these objectives was based on misinformation from House and an erroneous assumption of the good faith of the British. Nonetheless, other events had unexpectedly begun to set the stage for the long-overdue public declaration on behalf of American membership in a league nations. The first of these events was the resolution of the submarine issue in the spring of 1916; the second, ironically, was the concurrent refusal of the Allies to activate the House-Grey Memorandum at Wilson's urgent request.

On March 24, a German submarine torpedoed the unarmed French steamer *Sussex* in the English Channel. Four Americans were among the eighty casualties.¹² On April 6, the President, Colonel House, and Secretary Lansing held a long session to determine what course of action to

take in the face of impending war. They discussed the *Sussex* crisis, the prospects for getting Grey to execute the agreement of February 22 (in the hope of setting the process of mediation in motion), and the status of the Pan-American negotiations, which had settled into another bog, again, owing to Chile's uneasiness about the Tacna-Arica dispute.¹³ Within a matter of days, House received several messages from Grey. The Canadian Prime Minister had approved of Britain's joining the Pan-American league; but, Grey also reported, it would be best to delay an endorsement in Parliament until the United States and Argentina, Brazil, and Chile had reached a solid understanding among themselves.¹⁴ As for the House-Grey Memorandum, the French could not consider a peace conference while the outcome of the titanic struggle then raging around Verdun was still in doubt. "There must be more German failure and some Allied success before anything but an inconclusive peace could be obtained," the Foreign Secretary added.¹⁵

This was not encouraging news. In the meantime, Wilson weighed the potential consequences of holding Germany to strict accountability, a decision he was obliged to make if he expected the British to take him seriously as a mediator. In a very real sense, Wilson placed the choice between peace and war in the lap of the Germans. On April 18, 1916, he demanded that they restrict their undersea operations in accordance with the rules of cruiser warfare, or "visit and search"; he did not, however, insist that they abandon the submarine altogether. This concession, along with the fact that Germany's fleet of U-boats was not large enough to justify the risk of irrevocably offending the United States, probably prevented war between the two countries in 1916. On May 4, the German government accepted Wilson's conditions. The so-called *Sussex* pledge was the greatest diplomatic triumph of Wilson's first administration, and it seemed to vindicate the counsels of patience and forbearance. Sheer luck, however, had intervened as well.¹⁶

The happy resolution of German-American tensions caused many commentators in the United States to speculate that peace through Wilsonian offices was imminent.¹⁷ It also contributed to the President's belief that both peace in Europe and the establishment of a league of nations were now attainable, if only the Allies would cooperate. Just two days before the arrival of the German note, Brazilian and Chilean representatives had submitted a new draft of the Pan-American Pact; because the Chileans had participated agreeably, the administration awaited in high anticipation the official responses of the three principal South American governments.¹⁸ In the meantime, Wilson concentrated his attention on the British and mediation. Accordingly, he directed House to send Grey yet another entreaty, on May 10, to stress the growing public demand for action to end the war, and that the President was now willing to *publicly*

commit the United States to postwar collective security and to propose a conference to discuss peace.¹⁹

Grey responded with unadorned frankness on May 12. If the President acted on his stated intentions, the Allies would construe it as a plot "instigated by Germany to secure peace on terms unfavorable to the Allies."²⁰ House was mortified. "Sir Edward has been talking to me for two years concerning the necessity of the United States doing what you now propose," the Colonel (attempting, in part, to cover his own tracks) wrote to Wilson; "and yet when you are ready to do it, he hesitates."²¹ Wilson was not exactly overjoyed, either. The administration must "get down to hard pan," he told House, and either insist on the rights of trade as against the Allied blockade, or make a decided move for peace. He proposed a course of action on May 16: the United States would have nothing to do with the terms of peace the belligerents might agree on; it would, however, join "a universal alliance to maintain freedom of the seas and to prevent any war begun either a) contrary to treaty covenants or b) without warning and full inquiry,—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence."²² House drafted a cable that embodied Wilson's thoughts and dispatched it to Grey on May 19. Thus Wilson had met the Foreign Secretary's previous conditions for mediation and, in no uncertain terms, had conveyed to London his position on a league of nations. The time had come to make his position explicit to the American people as well.

During the height of the *Sussex* crisis, Wilson had declined an invitation from William Howard Taft to address the first anniversary meeting of the League to Enforce Peace, to be held in Washington. When Taft renewed the request on May 9, the day after Wilson outlined his ideas about a league to the American Union Against Militarism, he accepted.²³ The President's decision had all the characteristics of good politics and good statesmanship, and demonstrated how closely yoked domestic politics and foreign policy had become.

Domestic considerations were varied. Setting aside his own diplomatic initiatives, Wilson's sensibilities had surely been sharpened by the almost constant, impassioned pleas of the progressive internationalists. He also deemed it appropriate that, as head of the government, he should provide leadership and guidance for a movement that had captured the imagination of so many people. But why employ the Republican-dominated League to Enforce Peace as the forum? Wilson realized that he commanded the allegiance of probably most progressive internationalists, but not that of the conservative internationalists. By making his first public declaration before the LEP—the most influential of all pro-league organizations—he might bring some conservatives around to his own po-

sition and lay the foundation for broad-based, if not quite bipartisan, support for the movement. Even so, it was general knowledge that Wilson conferred much more often with left-wing progressives and socialists about the subject than with conservatives. There existed, then, the greater likelihood, as the electoral season approached, that the distance between Wilson's views and those of the conservatives would widen, thus fanning the embers of partisanship, especially if the public began to identify the league idea with Wilson and the Democratic party.

The Europeans—and, in particular, the British—were a consideration as well. If Wilson came out strongly for a league and perhaps called for a peace conference, he not only would make it clear that the United States intended to guarantee the peace settlement; his declaration would also focus the attention of the world on a peace league, invigorate all the elements of the British movement, and thus exert tremendous pressure on the Allies to consent to mediation.

"I am thinking a great deal about the speech I am to make on the twenty-seventh," Wilson wrote to House, "because I realize that it may be the most important I shall ever be called upon to make." He had, of course, voluminous material to draw upon. He kept a large file that contained reports and memoranda from the Woman's Peace party, the AUAM, the LEP, and the Union of Democratic Control, a collection of quotations from the speeches of Asquith, Grey, Viscount Bryce, and clippings from the *New Republic*, Hamilton Holt's *Independent*, and other publications.²⁴ As usual, House was the chief consultant; since Sir Edward had not yet responded to his latest message (the cable of May 19), he advised Wilson to treat only the subject of the league and to do no more than hint at mediation. "Whether you succeed in starting a peace movement at this time or not," he wrote after reading Wilson's final draft, "you are making, I think, a good record to go before the world with."²⁵

At 7:20 P.M., on the evening of May 27, some two thousand people greeted the President as he entered the main dining room of the New Willard Hotel and sat down at the speakers' table with former president Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.²⁶ He was, by choice, the last speaker on the agenda, after Lodge.

Wilson began by talking about the war. "With its causes and objects we are not concerned," he said, although the American people "were as much concerned as the nations at war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence." The United States, he observed, had reached a point in its history when it could no longer be guided by the timeworn precepts of George Washington's valedictory: "We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.

"The peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy," he continued. "Only when the nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement . . . as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at last in a way of justifying itself." He thereupon proclaimed that the American people believed in the following things: "First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. . . . Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity. . . . And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origins in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.

"So sincerely do I believe in these things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation." This would involve (once the belligerents had come to a peace settlement on their own) "an universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.

"But I did not come here, let me repeat, to discuss a program," he said in conclusion. "I came only to avow a creed and give expression to the confidence I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some common force will be brought into existence which shall safeguard rights as the first and most fundamental interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common peace. God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and cooperation may be near at hand!"²⁷

The tumultuous applause that shook the New Willard Hotel was but the first indication that Wilson's momentous pronouncement would be received, as Colonel House described it, as "a land mark in history." The president of Williams College, for instance, compared it to the Gettysburg Address. Walter Lippmann, using the Monroe Doctrine as his point of reference, wrote: "In historic significance it is easily the most important diplomatic event that our generation has known." Hamilton Holt proclaimed that the address "cannot fail to rank in political importance with the Declaration of Independence." In an editorial entitled "Mr.

Wilson's Great Utterance," the *New Republic* suggested that the President might have engineered "a decisive turning point in the history of the modern world." Because he had given new meaning to preparedness and had broken with isolationism, Wilson's stand represented "one of the greatest advances ever made in the development of international morality."²⁸

While the preponderance of American opinion was overwhelmingly favorable—literally hundreds of editorials characterized the speech as "the voice of America"²⁹—Wilson had also incensed many observers. The *New York Tribune*, for example, condemned as "fantastic" the idea of self-determination and described the performance as "another flagrant illustration of Mr. Wilson's instability as a statesman, his fluid sentimentalism, his servitude to winged phrases."³⁰ Theodore Roosevelt's organ, the *Outlook*, castigated the President for not taking sides with the Allies.³¹

The *Outlook* was practically alone in discerning that the League to Enforce Peace might have less cause for celebration than the first flush of exhilaration seemed to warrant. Hamilton Holt considered the speech an "almost official endorsement" of the LEP's position; Taft, usually a shrewd analyst, believed simply that Wilson's appearance evidenced "sympathy with our general purposes." But they both had failed to note Wilson's comment "I did not come here, let me repeat, to discuss a program." Indeed, he had not endorsed the LEP's platform. Even in its generalities, the address implicitly testified to the unreconciled differences between the progressives and conservatives over several important questions, including self-determination, national sovereignty, and whether the war itself should end in favor of the Allies or in a draw. If anything, Wilson had articulated the position of the American progressive-left and the British radicals. As Philip Snowden correctly observed, "Every one of the principles of the U.D.C. was stated and approved in the speech by the American President."³² In any case, Wilson clearly had achieved two important objectives: he had elevated the general proposition of postwar collective security to a position of preeminence in American politics, and, virtually overnight, he had secured for himself the leadership of the American league movement.

This much could also be said about the effect of the address in Europe. A. G. Gardiner, in the *London Daily News*, claimed that Wilson had opened "a new chapter in the history of civilization." Sir Horace Plunkett added that the League had now been raised "to a high place among the prophetic visions of international statesmanship."³³ Commenting on the UDC's plans to disseminate the speech, Kate Courtney wrote that Wilson had "filled us with hope," while Noel Buxton, a Liberal member of Parliament, told House that his party would now begin active propaganda.³⁴ Viscount James Bryce, whose views more closely approximated Taft's than Wilson's, informed House that all groups in the British move-

ment were "greatly cheered and encouraged by the President's recent deliverances."³⁵

The majority of European commentators, however, were decidedly not cheered and encouraged. The most prevalent interpretation was that Wilson was about to intervene independently to try to end the war, chiefly to impress the American electorate.³⁶ Both the French press and Foreign Office fairly scoffed at Wilson's alleged presumptions as mediator. Jean Jules Jusserand, the ambassador to the United States, warned House that his countrymen believed that the appeal was "clearly inspired by German interest."³⁷ For its part, the German press also dismissed the speech as Wilson's opening petition for reelection (an opinion not without some basis).³⁸ The response of the Foreign Office was subtler. Since the war then appeared to be moving in their favor, the Germans did not welcome a Wilsonian settlement. In the event that a serious peace move materialized, they hoped to remain equivocal and to shift to the Allies the onus of rejecting Wilson's hand.³⁹ In Great Britain, the political right and center were stung by Wilson's professed unconcern with the war's causes and objects. Lord Cromer, in a letter to the *London Times*, claimed that the remark disqualified the President from exercising "any decisive influence on the terms of peace." This opinion was shared by many publications, including the *Times* itself.⁴⁰

The British Cabinet was probably Wilson's most important foreign audience—not only because of the messages that were traveling back and forth between Washington and London at the time, but also because the Cabinet had just had an intense internal debate over the league idea. In May 1915, Lord Chancellor Haldane had prepared a memorandum on the subject. His study reflected the influence of the Bryce Group (the British equivalent of the LEP) and suggested that a league would serve Britain's security interests, but only if the United States became a dedicated member. Two days before Wilson's LEP address, Maurice Hankey, secretary of the War Committee, rejoined that security through a league was illusory. He feared that the Allies and other presumably peace-loving nations would fall prey to the "enthusiasts for social reform and the anti-war and disarmament people," while the Germans (and perhaps the Russians) would exploit the postwar craving for peace, rearm themselves, and attack the democracies at the appropriate moment. The United States, he further argued, could not be counted on. Its tradition of isolationism and its allegiance to the almighty dollar offered proof of his assertions. Any international scheme was doomed to failure, Hankey concluded. Arthur James Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty, had earlier staked out the middle ground. In reply to the Haldane memorandum, Balfour had suggested that periodic, informal conferences between nations, which brought disputants together without forcing a judgment on them, would do more

good than compulsory arbitration and ironclad guarantees of territorial integrity. In any case, he was now advising that the government inform Wilson that the league idea would best be furthered by American intervention against Germany.⁴¹

On the general question of a league of nations, then, there was divided counsel within the British government. On the question of a peace conference, however, there was unanimity. And in this respect, the timing of both House's request of May 19 for action on the House-Grey Memorandum and Wilson's celebrated preachment could not have been worse. Germany was in a vastly superior position *vis-à-vis* the Allies, and the War Office was just then eager to unleash a new British army on the Somme and deal the enemy the crushing blow. The government would never consider mediation as long as some hope of victory remained. Wilson would be called in only if Allied defeat appeared certain.⁴²

Consequently, Grey's formal response to House on May 29 explicitly ruled out American mediation. It also demonstrated the fundamental differences, in this instance, between the British government's qualified view of the league predicated upon victory and a postwar *Pax Atlantica*, and Wilson's view of the league begat by self-determination and a peace short of victory. "The best chance for the great scheme," Grey wrote, "is the President's willingness that it should be proposed by the United States in convention [with] a peace favorable to the Allies obtainable with American aid. The worst chance would be that it should be proposed in connection with an inconclusive peace. . . . No such peace could secure a reliable and enduring international organization of the kind he contemplates."⁴³ Thus was Wilson at last confronted with reality; or, as he later put it to House, with "the stupidity of English opinion."⁴⁴ Yet no one in the Cabinet had altered his attitude since the initialing of the agreement of February 22; Grey had said nothing that he had not previously said to House. Although he failed to grasp it, Wilson had finally reaped what the Colonel had sown.

The ensuing summer witnessed the lowest ebb in Anglo-American public and official relations since the British burned Washington in 1814. The British government's ruthless suppression of the Irish Rebellion in April and the subsequent execution of its leaders disturbed even the staunchest Anglophiles, including Theodore Roosevelt. The tensions soon heightened when the Allies began to seize American mails on the high seas. Then, on July 19, the British government published a "blacklist" and forbade its subjects to do business with some 347 American and Latin American firms suspected of carrying on trade with the Central Powers. This action generated another swell of indignation in the United States. By September, Wilson's attitude toward the British had so hardened that

Secretary Lansing feared that the United States would soon find itself aligned with Germany.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, House's and Grey's correspondence tapered off. "I am not sure that there is anything further that the President can do for the moment, for he gets little support or encouragement outside of America," House lamented to the Foreign Secretary. "We are standing it seems at the roads of destiny, waiting to see which way to turn." Grey did not answer for six weeks. "There is nothing more that I can do at the moment," he retorted on August 28, and reminded House that he, Grey, had publicly advocated a league on three occasions. It was too bad if the President was disappointed "at the want of response to his speech." But both Wilson and the American people were apparently hell-bent on avoiding war, even at the cost of national honor. He now wondered whether Americans really understood what was at stake in the war and whether "even with a League of Nations the United States could be depended upon to uphold treaties and agreements by force."⁴⁶ The situation had reached an utter stalemate.

For about three weeks after Wilson's address to the League to Enforce Peace, events seemed to auger extremely well for the Pan-American Pact, despite the fact that Grey had all but disposed of House's overture to include Great Britain in it. On June 3, the government of Brazil, following the example of Argentina, accepted the Wilson-emended, Lansing-Naón draft treaty. Although Chile had not responded, Ambassador da Gama launched a new drive to persuade her to come along. The Foreign Minister of Brazil announced that he would travel to Washington personally to affix his signature, and Ambassador Naón began preparations for a gala ceremony in which some thirteen Latin American countries were expected to sign the Pact. "I think it is safe to say," Henry P. Fletcher said in a letter to House on June 15, "we have arrived."⁴⁷

Even as Fletcher wrote, however, untoward developments in the Mexican Revolution conspired to ruin the credibility of the United States in the eyes of practically every Latin American government and dealt the Pan-American Pact a mortal blow. In October 1915, Wilson had granted Venustiano Carranza's Constitutionalists recognition as the *de facto* government of Mexico. On March 9, 1916, Pancho Villa, Carranza's opponent, led a mounted attack on the little town of Columbus, New Mexico, killing nineteen Americans. A substantial historiography has since grown up around the question of Villa's motivations. For years, the most prevalent interpretation held that Villa, encouraged by German intrigues, sought to further his own ambitions by provoking war between the United States and Mexico. New documentary evidence, brought to light by Friedrich

Katz, suggests that the raid sprang from the general's firm (but unfounded) belief that Carranza and Wilson had reached an agreement that would have made Mexico a virtual protectorate of the United States.⁴⁸

The killing of American citizens put the Wilson administration in an extremely difficult position. Although few individuals of influence demanded war, many Republican critics of his Mexican policy blamed the President for creating the circumstances that incited the raid. Perilous as any sort of retaliation promised to be, Wilson, in this situation, could not cry "too proud to fight"—and certainly not in an election year. On March 15, he ordered Brigadier General John J. Pershing, with a force of approximately 7,000 soldiers, to pursue Villa into Mexico. (Wilson took special pains to keep a tight rein on Pershing in order to avoid a clash with Carranza's troops; he also cautioned several news services not to put a dramatic construction on the intrusion.⁴⁹) Initially, Carranza tacitly sanctioned the so-called Punitive Expedition; by late spring, however, it had penetrated 350 miles into the interior without even catching sight of Villa. Then on April 12, a detachment of Pershing's command clashed with *Carranzistas* at Parral, leaving from forty to one hundred Mexicans dead. At Carrizal, another incident occurred on June 21. Carranza now demanded that Pershing's forces withdraw to the border. Wilson would not comply.⁵⁰

At this point, the situation quickly went from bad to worse. The first reports from Carrizal, on June 22, characterized the incident as a treacherous ambush by Mexican soldiers. Upon learning that Carranza refused to release the prisoners taken in the engagement, Wilson seriously considered asking Congress to authorize him to clear northern Mexico of forces that placed American citizens of the border states in harm's way.⁵¹ Clearly, the President was losing control of events that now threatened to bring on full-scale hostilities between the United States and Mexico and, short of that, to wreck not only the Pan-American Pact but also his standing among progressive internationalists.

Although the evidence is not altogether conclusive, it appears that the crucial factor in averting war was a series of extraordinary steps taken by the American Union Against Militarism and the Woman's Peace party. During the last week of June 1916, the AUAM publicly called upon William Jennings Bryan, David Starr Jordan, and Frank P. Walsh to meet with three Mexican representatives at El Paso, Texas, "in an effort to get at the difficulties which have arisen between the two governments."⁵² Then, to disprove the sensationalized accounts of the clash at Carrizal, the AUAM, on June 26, published in several major newspapers an eye-witness account of an American captain, which revealed that his troops, and not the Mexicans, had been the aggressors.⁵³ Within twenty-four hours, the AUAM's advertisements precipitated a flood of telegrams to the White

House and editorials imploring the President not to take any belligerent action. "My heart is for peace," Wilson assured Jane Addams on June 28, in response to a petition from the Woman's Peace party.⁵⁴ When, later that evening, word arrived that the Mexicans had released their prisoners, the crisis began to recede.

On June 30, Wilson, obviously with an enormous sense of relief, addressed the New York Press Club and obliquely acknowledged the salutary results of the good offices of the AUAM and the WPP. "Do you think the glory of America would be enhanced by a war of conquest in Mexico?" he asked his audience. "Do you think that any act of violence by a powerful nation like this against a weak and distracted neighbor would reflect distinction upon the annals of the United States?" With one voice, the seven hundred diners shouted "No!"⁵⁵

From the point of view of the AUAM and the WPP, these developments, coming on the heels of the former group's colloquy at the White House, furnished new proof that they wielded influence where it counted most.⁵⁶ For his part, Wilson realized that the AUAM and the WPP had helped save him from a disaster. The unusual circumstances surrounding the resolution of the crisis with Mexico had strengthened the bonds between Wilson and the progressive internationalists.

This was definitely not the case for the bonds of Pan-Americanism. To an extent, the initial American military operation was a legitimate retaliatory response to Villa's attack. But by June it had become a blatant violation of Wilson's verbal commitment against interventionism, notwithstanding his very limited goal in the incursion and the political pressures he was subject to. The Punitive Expedition aroused anti-American feeling in most of the prospective members of the Pan-American family.

Both Lansing and Fletcher informed the President that the imbroglio would have a very bad effect on the Pact. Somewhat cryptically, Wilson replied that the situation constituted "an additional reason for signing rather than otherwise."⁵⁷ Argentina, Brazil, and Chile did not share his opinion. *La Prensa* of Buenos Aires remarked, "The triumph of the Pan-America policy is preferable to any advantage that could be gained by war."⁵⁸ But by this point, not even Ambassador Naón, the staunchest Latin American champion of the Pact, could recommend proceeding. "It is difficult to sign treaties which tend to impose concord and union on the continent," he wrote Fletcher on June 27, "while threats of war are passing between two of the most important nations of America."⁵⁹ This was the heaviest blow of all. Da Gama, too, believed that it would be a mistake to sign, in view of the likelihood of war between Mexico and the United States, and also because Chile was now "decidedly opposed to the treaty." Although the war crisis abated by mid-July, neither Argentina nor Brazil found Wilson's attempt to rekindle the courtship beguiling as

long as Pershing remained in Mexico. In early August, Frank L. Polk, Counselor at the State Department, told Colonel House that the Pact "seems dead for the moment." At length, the grand endeavor became a closed incident.⁶⁰

Chile's unremitting reluctance to commit herself to the Pact's guarantees, when Argentina and Brazil (and several other sister republics) were willing to do so, was one of two chief reasons for the project's failure. The second reason was the Mexican incursion, especially after the blood-letting at Carrizal. With that, Wilson extinguished the light of all his earnest work—the good faith and confidence which many Latin Americans had temporarily come to repose in the United States. There is some irony in the fact that Wilson interfered in the internal affairs of neighboring states (Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, as well as Mexico) on a scale to rival Roosevelt and Taft. He was not unconscious of those "blind spots"—of the contradictions between his pronouncements and his actions. The President's response to Argentina's and Brazil's decisive alarm over the Punitive Expedition—that the situation was "an additional reason for signing rather than otherwise"—was not disingenuous; rather, it reflected his conception of the Pact as a means of removing the causes of those problems that, in his thinking, compelled him to do violence to his own words.

Two years later, Wilson was still trying to explain himself. The trouble was that the Monroe Doctrine "was adopted without your consent," he said to a group of Mexican newspaper editors. "We did not ask whether it was agreeable to you that we should be your big brother." Whereas the Monroe Doctrine was ostensibly intended to check European aggression in Latin America, there was nothing in it to restrain the United States. The Pan-American Pact was, alas, "an arrangement by which you would be protected from us." The whole family of nations someday would have to do this—to guarantee that none should violate another's political independence and territorial integrity. "That is the basis, the only conceivable basis, for the future peace of the world, and I must admit that I was anxious to have the states of the two continents of America show the way to the rest of world as to how to make a basis of peace."⁶¹

In any event, by the late spring of 1916, Wilson had brought the United States closer to a commitment to join some kind of postwar league of nations—as much by the failure of the Pan-American Pact as by the ringing success of his address to the League to Enforce Peace. Now a new campaign season approached. The precise cast of his bid for re-election, with respect to both domestic and foreign policy, remained to be seen. Yet, as his convictions about progressive internationalism continued to grow, one thing was sure: there could be no turning back.

6

Raising a New Flag

The League and the Coalition of 1916

Colonel House was the first administration insider to realize that Wilson's attendance at the meeting of the League to Enforce Peace held one of the keys to his re-election. As we have seen, many European critics, fearing that he was about to intervene on behalf of mediation, sought to dismiss the President's address as a transparent attempt to solicit votes. The address was not conceived for that purpose, however. Taft certainly did not invite Wilson to speak in order to help a Democrat renew the lease on the executive mansion. And House originally considered the belligerents Wilson's primary audience. But, because of the unprecedented outpouring of acclaim, a very bright idea occurred to the Colonel. "Do you not think that your speech . . . should be endorsed by the St. Louis convention?" he asked Wilson on May 29. "Many people with whom I have talked today regard it as the real democratic platform. Some of them say it leaves the republican leaders without a single issue either foreign or domestic."¹

Other sources, for somewhat different reasons, confirmed House's judgment. At the New Willard Hotel, Wilson had administered a large dose of adrenaline to American and European friends of the league. Now they clamored for more. Sir Horace Plunkett urged the President to restate his case as often as possible and in greater detail. Such efforts, Lord

Loreburn added, would "render priceless service to the cause of common sense." Noel Buxton wrote to House that the people, in general, needed more education on the subject. "The President's prestige as a statesman and speaker is immense," the Liberal Member of Parliament also told the Secretary of the Interior. "A great public following exists potentially if he shows that he means to push the League of Peace."²

Well-nigh all scholarly accounts of the subject cite the wartime congressional elections of 1918 as the point of no return in infusing an intense degree of partisanship into the debate over American membership in the League of Nations. That interpretation must be revised. For it was during the presidential campaign of 1916 that the league idea first became an issue of national importance; and therein the partisan element had its origins. That fact necessitates, as well, a reevaluation of the nature and significance of Wilson's bid for re-election.

Wilson appealed to the electorate by emphasizing his achievements in domestic reform and his success in having kept the country out of war—a "campaign for progressivism and peace," as Arthur S. Link aptly characterized it in the fifth volume of his biography of the President. Yet, as he set out to win votes, Wilson could actually boast of deeds which went beyond even the New Nationalism—if the spectrum of progressive and socialist opinion were any guide. Moreover, Wilson, persuaded by the counsel of House, Buxton, and others, would defend his foreign policy record and speak of things to come in terms that were much stronger than a defense of neutral rights and the wish simply to remain at peace with Europe. His first step in this regard was to fashion a party platform that stressed progressive internationalism. For example, he built into a plank on preparedness an explanation based on the one that he had made to the American Union Against Militarism—the requirement of an army and navy "equal to the international tasks which the United States hopes and expects to take a part in performing." He also wrote a separate, major plank on international relations (lifted from his speech to the LEP) that affirmed the right of every people to self-determination and the duty of the United States to join a league of nations. The fact that he had embedded these ideas in the Democratic platform, Wilson told House, would "give them immensely increased importance. That ought to soak in on the other side, with all parties to the war."³

Wilson could not have made a truly plausible case for a new diplomacy and a league—nor, as the election returns bear out, would he have been continued in office—if, at the same time, he had not been both willing and intellectually able to move plainly to the left of the center of American politics. Indeed, the impressive array of (primarily) social-justice legislation that he pushed through Congress on the eve of the campaign gave legitimacy and magnetism to his aspirations in foreign policy like

nothing else could have. Never was the relationship between reform and foreign policy more decisive than during the campaign of 1916. It was no mere coincidence that leading conservative internationalists lined up as Wilson's chief domestic critics, while progressive internationalists (socialists as well as liberals) enthusiastically applauded his work and cheered him on. These parallel alignments framed practically every important issue pertaining to domestic affairs that arose throughout the whole of 1916. In fact, if a gulf separated the internationalist movement's two wings, it seemed to grow wider, not simply because of competing views on the proper role that the United States should play in world affairs, but because of their respective visions of the future of American society.

The response to Wilson's two additions to the Supreme Court in 1916 is an illuminating example. Wilson created an almost unprecedented sensation when, in January, he nominated Louis D. Brandeis for Associate Justice. Not until Ronald Reagan attempted to elevate Robert Bork to the high bench in 1987 would such an acrimonious battle over confirmation take place in American politics. Progressives were extremely impressed with what Wilson had done. "It took courage & sense to make this appointment," said Amos Pinchot of the American Union Against Militarism, "& I take off my chapeau to the President."⁴ Because Brandeis was so closely identified with the social-justice movement and so hated by powerful corporate interests, conservatives could not have been more upset if Eugene Debs had been recommended. That "a socialist" could be put on the Court, the president of the League to Enforce Peace told a friend, "is one of the deepest wounds that I have had as an American and lover of the Constitution." Taft also joined with other prominent conservative internationalists, including Elihu Root and A. Lawrence Lowell, to organize a national campaign to discredit Brandeis; along with five other former presidents of the American Bar Association, Taft and Root signed a statement declaring him "not fit" to be a Supreme Court Justice.⁵ Brandeis was confirmed, on June 1, in large measure because Wilson went to the mat for him.⁶

The "People's Lawyer" was no sooner sworn in, however, than Wilson proffered "Another Supreme Court Radical," John Hessin Clarke of Ohio.⁷ Clarke, a protégé of Cleveland's mayor, Tom Johnson, and Mark Hanna's opponent in the senatorial race of 1903, was then a federal district judge noted for his decisions on behalf of organized labor. According to the *New York Times*, his nomination, coming so close on the heels of Brandeis', was "likely to be viewed with some doubt and misgiving by the conservative part of the public." The liberal and socialist press, on the other hand, was almost as pleased as it had been by the tapping of Brandeis. The *New York World*, a staunch supporter of the Wilson administration, underscored Clarke's "sympathies and activities for the causes of

political and social justice." The *Call*, New York's leading socialist daily, quoted a statement that Clarke had made during the preparedness controversy, "If we expect labor to fight our nation's battles we must give labor a nation worth fighting for," and focused attention on a recent court decision in which Clarke had saved the jobs of the wage-earners of Brewster, Ohio. "There will be another radical on the bench," the *Call* proclaimed. "Not as radical as Justice Brandeis, but something of a near-radical."⁸

Wilson appointed Clarke and Brandeis because, he said, they believed in a "liberal and enlightened interpretation" of the Constitution.⁹ Although their membership on the great tribunal gratified progressive internationalists, it was a source of resentment among most conservative internationalists. By autumn, Taft had come to regard the approaching election as the most critical one of his career, and worried that Wilson might have additional opportunities to select "men who are radical in their views, who have no idea of preserving the rights of property. . . ."¹⁰

In retrospect, it is somewhat ironic that historians frequently cite the nomination of Brandeis—who was the principal architect of the New Freedom—as the beginning of Wilson's transition to the New Nationalism. The signs of at least a merger of the New Freedom and the New Nationalism had been gathering since early 1915. They were manifest in, among other things, the flexibility that Wilson had demonstrated in the evolution of federal trade and antitrust legislation; in the assistance he had lent to certain social-justice measures of limited scope, such as the La Follette Seamen's Act; and in his sympathetic approach to the grievances of the miners of Ludlow, Colorado, who had been murderously victimized by John D. Rockefeller's private army in the notorious massacre of 1914. Nor can one discount in Wilson's metamorphosis the cumulative impact of his regular exposure, from 1915 onward, to the eclectic ministrations of socialists and liberals who spearheaded the progressive internationalist movement. Then, too, the connections that he perceived between domestic politics and foreign policy, as well as the very nature and development of his internationalist thought, suggested a predisposition to advanced positions on social issues, once a political environment conducive to them had materialized.

There was a comparative dimension to all of this, too. It centered upon the devolution of Theodore Roosevelt, the politician who had once stood as the incarnation of progressivism.¹¹ Since 1913, the Republican party had begun pulling itself back together under the aegis of the Old Guard; by the following year, conservatives had completely consolidated their control. In the mid-term elections of 1914, the former Bull Moose, conflicted and frustrated, declined to campaign for most Progressive party candidates. While the Democratic majority in the House of Representa-

tives fell from seventy-three to twenty-five, the Progressive party succeeded in electing only a single member to Congress. "The fundamental trouble was that the country was sick and tired of reform," Roosevelt wrote to William Allen White. "Not only did the people wish to beat all the reform leaders but they wished to beat the reform legislation." As for the Republican party, he said, "the dog has returned to its vomit."¹²

After 1914, Roosevelt's real political passions were restricted to the war, to preparedness, and to the hated Wilson. As many of his erstwhile adherents became increasingly identified with antimilitarists, socialists, and other assorted miscreants, he distanced himself from them even further. In 1915, he began to make peace with the chieftains of the GOP. This was proof enough for many critics that the Progressive party, now only a brittle husk of its former self, had been created to vent the spleen of one man.

It was, therefore, almost inevitable that Progressives should turn for leadership in 1916 to someone who seemed as sincere and inspired as the Roosevelt of 1912, to someone who already possessed a record of significant accomplishment as well as a capacity to expand his concept of the role of government in order to confront the social problems born of industrial capitalism. Wilson needed the Progressives as much as they needed him. The Democrats, still the country's minority party, had gained power because of the rupture within Republican ranks, which was now on the mend. Simple political arithmetic dictated an expansion of the Democrats' present electoral base if the party intended to remain in power. Certain aspects of the President's performance were thus shaped by expedience.

For instance, until 1916, Wilson had opposed a system of federal rural credits that would gradually lower the discount on farm mortgages. By the time a new Federal Farm Loan Act was introduced in Congress in January, however, he had become more conversant with agrarian problems, specifically those generated by usurious interest rates that burdened farmers in many regions. He also knew that the Democratic party stood to lose the Middle West in November, as a Nebraska farmers' organization warned, if he failed "to give suitable legislation on this subject." In March, Wilson declared the Federal Farm Loan Act an administration measure, worked to enlarge its provisions, and signed it into law in July. By late summer, its beneficiaries were hailing the bill as the "Magna Carta of American farm finance."¹³

Wilson's political instincts undoubtedly motivated a pre-campaign decision to follow the lead of progressives in Congress in another critical matter, one that concerned both domestic and foreign policy and registered a "radical" postscript to the preparedness controversy. Near the end of summer, the administration had secured compromise legislation to expand the size of the Army and Navy (though not enough to satisfy Roo-

sevelt, who pronounced the bill's supporters guilty of "moral treason to the American commonwealth").¹⁴ The question of the hour, though, was who was going to foot the bill. Representative Warren Worth Bailey, an ardent antipreparedness Democrat from Pennsylvania, had an answer: "If the forces of big business are to plunge this country into a saturnalia of extravagance for war purposes in time of peace, it is my notion that the forces of big business should put up the money." Socialist James Maurer agreed. "We are sick and tired of being turned into fodder for cannons and then [*sic*] have to pay for 'preparedness,'" he said to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. "If it's right to take a poor man's life, it's right to take the rich man's fortune."¹⁵

The coalition of antimilitarists and progressives wrested more than modest indemnities. The Revenue Act of 1916, signed by Wilson on September 8, levied a surtax, ranging from six to thirteen per cent, on incomes over \$20,000; an estate tax, from one to a maximum of ten per cent, on amounts over \$50,000; a two per cent tax on annual net corporate income; and a tax of twelve-and-a-half per cent on gross income of all munitions manufacturers. Designed to shift virtually the entire financial burden for preparedness—some \$300,000,000—onto the country's wealthiest classes, this bill established the first and one of the few truly progressive tax schedules of the twentieth century. Few presidential signatures ever gave radicals greater satisfaction, or conservatives greater apprehension.¹⁶

Where Wilson really proved himself worthy of the support of liberals as well as of potentially large numbers of socialists was in the realm of social welfare, particularly as it affected the lives of everyday working people. During the first week of June, Wilson sat down to write the national party platform, a manifesto in the spirit of "Progressive Democracy." The document could be distinguished in two important respects from the one that the Republicans would adopt. First, Wilson's synthesis of progressive internationalist intentions, as concise as it was, represented a position far in advance of the foreign policy planks contained in, not only the Republican, but also the Socialist, party platform. Second, Wilson catalogued his administration's proudest deeds and endorsed the sections of the Progressive party program of 1912 that the Democrats had not yet brought to legislative fruition—the enactment of federal laws to restrict child labor, to provide workers with adequate compensation for industrial accidents, and to establish the eight-hour day.¹⁷ These three measures had for years engaged the energies of progressives and of both left-wing and "gas and water" socialists.

Unannounced, on July 18, Wilson traveled up to Capitol Hill to confer with Democratic leaders about the Keating-Owen child labor bill and the Kern-McGillicuddy bill for federal workmen's compensation, both of

which had already passed the House. Commending the justice of the laws and stressing that they constituted solemn platform pledges, he enjoined his colleagues to see them through before the Senate adjourned. His personal appearance on the Hill, then considered an extraordinary step for any president to take on behalf of pending legislation, did the trick. The action "may have been extremely good politics," remarked the *Brooklyn Eagle*, "but it was also a use of party leadership in the interests of humanity." The bills arrived on Wilson's desk on September 1, a day of celebration for the nation's labor leaders and for the folks at Hull House and the Henry Street Settlement.¹⁸

To be sure, Wilson was a distinctly political animal. Yet his dramatic exercise of power on behalf of children and adult workers also represented genuine convictions and reflected the historian's sensitivity to the changing world around him. In foreign policy, Wilson had first demonstrated a growing awareness and appreciation of the fact that the problems of the Industrial Age were as much social as political; they could not be adequately addressed (as, for instance, he had learned in Mexico in 1914) by recourse to old nostrums or by clinging to narrowly conceived constitutional scruples. So also with the conditions of life and work at home. Times had changed. "The pressure of low wages, the agony of obscure and unremunerated toil did not exist in America in anything like the same proportions that they exist now," he said to a convention of woman suffragists on September 8. "As the populations have assembled in the cities, . . . the whole nature of our political questions has been altered. They have ceased to be legal questions; they have more and more become social questions, questions with regard to the relations of human beings to one another."¹⁹ And, on the Fourth of July, he had declared to some ten thousand people assembled for the dedication of the American Federation of Labor building in Washington: "The great difficulty about the relationship between capital and labor is this: Labor is in immediate contact with the task itself—with the work, with the conditions of the work, with the tools with which it's done, and the circumstances under which they are used; whereas, capital, in too many instances, is at a great remove."²⁰

Wilson gave climactic proof of his conviction in an unforeseen series of events that flared up just as the presidential campaign was getting under way. Since the spring, the country's major railroad brotherhoods had been struggling to obtain the eight-hour day (reduced from ten hours), without a cut in pay and with time and a half for overtime. When twenty railroad presidents rejected these demands and mediation failed in June, ninety-four per cent of all the railroad workers voted to call a nationwide strike.²¹

The situation was easily the gravest domestic crisis that Wilson had

yet confronted. Throughout August he invited to the White House delegation after delegation of representatives from management and the brotherhoods to try to work out a settlement. He assured the brotherhoods he favored the eight-hour day because, he said, it was right, and, on August 18, persuaded them to compromise on the issue of punitive overtime pay. During the next three days, forty-three railroad presidents entered the Green Room to hear what Wilson had to say. They did not like a word of it. When they refused to budge, he reportedly said, "I pray God to forgive you. I never can."²² Capital had demonstrated to his satisfaction that it was, indeed, "at a great remove."

Wilson had pleaded with the railroad presidents to help him to untie the Gordian knot. With the shutdown of the nation's transportation system set for September 4, he would now undertake to cut it with the stroke of a pen. Between August 28 and 31, he ventured up to the halls of Congress four times—three times to hammer out legislation with the Democratic leadership, once to address a joint session of Congress—on behalf of the railroad workers. On the latter occasion he portrayed management as unreasonable and the eight-hour day as "a thing upon which society is justified in insisting."²³ The Adamson Act passed the House by a vote of 239 to 56 on September 1, and the Senate by 43 to 28 the next day. When Wilson placed this final jewel in the crown of "Progressive Democracy," the most hotly debated subject of the campaign was born.

The Adamson Act, perhaps more than any other domestic issue, separated the progressives from the conservatives among internationalists. "[T]he most humiliating thing in the recent history of the United States" was how William Howard Taft characterized the settlement, in a letter published in the *New York Times*. Charles Evans Hughes, the Republican nominee for President, heartily agreed. "I am opposed to being dictated to either in the executive department or in Congress by any power on earth," he said in a hard-hitting campaign speech at Nashville. Attacking both Wilson and the brotherhoods, Hughes declared at Beverly, Massachusetts: "This country must never know the rule of force. It must never know legislation under oppression." The *New York Times*, usually sympathetic toward the administration, also condemned the settlement for "reduc[ing] 100,000,000 people to a condition of vassalage."²⁴

The vast majority of progressives and socialists, however, saw the matter differently. If nothing else, Wilson should be honored for having averted what was potentially the worst strike of the century, argued most Democratic newspapers. Although its editorial board was still undecided about whose candidacy to endorse, the *New Republic* could not have been more impressed with the "high statesmanship" that Wilson exhibited: "In a very real and accurate sense the President has made himself the spokes-

man of a whole people . . . [and] has shown how to turn an emergency to constructive purposes."²⁵

Such handsome praise was a welcome contribution to Wilson's uphill re-election campaign; but, in view of Hughes' attempt to exploit the Adamson Act in the context of the Republican party's swerve to the right, it might have been expected that the *New Republic* and the presidents of the American Federation of Labor and the United Mine Workers, as well as Democratic and progressive Republican newspapers, would issue strong statements commending Wilson's attitude toward labor. What really exceeded all expectations, though, was the way leading Socialist party members acknowledged Wilson's accomplishment—despite the fact that any palm extended to him was bound to hurt their own presidential candidate, Allan Benson.²⁶

For instance, Max Eastman startled many of his fellows by addressing the Woodrow Wilson Independent League. There were several reasons why the President had earned Socialist support, he suggested, among them "his announcement that the best judgment of mankind accepts the principle of the eight-hour day." This was compelling evidence—in contrast to Hughes' "petty and indiscriminate scolding,"—that Wilson "has vision and sympathy with human progress." The *Weekly People*, a socialist publication in New York, while giving the brotherhoods the greater share of credit, also exulted because Wilson had conceded the "power of the working class when consolidated upon the field of industry."²⁷ Mary Harris ("Mother") Jones, the beloved, eighty-two-year-old radical and inveterate crusader for the rights of working people, declared that Wilson was the first chief executive ever to "demand that the toilers be given an even break in the world."²⁸ Frank Bohn of the *Masses* wrote that the President, coming "face to face with the social problems of the new industrialism," had established himself "the ablest progressive yet produced by our politics."²⁹

Out of the heady welter of American progressive and socialist politics, then, a left-of-center coalition was becoming an increasingly distinct and practical possibility, with Wilson as its pivot. For Wilson could boast, not only of the Underwood tariff, the Clayton Act, the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Trade Commission; he had also put "radicals" on the Supreme Court, and had secured enactment of an unprecedented program of legislation to improve the lives of all working men, women, and children. Moreover, he had defused the conservatives' appeal to militarism with his moderate approach to preparedness, which, not incidentally, had yielded the first real tax on wealth in American history. And he had kept the country out of war.

Throughout the United States, growing numbers of Roosevelt's former followers as well as independents representing every shade of pro-

gressivism came out for Wilson.³⁰ Walter Weyl of the *New Republic* and Amos Pinchot and Rabbi Wise of the American Union Against Militarism presented the President with a resolution (signed also by John Dewey, Ray Stannard Baker, and Walter Lippmann) expressing their regret for having earlier opposed him; they now averred their unified support and admiration for his battle against "privilege" as the "reactionaries of all parties have watched this with dismay."³¹ Paul Kellogg and Lillian Wald organized "Social Workers for Wilson," which claimed that the President's driving purpose was "the social welfare of the whole people." On October 14, the Democratic National Committee proudly announced that Jane Addams planned to vote for Wilson. In explaining her decision to one activist in the internationalist movement, she confessed to having been "quite unprepared for the distinctive period in American politics developed under the brilliant Party leadership of President Wilson."³²

Socialist luminaries admitted as much, too. John Reed, Jack London, Charles Edward Russell, Helen Keller, Upton Sinclair, John Spargo, William English Walling, Florence Kelley, Algie M. Simons, and Gus Myers, among others, forsook the party's candidate for Wilson. For some, a practical consideration figured prominently; in the current world situation a Socialist vote was too great a luxury when the race between Wilson and Hughes promised to be so close.³³ Others, like Frank Bohn, Max Eastman, and John Reed, put their endorsements in wholly positive terms. Ungrudgingly, they recognized that great advancements had been made and they did not quarrel over the instrument (a capitalist party) employed. Indeed, Mother Jones doubted whether a Socialist president could have improved upon Wilson's record on behalf of children, railroad workers, and farmers. "I am a Socialist," she explained. "But I admire Wilson for the things he has done. . . . And when a man or woman does something for humanity I say go to him and shake him by the hand . . . and say, 'I'm for you.'"³⁴ Bohn and Eastman made similar arguments. "The old-fashioned, impossible attitude on the part of some Socialists—that of hating every radical because 'he steals our thunder,' and so on—has no place in the minds of intelligent persons in 1916," Bohn admonished dissenters. "Let us try to use our brains freely; love progress more than party," Eastman wrote, "and see if we can get ready to play a human part in the actual complex flow of events."³⁵

According to the *Literary Digest*, the rank and file was of the same mind. In certain parts of the country, union labor was divided between Wilson and Benson, rather than between Wilson and Hughes. Socialists frequently said that they preferred the President "because in the way of actual accomplishment he can do more for the Socialists." An official of the Western Federation of Miners reported that Wilson's labor legislation "will cause many members to vote the Democratic ticket who would oth-

erwise vote for Benson." A member of a local of the Ladies' Garment-Cutters' Union in Boston put it this way: "Nearest related to the workers are the Socialists and next to the Socialists are the Democrats. Because the Socialists are too extreme and the Republicans are too slow," most of them were supporting the Wilson ticket. In the pivotal state of Ohio, where the Socialist party was strong, an official of the International Association of Machinists reported to the *Literary Digest*: "Everywhere . . . the machine-shop workers give Wilson credit for doing more than any other President has done." Citing the child labor bill and the Adamson Act, the interviewer said "the shopmen seem to think Wilson is the best President we ever had. . . ."³⁶

All of this, of course, was only the half of it. A brother of the Painters Union of Tennessee also emphasized that Wilson should be re-elected because he kept the country out of war—for "labor as well as all other units of society know full well that war is only wanted by the people who reap special dividends from their munitions and shipyard-holdings."³⁷ The left-wing *Internationalist Socialist Review* struck the same note. Responding to Victor Berger's attacks on Wilson's preparedness program, that publication told its 150,000 readers: "To howl of militarism against a president who has kept the working class of America out of war during a hair-trigger period is a species of treachery to the working class that does no good."³⁸ Max Eastman carried the argument a step further in an editorial that corresponded to House's thoughts about the implications of Wilson's address to the League to Enforce Peace. The President would be re-elected, Eastman predicted in late summer, but not just because "he kept us out of war." He would win because "he has attacked the problem of eliminating war, and he has not succumbed to the epidemic of militarism in its extremest forms."³⁹

That point has never been established either in biographies or in more specialized studies of Wilson's foreign policy. But Wilson made American membership in a league of nations one of the themes of his campaign. As he set out to win votes, he also had other goals in mind: to persuade the belligerents that the guarantee of collective security rebutted every reason for fighting on; and to continue, personally, what he had begun at the New Willard Hotel—the education of the American people on the subject of progressive internationalism.

Wilson introduced the message at the very start, in his acceptance speech at Long Branch, New Jersey, on September 2. The speech was quite unlike any that either Hughes or Benson would deliver. Marking off the distance that the Democracy had traveled since 1912, Wilson argued that the party had surpassed itself and the Progressives of that time. "An age of revolutionary change," he said, "needs new purposes and new ideas." The United States now faced searching problems born of both the

nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. "They will require for their solution new thinking, fresh courage and resourcefulness, and in some matters radical reconsideration." Even though Americans had not been forced to take sides in the present awesome war, its effects could no longer be confined to Europe. "[A] new atmosphere of justice and friendship must be generated by means the world has never tried before. The nations of the world must unite in joint guarantees that whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life must first be tested in the whole world's opinion before it is attempted. These are the new foundations the world must build for itself, and we must play our part in the reconstruction, generously and without too much thought of our separate interests."⁴⁰

Wilson gave his first full-fledged campaign speech about a league of nations at Omaha, Nebraska, on October 5. Ever since 1898, he said, "we have been caught inevitably in the net of the politics of the world." Whereas there was now "a program for America in respect of its domestic life . . . we have never sufficiently formulated our program for America with regard to the part she is going to play in the world. And it is imperative that she should formulate it at once." The world was no longer divided into little circles of interest. "The world is linked together in a common life and interest such as humanity never saw before, and the starting of wars can never again be a private and individual matter for the nations. What disturbs the life of the whole world is the concern of the whole world. And it is our duty to lend the full force of this nation—moral and physical—to a league of nations."⁴¹

On October 12, in Indianapolis, Wilson attempted to relate his domestic reforms to his aspirations in foreign policy. The United States, he said, was in the throes of rebirth. "We have been making America in pieces for the sake of the pieces. Now, we have got to construct her entire, for the sake of the whole and for the sake of the world, because, ladies and gentlemen, there is a task ahead of us for which we must be very soberly prepared. I have said, and shall say again, that, when the great present war is over, it will be the duty of America to join with the other nations in some kind of league for the maintenance of peace. . . . It is now up to us to say whether we are going to play, in the world at large, the role which the makers of this great nation boasted and predicted we should always play among the nations of the world."⁴²

Two days later, at Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, Wilson defended American neutrality in the following terms: "What Europe is beginning to realize is that we are saving ourselves for something greater that is to come. We are saving ourselves in order that we may unite in that final league of nations in which it shall be understood that there is no neutrality where any nation is doing wrong, in that final league of nations which must, in the Providence of God, come into the world, where nation shall

be leagued with nation in order to show all mankind that no man may lead any nation into acts of aggression without having all the other nations of the world leagued against it."⁴³

Society was struggling to understand itself, he continued at Chicago on October 19, so that it could create a new instrument of civilization. And the United States could facilitate this great endeavor by infusing in international relations the qualities of mercy and sympathy, and by demonstrating to the family of nations its disinterestedness—the regenerative influence that sprang, not from the power of arms, but from "the great invisible powers that well up in the human heart." He also publicly expressed an opinion, for the first time, on a fundamentally important aspect of collective security. "There is coming a time, unless I am very much mistaken," he said, "when nation shall agree with nation that the rights of humanity are greater than the rights of sovereignty."⁴⁴

As election day drew near, Wilson pressed his case for a league again, on October 26, in two major addresses in the great river city of Cincinnati, the home of William Howard Taft. After briefly describing the European balance-of-power system, he said: "Now, revive that after this war is over, and, sooner or later, you will have just such another war. And this is the last war of the kind, or of any kind that involves the world, that the United States can keep out of." Neutrality, then, would be impossible to maintain. "We must have a society of nations. Not suddenly, not by insistence, not by any hostile emphasis upon demand, but, by the demonstration of the needs of the time, the nations of the world must get together and say, 'Nobody can hereafter be neutral as respects the disturbance of the world's peace for an object which the world's opinion cannot sanction.'"⁴⁵ Later that day he reiterated the same points, with a reference to the Declaration of Independence: "Other nations owe it to a decent respect for the opinion of mankind to submit their cases to mankind before they go to war. And I believe that America is going to take pride in the days to come in offering every dollar of her wealth, every drop of her blood, every energy of her people, to the maintenance of the peace of the world upon that foundation."⁴⁶

In his penultimate speech of the campaign, at Madison Square Garden, he spoke of his vision of international relations in the context of domestic politics and social justice. "In proportion as we defend the children, as we defend the women, as we see that the men are safe in the mines . . . will the country be triumphant in all its affairs," he told the forty thousand people assembled in the Garden. "We have formed, for the first time in recent years in this country a party of the people. We have set up government in response to the opinion of the people. . . . And as America feels her unity, she is gathering her force to play a part among the nations such as she was never able to play before. When Amer-

ica has found herself, then she will be able to play the part which it was destined she should play."⁴⁷

Wilson brought his two-point message to a climax in his final campaign address, at Shadow Lawn, New Jersey. He characterized the conditions of work in many regions of the United States as "a disgrace to our civilization." He had not *given* working people anything; he had simply gone "into the fight shoulder to shoulder with them to get the rights which no man has a right to give them." He questioned whether the Republicans even wanted "to expound the real heart of the social necessities and the political exigencies of America." Wilson's coalition, in contrast, was "trying to reconstruct America along the lines of justice and equity, which cut very much deeper than any party lines." The crisis of change at home was all the more exigent, he suggested, because it had a bearing upon and mirrored the life of the world. "We have seen that, unless we could unite and direct and purify the forces of this country, we could not do what it was necessary to do for the world through the instrumentality of America." Then, he declared: "The United States will never again be what it has been." For all time, America was caught "in the great drift of humanity which is to determine the politics of every country in the world." Thus so for the decision on Tuesday next, he said in a closing peroration. The great forces of humanity were growing stronger and stronger. "In the days to come, men will no long wonder how America is going to work out her destiny, for she will have proclaimed to them that her destiny is not divided from the destiny of the world, that her purpose is justice and love of humanity."⁴⁸

To Colonel House, Wilson's sponsorship of the league idea had an emphatic meaning. Even before the campaign had commenced, he warned Sir Edward Grey in a letter on July 15, "If the President is re-elected the people will have endorsed his position on this question and the country will stand committed to it."⁴⁹ This view was not restricted to partisan Democrats. Wilson's utterances on the league (as the epiphenomenon of his advanced progressivism) had a significant impact on progressive internationalists and, ultimately, on the election. Max Eastman's controversial remarks to the Woodrow Wilson Independent League in mid-October—about why Socialists could in good conscience vote for the administration—are a good example. Eastman had discussed, not only the President's labor policy, but also his foreign policy. "Wilson aggressively believes not only in keeping out of war, but in organizing the nations of the world to prevent war," he had said. "His official endorsement of propaganda for international federation in the interest of peace is the most important step that any President of the United States has taken towards civilizing the world since Lincoln."⁵⁰

Two weeks later, Herbert Croly, after agonizing (by all accounts) over whom to support, finally came out for Wilson, but not solely on the grounds of Wilson's domestic record, as it is always implied in scholarly discussions of that influential editor's decision.⁵¹ The President, Croly wrote in the October 21st issue of the *New Republic*, had "committed himself and his party to a revolutionary doctrine"—that is, to "ardent and intelligent support of the plan of international organization which has the best chance of substituting security for insecurity as the basis of international relationships." He described Wilson's campaign as "educative": "He has been gradually domesticating in the minds of the plain American people some sense of international responsibility. . . . In its net result his leadership has helped to bind the nation together, because it has been gradually squaring popular ideas about foreign policy with the facts of the American international situation. Public opinion . . . is better prepared for action than it was two years ago." Croly also attributed this apparent fact in part to "the bracing and healing effect of the administration's domestic policy." In the following issue of the *New Republic*, he added that "enormous progress" had been made in arousing American sentiment for the league, "chiefly as a consequence of President Wilson's assistance."⁵²

Because of the kind of re-election campaign that Wilson waged, the proposition of American membership in a league of nations had begun to put down roots. But the young plant grew in rocky, highly politicized soil. The contest between Wilson and Hughes turned into one of the bitterest and most rancorous in American political history; and rarely have the two major parties exhibited such strong ideological differences as they did in 1916. That the league issue would acquire a vexatious partisan dimension probably became unavoidable, however, when, just as the parties launched their campaigns, conservative internationalists failed to secure even a vague endorsement of their position in the Republican party platform.

Taft had lobbied strenuously for a plank based on the ideas of the League to Enforce Peace. But Roosevelt, still personally estranged from Taft, regarded the LEP's propaganda as an "education of evil." As Taft once noted, the fact that he was president of the LEP "is like a red flag to a bull to Roosevelt."⁵³ Republican opinion was therefore very much divided on the question. It fell to Henry Cabot Lodge to bridge the gap. Previously, Lodge himself had expressed general approval of the LEP, or so it seemed, inasmuch as he had shared the dais with Wilson on May 27. But as William C. Widenor has demonstrated, Lodge had always harbored suspicions. Ever the vigorous proponent of the Allies and of preparedness, he believed that the future peace could be maintained only by a large army and navy, and, perhaps, by Allied-American cooperation in a "league of victors." To the extent that the LEP matched these views, he

had endorsed its aims. (It should be added that Wilson's coupling of progressive internationalism with neutrality during the campaign only served to increase the senator's doubts about the desirability of a league—be it Taft's or Wilson's.)⁵⁴

In any case, Lodge's chief concern was the presidential campaign. "My one, overwhelming desire is to beat the Wilson administration," he told Roosevelt. "I shudder to think what four years more of that crowd would mean."⁵⁵ On this score, Taft was in complete accord; he realized that any disruption provoked by the party's two titular leaders—especially a battle over foreign policy—could only damage the party's chance to recapture the White House. Hence, at Lodge's insistence and with Taft's acquiescence, the Republican platform would contain only a general statement on behalf of the principle of arbitration.⁵⁶

Wilson's campaign, as House had predicted, deprived the Republicans of any completely serviceable issue. From child labor, rural credits, and preparedness, to Mexico, the European war, and the league idea in general, the President made the causes of advanced progressivism and, especially, peace and internationalism, his own. The situation was exacerbated by the campaign that the Republicans mounted. Charles Evans Hughes, the former governor of New York and an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, possessed impressive credentials—one wag referred to him as "Wilson with Whiskers"—and a few progressives initially applauded his nomination.⁵⁷ But Hughes proved to be a listless campaigner. Roosevelt privately dubbed him "the bearded iceberg," and William Allen White characterized the Republican ticket as "two estimable mutes . . . who could conduct nothing but a funeral."⁵⁸ More often than not, Hughes was on the defensive. Of crucial importance, his doubts about the virtues of the eight-hour day (or, rather, his hostility to it) and related domestic issues drove away probably tens of thousands of voters who feared that the Adamson Act, along with other social-justice measures, would be repealed by a Republican President and Congress.⁵⁹

On foreign policy, it was equally difficult to determine Hughes' position. Despite occasional references to the LEP and an innocuous declaration that the United States could no longer maintain its old policy of isolation, neither he nor his supporters gave the league idea the attention that Wilson did. The one indelible impression that Hughes made on the voters—mainly because he permitted Roosevelt to campaign for him, while the Democrats chanted their peace slogan everywhere they went—was that the country was more likely to get into the war under the Republicans than under the Democrats.⁶⁰ Moreover, as the contest heated up, contempt for Wilson among Republicans grew apace. Lodge characterized the administration as "the worst Presidency this country has ever had, and I do not except Buchanan."⁶¹ Taft, a Republican first and a sincere

internationalist second, regarded Wilson as "a ruthless hypocrite . . . who has no convictions that he would not barter at once for votes."⁶² What perhaps should have been more regrettable to the president of the League to Enforce Peace was the fact that, for a number of reasons, his party (and the LEP) had handed the issue of the league to Wilson and the Democrats virtually on a silver platter.

It is almost superfluous to say that the Republicans considered the outcome of the election something of a national disaster. Hughes swept the Northeast and the upper Middle West, with the exception of New Hampshire and Ohio. On election night, the *New York Times* conceded the race to the challenger and Wilson went to bed thinking about his imminent release from enormous responsibilities. But two days later, the official returns showed that Wilson had won not only the Democratic stronghold of the South, but also all the Western states, save South Dakota and Oregon. The final tally went as follows: Wilson, 9,131,511 popular votes and 277 electoral votes; Hughes, 8,548,935 popular votes and 254 electoral votes; Benson, 585,974 popular votes. The returns revealed an important personal victory for Wilson; he polled approximately 2,830,000 more votes than he had in 1912. His plurality over Hughes, however, came to only some 582,000 out of the 18,536,000 votes cast for all candidates.⁶³

So close was the race in several states that any single factor could have tipped the balance one way or the other. By all estimates, labor and the farm vote proved vital to the winning coalition, particularly in Ohio, the Plains states, and the Far West.⁶⁴ As a bloc, women also were a decisive factor. Wilson carried ten (all west of the Mississippi) of the twelve woman-suffrage states; women voted for him in disproportionately large numbers because of the peace issue.⁶⁵ Contemporary analysts and historians generally agree that the key to the dramatic victory was Wilson's appeal to voters who had supported Roosevelt in 1912. Across the board, he drew at least twenty per cent of the former Progressive vote.

Significantly, however, Wilson's proportionate share of the Socialist party vote was probably far greater. Slightly over thirty-three per cent of it shifted to him, or some 315,000 of the 901,000 who had supported Debs four years earlier—a figure that represented well over half of his overall margin of victory. At the local and state level, the Socialists improved their showing over 1912 by approximately 250,000. Reports of ticket-splitting at the top were common, however; and the fact that Wilson did well in states with a sizeable distribution of Socialists was crucial. For example, a switch of 1,983 votes in California (.01 per cent of all votes cast for Wilson and Hughes) would have given Hughes that state's thirteen electoral votes and thus the presidency. Wilson prevailed by attracting almost half of those 79,000 Californians who had favored Debs in 1912.⁶⁶ The

Golden State notwithstanding, if he had not made comparable inroads in New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Washington, Wilson would have lost those states' combined sixteen electoral votes as well as the national election. Literally all of Debs' 7,000 supporters of 1912 cast their ballots for Wilson in North Dakota, which gave him a plurality of 1,735; he squeaked through by fifty-six votes in New Hampshire where about a third of Debs' small bloc switched to the President; and some 17,000 of the 40,000 Socialist votes of 1912 moved to Wilson's column in Washington, where he bested Hughes by 16,000 out of approximately 380,000 votes cast.⁶⁷

There were similar trends in other parts of the country as well. According to Charles P. Taft, the ex-President's brother and owner of the Cincinnati *Times-Star*, Wilson owed his victory in Ohio (an electoral college prize of twenty-four) to the Socialist vote: "The President was radical enough to catch the extreme radical vote without being so radical as to drive away many moderates who on general lines favored his policies," Mr. Taft explained. Wilson won about 52,000 of those Ohioans (sixty per cent of his edge over Hughes) who had previously gone for Debs. The current ran in the same direction in Missouri, where Socialists made up about half of Wilson's margin.⁶⁸ Two independent reports—one by William English Walling and another by the New York *Evening Sun*—confirmed massive ticket-splitting in New York City; Socialists supported local party candidates but voted in the thousands for Wilson (albeit not enough for him to carry the state).⁶⁹ J. A. H. Hopkins, a leader of the Progressive party and a good friend of Wilson's, reported an identical pattern in New Jersey, at the rate of thirty per cent.⁷⁰ In Minneapolis, both Wilson and the Socialist candidate for mayor split an unexpectedly large number of ballots. Statewide, Wilson reduced the Debs bloc of 27,505 votes by 7,388. Had he succeeded in attracting another 393 Socialists, he would have carried Minnesota.⁷¹

In the context of the politics and diplomacy of the previous two years as well as of the nature of the campaign itself, we can assume that the implications of the returns were too awful for all Republicans and many conservative internationalists to contemplate. For their part, advanced progressives, socialists, and certainly all progressive internationalists had as much reason to rejoice as the right had to grieve. They and their triumphant, like-minded President had not merely checked the reactionaries; they had presided over the creation of a left-of-center coalition that now seemed to hold the balance of political power in the United States. At the very least, as so many pundits noted, Wilson had fulfilled William Jennings Bryan's dream of uniting the West and the South.⁷² Eastman acknowledged the birth of "the state capitalistic social reform party"; it was hardly a revolutionary party, but "its attack on the plutocracy was genuine and important," he said. "It was the clearest line-up we have had in

American politics."⁷³ One of Wilson's colleagues in the moribund Progressive party suggested that he had built the foundations for an entirely new party "to sweep the country clean"—a Progressive Democracy augmented by elements of the Socialist party.⁷⁴

Precisely what such conclusions portended for future domestic struggles could hardly be predicted. As for foreign policy, however, the election had surely sharpened the conflict imbedded in the diverse political configurations of the American internationalist movement. The participation of the United States in a league of nations now seemed a much greater likelihood; yet, in retrospect, the most compelling fact was that circumstances surrounding the election had, if anything, dimmed the prospects for bipartisan support for a league some two years before actual membership impended. Likewise, with regard to Europe, Wilson's electoral success had emboldened the league movement in Great Britain; but that movement, too, was far from united in purpose. Moreover, the Allied governments remained implacable in their opposition to ending the war on Wilson's terms.

Even so, the campaign of 1916 was the prelude to a new era in the history of international relations. By election day, Wilson had thrust the proposition of a league of nations into the vortex of political debate on both sides of the Atlantic. The American electorate had reconfirmed the new leader of the internationalist movement, who, in the course of his campaign, had implicitly committed his administration to pursuing the concept and cause of collective security. In this fact alone, Wilson's re-election marked the first important culmination in the quest for a new world order based on the League of Nations.

The American people had traveled a great distance since 1912. The legislative record the Wilson administration had achieved by the late summer of 1916 represented a watershed in American social and political history. Those four years also heralded the primacy of foreign affairs in the life of the nation. The United States, unlike any other major power, now had begun to weigh and to champion the New Diplomacy. The origins of this profound conjunction of events were manifold. From the strictly Wilsonian standpoint, they lay in his administration's prewar efforts on behalf of arbitration and conciliation, disarmament, and economic cooperation among nations. These aims further crystalized as Wilson gained experience in hemispheric diplomacy and as the magnitude and significance of the Great War became clearer to him. In his mind, the European conflict illustrated the utter necessity of establishing instrumentalities that, in addition to securing peace, would also insure the right of self-determination for all peoples and "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind" by the major governments of the world.

In all of this, it would be misleading to portray a solitary Wilson, imperturbably rolling over in his mind political systems and possible solutions to the world crisis. As several historians have pointed out, he was indebted to the formulations of the British radicals;⁷⁵ but the British radical influence has perhaps been exaggerated. Wilson owed his greatest debt to the American progressive internationalists—the advance guard of the New Diplomacy in the United States and the impassioned proponents of a fledgling, Americanized version of social democracy. The American political origins of the New Diplomacy lay in the intellectual communion that Wilson and the American left and liberal-left had carried on together, and that was now manifested in the unusual political coalition that had just elected him to a second term. Out of the hybrid of liberal and socialist perspectives had blossomed Wilson's formula for a community of nations as well as a program for social and economic justice at home. Perhaps more important than anything else, the progressive internationalists had helped Wilson to grasp the fact—which his own experience and independent thinking corroborated—that the opponents of domestic reform and the advocates of militarism, imperialism, and balance-of-power politics were twins born of the same womb.

At the same time, Wilson's distinctive contribution should not be underestimated. He had become the touchstone by which progressive internationalist ideas acquired force and legitimacy. Because of him, conservative proponents of the league as well as the center-right opposition in both America and Europe would have to reckon with potentially revolutionary concepts in international relations. No one, then, who had voted either for or against Wilson, or who had watched the proceedings from afar, could fail to see the deeper meaning of the politics of 1916. "[I]f public education is equal to the strain of understanding what the President is trying to do, he may accomplish a service perhaps larger than any other president," Amos Pinchot submitted. "For the President we re-elected has raised a new flag, or, at all events, a flag that no other president has thought or perhaps dared to raise. It is the flag of internationalism."⁷⁶ The United States, as Wilson himself had declared on the eve of his victory, would never again be what it had been.

7

“All the Texts of the Rights of Man”

Manifestoes for Peace and War

A few days after Wilson's re-election, his greatest admirer among British journalists declared that in the next few years the United States would become “the single greatest political potentiality on earth.” This was so, wrote A. G. Gardiner, because the President was struggling toward a conception of a society of nations. Gardiner praised Wilson's unrewarded efforts to construct such a community in the Western Hemisphere and even went so far as to defend American neutrality. If the great powers of Europe could only be brought to see their own self-interest, those policies might, in the end, “bring all the nations into this world society, regulated by law and backed by force which alone can make the rule of law valid.” This was “the only vision that makes the future thinkable.”¹

Gardiner's praise of Wilson's higher purpose, however, overlooked the absence of any concrete achievements on behalf of that purpose. By November 1916, the Pan-American Pact had slipped beyond resuscitation, and the belligerents stood no closer to peace than they had two years before. Yet Wilson—imbued with the ideas of progressive internationalism, in the grip of intellectual metamorphosis, and acutely aware of the historical moment—was the first major statesman to commit his government to the pursuit of a league of nations; soon, while the United States remained a neutral, he would become the first statesman to articulate a

comprehensive synthesis of progressive internationalism—a New Diplomacy based upon the principles of the equality of nations, self-determination, the peaceful settlement of disputes, freedom of the seas, disarmament, and collective security.

Wilson's re-election meant different things to different people. To A. G. Gardiner, it represented something akin to the salvation of Europe. To Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, it signaled the diminution of the character of the American people and perhaps (through Wilson's spineless neutrality) the destruction of Western European civilization, if the United States acquiesced in a German victory. Wilson himself could interpret the election as a referendum on neutrality and, by reasonable inference, on the desirability of both a negotiated settlement of the war and the establishment of a league of nations to maintain that settlement. At the same time, Wilson fully realized that Germany shared the bouquet for the happy circumstance that had facilitated the slogan, "He Kept Us Out of War." Although he was content to have his managers run with it, Wilson, personally, never felt comfortable with such prating; any little German lieutenant, he knew, at any moment could throw the country into an irremediable crisis by some unexpected outrage on the high seas. Thus, strengthened by the electoral mandate for peace, he was now determined to force a compromise in Europe. As before, he believed that the most alluring inducement he could offer the belligerents was the promise of postwar collective security. Conversely, he was no less resolute in the conviction that a military standoff was essential to the creation of a peace-keeping organization. During the few remaining months before the war would engulf the United States, in Wilson's thought and diplomacy the quest for a negotiated peace and a league of nations became symbiotically linked.

On November 10, 1916, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, addressed the Reichstag and pledged that Germany would cooperate to establish a peace league after the war in order to prevent the recurrence of another monstrous catastrophe. "Germany is at all times ready to join a league of nations," he said; "yes, even to place herself at the head of such a league—to keep in check the disturbers of the peace."² Bethmann's declaration may have been, as the *New Republic* asserted, "the most momentous and encouraging utterance" made by any belligerent spokesman since the beginning of the war.³ But the speech was motivated by a number of considerations. Bethmann was responding in part to growing restiveness among Social Democrats in the Reichstag and, it was said, to Wilson's campaign speeches about the league (in particular, the ones he had made in Cincinnati).⁴ Bethmann's appearance before the Reichstag amounted to a public invitation to Wilson to resume his mediatorial efforts.

The German government was receptive to a negotiated settlement for the same reasons that the Allies opposed it—that is, because the Central Powers now commanded the Continent from northern France to Eastern Europe. Bethmann also sought Wilson's help because he did not know how much longer he would be able to withstand renewed pressure from within the German High Command to reinstitute unrestricted submarine warfare; this, he feared, would mean war with the United States. Already he had instructed Count von Bernstorff to explore the possibilities with Colonel House, and to indicate that Germany would be willing to evacuate Belgium and France as a first step.⁵

The Allies, meanwhile, once again had indicated their unchanging view of mediation even as Wilson was making his campaign speeches on the League. On September 28, David Lloyd George, Great Britain's war minister, told the press that, until Prussian despotism was crushed, outside interference would not be tolerated. "Peace now or at any time before the final and complete elimination of this menace is unthinkable," he avowed. "The fight must be to the finish—to a knockout."⁶ Since that time, nothing had passed between London and Washington to indicate a change of heart.

In the circumstances, Wilson told House, on November 14, that he was prepared to send a note to all of the belligerents and demand that the war cease. He must act soon if the United States were to avoid drifting into war over the submarine issue, and in such a way as to persuade the Allies that, through his offices, they could obtain everything that they claimed to be fighting for.⁷

Before writing the note itself, Wilson composed a lengthy prolegomenon, an eloquent indictment of the balance-of-power system, which he never sent and never showed to anyone. "War before this one used to be a sort of national excursion . . . with brilliant battles lost and won, national heroes decorated, and all sharing in the glory accruing to the state," he wrote. "But can this vast, gruesome contest of systematized destruction . . . be pictured in that light . . . wherein the big, striking thing for the imagination to respond to was untold human suffering? . . . Where is any longer the glory commensurate with the sacrifice of the millions of men required in modern warfare to carry and defend Verdun?"⁸

The actual draft of the peace note was more restrained; but it, too, revealed the progressive's despair over a holocaust that humankind never previously imagined possible.⁹ After reading it, both Colonel House and Secretary Lansing argued that the introduction—which placed the war aims of all the belligerents on the same plane—would enrage the Allies. House recommended that Wilson explicitly state that he was not attempting to impose mediation and later suggested that the House-Grey Memorandum be activated instead.¹⁰ Wilson spurned that idea as obsolete. If

necessary, he would use coercion to compel the Allies to come to the peace table. Shortly after he finished the draft of his peace note, he instigated a formal warning from the Federal Reserve Board to American bankers against making any further unsecured loans to the Allies.¹¹ During the next weeks, the troubled, chain-smoking Lansing fretted openly—House was far subtler—over the possibility of Germany's acceptance and England's rejection of the President's overture. "Would it not be a calamity for the nation, and for all mankind?" he asked Wilson.¹²

There were, however, other voices to counter Lansing's. On December 2, Wilson received an advance copy of "An Open Letter to Americans" by Charles P. Trevelyan, radical pacifist of the Union of Democratic Control and a Member of Parliament. "My countrymen do not see that your approval of the League of Peace amounts to an American cooperation in the objects for which they profess to be fighting—a secure civilization," Trevelyan wrote. "Sooner or later your espousal of that plan will affect the course of the war. It will shorten it." Trevelyan also appealed personally to Wilson to remind him of his standing in world opinion. "However much you try to influence Prime Ministers and Chancellors, it is far more important that your great, sane policy should be heard and understood by peoples," he wrote. "I am certain you can evoke the spirit that will make mediation possible."¹³ These were welcome words. "That was a most impressive letter from Mr. Trevelyan," Wilson wrote to House. "The time is near at hand for *something!*"¹⁴

As Wilson polished his peace note, new political developments in Great Britain brought about the downfall of the Asquith-Grey government and the formation of a center-right coalition, on December 7. Lloyd George was now Prime Minister, and Arthur James Balfour became Foreign Secretary; neither was enthusiastic about a league of nations.¹⁵ On the following day, in Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm listened to his advisers debate the potential advantages of a negotiated peace versus victory through expanded undersea operations. The outcome was that Bethmann Hollweg would be permitted one final peace initiative—which he took on December 12—while the Navy was to prepare for submarine warfare against all vessels in the event that the Chancellor's move failed.¹⁶

Wilson dispatched his own peace note on December 18, the first instance in which he directly thrust himself into the politics of the war. It began by calling attention to the fact that the *apparent* objects of the belligerent governments were "virtually the same." His review of their stated objects emphasized that each side was "ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world." But, he beseeched them, the war had to be ended now so that "millions upon millions of lives will not continue to be sacrificed . . . and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned

for or repaired." The President was not proposing peace, or even offering to mediate. He was simply requesting a direct statement of terms—earnest soundings that might reveal "how near the haven of peace we may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing."¹⁷

Because it was the first official, public statement that suggested that the United States was willing to join a postwar peacekeeping organization, Wilson's note set off the first important debate on the league issue to take place on the floor of the Senate. On December 21, the day that Wilson's peace note was published, Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Democrat of Nebraska, introduced a resolution endorsing the President's action.¹⁸ Over the next few days, several Republican senators—including Henry Cabot Lodge, Jacob H. Gallinger of New Hampshire, and the progressive William E. Borah of Idaho—rose to speak against the measure. While they did not necessarily object to Wilson's request for a statement of terms, Lodge, in particular, accused the White House of partiality toward Germany and indicated that he did not want to find the United States suddenly ranged against the side that he personally believed was "fighting the battle of freedom and democracy as against military autocracy."¹⁹ The senator and his fellow Republicans were also alarmed in this instance by the implied commitment to membership in a league of nations. This commitment constituted an irrevocable break with tradition, Lodge said. It meant the abandonment of the venerable policy "of confining ourselves to our own hemisphere, and makes us part of the political system of another hemisphere." How much, he wanted to know, would such a sweeping change interfere with the security and sovereignty of the United States? Would it not shatter the Monroe Doctrine, the bulwark that had repelled European encroachments for nearly a century?²⁰ These were all important and legitimate questions that Wilson had yet to answer satisfactorily.

Lodge's arguments were not based on isolationist sentiments. Intellectually, his objections stemmed from his own unilateralist approach to internationalism, which countenanced few of the restrictions on American freedom of action that Wilson's references to the league seemed to entail; but, perhaps more important at this juncture, he took exception to the league because Wilson had attached the proposal to an "inconclusive peace." In any event, the Senate passed an amended version of Hitchcock's resolution by a vote of forty-eight to seventeen (with Lodge among the latter) and thirty-one abstentions. The resolution simply endorsed Wilson's call for a statement of peace terms.²¹

Although the senatorial discord was a portent of what lay beyond the horizon, it was drowned out by acclaim for the peace note.²² In official European circles, however, it was quite another matter. Again, as in the case of his address to the League to Enforce Peace, Wilson's assimilation

of the belligerents' motives incensed the Allied governments and most of the Allied press. Ambassador Page used the words "sorrow," "anger," and "disappointment" to describe the mood in London. James Bryce was "profoundly depressed" when he sought out the ambassador. Asquith could not bring himself to discuss Wilson's note with anyone. The King, reportedly, wept. The UDC, Page wrote, was the "only section of opinion that is pleased."²³

Much like the great majority of the Allied press—which accused Wilson of working hand-in-glove with the Central Powers—the Pan-German press asserted that the President was seeking to rob the Fatherland of deserved victory. Many leaders within the German High Command, including the Kaiser, shared this view. Nonetheless, Germany avowed its willingness both to confer with the enemy and to cooperate with the United States in the "sublime task" of establishing a peace league.²⁴

The German response was less important for what it said than for what it did not say; that is, it did not indicate specific terms under which the Central Powers would agree to negotiate. This evasiveness allowed the Allied governments to reject Bethmann's peace note of December 12 as insincere. To enter into a conference without knowing exactly what Germany was proposing "is to put our heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of Germany," Lloyd George assured the House of Commons.²⁵ Of course, the Allies could not so easily dismiss Wilson's request for terms. They would, indeed, respond with a list of specifics—and with some assistance from the American Secretary of State.

On the day that Wilson's note was published, Lansing was almost prostrate with worry that the President would permanently alienate the Allies. "When we go into the war," he had written in his diary on December 3, "we *must* go in on the side of the Allies."²⁶ Suddenly he took it upon himself to tell the press that the note was not, in fact, a peace note; it was merely an effort to learn exactly what the belligerents' aims were because the United States was "drawing nearer the verge of war itself."²⁷

Lansing's statement set off an explosion that reverberated from Washington to Wall Street. When Wilson first learned of it, he considered firing Lansing on the spot. He relented, however, at this delicate juncture, and simply ordered him to issue a public retraction on the following day.²⁸ But this was not the only nail that Lansing had driven into the coffin. On December 20 and 21, he had conferred with the British and French ambassadors and recommended that the Allies respond to the note by demanding the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, an indemnity for France, Belgium, and Serbia, and the democratization of Germany—in short, terms that only the victor could impose on the vanquished.²⁹

Arthur S. Link has characterized this attempted sabotage as "one of

the most egregious acts of treachery in American history."³⁰ Be that as it may, the Allies were capable of framing a reply—without instructions from Lansing—calculated to thwart Wilson and to encourage Germany to revert to unrestricted submarine warfare (which is what the Secretary of State hoped would happen). In any event, when the Allies responded on January 10, 1917, their terms included all of Lansing's suggestions, as well as an obligatory expression on behalf of a postwar league of nations.³¹

In the meantime, Colonel House had prevailed upon Count von Bernstorff to find out whether Berlin would be willing to reveal to Wilson, in strictest confidence, its specific terms, thus enabling the President to begin mediation.³² This breakthrough caused Wilson to believe that the elusive goal was within reach. While awaiting Bethmann's reply to von Bernstorff, as well as the Allies' response to his own note of December 18, he came to a momentous decision. After twenty-nine months of neutrality, he would finally explain to the peoples of the world what he believed the general terms of the settlement ought to be—the kind of peace which the United States would be willing to uphold. This, Wilson's climactic attempt to end the war, would beget the most important American pronouncement on international relations since the Monroe Doctrine—the supreme progressive internationalist synthesis and the basis of all of Wilson's state papers thereafter.

Wilson discussed his idea with House on January 3. "We thought that the main principle he should lay down was the right of nations to determine under what governments they should continue to live," the Colonel recorded in his diary. "The keystone to the settlement arch," they agreed, should be "the future security of the world against wars and letting territorial adjustments be subordinate to the main purpose." "You are now playing with what the poker players term 'the blue chips,'" House said.³³

Most senators were taken by surprise on January 22 when Vice President Marshall announced at noon that, within the hour, the President would make a personal communication to them concerning foreign affairs. Not since George Washington had any president addressed a formal session of that body. Senators rushed to take their seats and members of the lower house packed the gallery and the back of the chamber. According to the *New York Times*, as Wilson spoke, the entire audience leaned forward in solemn, strained attention so as not to miss a word.³⁴

Since the parties to the Great War had replied to his recent request for a statement of terms, he began, they were all that much closer to peace discussions. It was, therefore, his duty to disclose to the council associated with him in the final determination of foreign policy his thoughts and purposes in regard to the foundations of the anticipated settlement.

The creation of a league of nations, he declared, was the one essential element of the peace to come: "In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again." It was "inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise." This was the destiny they had sought to prepare themselves for since the Founding Fathers. He then went a step further, in an expansion of his previous comment, which was informed by the Pan-American Pact: "No covenant of cooperative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war." Together, the Americas would lend "their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world." To this he added a vigorous brief on behalf of collective security, reminiscent of his justification of preparedness to the American Union Against Militarism: "It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed . . . that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it." The peace must be made secure "by the organized major force of mankind."

Wilson then turned to an analysis of the basic structural causes of the European conflict. "Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement?" he asked. "There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace." If, as the belligerents had repeatedly claimed, neither side wished to crush the other, then the peace must be "a peace without victory." A decision by arms would mean peace forced on the loser, "accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last."

He then outlined the basic principles upon which both the peace and a league must stand. They constituted his version of the New Diplomacy. First, "the equality of nations . . . must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak." Second, no peace could last "which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. . . . Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will

inevitably be upset." Third, every people, so far as practicable, should be assured an outlet to the sea. "Freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality and cooperation." Fourth, "there can be no sense of safety and of equality among nations if great and preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained." The question of armaments, he said, was "the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind."

As if to answer some of his Republican critics, Wilson characterized his proposals as the logical culmination of, rather than a departure from, American diplomatic tradition. "I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful. . . . There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. . . ."

"These are American principles, American policies," he said in conclusion. "We could stand for no other. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail."³⁵

A sharp round of applause broke the momentary silence after Wilson finished speaking. Virtually every Democrat and a significant number of Republicans gave the President unstinting praise. "It was the greatest message of the century," exclaimed Senator John F. Shafroth of Colorado, on behalf of the Democrats. "We have just passed through a very important hour in the life of the world," said Senator La Follette, who led the applause from the other side of the aisle.³⁶ William Howard Taft stated that adherents of the League to Enforce Peace could "rejoice sincerely."³⁷ Several senators who previously held doubts about the league admitted that they were now completely won over. Others, however, described Wilson's proposals as utopian, presumptuous, and impracticable. One Republican remarked, "The President thinks he is President of the whole world"; while another quipped that the address "will make Don Quixote wish he hadn't died so soon." Senator Lodge declined immediate comment. "Peace without victory," Roosevelt said a week later, "is the natural ideal of the man who is too proud to fight."³⁸

Partisan critics notwithstanding, Wilson's "Peace Without Victory" address met with the same response from every quarter as did his address to the League to Enforce Peace and his peace note. This time, however, in the United States, the superlatives and comparisons with the Declaration of Independence were all the more excessive. "The President's great-

est utterance," the *New York Times* said, served notice to all the world that "in the great adjustments at the end of the war our views must be consulted, our interests must have representation."³⁹ Herbert Croly told Colonel House that "it was the greatest event in his own life" and wrote to Wilson to say that the address "will reverberate throughout history." The *New Republic's* editorials were only slightly less fulsome.⁴⁰

On behalf of the American Union Against Militarism, Lillian Wald, Oswald Garrison Villard, Paul Kellogg, and Amos Pinchot stated that Wilson had rendered "a service to all humanity which it is impossible to exaggerate." To their minds, the address was "destined to an immortality as glorious as that of the Gettysburg Address." Wilson's pronouncements on the league and his call for peace without victory, they continued, would penetrate "every American town and hamlet" as well as the "silent mass of mankind."⁴¹ Max Eastman, upon reflection, was not to be outdone by his liberal friends in the AUAM. "I believe that the histories of the nations of the world will hold a venerated record of President Wilson's address to the Senate," he said in the *Masses*. As one of the few commentators to point out that it was significantly different from the program of the League to Enforce Peace, Eastman added (in perhaps the most amazing assessment of all) that Wilson's formulation was "the one hope of preserving that struggle for a new civilization which we call Socialism, or Syndicalism, or the Social Revolution, or the Labor Struggle, from the continual corruption of militarism, and the ravaging set-back of patriotic war."⁴² If any doubts had lingered in their minds, Wilson had surely vindicated and even enhanced the faith that progressive internationalists of all persuasions had reposed in him in November.

Since Wilson's address was not a formal diplomatic communication, none of the belligerent governments gave out a formal response. But the British government's attitude was well represented by Viscount Bryce. Wilson's goals were admirable, he wrote to Colonel House, but unattainable so long as Germany remained a militarist autocracy. In the Allied press, the opinion was the same, though much less friendly in tone. Likewise, in Germany, many commentators noted the impartiality of Wilson's statements, but doubted their practicability, especially in view of the Allies' announcement of uncompromising war aims on January 10. Others more critical were rankled by Wilson's presumption that he could parcel out the whole of Europe, and wondered who had asked him for his views in the first place.⁴³

How Wilson could have expected, at this time, to achieve the kind of peace he had outlined is difficult to fathom in light of the previous succession of rebuffs that he had met with, and considering what he knew about the belligerents' ambitions. But, as he wrote to John Palmer Gavit, "the real people I was speaking to was [*sic*] neither the Senate nor foreign governments, as you will realize, but the *people* of the countries now at

war."⁴⁴ From this perspective, in Europe (and, as we have seen, in the United States), he had achieved a great deal. On January 26, the French Socialist party registered "with joy the admirable message of President Wilson" and asked that the French Government "instantly and clearly declare its agreement with Wilson's noble words of reason." When the "Peace Without Victory" address was read aloud to the annual conference of the British Labour party, the delegates stood and cheered Wilson's name for five minutes. Previously, this important group, unfaltering in its support for the war, had repudiated the goals of the Union of Democratic Control and the radical Independent Labour party; but now, Labour joined with the radicals and unanimously passed a resolution calling for "the formation of an international League to enforce the Maintenance of Peace on the plan advocated by the President of the United States."⁴⁵ And from the foreign ministry in Petrograd came word, on January 26, that Russia, reeling after two and a half years of savage blows from the German and Austrian armies, embraced Wilson's program in its entirety.⁴⁶ (All of these developments transpired within two days.) Thus Wilson's address had opened the floodgates of an ensuing international debate on war aims—in spite of the obduracy of the belligerent governments themselves—and caused the first cracks in the political truces within and among the Allied countries.

As a peace move, "Peace Without Victory" failed. Nonetheless, Wilson had drawn the attention of practically the entire world to the fact that the warring nations, in their responses to his peace note, had joined the United States in a commitment to the proposition of collective security. The creation of some kind of league of nations at the conclusion of the war now seemed a virtual certainty. Most significant of all, however, the address marked the first time that any statesman of stature had launched such a penetrating critique of European imperialism, militarism, and balance-of-power politics. In their stead, Wilson had called for a "community of nations," sustained by general disarmament, self-determination, freedom of the seas, and collective security. The chief instrumentality of this new world order to supersede the old system was to be a "League of Nations." Thus, Wilson had spoken to every major issue and had offered an answer to every important question the war had raised, or would raise. With this grand synthesis of progressive internationalism, forged in the struggle for neutrality, Wilson began his ascent to a position of central importance in the history of international relations in the twentieth century. The "Peace Without Victory" address was *the* Wilsonian manifesto of the Great War.

Even as Wilson digested the voluminous commentary on his address, the irony of fate was overtaking his exertions with cruel indifference. On January 9, the pro-submarine faction within the German High Command

had become a majority. Wilhelm's advisers argued that the Allies had demonstrated their true intentions in their responses to both Wilson's and Bethmann Hollweg's peace notes; only by making war on ships of every flag could victory be Germany's, and the war would be over before the United States would have a chance to affect the outcome.

Count von Bernstorff received word of this drastic change of policy on January 20, but kept it to himself. On January 26, Colonel House told the ambassador of a letter Wilson had written him just two days before: "If Germany really wants peace she can get it, and get it soon, *if she will but confide in me and let me have a chance.*"⁴⁷ Bernstorff apparently was moved, and made a last, vain attempt to convince his superiors in Berlin of the wisdom of mediation. By then, however, Germany's sizable fleet of long-range submarines had already steamed to their positions, beyond the point of recall. Moreover, British intelligence had intercepted the Foreign Office's previous instructions to Bernstorff; the Allies had only to pay lip service to Wilson and wait for an incident to occur that would bring on war between the United States and Germany. Bernstorff's attempt to blunt the effect of the new submarine policy was all for naught: when, at the designated time, he was to inform the American government of the new conditions of war, he was told that he could also tell Wilson, in confidence, of the terms under which Germany would have been willing to enter into negotiations if the Allies had accepted Bethmann's peace proposal of December 12. In addition, the ambassador should encourage Wilson to continue his efforts, but the President should know—and, in this, Wilhelm was adamant—that he would not be welcome to participate even if he were able to bring a peace conference about. Bernstorff delivered the grim message to Lansing on January 31.⁴⁸

Wilson paced the floor and rearranged his books as he and House discussed the situation on the following day. House openly advocated a policy that had been in the back of his mind for so long—the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. On February 2, the Cabinet concurred in House's judgment: Germany's unqualified decision left him no choice. Yet, when he announced the diplomatic break before Congress on February 3, Wilson expressed the hope that Germany would not actually sink American ships. While pursuing a policy of "armed neutrality," Wilson continued to work for a negotiated peace in the belief that justice could be done only if the conflict ended in a draw.⁴⁹

Events in February and March did not bode well for Wilson or armed neutrality. On February 25, a German U-boat sank the British passenger liner *Laconia* without warning and with the loss of two American lives. On the following day, Wilson learned of a fantastic secret plot in which Arthur Zimmermann, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had attempted to induce Mexico to declare war on the United States in

the event of war between Germany and the United States, with the "lost provinces" of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas as bait. In light of the recent history of Mexican-American relations, the Germans could not have made a more unfortunate choice of countries with which to conspire. Not even the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare disturbed Wilson as much; the Zimmermann Note virtually shattered his confidence in Germany's good intentions. When the plot was made public under blazing headlines on March 1, the reaction rivaled the uproar that had accompanied the sinking of the *Lusitania*. Then, in mid-March, German submarines, after having sunk hundreds of thousands of tons of Allied vessels, demonstrated the frailty of armed neutrality by sending to the bottom three American merchant ships—the *City of Memphis*, the *Illinois*, and the *Vigilancia*. On March 20, the Cabinet unanimously recommended full-fledged belligerency.⁵⁰ "He is to be for recognizing war and taking hold of the situation in such a fashion as will eventually lead to an Allies' victory over Germany," the Secretary of the Interior wrote of the President on April 1. "But he goes unwillingly."⁵¹

Although Wilson had not abandoned his cherished goals, from the moment that he announced the break with Germany on February 3, the progressive internationalist movement was hurled onto the horns of a dilemma and suffered wounds from which it would never completely recover. It was one thing for Theodore Roosevelt's organ, the *Outlook* (along with countless other publications), to demand war during the week of March 14.⁵² It was quite another for the *New Republic*, a month earlier, to have characterized Germany's war against the Allies as "a war against the civilization of which we are a part." With an almost mystical faith that the means would not alter the ends, that fount of progressivism asserted that, by joining in the "the defense of the Atlantic world," the United States "would weight it immeasurably in favor of liberalism and make the organization of a league of peace an immediately practical object of statesmanship."⁵³

Yet, until at least the end of February—before intrigue in Mexico and the sinking of American ships changed public attitudes—it was the more radical and pacifistic elements of the progressive internationalist movement who seemed to speak for the majority of Americans. As if to counter the *New Republic*, Paul Kellogg coincidentally wrote in the *Survey*'s issue of February 17 that the United States was now "the world's only great reservoir of good will and resource for the generous purposes of reconstruction." Go in now, he warned, and that, and much more, would be lost forever.⁵⁴ Leading members of the AUAM, the Women's Peace party, the Socialist party, and not a few Democrats marshaled their collective energies to prevent "ignominious eleventh-hour participation in

a struggle for mastery that is not our own." On February 12, they staged a march on Washington. Other great antiwar rallies (matched by equally well subscribed pro-interventionist congregations) were held in major cities throughout the country. In Philadelphia, James Maurer called for a general strike in the event of a declaration of war. The AUAM took out full-page ads in major newspapers on behalf of continued armed neutrality and democracy at home.⁵⁵ On February 28, Wilson received 150 delegates of the newly formed Emergency Peace Federation, headed by Louis Lochner, Jane Addams, and Emily Balch. That same afternoon he met with a delegation from the AUAM, led by Lillian Wald and Amos Pinchot, and listened to a moving memorial on behalf of forbearance by Max Eastman.⁵⁶

Leaders of the AUAM probably realized that they could not indefinitely hold back the surging interventionist tide when principled colleagues in their ranks struggled with their own souls. In late February, Rabbi Stephen Wise, sweat streaming down his face, told the AUAM's executive committee that triumphant Prussianism posed a greater threat to democratic and progressive internationalist values than any possible consequences of American belligerency. By the end of March, many prominent Socialist party members, including William English Walling, Charles Edward Russell, and Upton Sinclair, had come to the same conclusion. It is no wonder that Lillian Wald was moved to write to Wilson's private secretary: "Our anxieties are with the President. His friends hardly sleep at night or rest by day in their ardent desire to help him sustain his high moral plane and to keep out of the war."⁵⁷

There is no direct evidence that reveals why Wilson decided to lead the country into war. To be sure, a number of cumulative influences weighed upon him. Arthur S. Link has suggested that the *immediate* factors that shaped his decision were twofold: Germany's flagrant assault upon American lives and property, and the Zimmermann Note. Together they caused him to lose all faith in the intentions of the German government. Link further concludes that Wilson chose war because he believed that the European conflict was in its final stages and that American intervention would hasten its end; but that he did not choose war because he regarded the Allied cause as altogether just and the Central Powers' cause as altogether unjust. Rather, he believed that American belligerency would insure his place at the peace conference at the end of the war and thereby guarantee a liberal settlement and American participation in a league of nations.⁵⁸ In the opinion of this writer, the latter considerations—and especially the promise of a league of nations—were the crucial factors in Wilson's decision, once Germany demonstrated its intention to prosecute submarine warfare without quarter.

On February 11, long before Wilson had made up his mind, Lloyd

George conveyed a personal message to the President through Ambassador Page. The Prime Minister wanted the United States to enter the war, not simply to help in the fighting, but to help in the peace-making. "The President's presence at the peace conference is necessary for the proper organization of the world," he insisted. "Nobody therefore can have so commanding a voice. . . . Convey to him this deep conviction of mine. He must help make peace if the peace made at the conference is to be worth keeping. American participation would enable him to be there and the mere effect of his participation would shorten the war, might even end it very quickly."⁵⁹

Wilson well understood the underlying motive behind the Prime Minister's plea; he had no illusions about the purported virtues of Allied war aims. (In fact, Lloyd George had not even begun to think seriously about a league of nations.) But others in Great Britain who genuinely shared Wilson's outlook—including the leaders of the UDC—cultivated the nobler idea quite persuasively. For instance, as early as November 1916, Norman Angell sent the President a lengthy memorandum on the subject. Wilson's professions of unconcern with the causes and objects of the war were illogical, he argued, for they contradicted his other avowed convictions. The United States *was* involved in the war by sheer force of circumstance, and it should not permit itself to drift into hostilities simply as a result of some humiliation inflicted by a belligerent. Theoretically, Wilson's neutrality was unsound—it had been all along, if he truly believed in collective security—in its protests against violations of American rights alone: "Only by directing efforts first to the establishment of rights which are common to all can particular rights be safeguarded." In a community of nations, no one was secure against aggression unless all were secure; and, Angell concluded, unless the United States entered the war for that purpose, then a punitive peace—a peace that would sow the seeds of another war—was inevitable.⁶⁰

Charles P. Trevelyan had put it more succinctly, in a somewhat different context, in his "Open Letter to Americans." "Sooner or later," he had written in reference to Wilson and the league, "your espousal of that plan will affect the course of the war. It will shorten it." Noel Buxton, another leader of the UDC, added in late February that, whereas he had previously supported American neutrality, he now believed that Wilson "could do more good by 'coming in' as a check on the Entente jingoes."⁶¹

Walter Lippmann effectively assimilated these views (in consultation with Colonel House) and sent them to Wilson in a memorandum on March 11. Lippmann knew that, despite Germany's deplorable course, Wilson's long-range objectives had not changed; the point now was that the German government posed the greatest obstacle to their realization.

Whenever Germany was ready to abandon its present policies it would be welcome in a league of nations. In the meantime, the United States faced a terrible dilemma. The solution to it lay in Wilson's principles and the quality of his leadership. Under Wilson, belligerency would always remain subordinate to liberal policy and to the goal of establishing a league of nations. Indeed, Lippmann concluded, "the only victory in this war that could compensate mankind for its horrors is the victory of international order over national aggression."⁶²

Perhaps the best evidence that these kinds of invocations penetrated Wilson's thought and provided the solution to his dilemma comes from Jane Addams' poignant account of the Emergency Peace Federation's visit to the White House on February 28. "The President's mood was stern and far from the scholar's detachment," she later recalled. "He still spoke to us, however, as to fellow pacifists to whom he was forced to confess that war had become inevitable. He used one phrase which I had heard Colonel House use so recently that it still stuck firmly in my memory. The phrase was to the effect that, as head of a nation participating in the war, the President of the United States would have a seat at the Peace Table, but that if he remained the representative of a neutral country he could at best only 'call through a crack in the door.' The appeal he made was, in substance, that the foreign policies which we so extravagantly admired could have a chance if he were there to push and to defend them, but not otherwise."⁶³

One is tempted to make a final comment about Wilson's decision that, in a sense, is implicit in all of the foregoing. In January 1916, Robert Bridges, England's poet laureate, published a small volume entitled *The Spirit of Man*. The war, he wrote, had made it increasingly necessary to affirm that "man is a spiritual being and the proper work of his mind is to interpret the world according to his higher nature." For Europeans, such an outlook was now all the more essential because it lent "distraction from a grief that is intolerable constantly to face, nay impossible to face without the trust in God which makes all things possible."⁶⁴ Bridges might have said much the same about Wilson. For Wilson was a deeply religious man, the son and grandson of Presbyterian ministers, and the statesman who had called for peace without victory. He was intensely aware of the fact that perhaps thousands of young Americans might go to their deaths upon his command. Once, during a campaign address in October, he had said in defense of neutrality, "When you are asked, 'Aren't you willing to fight?' reply, yes, you are waiting for something worth fighting for; that you are not looking about for petty quarrels, but that you are looking about for that sort of quarrel within whose intricacies are written all the texts of the rights of man."⁶⁵ Only the reasonable prospect of redemption—the hope of a league of nations and lasting peace, attainable, now,

apparently only through the crucible of war—could permit someone such as Wilson, in whom fate had so mixed the elements, to pronounce the words for belligerency.

Thus, on the evening of April 2, 1917, Wilson asked Congress to recognize that a state of war existed between their country and the German empire. He began by indicting submarine warfare as "a warfare against humanity" and recounted the events of the previous two months. Because armed neutrality had proved impracticable, he said, the United States was compelled to accept the status of belligerent that had thus been thrust upon it.

After outlining the measures necessary for getting the country's war effort underway, he turned to more transcendent matters. His thoughts, he said, were still the same as when he had addressed the Senate on January 22: "Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles." Yet he emphasized several times, in all of this, the United States had no quarrel with the German people themselves; it was not they, but their military masters, who had brought on the war. "A steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants."

He continued: "The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them."

Then, in words that one observer compared to Shakespeare's for their rhetorical grace and power, Wilson compressed into a final peroration his vision of the American historical mission, in all its arrogance and innocence—a summons to the New World to return to the Old to vindicate the creed for which it had broken away a hundred and forty years before:

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts,—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the

rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.⁶⁶

In the thirty-six minutes that it took to deliver the address, Wilson had seemingly united behind him the preponderance of the American people. Even Lodge and Roosevelt admitted being impressed by the President's words and performance. Of all the outpouring of public commentary, none better captured the thoughts and emotions of Wilson's admirers and critics at that moment than the *New Republic*. "Our debt and the world's debt to Woodrow Wilson is immeasurable," the editors wrote. "Only a statesman who will be called great could have made American intervention mean so much to the generous forces of the world, could have lifted the inevitable horror of war into a deed so full of meaning. . . . Through the force of circumstance and through his own genius he has made it a practical possibility that he is to be the first great statesman to begin the better organization of the world."⁶⁷

Thirty years later, another of Wilson's disciples, from a different corner of the progressive internationalist movement, reflected on his high speech to Congress and on the exhilarating few years that had preceded it: "As I look back, my whole life up to that point seems to have been introduction—a too tender introduction, politically, to the hard, fierce, bloody thing that man's life on this planet has been and is. Like all my radical friends, I had mistaken for final reality the brief paradise of America at the turn of the century. . . . It was, comparatively, a protected little historic moment of peace and progress that we grew up in. We were children reared in a kindergarten, and now the real thing was coming."⁶⁸

8

"If the War Is Too Strong"

The Travail of Progressive Internationalism and the Fourteen Points

The evolution of the League of Nations entered a new and decisive stage in American and world politics after April 1917. Whereas all of the potential obstacles to its creation had their genesis in the neutrality period, the issue took on an entirely new complexion once the United States became an active belligerent. Wilson's problems, needless to say, were numerous and complex. They included, first, an indeterminate measure of opposition, both ideological and partisan, which was clustered in the Senate and had first begun to stir in reaction to his peace note of December 1916. Second, the ideas and the growing influence of conservative internationalists of the League to Enforce Peace, with whom Wilson enjoyed neither a good working relationship nor ideological affinity, complicated the senatorial challenge. Third, and just as important, the exigencies of war imposed a fearful toll on progressive internationalists, Wilson's most important source of political strength outside the Democratic party. Finally, the wide divergence between the United States and the Allies over objectives for peace constituted virtually an insoluble problem from beginning to end.

The outstanding ideological and partisan parameters of the American debate over the League bared themselves during the presidential campaign of 1916; in some respects, they gained greater clarity in the final

months of neutrality. On January 23, 1917, a number of Republican senators publicly challenged the assumptions behind Wilson's "Peace Without Victory" address—"the stump speech from the throne," as Lawrence Y. Sherman of Illinois characterized it.¹ During the extended floor debate, Senator Borah introduced a resolution, on January 25, that reaffirmed the verities of Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine, while Porter J. McCumber of North Dakota asked whether Wilson really represented the views of most Americans "when he leaves the realm of generalities."²

On February 1, the chamber listened to a well constructed speech by Senator Lodge. It contained some of the most trenchant criticisms that he had theretofore raised. In the first place, Lodge questioned the desirability of the kind of settlement that Wilson advocated, and defended Great Britain against those who would hinder her righteous cause. He then turned to the subject of the future peace and the role of the United States in preserving it. If self-determination was the essential condition upon which the peace must rest—and he did not contest the justice of that notion—what steps, Lodge asked, was the United States prepared to take in order to secure the adoption of the principle by other governments? The Senator also acknowledged the salutary function of voluntary arbitration in settling international disputes; but as for compulsory arbitration and collective security, he noted, these were matters that could not be determined "by verbal adherence to general principle; everything here depends on details." What, exactly, was a league of nations supposed to do if a member went to war after arbitration had taken place? How large an armed force was the United States expected to contribute to the international force that, presumably, the league must maintain? Then, too, in such a league, would not the smaller nations, by virtue of their numerical majority, be able to compel the United States to go to war without any action by the Congress?

"You can not make effective a league of peace, 'supported by the organized force of mankind,' by language or high-sounding phrases," he said in conclusion. The United States must first preserve its own peace with the world. It should enter into only those agreements that were possible to uphold, build a strong national defense, and work to recodify international law. Only then should Americans consider whether they wanted to consign their vital interests to a league of nations, and then only with "a full appreciation of just what it involves."³

As William C. Widenor has pointed out, Lodge's remarks were motivated, not only by second thoughts about collective security, but also by Wilson's coupling of the league with an "indecisive" peace.⁴ He apparently felt so strongly about the latter point that he had formally disassociated himself from the League to Enforce Peace two days before, in a

letter to A. Lawrence Lowell. Since addressing that organization, the LEP had "become involved in one way or another in the popular mind, and now definitely by the President's action [his peace note and the "Peace Without Victory" address], with the peace which is to end the present war. To me this is most unfortunate and so far as I am concerned I do not feel that [the LEP] any longer represents my opinion."⁵ Lodge may have been concerned (for any number of reasons) about the public's identification of the league idea with Wilson; but he had grossly misinterpreted the LEP's views on the war, which had never included a peace short of Allied victory. He had only to observe the LEP's letterhead to comprehend that fact.

The debate in the Senate probably would have generated a major controversy if it had not been for Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on the same day. When events finally compelled Wilson to call for war, Lodge joined in the cacophony of praise for the President. The war address, after all, was a tacit admission that the administration's pro-Allied critics had been right all along, and, for a while, it dissipated a certain amount of Republican ire. Lodge believed that American entry into the war symbolized the formation of the kind of peace league that he could support.

Not all Republican opponents of Wilson's internationalism, however, were of the same mind as Lodge. For instance, Senator Borah, a progressive Republican from Idaho, had come to conclusions similar to Lodge's during the Senate debates in first week of February; but Borah's approach was significantly different. When the time came to vote on the war resolution, he did so from the distinctly isolationist perspective (unlike Lodge) that he had articulated on at least two previous occasions. "I join no crusade," he declared in explaining his vote. "I seek or accept no alliances; I obligate this Government to no other power. I make war alone for my countrymen and their rights, for my country and its honor."⁶ Between Wilson and many Senate Republicans, substantial and varied differences over both the league and the nature of the peace in general remained unresolved as the United States entered the war.

Even as the wave of international acclaim began to wash over the White House, Wilson confessed to a close friend, "I have been a little low in my mind the last forty-eight hours because of the absolute lack of any power to see what I am driving at, which has been exhibited by the men who are looked upon as the leading Republican members of the Senate. After all, it is upon the Senate that I have to depend."⁷ Herbert Croly shared the concern. "There seems to be a tendency among Republicans," he told Wilson on January 23, "to oppose the participation of the United States in a League of Nations under any conditions. They seem to have decided to try to make party capital out of it." Although he did not think

that the League was in danger, he recommended a presidential speaking tour for the league.⁸ (In the main editorial of the *New Republic's* next issue, Croly berated the Republican party for its unbecoming capacity "to crouch at its own fireside, build a high tariff wall, arm against the whole world, cultivate no friendships, take no steps to forestall another great war, and then let things rip."⁹)

Republican animadversion had a far more important impact on Wilson. It aggravated his disinclination to talk about the league in very specific terms. The Senate Republicans' interpretations of his address, he believed, constituted a deliberate misrepresentation. They "had read all sorts of things into his speech he never said," he told Louis Lochner on February 1. He shuddered to think what would happen "if an elaborate, detailed program were to be submitted for discussion."¹⁰ During a press conference, on January 10, reporters dropped the subject after the following exchange took place:

A reporter: "Mr. President, your world peace league plan you unfolded to the Senate seems to give the United States a certain interest in the possible future quarrels of Europe. It occurred to me that if the European nations would be given a reciprocal interest—"

Wilson: "My dear boy, do you suppose I am going to tell you an answer? If you want to find out, attend the conference that brings this thing about. I don't know anything about it."¹¹

Wilson was considerably more courteous in responding to an inquiry from Edward A. Filene, a Boston Democrat, and the LEP's most successful fund-raiser. "I have carefully put forth only the idea, . . . feeling that it could be best achieved by leaving the whole question of organization and detail to the [peace] conference," Wilson wrote. "At present the opponents of the measure are rejoicing in setting up men of straw and knocking them down, and all the men of straw are particular plans and details."¹²

Personal distemper and his own partisan anxieties were not the sole factors behind Wilson's position. His silence on the details was also attributable to the very nature of his conception of the structure of the league. And that conception did not conform to the picture of unlimited diplomatic entanglements and military commitments that opponents conjured up from the start. In early February 1917, Wilson set down some essentials for the league in a document entitled "Bases of Peace." These included guarantees of territorial integrity and political independence, equal trade opportunities, and a provision for the limitation of armaments. The document also stressed that no administrative agency or permanent tribunal was necessary in order to uphold such a settlement: "It would in all likelihood be best to await the developments and suggestions of experience before attempting to set up any common instrumentality of inter-

national action."¹³ Wilson had no illusions about the difficulties involved, he assured Ambassador Jusserand confidentially in March 1917, but he was convinced that the league should evolve, rather than be created by formal convention. One should begin with simple covenants, he explained in a subsequent communication to Jusserand—for instance, with the obligation to submit disputes to arbitration. Then, "in the very process of carrying these covenants into execution from time to time a machinery and practice of cooperation would naturally spring up which would in the end produce . . . a regularly constituted and employed concert of nations."¹⁴ "The establishment of a league of nations," he told William E. Rappard, a Swiss authority on international organization, in November 1917, "is in my view a matter of moral persuasion more than a problem of juridical organization."¹⁵

Within Wilson's rationale lay an important proviso to what would become Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations as well as a cogent response to one of the penetrating issues that Lodge, among others, had raised—but that Wilson never clarified in any public forum before it was too late to do any good. A mutual guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity would *not* oblige every member of the League automatically to throw an army into the field every time the peace was disturbed; nor would it empower the League itself to compel a member to do so. Whether the United States would employ military force would depend entirely on all the circumstances surrounding a particular incident. Then, too, Wilson (unlike conservative internationalists) also laid great stress on disarmament as a crucial component of collective security. Disarmament would eliminate many potential problems from the start. By itself, the League could not prevent conflict in every instance. But it could provide, as Walter Lippmann pointed out for him in 1917, "a temporary shelter after the storm." The best strategy for peace after the war was "to establish enough order for a few decades in order to release some of the more generous forces of mankind."¹⁶ For Wilson, then, the League of Nations was a compass rather than the final destination. Could such a league, formed under specific covenants and subject to a broad construction, really work in actual practice? That, Wilson admitted, was a very good question. But, as he said to Jusserand, "It would be an experience to try it."¹⁷

Wilson's considered opinions were not unsound. After the United States entered the war, however, he courted trouble by not taking any leading internationalists, conservative or progressive, into his confidence. Until the autumn of 1918, the major strain between the administration and the conservative internationalists did not grow out of differences pertaining to the League's responsibilities. Rather, frustration and bad feelings developed owing to the pains Wilson took to preserve, almost jeal-

ously, his freedom of action. This problem became especially acute when the LEP began to recommend the establishment of a commission to formulate a constitution for the League.¹⁸

Early on, Wilson took things more or less in stride. The LEP's activities were "based upon a very much too definite programme," he wrote to an old friend in May 1917, "but in view of my concurrence with the general idea they have advocated, I have never felt at liberty to criticize them."¹⁹ As they continued to press him, however, Wilson began to reveal some hostility. To Colonel House he complained about "the folly of the League to Enforce Peace butters-in" and worried that he would not be able to head off Taft because "Mr. T. never stays put." Theodore Marburg, Wilson's most loyal supporter in the LEP, was dubbed "one of the principal woolgatherers." As for A. Lawrence Lowell, House wrote in his diary, "The President dislikes [him] as much as he could."²⁰

Wilson's indisposition toward the leaders of the LEP was no doubt nourished by their Republican affiliations, by their commitment to a particular program for the league, and by the bitter residue of the recent presidential campaign. Although he refrained from public criticism, rarely did he consult with them personally. That assignment fell to Colonel House, whom the LEP regularly sought out; and House occasionally showed them materials he and Wilson were working with. But the main result was simply to protect Wilson, Taft, and Lowell from one another's scrutiny.²¹ Ultimately, this would not prove sufficient. By 1918, the LEP would become the single most assiduous propagator of the league idea, reaching millions of Americans through its cohort of public speakers and by disseminating some four million pieces of literature.²² Meanwhile, in part (but only in part) because he was absorbed by the enormous task of running the nation's war effort, Wilson did not carry on with the impressive program of public education that he had mounted from May 1916 to January 1917. With the exception of Colonel House, Wilson's ideas about the League remained a mystery to all. We shall return to these subjects in the next chapter; suffice it to say at this point that that omission, along with Wilson's failure to extend a friendly hand to the LEP leadership (especially to Taft) would have extremely unfortunate repercussions.

To an extent, Wilson was justified in distancing himself from the LEP's program. By and large, it was advanced by very conservative people who, on one hand, advocated for the United States a sort of garrison-state internationalism, and, on the other, had serious doubts about domestic reforms as basic as the eight-hour day. The conservative internationalists were not Wilson's natural constituency; the progressive internationalists were. Let us, then, turn to the wartime relationship between Wilson and

those groups who constituted the left-of-center coalition that had sustained him in November 1916 and who had appreciated and contributed so much to the "Peace Without Victory" manifesto of January 1917.

Wilson's legislative accomplishments, his synthesis of the anti-imperialist New Diplomacy, and a war message as inspiring as the oration of Henry V on St. Crispin's Day settled most things for most progressives. "The war liberals," Christopher Lasch once observed, "now began to argue that a national emergency of such scope would unify the country behind a program of socialized democracy, . . . putting an end to years of aimless drift."²³ Indeed, during the week preceding the declaration of war, the *New Republic* had outlined "A War Program for Liberals," one that not only liberals, but also many socialists could endorse.

First and foremost, this program echoed the rationalization for war that Walter Lippmann had presented to Wilson in March—that is, "the need for constant subordination of strategy to political aims. . . . [U]nless the world emerges from this war a more liberal and more peaceful world America is beaten no matter how badly Germany is crushed." The substance of the war program flowed logically from the Wilsonian reforms of 1916, under the general category of "administrative efficiency"—of the sort that would "keep the conduct of the war out of the hands of the jingoes." This would require nationalization of all the country's important economic resources, progressive taxation of wealth and war profits, the encouragement of the unionization of labor, the expansion of educational opportunities, and, finally, universal military training, short of conscription. Through such a program, the *New Republic* concluded, the United States "may be able to maintain democracy at home and contribute to the internationalism of the world."²⁴

So confident was Walter Lippmann of the progressive uses the war could be put to that he told a leading pro-war Socialist, in May 1917, that the country stood "at the threshold of a collectivism which is greater than any as yet planned by the Socialist party."²⁵ To the *New Republic's* benefactor, Herbert Croly wrote that "under the stimulus of the war & its consequences there will be a chance to focus the thought & will of the country on high and fruitful purposes such as occurs only once in many hundred years."²⁶ These were exceedingly extravagant claims, but not entirely without justification. At least on some levels, the changes that occurred in America during the First World War could be characterized, as Allen F. Davis once suggested, as "the flowering of progressivism."²⁷

For instance, the newly created War Industries Board, though it shied away from full-scale state control, exercised unprecedented centralized powers in coordinating industrial production.²⁸ Under the United States Railroad Administration, the federal government took over and modernized the nation's transportation system, increased wage scales, and gave

impetus to plans (supported by both the American Federation of Labor and the brotherhoods) for permanent nationalization of the railroads. "Not even the Declaration of Independence nor the Emancipation Proclamation would equal for liberty and democracy your act in taking the operation of the railroads out of private hands," one overwhelmed progressive told Wilson.²⁹ Whereas war bonds ("Liberty Loans") supplied about two-thirds of the \$33.5 billion that the war cost the United States, the remaining third was raised through new taxes. And, with some vengeance, wartime tax legislation picked up where the Revenue Act of 1916 had left off. The Revenue Act of 1917 (denounced by Senator Lodge as "perfectly exorbitant taxation") placed some seventy-five percent of the burden on corporate profits and on individuals with high incomes. Then the Revenue Act of 1918 increased the previous rates by nearly two-and-a-half times, eighty percent of which was imposed on the same well-heeled groups. Together, these bills represented one of the real triumphs achieved by progressives and radicals during the war.³⁰

Finally, as Frederick C. Howe noted at the time, "the consideration . . . shown for the workers in the midst of the war that commanded all our energies, exceeds anything the most optimistic reformer felt could be achieved in a quarter of a century."³¹ Howe was commenting on the fact that for the first time the federal government had recognized labor's right to organize and bargain collectively. The National War Labor Board also established a minimum wage and the eight-hour day in most industries, and settled labor disputes almost always in favor of the workers. By the end of the war, membership in the AFL had increased from slightly over two million to some 3,260,000, and real income for all of labor had increased by twenty percent over the prewar level. In addition, other notable progressive initiatives included the beginnings of federal public housing, social insurance, federal programs to improve public health, and an abortive venture (personally initiated by Wilson) to build a government-owned munitions plant in order to deprive Pierre S. Du Pont of immoderate profits.³²

By any reasonable standards, one had to conclude that the total mobilization effort reflected certain traditional American liberal and socialist values. But to infuse a progressive character into the wartime political economy was not without its political costs. Although some Republicans and Democrats liked to maintain the fiction that "politics is adjourned" (a phrase coined by Wilson), the enactment of virtually all of the foregoing measures was accompanied by partisan bitterness, by accusations that sectional interests were at work, and by administrative and legislative confusion.³³ Moreover, the Wilson administration endured incessant criticism of its conduct of the war and incurred the deep resentment of the business community. "They dread government control of the railroads and the

mines: they chafe under taxation: they fear the growing power of labor in the councils of the nation," Ray Stannard Baker wrote in his journal in January 1918. "They recognize in Wilson, clearly, a truly progressive if not radical leadership and they fear and despise him."³⁴

Skepticism, and even fear, about the nature of Wilson's domestic war policies was not confined to Republicans and conservative businessmen. The criticism and opposition that was the most unsettling for Wilson and the progressives emanated from within—from vital elements within the progressive internationalist movement itself. The outcome was by no means inevitable, but the constituent parts that made up the American left had a potential every bit as great as that of the American right to undermine essential support for the League. And, as in the past, domestic and foreign policy could not be separated.

The events of the four days between Wilson's address on April 2 and the vote on the war resolution were a portent of the broader problem. During that time one of the most intense dramas in the history of the United States Congress was played out. "Treason! Treason!" Senator Norris's colleagues shouted when he said, "We are going to war upon the command of gold" and "I feel that we are about to put the dollar sign on the American flag." In all, six senators (including Norris and Robert La Follette) and fifty representatives, mainly from the West and South, voted no. Impressive as those numbers were, they probably did not reflect the full extent of the opposition to the war, or at least the misgivings, in either the Congress or the country as a whole. Yet, Senator Norris, after voicing his convictions, had vowed that, should war be declared, "all of my energy and all of my power will be behind our flag in carrying it to victory."³⁵

No such reassuring qualification, however, was given out by the Socialist party at its emergency convention in St. Louis during the second week of April. Denouncing American participation in the war as "a crime against the people of the United States," its proclamation also promised to oppose conscription and the sale of war bonds and to resist any restrictions on First Amendment rights. (A minority report, drafted by John Spargo, urged support for the war as the best means of advancing socialistic reforms as well as an anti-imperialist peace, which required the defeat of German militarism.) The uncompromising majority document was approved overwhelmingly by both the Socialist press and the party membership in a national mail referendum.³⁶

The principled stand of the Socialist party intensified the protracted crisis that had overwhelmed the pacifist and radical elements of the progressive internationalist movement from the moment the United States entered the war. Within the American Union Against Militarism, younger members, such as Roger Baldwin and Norman Thomas, proposed a campaign against conscription and another to defend conscientious objectors.

Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, and Paul Kellogg, however, saw the need to "distinguish between opposition to militarism and war and active opposition to this war" and, especially, to preserve the lines of communication with the White House. Should they attempt to interfere with the prosecution of the war (which Baldwin and Thomas' proposals seemed to entail), the AUAM would be perceived as a "party of opposition" and lose all respectability and influence. Within four months, irreconcilable differences over these issues paralyzed the organization. When Addams, Wald, and Kellogg stepped down from the executive board, the AUAM all but disintegrated.³⁷

That the war was a giant wrecking machine with the potential to batter the progressive wing of the American internationalist movement to ruins was foreshadowed by the travail of the Socialist party. Upon the adoption of the St. Louis Proclamation, many prominent members resigned from the party. By no means were all of the "deserters" right-wing socialists. They included, from the left, William English Walling and Frank Bohn; and from the center, Spargo, Charles Edward Russell, Upton Sinclair, Algie M. Simons, Gus Myers, and Allen Benson. Although even better-known lights—Debs, Eastman, Reed, Hillquit, Berger—endorsed the St. Louis Proclamation, the party was badly hurt, especially when publications like the *New York Times* delighted in reporting resignations (for instance, Spargo's) on page one.³⁸ The defections proved detrimental to progressive internationalism as well, for they signaled the beginning of the end of the intellectual communion and joint political activities between American liberals and socialists, the great hallmark of the pre-1917 period that had given progressive internationalism and the reform movement in general so much of its vitality.

Some pro-war socialists were not content merely to sever party affiliations and let it go at that. Spargo denounced the St. Louis proclamation as "essentially un-neutral, un-American, and pro-German."³⁹ Gus Myers wrote to the President that the party's "dangerous and insidious propaganda [must] be exposed."⁴⁰ And Walling, only one month into the war, informed Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson: "None of the official leaders of the Majority now in control of the American Party can be trusted. On the contrary, all of them are in bitter opposition to the American government and the American people."⁴¹

Walling's intolerance, however, was mild compared to other manifestations of "One Hundred Percent Americanism" that soon coursed through the country. On March 19, 1917, while he was still weighing his fateful decision, President Wilson told Frank Cobb of the *World*: "Once lead this people into war . . . and they'll soon forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance."⁴² But, by April 2, Wilson had emerged from his torment singleminded in his conviction to prosecute with as much dispatch and

efficiency as possible a war to end all wars. "If there should be disloyalty," he noted briefly in his address to Congress, "it will be dealt with with the firm hand of stern repression."⁴³ In his next public address, on Flag Day in 1917, while making the case for a war against German militarism, he concluded with a warning: "Woe be to the man or group of men that seeks to stand in our way in this day of high resolution. . . ."⁴⁴

To help sustain the high resolution and vindicate principles held dear, Wilson created the Committee on Public Information (CPI), headed by the energetic progressive publicist George Creel. In "the fight for the *minds* of men, for the conquest of their convictions," as Creel called it, the CPI launched a propaganda campaign of unprecedented proportions. An estimated seventy-five million pieces of pamphlet literature spread the official line on the war to all parts of the country. Stirring poster art, to encourage enlistments and the purchase of war bonds, appeared everywhere. Famous movie stars lent their celebrity to national Liberty Loan drives. And, not only to sing the virtues of democracy and "Americanism," but also to discredit all things German, the CPI coordinated 75,000 so-called Four-Minute Men to make speeches that were heard by tens of millions of people.⁴⁵

As early as the summer of 1917, it was clear to many observers that the CPI was doing its work all too well. Citizens of German ancestry, of socialist inclination, and of dissident mind in general bore the brunt of the national campaign for patriotic conformity. Some aspects of the campaign at the local and state level were merely ludicrous—for instance, the removal of pretzels from saloon counters in Cincinnati and the renaming of German measles, sauerkraut, and German shepherds to "Liberty measles," "Liberty cabbage," and "police dogs." But from there it was a short step to local ordinances that banned Brahms and Beethoven from major concert halls, to the removal (and burning) of works of German literature from small-town schools and public libraries, and to demands by Theodore Roosevelt to prohibit the teaching of the German language—a "barbarous tongue," according to one noted scholar at Johns Hopkins.⁴⁶

Inspired by federal legislation, encouraged by national organizations such as the American Protective League and the National Security League, and frequently instigated by local committees on public safety, acts of political repression and violence were committed in almost every region of the United States. In July 1917, thousands of soldiers and sailors attacked a parade of Socialists on Boston Common and sacked the local party headquarters while the police stood by and watched. That same month some 1,200 miners peaceably walked off the job in the copper fields of Bisbee, Arizona, in protest against substandard wages and working conditions. A small army of thugs, equipped by the Phelps-Dodge Corporation, rounded them up at gunpoint, loaded them into cattle cars, and

transported them miles into the desert where they were abandoned without food, water, or shelter. (Federal authorities rescued the workers three days later.)⁴⁷ In August, Frank Little, a physically handicapped union organizer in Butte, Montana, made the mistake of speaking out against strike breakers and the war of the capitalist class. In the middle of the night, he was taken from his bed by vigilantes, chained behind an automobile, and dragged until his kneecaps were worn away. His patriotic assailants then sexually mutilated him and hanged him from a railroad trestle.⁴⁸ Around Cincinnati, it was well known that the Justice Department monitored the pacifistic sermons of Herbert Bigelow, a leading minister of the city and a former associate of Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. In October, a mob seized Bigelow, stripped him to the waist, and cut his back to ribbons with a horsewhip.⁴⁹

Thousands of citizens suffered less brutal forms of chastisement as rumors of espionage spread like plague. German-Americans frequently were forced to kiss the flag in retribution for a casual remark that smacked of disloyalty. Municipal judges issued countless fines to individuals who failed to stand up when the national anthem was played at public events. A movie producer received a three-year prison sentence for having made *The Spirit of '76*, a film about the American Revolution that portrayed the British in an unfavorable light. Teachers routinely lost their jobs if they betrayed any objectivity about the causes of the war or discussed the possibility of an early armistice. Perhaps the crowning blow came when the Los Angeles Board of Education ordered teachers to cancel a student debate on the subject of William Howard Taft's League to Enforce Peace.⁵⁰

From the start, many progressive internationalists feared for the overall health of the body politic. Only two weeks after Congress adopted the war resolution, Lillian Wald, Herbert Croly, Jane Addams, Amos Pinchot, Paul Kellogg, Norman Thomas, and Oswald Garrison Villard sent Wilson a letter of caution: "It is possible that the moral damage to our democracy in this war may become more serious than the physical or national losses incurred." So that "the spirit of democracy will not be broken," they urged the President to make "an impressive statement" to curb local and state officials who might exploit the wartime circumstances to serve their own agendas.⁵¹ "Surely you can find a way for us to pull together," Wald wrote in a separate note to Wilson. "You will not drive your natural allies from you. You will not banish us from the Democratic party which you promised to make the home of all liberal spirits."⁵²

Wald's letter anticipated a broader issue—the preservation of civil liberties in wartime—which held the gravest implications for the success or failure of the league from the standpoint of progressive internationalism. Wilson was not insensitive to the problem. However, he not only never came forth with "an impressive statement"; he permitted Attorney

General Thomas Watt Gregory and Postmaster General Albert Sidney Burleson virtually to become the arbiters of the First Amendment. In the long run, their activities would prove to be the main source of disruption within the progressive internationalist movement.

On July 15, 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act.⁵³ Title I imposed stiff fines and up to twenty years' imprisonment for any one who attempted to cause insubordination or disloyalty in the armed services or to obstruct recruitment. The Justice Department prosecuted more than 2,000 cases under this provision. Title XII gave the Postmaster General power to exclude from the mails any material that could be construed to be in violation of the strictures of Title I, or that advocated or urged "treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States."⁵⁴

Postmaster General Burleson was not a man of broad political or social vision. Any day laborer in America, he once told a reporter, could become "a railroad president as J. P. Morgan"; if he did not, it was due to "the shape of the brain." Burleson also held that the work of Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, and the AUAM had done "great harm" to the country and that Max Eastman was "no better than a traitor."⁵⁵ According to the Postmaster General, "papers may not say that the Government is controlled by Wall Street or munitions manufacturers," nor could they indulge in "attacking improperly our allies."⁵⁶ As Upton Sinclair observed in a letter to Wilson, Burleson was "a person of such pitiful and childish ignorance concerning modern movements that it is simply a calamity that . . . he should be the person to decide what may or may not be uttered by our radical press."⁵⁷

Burleson exercised his new powers to the fullest against socialists and, on occasion, liberals. In July 1917, he excluded from the mails the *American Socialist*, the *Appeal to Reason*, the *International Socialist Review*, the *Masses*, and *Social Revolution* (formerly the *National Rip-Saw*), along with several weeklies in Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, and St. Louis. Together, these publications had a circulation of more than one million.⁵⁸

Burleson struck at the August 1917 issue of the *Masses* because of its "general tenor." (The issue contained an editorial that defended Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, both recently convicted of conspiracy to obstruct Army recruitment.) Eastman, Amos Pinchot, and John Reed protested directly to Wilson on behalf of all of Burleson's victims. "Can it be necessary, even in war time, for the majority of a republic to throttle the voice of a sincere minority?" they asked. "As friends of yours, and knowing how dear to you is the Anglo-Saxon tradition of intellectual freedom, we would like to feel that you do not sanction the exercise."⁵⁹ Wilson promised to "go to the bottom of the matter" and wrote to Burleson, "These are very sincere men and I should like to please them."⁶⁰

Burleson claimed that he had excluded only particular issues that "have gone far beyond what might properly be termed criticism."⁶¹ But he continued to impose the ban on the *Masses*, arguing that, since the publication had skipped an issue, it no longer fitted the category of "periodical." This maneuver compelled Eastman to seek redress in the United States Court of Appeals and to petition the White House both in person and by letter. Reactionary forces had seized on the war "to kill the propaganda of socialism," he told Wilson on September 8, and "you also know that this propaganda will surely play a great part in the further democratizing of the world." Eastman's anxiety thus extended to foreign policy. "I believe that the support which your administration will receive from radical-minded people the country over, depends greatly on its final stand on these two critical matters of free speech and assemblage and freedom of the Press."⁶²

Wilson confessed to Eastman that he had little confidence about how to proceed in the matter of censorship: "I can only say that a line must be drawn and that we are trying, it may be clumsily, but genuinely, to draw it without fear or favor or prejudice."⁶³ He was no doubt sincere; but, as of September 1917, only timidity and deference marked his efforts to restrain his subordinate. In early September, he wrote to Burleson, "[Y]ou know that I am willing to trust your judgment after I have once called your attention to a suggestion."⁶⁴

The controversy over the *Masses* was still hanging fire when, in October, the *Milwaukee Leader*, the *New York Call*, and the *Jewish Daily Forward*—with a combined readership in excess of 200,000—were denied second-class mailing privileges. Censorship now became the object of serious concern, not only for the journalists directly affected, but also for pro-war socialists and straight-line liberals.⁶⁵ Colonel House advised Wilson "to err on the side of leniency" and take the matter out of Burleson's hands.⁶⁶ Walter Lippmann attempted to explain to the President that "the feeling on this issue is at white heat," not only for the radicals, but also for the liberals and the labor movement. If he permitted the Postmaster General to persist, he would "divide the country's articulate opinion into fanatical jingoism and fanatical pacifism." Lippmann emphasized the importance of the relationship between coalition politics and foreign policy. "[T]he overwhelming number of radicals can be won to the support of the war simply by conserving the spirit of the President's own utterances."⁶⁷ In reply to a similar letter from Herbert Croly, Wilson said the Postmaster General was "misunderstood," and "inclined to be most conservative in the exercise of these great and dangerous powers."⁶⁸ Yet, when he informed Burleson—"I am afraid you will be shocked," he began—that he did not think that the *Milwaukee Leader* "ought to be regarded as unmailable," Burleson simply ignored him.⁶⁹

Soon, even pro-war Socialists pressed the vital point. Upton Sinclair, who had agonized over his decision to break with his party, practically pleaded with the President. He had tried to stay out of it, but the measures taken against the *Masses* could "only be described as disgraceful," and he now had to speak his mind. "I voice the sentiments of millions throughout America, who will give their sincere support to a war for democracy, but who will feel weakened in their enthusiasm if they see any signs that while helping to win democracy abroad, we are losing it at home."⁷⁰

If any doubts remained about the implications of censorship for progressive internationalists, they should have been laid to rest by the warnings of the ardent pro-war Socialist John Spargo, whose own previous public statements had helped undermine the respectability of the Socialist party's anti-war position. "In common with a very large number of radicals, I have rejoiced to acknowledge your leadership," he wrote to the President. But he knew personally scores of men and women who found themselves constant critics of the administration because of "the unwarranted and unnecessary suppression of criticism." Wilson *must* find a way—and it could be done, perhaps, by inviting "a group of leading radicals of various schools" to help formulate a new policy to replace Burleson's—"to overcome opposition and remove misunderstanding, and to secure the support of by far the greater number of those liberals and radicals who are now distrustful of our part in the war and more or less active opponents of the Administration."⁷¹

Wilson's attitude toward civil liberties would remain an unresolved problem throughout the war. After the autumn of 1917, however, the issue seemed to abate somewhat. Indeed, by the early spring of 1918, Wilson had regained his standing among progressive internationalists of virtually all persuasions, chiefly because the editors of socialist publications, like their liberal counterparts, found themselves on common ground with the President in the ensuing international debate over war aims. Nonetheless, the controversy would have a most untimely revival, during the summer and fall of 1918.

In most of his wartime reflections on the subject, Wilson emphasized that the proper application of the League's guarantees would depend on whether the territorial agreements at the peace conference "ought to be perpetuated"—whether the final settlement conformed "with the general principles of right and comity" as set forth in his "Peace Without Victory" address.⁷² Yet the last time that the Allies had made a statement on war aims was on January 10, in their response to Wilson's peace note of December 1916. That declaration hardly conformed to the precepts of the New Diplomacy. In a sense, Germany's resumption of submarine warfare

had temporarily rescued the Allies from Wilson. Moreover, Wilson had not imposed any conditions on the Allies in exchange for American belligerency; thus, divergence in avowed purposes remained unreconciled as Congress voted on the war resolution.⁷³

Both Wilson and the Allied governments knew full well that a day of reckoning was inevitable. In the first months after the United States entered the war, however, Wilson avoided a direct confrontation. Otherwise, as House said, the Americans and the Allies would have soon hated "one another more than they do Germany."⁷⁴ Shortly after he visited Washington in late April, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour sent Wilson copies of the secret treaties the Allies had earlier negotiated among themselves to divide enemy territories as the spoils of victory.⁷⁵ In Wilson's eyes, such egregious violations of the principle of self-determination justified his designation of the United States as a wartime *associate*, rather than as an ally, of the powers arrayed against Germany. "England and France have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means," he told House. Alas, not much could be done about it so long as Germany was undefeated; he took solace in the optimistic assumption that, after the war, "we can force them to our way of thinking, because by that time they will, among other things, be financially in our hands."⁷⁶

The great question of war aims acquired a new urgency, however, not just because the entrance of the United States into the war meant that the Allies would eventually have to contend with Wilson. In March 1917, the repressive autocracy of Tsar Nicholas II had been overthrown, to the gratification of liberals, socialists, and not a few conservatives around the world. When Wilson went before Congress on April 2, the revolutionary transformation of the government of Russia had made it possible for him rhetorically to portray the world conflict as a struggle between the forces of democracy and the forces of autocracy. The United States also became the first power to recognize the Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky.⁷⁷

From the start, Kerensky, vowing to continue the war (but now for democratic socialist purposes), was besieged from within and without. Week by week, the Russian army, starving and poorly equipped, staggered under the relentless blows of the German and Austrian armies. In April and May, the soldiers' and workers' councils in Petrograd challenged the Provisional Government's authority and issued dramatic proclamations that might easily have been passages from the "Peace Without Victory" address. These proclamations appealed to all the belligerents for a peace based on self-determination and prevailed upon the peoples involved in the war to press their respective governments to repudiate plans for conquest.⁷⁸

Wilson's series of anti-imperialist pronouncements before April 1917,

in tandem with the Petrograd formula, stood in stark contrast to Allied war aims. In light of both Russia's precarious internal situation and the existence of a formidable anti-war minority in the United States, pro-war liberals and socialists on both sides of the Atlantic began to put new demands on Wilson. "Something needs to be done at once," the *New Republic* said on May 19. "The thing which is needed is a powerful reaffirmation of the international purposes for which the war is waged."⁷⁹ The executive committee of the Union of Democratic Control also pressed Wilson to give his public endorsement to the Petrograd formula—"so in accord with your own pronouncements"—and thereby remove the suspicions hanging over the Allied cause.⁸⁰

In his Flag Day address, Wilson had characterized the war as a "Peoples' War." At the same time, however, his exhortations to crush Prussian militarism tended primarily to fortify super-patriotism and anti-German hysteria and concomitantly obscured the objectives of a just peace and a league of nations.⁸¹ The tone alarmed not only progressive internationalists at home; the British radicals as well sought reassurance that Wilson had not forsaken his higher goals.⁸² Although Wilson naturally sympathized with the Petrograd formula, his first priority would always be the prosecution of the war. He preferred to agitate for the revision of Allied war aims, initially, through the quiet channels of diplomacy.

Before the end of summer, however, Wilson was compelled to make a public declaration. On August 13, Pope Benedict XV (who sympathized with the German and Austrian governments) published an appeal to all the belligerents to end the war on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*.⁸³ Such a challenge from the Holy See could not go unanswered. Before releasing his reply, Wilson told House, "I have tried to indicate the attitude of this country on the points most discussed in the socialistic and other camps."⁸⁴ In the document, Wilson suggested that the peace initiative was premature, particularly if the object of the war were in fact "to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment." He also implied that the Russian Revolution would fall prey to "the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influence to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world." The note continued: "Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem . . . no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind."⁸⁵

Wilson's forthright reply to the papal gambit accomplished a number of things. In recapitulating his "peace without victory" formula, he had publicly registered his displeasure with the Allies' prevarication on war aims, provided a more satisfactory response to the Petrograd soviet, and

had also relieved the British radicals⁸⁶ and American progressive internationalists of much of their anxiety. The *Appeal to Reason* described the message to the Pope as "not only a step toward the ending of the war, but also a blow to the imperialist schemers."⁸⁷ Max Eastman, even while under attack from Burleson, wrote to Wilson: "Now that you have declared for substantially the Russian terms—no 'punitive damages,' no 'dis-memberment of empires,' 'vindication of sovereignties,' and by making a responsible ministry in Germany one condition of your entering negotiations, you have given a concrete meaning to the statement that this is a war for democracy. The manner in which you have accomplished this—and apparently bound the allies to it into the bargain—has my profound admiration."⁸⁸

Eastman's understanding, while representative of the responses of American liberals and socialists, was erroneous on at least one count. The Allies had not been bound to the bargain, as Wilson well knew. And to prepare for the day when he would have to make the American case for the peace settlement and the League of Nations, he instructed Colonel House to gather a group of experts in the fields of economics, geography, history, and political science. This group, the first "Brain Trust" in American history, subsequently became known as "The Inquiry"; it put together detailed, scholarly studies on social, economic, and political conditions in Europe and Asia, which helped Wilson immensely throughout the war and during the peace conference as well.⁸⁹ In October, Wilson also decided to send House to the forthcoming Inter-Allied Conference in Paris where he was to try to obtain a joint statement on war aims.⁹⁰

Before House arrived in Paris, the Provisional Government of Russia had met with disaster. Under the leadership of V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky, and armed with the irresistible slogan "Peace, Land, and Bread," the Petrograd soviet overthrew Kerensky on November 7, and intended to turn the stirring words of the "International" into reality. On November 8, the new Bolshevik government issued a peace decree, strikingly Wilsonian in tenor, calling for "the immediate opening of negotiations for a just and democratic peace." Two weeks later, to tell the unholy lie on Allied war aims, the Bolsheviks published most of the Allies' secret treaties.⁹¹

Russia's virtual (or incipient) withdrawal from the war, in conjunction with a coincidental military disaster in October—the defeat of the Italian Army at Caporetto—dealt the Allied position a potentially mortal blow. When the Inter-Allied Conference convened on November 29, Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Baron Sidney Sonnino of Italy showed far more interest in getting American soldiers and matériel to the western front than in countering the enormous psychological advantage that the Central Powers had gained by the Bolsheviks' publication of the secret

treaties. Repeatedly, Colonel House tried get them to designate terms, and he even presented the conclave with a vague resolution on war aims before returning home. Clemenceau and Sonnino, however, would have no part of it. This being the case, House reproved them, the President would have to act unilaterally.⁹²

Wilson had already decided to do just that. In his annual message to Congress, on December 4, he made his most unambiguous statement since the "Peace Without Victory" address. It was his duty, he told the Congress, to add "specific interpretations" to what he had said to the Senate in January. Whereas he assailed the German autocracy for its exploitation of the Bolsheviks, he also asserted that the damage was as much the fault of the Allies themselves for not having purged their cause of suspicion before world opinion. Had they cleared the air, then "the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once and for all enlisted on the side of the Allies." In any case, Wilson now promised the German *people* an impartial settlement if they would but rid themselves of the encumbrance of the Kaiser's government. With German militarism defeated, "an unprecedented thing" would be possible: "We shall be free to base peace on generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors," and Germany itself could be admitted "to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace."⁹³

Wilson's message to Congress did not make the slightest dent in the leaders of the Allied governments; they chose to interpret it mainly as a reaffirmation of American commitment to victory. The British radicals, however, regarded the remarks as a most timely addendum to the "Peace Without Victory" address.⁹⁴ Significantly, in the United States, the message appeared to have brought a halt to the dissolution of the progressive internationalist coalition. The faithful and the doubters alike were greatly encouraged by Wilson's analysis of the events of November. "I rejoice exceedingly to have you remind the Congress as well as the statesmen of the world of that immortal January address to the Senate," George Foster Peabody wrote the President. In the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, the progressive publicist Lincoln Colcord praised the Bolsheviks for bringing order out of chaos and described the "magnificent liberalism of President Wilson's address" as a "gift" to the Russian people that would also "uplift the failing hearts of the whole world." Grenville Mcfarland, who had prevailed upon Wilson on behalf of the socialist press, wrote in the New York *American* that the message to Congress "breathes the spirit of Lincoln's second inaugural and will take its place beside that great document."⁹⁵ And Louis Kopelin, editor of the *Appeal to Reason*, wrote: "Your open-hearted espousal of a democratic peace after the central European peoples have been freed from the yoke of Prussian militarism removes the

last possible suspicion against the cause of the entente allies." From December 1917 onward, the *Appeal*—"the oldest and largest American socialist publication," Kopelin had reminded Wilson—reversed its anti-war position and for the next year became one of the President's most faithful editorial patrons.⁹⁶

As word of Wilson's pronouncement reached Europe, the Bolsheviks had begun to consider a bold initiative for a separate peace. In part to consolidate their own power in Russia, in part because the Allies (not to say Wilson) had studiously maintained silence about their régime, the Bolsheviks at last signed an armistice with Germany at Brest-Litovsk, on December 15. One week later, Adolf Joffe, the leader of the Russian delegation, laid down six points as the basis for the negotiations, which the Germans accepted on December 25. In broad strokes, the program constituted a model "peace without victory"—no forcible annexations, the application of self-determination for all national groups, no indemnities, no economic boycotts or restrictions on freedom of trade.⁹⁷ This extraordinary new set of circumstances—the Bolsheviks' appropriation of most of the New Diplomacy, coupled with the specter of a separate peace in the East that would enable Germany to bring new might to bear in the West—rendered Wilson's recent utterances inadequate.

Colonel House's diary entry of December 18 offers a succinct explanation of the immediate genesis of what was to become the most celebrated diplomatic statement of Wilson's career: "I never knew a man who did things so casually. We did not discuss the matter more than ten or fifteen minutes when he decided he would take the action I told the Interallied Conference he would take as soon as I returned to America."⁹⁸ Wilson then instructed House to put The Inquiry to work. Over the next two weeks the team of experts labored day and night, drawing up specific recommendations on a wide variety of economic, political, and territorial matters.⁹⁹ On their own, the President and House hammered into shape a series of (as it turned out, fourteen) concise, categorical paragraphs on war aims, on January 5. "We actually got down to work at half past ten," House recorded, "and finished remaking the map of the world, as we would have it, at half past twelve o'clock" (It had been a remarkably productive morning!)¹⁰⁰

Unexpectedly, on the same day, Lloyd George had abandoned the ancient Foreign Office custom of sitting on the fence and had managed to upstage Wilson, or so it seemed for a short while. On December 28, the British Labour party had published a "Memorandum on War Aims." It declared that the war could no longer be justified, except "that the world may henceforth be made safe for democracy," and that a league of nations would be established so "that there should be henceforth on earth no more war." Labour thus served notice that its continued support hinged

on a satisfactory answer from the government. The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and the weary prospect of yet another year of senseless slaughter had obviously triggered the memorandum. Its substance, however, was determined by the previous pronouncements of Wilson and the British radicals. The war cabinet concluded that it had no choice but to reply.¹⁰¹

Accordingly, on January 5, Lloyd George addressed the British Trades Union League at Caxton Hall, in order to remove all "misgivings and doubts" about British war aims. Great Britain longed only for a democratic peace, the Prime Minister said; she harbored no ambitions to destroy the Central Powers, even though Germany was presently perpetrating the conquest of Russia. He then went on to pay obeisance to the New Diplomacy and assuage British Labour with a declaration of moderate terms: "First, the sanctity of treaties must be re-established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; and, lastly, we must seek by the creation of some international organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war."¹⁰²

When Wilson learned of the address, he momentarily hesitated to go forward with his own plans. House, however, persuaded him that Lloyd George had merely primed the pump, and that the President's "would so smother the Lloyd George speech that it would be forgotten."¹⁰³

Wilson delivered his address to a joint session of Congress on January 8. He began by acknowledging that the Russian representatives at Brest-Litovsk had recently engaged the Central Powers in parleys for a peace based on democratic principles. The Central Empire, he pointed out, was merely exploiting the precepts of the New Diplomacy in order to absorb part of Russia. Even so, there was no good reason not to respond to the Bolsheviks' earnest invitation to the Western powers to state their terms. The conception of the Russian people "of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness . . . and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind," he said. "Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace." The American people saw clearly that unless justice be done to others it would not be done to them. "The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme; and that programme, the only possible programme, as we see it, is this. . . ."

The first five of the fourteen points were familiar to all progressive internationalists: open covenants openly arrived at and the abolition of secret treaties; absolute freedom of the seas, "except as the seas may be closed . . . by international action for the enforcement of international

covenants"; the removal of all economic trade barriers and the establishment of the equality of trade conditions; the reduction of all national armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety; and the impartial adjustment of all colonial claims in observance of the principle of self-determination.

The sixth point demanded the evacuation of all Russian territory and the "unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political institutions." The way other nations treated Russia in the months to come, Wilson said, "will be the acid test of their good will." Points seven through thirteen specified the evacuation of Belgium; the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France; the readjustment of Italian frontiers along clearly recognizable lines of nationality; autonomous development for the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire; and the creation of a Polish state assured of free and secure access to the sea.

According to Colonel House, Wilson thought that the subject embodied in the fourteenth point "should come last because it would round out the message properly." For Wilson, it was the most important one of all: "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

It was for these things that the United States and its associates were fighting. "We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. . . . We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world." Before serious discussions could begin, however, the United States must know for whom Germany's representatives spoke—whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party whose creed was imperial domination. The single thread that ran through the whole program, he said in conclusion (as he had said many times before), was "the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and the right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak." This was the only principle upon which the American people could act. "The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test."¹⁰⁴

The Fourteen Points address, as the *New York Herald* described it at the time, continues to stand as "one of the great documents in American history."¹⁰⁵ Since the height of the Cold War in the late 1950s and 1960s, the preponderance of historical interpretations—most notably those of Arno J. Mayer, William Appleman Williams, N. Gordon Levin, and Lloyd C. Gardner—have emphasized the degree to which Wilson's program was formulated in response to, and the degree to which its provi-

sions were influenced by, the revolution in Russia. Yet, save the very one on Russia, Wilson did not define a single point that was in any way inspired by the Bolsheviks. The seven proposals for territorial adjustments (principally the work of Walter Lippmann and *The Inquiry*) would have been advised in any circumstances. The remaining six, a sermon on progressive internationalism, were fundamentally a reprise of Wilson's pronouncements before the United States had even entered the war, and long before revolutionary upheaval in Russia appeared imminent.

To be sure, but for the events that culminated at Brest-Litovsk, Wilson would not have delivered such an address just when he did. Two of his purposes were to diminish the impact of the publication of the secret Allied treaties and to try to bring the Bolsheviks back into the war against Germany through an appeal to common principles. Another purpose was to rally all groups at home and abroad behind a peace settlement grounded in a league of nations and other new principles of international conduct, and to induce the Allied governments to embrace that cause—an object Wilson had been striving for since the spring of 1916. Finally, Wilson hoped to foment political dissension within Germany and Austria-Hungary by indicating upon what terms they could obtain peace. Yet, in all of this, the Bolsheviks played a primary role only insofar as the timing of the Fourteen Points was concerned.

Neither was the address the opening salvo of a counterrevolutionary campaign. Not until the spring of 1918, when a German victory became a distinct possibility, did Wilson's historical appreciation of the Russian upheaval begin to show signs of real hostility toward Lenin.¹⁰⁶ For one thing, the President was far too self-assured to regard Lenin as any sort of challenge or threat to his own preeminence as a world statesman. (Lenin was, after all, a comparatively obscure politician at the head of a very shaky government, and Wilson knew very little about him.) Moreover, one of the most striking aspects of the Fourteen Points, in its restatement of the "Peace Without Victory" address, was its uncompromising anti-imperialism. As he had done in the case of Mexico, and thus in Russia, he fully accepted revolution as a legitimate, if undesirable, agent of change. And, as he had palpably demonstrated in American domestic politics, he did not consider liberalism and socialism, practically speaking, as irreconcilable—and certainly not in the sort of community of nations he envisioned, in which such contending forces would naturally audit and regulate one another.

In any event, Lenin himself reportedly hailed the address as "a great step ahead towards the peace of the world" and arranged for its publication in *Izvestiya*. American representatives and Bolsheviks worked together to circulate millions of copies in Petrograd and Moscow and among German soldiers inside Russia.¹⁰⁷ The entire French left, along with most

of the French press, greeted the Fourteen Points with unqualified approval—despite the circumspect attitude of Clemenceau's government.¹⁰⁸ In Great Britain, the UDC regarded the President's reiteration of the progressive internationalist synthesis as the vindication of its own platform. Whereas the London *Times* commented that the speech presumed "that the reign of righteousness upon earth is already within our reach," the London *Star* implored British politicians "to emulate . . . the greatest American president since Abraham Lincoln." Without actually endorsing its contents, Balfour called the address a "magnificent pronouncement." Lloyd George sent word informally that he was "grateful" that his and President Wilson's peace policies were "so entirely in harmony."¹⁰⁹

In the United States, the most important impact that the Fourteen Points had was to engender a fresh environment for progressive internationalism and the League. The approbation heaped upon the address approached phenomenal proportions. Although a few Republicans took sharp exception to the point on free trade, praise from both parties was generous. Many congressmen and senators expressed the opinion that the address marked the moral turning point of the war.¹¹⁰ The headline that the *New York Times* ran above its main editorial—"The President's Triumph"—was indicative of the general reaction across the country. Wilson had articulated "the very conscience of the American people," said Hamilton Holt in the *Independent*.¹¹¹ "We think that your message to Congress expresses the broadest understanding and profoundest insight and that your program would bring about the possibility of nations harmonized in their relationship with each other," Lillian Wald wrote to the President. Jane Addams transmitted to Wilson a resolution passed by the Woman's Peace party which acclaimed the address "the most profound and brilliant formulation as yet put forth by any responsible statesman of the program of international reorganization." John Spargo deemed it "a great inspiration to the believers in democracy in all lands, including the enemy nations."¹¹²

It was not, perhaps, surprising that leading members of the coalition of 1916 like Holt, Wald, and Addams, or a pro-war Socialist like Spargo, should lavish such praise. But indications that progressive internationalism was on the road to recovery extended further than that. Max Eastman's initial reflection, "A World's Peace," emphasized the fourteenth point, upon which rested all the others. "If the world falls into peace, exhausted, without having accomplished this," he wrote, "it will be a sad peace—a peace without victory indeed."¹¹³ The *Appeal to Reason* ran a front-page banner headline, "World League to Preserve Peace Is Now Vital Issue" and subsequently called upon the Socialist party to revise the St. Louis Proclamation.¹¹⁴ Eugene Debs pronounced the Fourteen Points "thoroughly democratic," deserving of "the unqualified approval of everyone believing in the rule of the people, Socialists included." There were even

bigger surprises coming. "I am not in the habit of paying tribute to public officials," Mother Jones told the West Virginia Federation of Labor, "[but] I pay my respects to President Wilson." She even announced that working people now could in good conscience buy Liberty Bonds. Meyer London followed suit, expressing the hope that soon "the world will be at peace, based on the principles formulated by President Wilson."¹¹⁵

Later, in the spring, Eastman offered an additional, 6,000-word meditation entitled "Wilson and the World's Future," published in the *Liberator*, the new incarnation of the *Masses*. Through his efforts to advance the New Diplomacy and the League, the President had brought to statesmanship "some of the same thing that Bergson and William James and John Dewey have brought into philosophy—a sense of reality of time, and the creative character of change. . . . It is the expression of a wisdom which is new and peculiar to our age." Eastman also commented on Upton Sinclair's recent statement that, in light of the Fourteen Points, the Socialist party should formally declare its support of President Wilson. It might be better, Eastman noted wryly, if Wilson joined the Socialist party. "I should be willing to take the risk of accepting him as a member."¹¹⁶

In October 1917, the brilliant young radical Randolph Bourne published in *The Seven Arts* what was to become his most famous essay—"Twilight of Idols." Disillusioned by his mentor, John Dewey, who had embraced the war because of its "plasticity," Bourne had asked all pro-war socialists and liberals the haunting question: "If the war is too strong for you to prevent, how is it going to be weak enough for you to control and mould to your liberal purposes?"¹¹⁷ In the autumn of 1917, it appeared that Bourne had surely struck home. By the early months of 1918, however, most progressive internationalists could claim that his question was no longer necessarily relevant, or they could turn to Wilson for an emphatic answer. For, if the response of progressive internationalists to the Fourteen Points was any guide, then it seemed that at last the war *was* being molded to serve the good purposes of, not only liberals, but also socialists. The President had forsaken neither after all. Even in the suffocating atmosphere of "One Hundred Percent Americanism," he had administered a most comforting balm to those important constituents who had been battered and betrayed. His championship of progressive internationalist values, like a cure endowed with miraculous properties, had also breathed new life into the hope that a better world could come of the violent and complicated spectacle humanity was passing through. If this was in fact "the culminating and final war for human liberty," as Wilson had said, then was it not worthwhile to see the struggle through to the bitter end? Was it not possible that Wilson could be right? There no longer seemed to be any serious reason to doubt it.

as little as possible with national sovereignty was the main challenge, and it had been met. He underscored the slow and circuitous procedure for imposing sanctions and stressed that any coercive action would require a unanimous vote in the Executive Council. To refrain from war until every other possible means of settling disputes should have been exhausted, then, was the "first and chiefest" principle behind the League. Moreover (though he had previously believed otherwise), if that principle were "really to be acted upon," nations must go one step further and carry into effect a meaningful reduction of armaments, as that was also clearly laid down as a responsibility of the League. They all "must try to substitute for the principle of international competition, that of international cooperation." He concluded with an observation at once Cecilian and Wilsonian: "We are not seeking to produce for the world a building finished and complete in all respects." If those who built on this foundation cultivated "the habit of cooperating with one another," if they really believed "that the interest of one is the interest of all, . . . then and only then, will the finished structure of the League be what it ought to be—a safety and a glory for the humanity of the world."⁸⁸

The presentation of the Covenant was a triumphal event. When it was all over, Wilson and Cecil received high marks all around. From Wilson's vantage point, if this League were incorporated into the general settlement, then he could feel confident that he had kept the faith, that the most important objective of the Great War had been consummated, and that any injustices done by the treaty of peace itself could be redressed later with relative ease. Though far from perfect, this League could become a "temporary shelter from the storm" and help release "some of the more generous forces of mankind" in the course of the next crucial decade.⁸⁹ Its contents perhaps pushed things to the limits of what the great powers might accept; but Cecil's heartfelt enthusiasm for the present Covenant (combined with his influence within the British Cabinet) was a good omen.

There were others. Tumulty telegraphed Wilson on the morning of his departure, quoting the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* on the Covenant: "Its superb achievement crowns his home coming with sweeping victory." "Plain people throughout America are for you," Tumulty added. "You have but to ask their support and all opposition will melt away."⁹⁰ And, to House's surprise, all of official France turned out with evergreens and red carpets to bid the President adieu. "He looked happy," the Colonel noted to himself as Wilson boarded the train for Brest, "as well indeed he should."⁹¹

13

"The Thing Reaches the Depth of Tragedy"

The *George Washington* dropped anchor in Boston Harbor on the evening of February 23. That afternoon a dense fog had caused the ship to stray some seventeen miles off course and nearly run aground 300 yards from land. Four days earlier, a wave had swept away two sailors from the decks of an accompanying destroyer. The high seas and strong winds that President Wilson's transport had encountered almost from the start of the voyage home were fitting harbingers of the politics that lay ahead.¹

It is not the mission of this book to retell, in all of its intricate detail, the familiar story of the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, although some aspects of the historiography surrounding it cannot be ignored. The primary emphasis of the final portion of this study will be the stage of inquiry that compelled Wilson to revise the Covenant when he returned to Paris for the second half of the peace conference. For it was during this period—in particular, the first month or so after the publication of the original Covenant—that the deep lines of demarcation were unmistakably drawn. Traces of this development, as we have seen, had first become manifest in the sharp ideological and partisan conflict vented by the recent congressional campaign. But, in light of those sources from which the President had derived his synthesis of the New Diplomacy as

well as of the nature of his political base outside the Democratic party, it would be a mistake to focus exclusively upon the consequences of his tactical errors in responding to the Republicans. The state of Wilson's relationship with the progressive internationalists was in many ways just as important for the future of the League as the bitter parliamentary struggle. Although certain potentially remedial options revealed themselves, the series of events set in motion during this crucial period foreclosed any real possibility for launching a Wilsonian League of Nations.

Let us begin with three general observations. First, Wilson's attitude toward the opposition, contrary to the common historical characterization, was not utterly defiant from beginning to end, although this was surely the case by the end of his visit. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that he had returned to Washington with an abiding faith that he would prevail. His sense of confidence was not altogether unjustified in view of the Covenant's initial reception in the press and among leading conservative and progressive internationalists. Before the *George Washington* had eased into its berth at Boston, Taft and Lowell had already set out on nationwide speaking tours on behalf of the League. (Rumor had it that Taft had said he would quit the party if the Republicans opposed American membership.²) Regional chapters of the League to Enforce Peace had announced their unqualified support and declared that "the overwhelming public opinion of the United States . . . will sustain the President."³ The Federal Council of Churches of Christ of America (claiming to represent 33,000,000 people) had passed a resolution of endorsement; by mid-February, several state legislatures, along with the World Court League and the New York Peace Society, had done the same.⁴ According to the *Literary Digest*, the majority of the nation's editorial pages regarded the experiment as "tremendously worthwhile." Although many bitterly anti-Wilson newspapers, such as the *New York Sun*, spared no criticism, many other partisan Republican newspapers, such as the *Boston Herald* and the *Los Angeles Times*, gave the Covenant their approval. In the staunchly conservative community of Amherst, Massachusetts, Ray Stannard Baker found "almost unanimous support of the League . . . [and] outspoken disapproval of the obstinate position of Senator Lodge." The President's opponents, stated the *New York Times*, "will contend in vain against an overwhelming public opinion."⁵ At least to some extent, then, it was not unreasonable for Wilson to regard the verdict of the press as "splendid" or to believe "that the people are absolutely with the purposes and plan of the thing."⁶

Second, notwithstanding public opinion, the intensity of the political storm about to break over Wilson's head was directly proportionate to the

success that he had thus far achieved at Paris. By virtue of their assent to his priorities—from Lloyd George's resolution to make the venture "an integral part" of the treaty, to the triumphal presentation of the Covenant—it appeared that Wilson's European counterparts either had decided to follow his lead in spite of his November setback, or had proved unable to exploit his Achilles' heel. By the end of the first major phase of the peace conference, one might have thought the mid-term elections had gone the other way.

Third, with respect to the more salient objections to the League aired during 1919–20, hardly any of them had not been registered before—either in the abbreviated Senate debates sparked by Wilson's peace moves in December 1916 and January 1917, or in the anti-League themes of the autumn campaign and the contention over the Armistice. It would be misleading, however, to characterize the preponderance of these objections as "isolationist." (That term fit only a small number of opponents, even among the dozen or so "irreconcilables.")⁷ No one better captured the essence of the situation than the Democratic leader in the Senate, Gilbert Hitchcock. "*Internationalism has come*," he declared in defense of the draft Covenant on February 27, "*and we must choose what form the internationalism is to take.*"⁸

Wilson's harshest critic would not have demurred. In a series of articles after the Armistice, Theodore Roosevelt had written that the United States could never again "completely withdraw into its shell" and that international consultation could help avert war.⁹ Yet Roosevelt, like most opponents of a *Wilsonian* league, was ever the ardent nationalist and the champion of universal military training; he could accept a league "only as an addition to, and in no sense as a substitute for the preparedness of our own strength for our own defense."¹⁰ Moreover, he wanted to know if Wilson meant to go to war "every time a Yugoslav wishes to slap a Czechoslav in the face."¹¹ In his ongoing condemnation of the Fourteen Points, Roosevelt would brook none but a "spheres of influence" partnership with the Allies. "Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some kind of police system in the weak and disorderly countries at their thresholds," he wrote, and let the United States look after the Western Hemisphere.¹² As for anything else, "let us with deep seriousness ponder every promise we make *so as to be sure our people will fulfill it.*"¹³

Along these lines of battle, he planned to lead his party against "Wilson's Hill," and it would have been the most spectacular charge of his career; but it was not to be. During the early hours of January 6, 1919, the sixty-year-old Bull Moose at last succumbed to the ravages of "the strenuous life."¹⁴ While most Americans mourned, Oswald Garrison Vil-

lard remarked that Roosevelt's passing was an act "of divine mercy for the country and another piece of Woodrow Wilson's extraordinary luck."¹⁵

Perhaps so. However, other prominent Republicans had been raising doubts, too, in anticipation of the kind of league they believed Wilson would bring home. Among the more notable ones was Philander C. Knox's speech to the Senate on December 18. Knox demanded that the League be separated from the peace treaty and went on to articulate his "new American Doctrine," a variation on Roosevelt's spheres-of-influence idea within the context of a limited Allied-American entente.¹⁶ As for the next chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge's thinking had not changed since his attack on the "Peace Without Victory" address two years earlier. Like Roosevelt, he believed that the United States must play its part in the peace settlement and work closely with the Allies in upholding it. Any league of nations, if it were to be more than "an exposition of vague ideals," must, of course, have both "authority to issue decrees and force to sustain them." It was at this point, Lodge emphasized to the Senate on December 21, "that questions of great moment arise."¹⁷ Even though Wilson had yet to make clear what he meant by a "league," his archrival feared the demise of the Monroe Doctrine and the submersion of American sovereignty.¹⁸ Anxious about all the easy talk about "the beauty and necessity of peace," he asked his colleagues: "[A]re you ready to put your soldiers and your sailors at the disposition of other nations?"¹⁹

As of February 14, it became obvious that Wilson had devised no slender organization. On the same day, he gave his critics even more to digest—a cable to each member of the House and Senate committees on foreign affairs requesting that they refrain from further public comment on the League until he could discuss the Covenant with them, article by article.²⁰ It is frequently maintained by scholars (as it was at the time) that Wilson thereby tried to muzzle the opposition so that he could fire the opening shot at Boston's Mechanic's Hall, where he told his audience he had "fighting blood" in him. Thus, the argument goes, it was Wilson who set the confrontational tone.²¹

Yet even Wilson's admirers among historians have overlooked several mitigating circumstances surrounding this seemingly partisan offensive. Although he had approved the idea (Tumulty's) for a presidential homecoming in Senator Lodge's own state, Wilson had not intended to make an important speech. En route to America he learned of newspaper announcements to the contrary and exchanged with Tumulty eight radiograms on the subject. He knew his "immediate duty" was to get to Washington; he was worried about the "impression on the hill" if his stopover became "an arrangement for a premeditated address." Could they not

forgo an elaborate ceremony and just let him make a few informal comments at the train station?²² Tumulty plainly had misconstrued Wilson's communications; but by this time he had invited the governors of all the New England states; and, he beseeched the President, the people of Boston looked forward to the event "with splendid and entirely non-partisan enthusiasm."²³ Wilson had no choice but to accept a *fait accompli*.

The speech itself, except for one or two sentences, was not markedly partisan. For half an hour he spoke extemporaneously about the great esteem in which Europeans held Americans. The people of Europe believed that the United States had converted the war to "the cause of human right and justice," and that the world was about to enter a new age when nations would "understand one another" and "unite every moral fiber and physical strength to see that right shall prevail." This imposed a proud burden upon America; if she were to fail, despair would send the nations back into hostile camps and America would forever have to live with a gun in her hand. Anyone who resisted the "present tides," he also declared, would find himself thrown upon a "high and barren" shore. But he had no doubt about the ultimate verdict. The world's peoples were in the saddle and they had "set their heads now to do a great thing."²⁴

If any of this was terribly unfair (or impolitic), it should be recalled that, since autumn, a steady rhythm of denunciations of both the League and Wilson had filled the air of the Senate; moreover, three irreconcilables (Borah, Poindexter, and the Democrat James A. Reed of Missouri) ignored the request for a temporary cease-fire and, before Wilson landed, had delivered some of the most vituperative addresses ever heard in the chamber.²⁵ Taft called them "barking critics." To a friend he bemoaned "the vicious narrowness of Reed, the explosive ignorance of Poindexter, the ponderous Websterian language . . . of Borah, the vanity of Lodge . . . [and] the selfishness . . . of Knox."²⁶ It is no reflection upon the integrity of his opponents' convictions to say that, as in the case of the 1918 campaign, Wilson was probably more sinned against than sinning. He may nonetheless have erred, but in number rather than degree. In part because of the crush of work confronting him during his ten-day stay, he made no other public addresses on the League until the eve of his return to Europe, and that would be that for almost half a year.

Wilson did, however, engage in significant parlay with his legislative colleagues at a White House dinner on February 26. For several hours he and his thirty-four guests explored most of the substantive issues at stake. Although it seldom receives more than brief scholarly notice, this was the most revealing and decisive encounter that would ever take place between the President and the League's critics.²⁷

One of their first questions concerned the disarmament article and

the right of Congress to establish the size of the armed forces. That right, Wilson maintained, was safeguarded, more or less. The Executive Council's responsibility for effecting a reduction of armaments was subject to the approval of each of the governments represented on that body; therefore, unanimity was required before any such plan could go into effect. (This was a reasonable interpretation of how the League might well proceed; but Article VIII, which Wilson considered among the Covenant's most important components, contained no such explicit qualifications.)

The League's potential impact on the Monroe Doctrine was in the forefront of the discussion. On at least two previous occasions, Wilson had faulted that shibboleth—because it had never protected Latin America against aggression from the United States—when he had unveiled the Pan-American Pact and in his remarks to a group of Mexican editors in June 1918. Now, he iterated its traditional stated purpose: to insure the Western Hemisphere against foreign aggression. In a sense, he said, the League would make all nations a party to the Monroe Doctrine and broaden its scope to cover the world.

Many senators also asked about the articles on arbitration. Anticipating their objections, Wilson gave a construction that suggested a limited application. Before resorting to arms, of course, League members would be required to submit their disputes to arbitration; if this were unacceptable, the next step would be an inquiry by the Executive Council. Only in the case of unanimity was the Council's decision binding on the disputants, on pain of sanctions. Therefore, the Covenant's provisions for the settlement of international disputes fell somewhat short of compulsory arbitration. (Again, the point was not clarified, but if, after going through the process, one nation invaded the other, then that nation would have violated Article X. While their main purpose was to delay hostilities, these articles, in the context of the whole, were still fairly strong.)

Some of the questions put to Wilson were captious. For instance, one related Senator Borah's recent assertion that, because the British dominions would have separate representation in the Body of Delegates, the Covenant embodied "the greatest triumph for English diplomacy in three centuries."²⁸ Wilson met this protest by explaining that Great Britain would never be more than one among the five permanent members of the Executive Council; and it was inconceivable that the Body of Delegates, whose right it was to name the other four of the council's nine members, would chose from among any but the smaller powers.

The most heavily stressed issues were Article X and sovereignty. Wilson did not mince words. "[S]ome of our sovereignty would be surrendered," he said. How could an enterprise to eliminate war hope to succeed "without some sacrifice[,] . . . each nation yielding something to accomplish such an end"? But, one senator asked, would the obligation to participate

in some concerted action not impair the right of Congress to declare war? Not necessarily, Wilson replied. The United States would be bound to the Covenant, like any other treaty; it was possible, though far more likely under the old order, that a situation might arise that would compel Congress to declare war. But the fact that such a situation "might force us to declare war was not a usurpation of the power of Congress to declare war." Even so, he went on, the United States "would willingly relinquish some of its sovereignty . . . for the good of the world"; and, of course, other nations would be doing the same. Wilson's summary comment underscored the central issue: the League "would never be carried out successfully if the objection of sovereignty was insisted upon by the Senate."²⁹

Most witnesses gave this signal conference a favorable report shortly after it adjourned. According to a *New York Times* canvas of participants, the session was nothing if not "good humored." Dr. Grayson's record for that day, based on what Wilson told him, described it as "free and easy." Some adversaries remarked that Wilson had gone some distance in allaying charges that he was secretive or imperious. Two senators told the *Times* that the President said he did not expect the charter to go through without some changes (though he hoped otherwise).³⁰

Two weeks later, however, Wilson complained bitterly about the way some senators had allegedly treated him. "'Your dinner,'" he said to Colonel House upon returning to Paris, "'was a failure as far as getting together was concerned.'"³¹ After initially speaking respectfully about it, one critic later said that he "had had tea with the Mad Hatter."³² These dramatic changes in perception, as we shall see, owed to subsequent events during the remainder of Wilson's stay—a chain reaction set swiftly in motion within two days of the White House gathering. For, rather than bringing them around, Wilson's forthright explanation of the Covenant—in particular, his comments about Article X and sovereignty—had simply confirmed his opponents' predictions. "I can say that nothing the President said changed my opinion about the League of Nations," Senator Frank Brandegee remarked. "I am against it, as I was before."³³

There was, of course, another constituency of consequence whose advice and consent Wilson had yet to secure. In light of ongoing developments in early 1919, the disposition of progressive internationalists toward the President had an increasingly significant bearing on the League's prospects. As Norman Hapgood had written to Colonel House in January, "most assuredly, we cannot gain the Senate if, in addition to the opposition of the reactionaries we have the liberals dissatisfied."³⁴

A few preliminary observations are in order before we consider the progressive internationalists at this critical juncture. As Wilson had interpreted it at the plenary session, the Covenant was both definite enough to

guarantee peace and elastic enough to provide for readjustment, its powers subject to "those who exercise it and in accordance with the changing circumstances of the time." Thus, as had been once the case with the Constitution of the United States, the League of Nations awaited practical definition. Considering the diplomatic realities that constrained him, Wilson had probably infused the Covenant with as great a progressive internationalist character as possible; but only time could tell in what direction the tree would actually grow. Under the best of circumstances (perhaps a third Wilson administration), progressive internationalists could feel reasonably confident that the United States would pursue a progressive construction and not only shoulder new responsibilities but also accept limitations on its own freedom of action in international relations. Yet a highly conservative, even reactionary, construction could be also put on the Covenant if the task of putting it into operation fell to conservatives and reactionaries. So the question was not just of the League in itself. Other matters of politics and foreign policy and perceptions of their relationship to the League—and, therefore, of what was likely to unfold in the immediate postwar years—shaped the thoughts and actions of progressive internationalists. (This much could be said, as well, of the thoughts and actions of Henry Cabot Lodge.)

Despite their dismay over his regrettable contribution to the adversities confronting them at home, Wilson had left for Europe with the blessings of most progressive internationalists upon him. But for one major exception, their early response to the Covenant was highly favorable, from Hamilton Holt's *Independent*, to Paul Kellogg's *Survey*. Matching its kindred, the *New Republic* extolled "the Constitution of 1919," ridiculed references to a weakened Monroe Doctrine, and dismissed other criticism that the document did not go far enough in a progressive direction. No one, the editorial asserted, "can doubt for a moment that if such an organization had been in existence in 1914 there would have been no war."³⁵

As for the socialist press, the *Appeal to Reason* (still circulating in the hundreds of thousands) hailed the Covenant as a "revolutionary document . . . designed to preserve the world's peaceful equilibrium." By itself, the League would not "absolutely wipe out the possibility of war," but it augured the eventual disappearance of the plague of "belligerent and wholly selfish nationalism." The President's opponents in the Senate, the *Appeal* also vigorously submitted, were not isolationists. They were imperialists and militarists who feared restrictions on "America's armed forces . . . [and] the commercial and territorial greed of American capitalists." The League foreshadowed "the internationalism of balanced justice and cooperation," while the Lodge crowd favored "the internationalism of unrestrained plunder and competition."³⁶

Many progressive internationalists held the great hope that the League

would become the vehicle for reuniting liberals and socialists. They gave Wilson credit for seeing to the drafting of the Covenant before the conference proceeded to impose a settlement on Germany. This was a significant achievement; and it fueled their hopes that, in the final peace terms, the New Diplomacy would replace the balance of power. Yet (evincing a close reading of Wilson) the Covenant was, as one of them put it, "a blank check—a form which may be signed but will then require filling out with the figures which alone can give it meaning."³⁷

Thus the ultimate worthiness of the League depended on the contents of a treaty as yet unwritten, and this made many progressive internationalists somewhat uneasy. As Paul Kellogg once noted, the League of Free Nations Association (LFNA), unlike the League to Enforce Peace, was not "absorbed in the machinery of international control," but rather in "the democratic principles which must shoot through" the League to make the peace settlement "tolerable."³⁸ Would the organization become merely a league of governments, or one of peoples, as Wilson had often said it should? Did it deal adequately with the economic causes of war? Was the disarmament article strong enough? Could Germany and Russia expect to be invited into the family of nations?

At this point progressive internationalists did not want to put such questions into print, for Wilson seemed to share their concerns. Meeting with representatives of the LFNA on March 1, he explained that some of the provisions they all desired had been impossible to obtain. But most of the important ones were there, including some that were not written out. (For example, his idea of giving each country a three-member delegation in the general assembly, he said, would make it possible for conservative, liberal, and radical groups alike to be represented in the League. And the present requirement for unanimity in the Executive Council in order to amend the Covenant itself would, in time, no doubt be reduced to a two-thirds majority.) Just now, however, he feared that too many proposals to alter the structure would only assist the obstructionists. "[T]he important thing to do is to get behind the covenant as it is," he said. And if changes had to be made, they should be pointed "in a liberal direction [and] not in the direction of the opposition."³⁹

In all, Wilson could not have hoped for a more thoughtful reception. And, for the time being—or pending the announcement of the final terms of the peace treaty—most progressive internationalists honored his request. If, in any case, apprehensions seized them during this winter of discontent, they did not center on the Covenant, or even on the arithmetic of the Senate. Far more ominous was the pall that darkened the skies above the national political scene.

By early 1919, "One Hundred Per Cent Americanism" was shifting focus from the German menace to the threat of Bolshevism, although it

was hard to tell where one form of hysteria left off and the other began: In February, Scott Nearing of the Rand School of Social Science was tried in federal court for attempting, through his writings, to obstruct the draft. On Capitol Hill, the Senate Judiciary Committee investigated alleged Bolshevik efforts to overthrow the government. In Seattle, when rising prices caused workers to strike for higher wages and the police brutally crushed the movement, Mayor Ole Hanson declared, "We didn't need any more law than we did to stop the red flag. We just stopped it." Later that month, senators Poindexter and Reed attacked the League by equating it with Bolshevism. In March, the Supreme Court, in *Schenck vs. the United States*, ruled that some forms of political expression were not protected under the First Amendment. Roger Baldwin, director of the National Civil Liberties Union, was in jail. Rose Pastor Stokes had begun serving a ten-year sentence for making an anti-war speech. Eugene Debs, after losing an appeal, would soon enter prison as well. And, though the fighting was over, the Post Office Department continued to harass or suppress radical publications such as the *Liberator*, the *Milwaukee Leader*, and the *New York Call*. It did not yet have a name, but Wilson's return visit coincided with the opening phase of the "Red Scare."⁴⁰

For progressive internationalists, the fate of the League presently did not hinge on what was in the Covenant, but rather on the persistence of a domestic environment that was discouraging liberals from giving the crusade their full devotion and preventing many influential radicals from participating in it at all. As far as the ultimate peace settlement was concerned, Wilson's performance so far had earned him the benefit of the doubt. Yet, in the circumstances, they needed further reassurance that their confidence in him was not otherwise misplaced. It was now essential that he take extraordinary steps to restore their erstwhile coalition to vitality. Without delay, he simply must put an end to the repression and extend to its past victims a sweeping presidential amnesty.⁴¹

This was not the counsel of malcontents on the periphery. Wilson received the same message from Democrats and nonpartisan liberals, pacifists and pro-war socialists, journalists across the progressive internationalist spectrum, and from personal friends. This aspect of the story has long been ignored, but it is no exaggeration to say categorically that, until the publication of the Treaty of Versailles, the broad issue of civil liberties rivaled the Covenant as the chief subject of concern among progressive internationalists.

The general question had first been raised in leading liberal publications shortly after the Armistice. For example, the *Dial* wondered: "Can we now look forward to something like normal conditions of freedom of speech and opinion? Will radicals and dissenters now be permitted to have their say, or must we expect more orgies of suppression?" Citing the

severe punishment meted out to Rose Pastor Stokes "for a few unimportant remarks," the journal hoped that, at a minimum, "some leniency [would] be now shown to . . . political prisoners."⁴² In January, Norman Thomas asked in the *New Republic*, "With what possible grace can we appear before the conference table as a champion of liberty" when so many in America were in prison "for no other crime than loyalty to conviction?" Charles Beard put the matter derisively. "The time has come," he wrote, "[t]o release political prisoners whose offense was to retain Mr. Wilson's pacifist views after he abandoned them."⁴³

Once he had arrived back in Washington, progressive internationalists lost no time in pressing the point—that herein the League hung in the balance—in correspondence with Wilson as well as in editorials. John Palmer Gavit was the first. Because of the burdens of peacemaking, the editor of the *New York Evening Post* wrote to him, Wilson probably did not realize the extent of the damage being done. But the administration's policy on civil liberties was "the very reason that you are not having now the liberal backing that is your right." The President had "a golden opportunity." Nothing "would so uplift and electrify" the country's liberal forces or have a more "far-reaching political effect," Gavit affirmed, as an "immediate and unconditional amnesty for all those persons convicted for expression of opinion."⁴⁴

John Nevin Sayre wrote Wilson that labor looked upon the repressive war machinery as a tool used in many instances by selfish capitalist interests to persecute labor leaders—that it tended "to undermine confidence in your proposals for a League." A general amnesty was the "one thing" that could "rally the laboring classes" to his side.⁴⁵ (On the broader subject, Ray Stannard Baker considered the recent official statement of the new American Labor party of Greater New York important enough to outline it for the President: The party resolutely supported the Fourteen Points and "a real league of nations." But labor demanded "honest disarmament," "honest self-determination," "open trade," and "open discussion" at home. They would oppose with all their might the Poindexters, the Reeds, and the Lodges. "As between them and Wilson we are for Wilson, but we are not behind Wilson. We are a long way ahead of him."⁴⁶)

Dudley Field Malone made the case with a direct reference to 1916. Many radical groups who had supported Wilson then, Malone explained, opposed him now because the government continued to act as if the war had not ended. A "bold and generous stroke," however, could win radical support for the Covenant. The President must urge Congress to repeal the Espionage Act, order the Attorney General to drop all pending cases under it, put a stop to Burleson's activities, and proclaim a general amnesty for all political prisoners. Courageous action was the key to victory.

It would create "a force great and militant enough to crush the opposition to the League."⁴⁷

Of all the anxious warnings, none was more emphatic than an open letter published in the *Appeal to Reason* on March 1. In the battle for the League, the message to Wilson began, "[y]ou will be met by a storm of reactionary opposition." Then, speaking on behalf of its less radical brethren, the socialist weekly asked, "Where in America can you turn for aid and comfort save to the American people?—to American liberals?" It was common knowledge that the President had received both public and personal notice of the gravity with which virtually all progressive internationalists regarded the issue of amnesty. "They cannot accept your leadership in the League of Nations movement so long as . . . you persist in ignoring their single demand," the *Appeal* concluded. "They must lose faith in you—regard your flowering rhetoric as mere 'wind along the waste,' signifying nothing sure or stable."⁴⁸

Wilson's response fell far short of stirring. With some dispatch, he looked into the questions of censorship and amnesty, but once again hesitated to act resolutely. After writing to Burleson on the subject of radical publications—"I cannot believe that it would be wise to do any more suppressing"—he failed to follow through. "Continued to suppress and Courts sustained me every time," Burleson subsequently scratched on the bottom of the President's note.⁴⁹ As for the Espionage Act, the Attorney General maintained that no one had been convicted "for mere expression of opinion." In those few cases where punishment had been unusually severe, a warrant of commutation was in order, but in no circumstances could he recommend "an indiscriminate pardon." Tumulty voiced doubts about the Justice Department's assertion that there were no political prisoners; he also pointed out to Wilson that Gregory took on the mien of prosecuting attorney and that, in most cases, the proposed reductions of sentences were "not at all considerable." Wilson should not grant Gregory's request to announce such a compassionless policy. It would be better, Tumulty advised, "if you would keep in mind the idea of a general amnesty and not foreclose yourself from acting along a different line."⁵⁰

Nevertheless, on March 1, Wilson did defer to Gregory's persistent ministrations. His decision could only compound the difficulties should he wish to change the policy later on; though not irrevocable, it certainly reduced the possibilities for an amnesty. "I can only say that it is a matter which I have approached again and again without being able to satisfy myself of a wise conclusion," he wrote to John Nevin Sayre two days later. "I am going to keep on thinking about it."⁵¹ But merely "thinking about it" was a luxury he could ill afford. Progressive internationalists had made it abundantly clear that both principle and political common sense required a long-overdue act of faith, a test of his sincerity in the search for

a democratic peace. Wilson needed their unconditional support; he would no longer have it. Soon they would disregard his appeal to refrain from publicly offering criticism of the Covenant. This additional complication, however, was owed as much to new developments on Wilson's right flank (precipitated by the White House dinner of February 26)—to which we now turn.

Few historians have ever doubted that the League, at least until 1920, enjoyed overwhelming public approval. Nor did Henry Cabot Lodge; that fact informed his strategy at every turn. "[T]he people of the country are very naturally fascinated by the idea of eternal preservation of the world's peace," he wrote to ex-senator Beveridge. The problem was that "[t]hey have not examined it; they have not begun to think about it." To an extent, this was probably the case, but the observation also reflected Lodge's contempt for public opinion, especially in foreign policy, whenever it intruded with judgments averse to his own. (His attitude toward the public's regard for progressive taxation and the eight-hour day, it should be noted, was no different.) The remedy was to educate the people, to take every opportunity to bring them to a full understanding of the practical details. "[T]he second thought," Lodge assured Beveridge, "is going to be with us."⁵²

At the same time, Lodge knew that it would be counterproductive to confront Wilson "with a blank negative." Even among his own constituents the League idea was popular. Some two hundred thousand Bostonians had turned out to give the President a rousing hero's welcome, and Governor Coolidge had reminded the Senator that "Massachusetts is a pacifist state in a way."⁵³ If the party adopted the position of the irreconcilables, a minority view among critics, it was bound to backfire. Wilson could easily make capital out of an uncompromising stand against any League at all; moreover, it would alienate Republicans like Taft, who found the Covenant satisfactory, or those others who apparently desired a league but had qualms about its present form. As his most insightful and sympathetic biographer has observed, "we may reasonably assume that Lodge would have swallowed the League had he seen therein the means of securing a Republican victory."⁵⁴

There were other grave concerns—in a sense, the mirror opposite of those of progressive internationalists—at work as well. "Any party which carries out . . . a great progressive and constructive program is sure to bring out a reaction," Wilson said to members of the Democratic National Committee on February 28, in reference to the mid-term elections.⁵⁵ He might also have applied that analysis to current circumstances. As the Republicans' recent campaign suggested, his prewar domestic policies and "war socialism," from labor legislation to tariffs and taxation, gave them

every cause for alarm over the issue of postwar reconstruction. Since November, Wilson had refused to appoint a formal commission on reconstruction, in order to prevent Republicans from controlling it.⁵⁶ And, while he had scarcely begun to consider a program (as progressive internationalists complained), there was talk within administration circles about permanent government ownership of the nation's railroads and telegraph system, the establishment of a permanent federal employment service, and federal coordination of a major public works program. Furthermore, on the day of his arrival in Washington, the President signed into law a new progressive tax bill that sharply increased the previous, high rates on large incomes and corporate profits.⁵⁷ From the Republicans' standpoint, then, the triumph of an unmitigated Wilsonian League held profound implications for foreign and domestic policy alike. Here partisanship was imbued with ideological conviction. Their present advantage in the Senate was as slim as could be, perhaps ephemeral. What would become of the party—indeed, of the country—if Wilson got his League, if the Democrats could boast of “the greatest constructive world reform in history”?⁵⁸

With Roosevelt's death, the torch had been passed, and the stakes could not be higher. Wilson's League must be overhauled or, better, defeated; but this could be done, Lodge reasoned, only by holding “such a position that I shall be able to unite the [Republican] senators behind me.”⁵⁹ To that end, the battle was formally joined two days after the White House dinner. On February 28, Lodge delivered the second most important address of his career.

The President, he began, was unfortunately prone to “enticing generalities” and “shrill shrieks.” What was needed were “facts, details, and sharp, clear-cut definitions.” The present constitution of the League was crudely expressed and susceptible to diverse interpretations. Rather than promoting harmony, the Covenant itself would become the source of disagreement among those who signed on. One thing was nonetheless definite: Article X would turn American foreign policy upside down. He wanted “very complete proof . . . of the superiority of any new system before we reject the policies of Washington and Monroe.” To guarantee the political independence and territorial integrity of all the members of the League was “a very perilous promise to make.” And “that guarantee we must maintain at any cost when our word is once given.” The question of compulsive force was not a matter of interpretation, he told his fellows. “It is there in article 10 absolutely and entirely by the mere fact of these guarantees.” Moreover, dismissing Wilson's attempt to reconcile collective security with the Monroe Doctrine, he asserted that, under the League, domestic questions, including such issues as immigration, would no longer be settled by Americans alone. The United States would also waive the right at all times to take independent action in its foreign af-

fairs, “if there is a majority against us.” Wilson would substitute “an international state for pure Americanism.” In other words, the country was being asked “to move away from George Washington to . . . the sinister figure of Trotsky the champion of internationalism.”

The Senator granted that a league might be advantageous. All he asked was for “consideration, time and thought.” As the League stood now, the danger of future collision with Europe was very great. The Covenant required amendments to exclude from its jurisdiction the Monroe Doctrine and immigration, to provide for the right of withdrawal from the organization, and to clarify how international force might be employed. Perhaps it would be wiser, he concluded, to have a league “made up by the European nations whose interests are chiefly concerned, and with which the United States could cooperate fully at any time, whenever cooperation was needed.”⁶⁰

Lodge's carefully calibrated assault had the desired effect all around. His catalogue of the troubles that might be visited upon the country garnered the applause of the irreconcilables; his list of “reasonable” suggestions for improving the Covenant impressed the more moderate critics. The performance even had the benefit of provoking Wilson. Later that day, to the Democratic National Committee, he cast aspersions upon the intelligence of his adversaries and declared that they were “going to have the most conspicuously contemptible names in history.” Though meant to be off-the-record, the remarks quickly made the rounds and added credence to the Republicans' charges that the President was unreasonable.⁶¹

Even so, it appeared to Lodge and Brandegee that Wilson still enjoyed the upper hand, at least on the surface of things. Many Republican newspapers remained more or less favorably disposed toward the League. (“We have been almost entirely cut off,” Lodge complained to Viscount Bryce.⁶²) The LEP was unwavering in its support. Taft and Wilson were scheduled to appear together at New York's Metropolitan Opera House on March 4. It did not occur to Lodge that the President's following among progressive internationalists could possibly be in jeopardy. Most important, because of the dinner at the White House, Wilson could truthfully report to the Peace Conference that he had met and consulted with members of the legislature.

Thus, before Wilson returned to Europe, it was essential to demonstrate the views of a strategic minority. To that end, Lodge, Brandegee, and Knox drew up an appropriate resolution, circulated it strictly among Republicans, and secured some thirty-seven signatures. The document stated that it was the sense of the Senate that a league of nations should be considered only after peace terms with Germany were settled and that the Covenant “*in the form now proposed* . . . should not be accepted by the United States.” These rather open-ended words fit Lodge's strategy per-

fectly, for they were deliberately chosen to attract (in addition to the irreconcilables) a good number of senators not on record as diehard opponents of the League. In a daring parliamentary maneuver just before midnight on March 3, Lodge introduced this, his famous "Round Robin," and read off the names of the signatories.⁶³

The impact of this simple device was manifold. First, literally overnight, it forced most of the League's supporters to review the entire situation. In his address at the Metropolitan Opera House, Taft, while deploring the tactic and insisting that the League must be a part of the treaty, conceded the necessity of amendments to preserve the Monroe Doctrine and to safeguard American control over immigration.⁶⁴ Democratic newspapers also soon began to realize that such modifications were inevitable.⁶⁵

Second, as the dispatches from the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office amply demonstrate, the Republicans accomplished their main goal—to serve notice to the Allied leaders that at least one-third of the Senate would probably vote not to ratify the peace treaty, barring certain changes in the Covenant.⁶⁶ This would have unending repercussions. The fact that Wilson needed to obtain any important changes would weaken his bargaining position in other areas of contention, and that would have an enormous impact on the peace treaty.

Third, the Round Robin altered the debate in several ways with respect to progressive internationalists. Almost immediately, it undermined Wilson's argument about getting behind the Covenant as it stood. Now that it was clear that the document was going to be revised, progressive internationalists concluded that those revisions ought to be determined, not by reactionaries like Lodge or even conservatives like Taft, but by the League's real friends. And their concerns had little to do with the Monroe Doctrine, control of immigration, or sovereignty.

Robert Morss Lovett, editor of the *Dial* and a member of the League of Free Nations Association, outlined the progressive internationalist position on March 8. While maintaining that the Covenant should be welcomed "with such signs of acceptance as the Senate cannot fail to understand," he counseled Wilson to provide for Germany's and Russia's entry into the League and to ensure that the mandate system be implemented "in conspicuous good faith." Moreover, the Covenant was too vague on the subject of disarmament, the supreme test of nations, and silent on the subject of the economic causes of war. And, whereas it contained a provision to secure for labor humane conditions of work (Article XX), the League needed some form of direct representation of peoples as well as of governments.⁶⁷

A week later, the *New Republic* asserted that defeat could be avoided only by combining "agitation on behalf of the official draft with candid

and thoroughgoing criticism." Noting that radicals and liberals must not imitate their foes and "threaten to upset the whole applecart" if they did not get everything they wanted, the journal added to Lovett's list of shortcomings the draft's omission of a guarantee to protect minorities in national states. In this, the first in a series of articles, the *New Republic* also began to raise new doubts about Article X, but not because it "too severely limits sovereign discretion." Rather, it was potentially "dangerous and ambiguous" because it "may mould the League into an agency of international inertia rather than into an agency of international adjustment." The *New York Call*, too, worried about the League's capacity to "subdue the aspirations of sullen subject populations for the very self-determination for which we avowedly fought the war." Walter Lippmann put it this way: Article X constituted "an effort to be wiser than the next generation." There was no question of trusting the President; it was "a matter of the future, when Mr. Wilson will be a private citizen, and when perhaps some other person will be in the White House who needs to be checked by Congress."⁶⁸ Here, then, the Round Robin revealed how ineptly Wilson had marshaled the best among his own forces. Although they were judicious enough to leaven their criticisms with appeals to pragmatism, the very fact that progressive internationalists had opened up this entirely new front demonstrated, on one hand, that they expected to be heeded and, on the other hand, that Wilson now exerted little if any control over them.

Finally, in a more comprehensive way, Lodge's resolution also drew back the curtain and exposed both how much Wilson had overestimated his personal powers of persuasion and how inadequately he had played the role of propagandist in general. Only five days before, he had told Breckinridge Long, "I am in doubt whether the time has come for a systematic campaign."⁶⁹ But that was precisely what was needed. As Ray Stannard Baker urged, it was of paramount importance for Wilson to explain that *this* League really was the best one obtainable, to "defend the Covenant as adopted by your committee, to convince the people . . . and enforce and re-enforce the Covenant, illustrating how it applies in specific cases."⁷⁰

Lodge's timing left Wilson only one day to respond, in his farewell address at the Metropolitan Opera House. This was an event attended by thousands and scrutinized by millions. (The President looked, according to Baker, "very much worn, his face gray & drawn, showing the strain of his heavy work at Washington.") There were, to be sure, moving insights in his comments about the hopes of suffering Europeans, the sacrifice that tens of thousands of American soldiers had made to a great ideal, and about the dangers of another war if the balance of power were not supplanted by a community of nations. Yet, he maintained, "it is perhaps not

necessary for me to discuss in any particular way the contents of the document." Hence one single, hapless line of defiance reverberated: "And when that treaty comes back gentlemen on this side will find the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure."⁷¹ No matter how otherwise emotionally effective they might have been, Wilson's two addresses in Boston and New York, about general conditions in Europe and the duty of the United States to fulfill a historic mission, were hardly enough—not when he would be absent for another five months and the Republicans would continue to hammer on the details.

Two paths to the League now lay before Wilson, neither one guaranteeing success. He could undertake some heroic eleventh-hour endeavor to bring life back to the progressive internationalist coalition, or he could seek help from sympathetic conservative internationalists. It had been a long time since the Fourteen Points and the Fourth Liberty Loan addresses; progressive internationalists were in sore need of some tangible evidence that they still counted for something in the President's book. Primarily because of obstacles that he apparently did not care to clear away, the opportunity to take the first path was rapidly receding. The compliments he paid to Taft at the Metropolitan Opera House, however, as well as his estimation that the latter's presence there meant that the League was "not a party issue," seemed to suggest, ironically, that Wilson now considered the conservative second path as the more practical means to his own progressive ends.

But this entailed a tremendous gamble, notwithstanding Taft's prestige and willingness to help. Whatever "clarifying amendments" Wilson and Taft might settle on, there was no assurance that they would satisfy a sufficient number of the signers of the Round Robin. Nor did this approach take into account that Taft had faltered before—that he was bound, sooner or later, to come under pressure from fellow Republicans to draw back from Wilson. And, if after all of this Wilson was left high and dry, what other conclusion would progressive internationalists come to but that he had permanently abandoned them?

Then, too, what would the League mean, even if it won adoption on a decidedly conservative basis? Would the possibilities for a progressive internationalist League not have been lost forever? To whom would Wilson (or a like-minded successor) turn for understanding and support to sustain a progressive construction of the Covenant during the first postwar crisis when, hypothetically, the United States might have to sacrifice its own short-term interests for the well-being of the fledgling organization?

In this regard, the domestic political circumstances that prevailed would be as important as any other factor.

By March 1919, the events of the previous months had at last acquired an unmistakable meaning as they continued to hurtle out of Wilson's control with seemingly inexorable logic. Just after Wilson returned to Paris, Oswald Garrison Villard reflected upon the recent past and, with great perspicacity, contemplated the future. The Republican opposition was "more or less factitious," he admitted. The President ought now to realize, however, that arrayed against him was "a body of liberal thought" as well as "a body of feudal thought," and that "between them, though there can never be conscious cooperation, there is enough power to wreck his plans." He might well attempt to appease the Senate, but his persistent diffidence toward progressive internationalist concerns would continue to militate against him; "the compromises he has charted with an eye to the conservatives have not placated the latter, while they have chilled the faith of the radicals," Villard concluded. "Honest politics are always good politics, and there is only one method by which the President can win victories—by loyalty to the fourteen points and to the league that he formerly preached."⁷²

This was a harsh indictment from someone who, somewhat to the left of Wilson, had become as skeptical of the League as had Lodge, far to the right of Wilson. Yet, Villard had gotten to the crux. "The thing reaches the depth of tragedy," Wilson himself had said to members of the Democratic National Committee on the last day of February.⁷³ Indeed, the story had taken on that quality, but this was so, as much for any other reason, because Wilson did not seem to realize why.

Struggle for Neutrality, 219–227; and Keith Robbins, *Sir Edward Grey: A Biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon*, (London, 1971), 317.

57. See House to Wilson, Feb. 15, 1915, *PWW*, XXXII, 238; and House diary, Feb. 25 and March 4 and 7, 1915, HP, CtY.

58. *Ibid.*, March 27, 1915; House to Wilson, March 20, 23, and 26, 1915, *PWW*, XXXII, 402–403, 423, and 438, respectively.

59. House to Wilson, March 20, 27, and 29, and April 3, 11, and 22, 1915, in *PWW*, XXXII, 402, 441, 456, 475, 504, and *PWW*, XXXIII, 64, respectively. See also House to Wilson, Feb. 28 and March 15, 1915; and Wilson to House, March 18, 1915, in *ibid.*, XXXII, 300, 376–377, and 396, respectively.

60. See House to Wilson, April 22, 1915, *ibid.*, XXXIII, 64; House diary, April 30 and June 3, 1915, HP, CtY; and Link, *Struggle for Neutrality*, 229–231.

61. Quoted in Link, *Struggle for Neutrality*, 231.

Notes for Chapter 4

1. "The Belgian Tragedy," *The Outlook*, 108 (September 23, 1914), 169–178.

2. "Summing Up," *New York Times*, Nov. 29, 1914. See also (all in *ibid.*) TR's "Unwise Peace Treaties a Menace to Righteousness," Oct. 4, 1914; "How to Strive for World Peace," Oct. 18, 1914; and "An International Posse Comitatus," Nov. 8, 1914; and Cooper, *Warrior and the Priest*, 279–282.

3. Roosevelt to Arthur Lee, Aug. 1 and 22, 1914, *LTR*, VII, 790–791 and 809.

4. See Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, 310–314; Harbaugh, *Power and Responsibility*, 466–473; and Cooper, *Warrior and the Priest*, 282–87.

5. Taft to Otto Bannard, Sept. 10, 1911, quoted in *ibid.*; 154.

6. See his *Constitutional Government in the United States*, in *PWW*, XVIII, 116, for an example of this.

7. On the general disarray of the American peace movement in the first months of the war, see Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 229–247; and Marchand, *American Peace Movement and Social Reform*, 144–181; for a review of the new interest in world organization before the war, see Kuehl, *Seeking World Order*, 172–220.

8. I employ these two terms only for general descriptive purposes; their finer meaning will soon become evident.

On the subject of early twentieth-century peace movements, pacifism, and internationalism, Sondra R. Herman, *Eleven Against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898–1921* (Stanford, 1969); and Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1971); along with Kuehl, *Seeking World Order*, and Marchand, *American Peace Movement and Social Reform*, are pioneering works. The field has expanded in recent years, however. In addition to Patterson's *Toward a Warless World*, see also Chatfield, *International War Resistance Through World War II* (New York, 1975); and his "World War I and the Liberal Pacifist in the United States," *American Historical Review*, LXXV (December 1970), 1,920–1,937; Charles DeBenedetti's *Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement, 1915–1929* (Millwood, N.Y., 1978); and his *Peace Reform in American History* (Bloomington, Ind., 1986); DeBenedetti (ed.), *Peace Heroes in the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington, Ind., 1986); and Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen (eds.), *Peace Movements and Political Culture* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1988). For an excellent collection of documents, see John W. Chambers II (ed.), *The Eagle and the Dove: The American Peace Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1900–1922* (New York, 1976; rev. ed., Syracuse, N.Y., 1992). Two other reference works are Warren Kuehl (ed.), *Biographical Dictionary of Internationalists*. (Westport Conn., 1983), and Harold Josephson et al. (eds.), *Biographical Dic-*

tionary of Modern Peace Leaders, 1800–1975 (Westport, Conn., 1985). See also Lawrence S. Wittner, "Peace Movements and Foreign Policy: The Challenge to Diplomatic Historians," *Diplomatic History*, XI (Fall 1987), 355–370; and three groundbreaking dissertations—Michael A. Lutzker, "The 'Practical' Peace Advocates: An Interpretation of the American Peace Movement, 1899–1917" (Rutgers, 1969); Blanche Wiesen Cook, "Woodrow Wilson and the Antimilitarists, 1914–1917" (Johns Hopkins, 1970); and James R. Martin, "The American Peace Movement and the Progressive Era" (Rice, 1975).

9. The definitive work is Marie Louise Degen, *The History of the Woman's Peace Party* (Baltimore, 1939). See also the chapter on Jane Addams in Herman, *Eleven Against War*, 114–149; William L. O'Neill, *Everyone Was Brave, The Rise and Fall of Feminism in America* (Chicago, 1969), 174–184; and Marchand, *American Peace Movement*, 188–189, 197–200, and 204–208.

10. Degen, *Woman's Peace Party*, 38–46; John A. Alyward and Addams to Wilson, March 4, 1915, WP, DLC. See especially David S. Patterson, "Woodrow Wilson and the Mediation Movement," *Historian*, XXXIII, 4 (August 1971), 536–540. For an example of contemporary coverage of the convention, see "A Woman's Peace Party Full Fledged for Action," in *The Survey*, XXXIII (Jan. 16, 1915), 433–434.

11. Degen, *Woman's Peace Party*, 64–126; Jane Addams' memoir, *Peace and Bread in Time of War* (New York, 1922; reprint, 1972) 12–19; Martin, "American Peace Movement," 178–201; and Marchand, *American Peace Movement*, 209–212.

12. Roosevelt to Henry Green, July 2, 1915, quoted in Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*. See also Michael A. Lutzker, "Jane Addams: Peacetime Heroine, Wartime Heretic," in DeBenedetti, *Peace Heroes*, 40–42. For Addams's homecoming speech at Carnegie Hall, see "The Revolt Against War," in *Survey*, XXXIV (July 17, 1915), 355–359.

13. See House to Wilson, July 17 and 19, 1915, *PWW*, XXXIII, 516 and 533, respectively; House diary, July 19, 1915, HP, CtY; Balch to Addams, Aug. 19, 1915, *PWW*, XXXIV, 250–252; and Wilson to Galt, Aug. 18, 1915, *ibid.*, 243. See also Patterson, "Wilson and Mediation," 541–542.

14. Lansing to Wilson, Sept. 1, 1915, *PWW*, XXXIV, 398; for a sampling of Wilson administration correspondence on continuous mediation, see Lansing to Wilson, Aug. 6 and 18, 1915, *ibid.*, 110 and 236–237; Wilson to Lansing, Aug. 19 and 30, 1915, *ibid.*, 247–248 and 399; Wilson to Lansing, Aug. 7, 1915, WP, DLC; Charles R. Crane to Wilson, July 2, 1915; and Wilson to Lillian Wald, July 3, 1915, *PWW*, XXXIII, 469 and 472, respectively; and Wilson to Balch, Aug. 28, 1915; and Aletta Jacobs to Addams, Sept. 15, 1915, *ibid.*, XXXIV, 350 and 473, respectively.

15. Addams, quoted in Degen, *Woman's Peace Party*, 115. See also Addams to Wilson, Jan. 29, 1915, *PWW*, XXXII, 162; Wilson to Addams, Dec. 13, 1915, *ibid.*, XXXV, 348–349; and Wilson to Addams, Oct. 17, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVIII, 460.

16. Wilson, quoted in Degen, *Woman's Peace Party*, 115. See also, Addams, *Peace and Bread*, 59; Patterson, "Wilson and Mediation," 545–549; memorandum by Louis Paul Lochner, Nov. 12, 1915, *PWW*, XXXV, 196; and the *New York Times*, July 22, 1915 (news report and editorial).

17. Shannon, *Socialist Party of America*, 82–86; Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism*, 119–121. As Arno J. Mayer points out in *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918* (New Haven, 1959), the major socialist parties of the belligerent countries observed domestic political truces until well into 1917. (See *ibid.*, 5–6, 99–109, 143–144, and 152–154.)

18. Ginger, *Bending Cross*, 346.

19. Quotations, respectively, from Salvatore, *Debs*, 274; and Ginger, *Bending Cross*, 346. For similar indictments, see *Appeal to Reason*, Sept. 5 and 12, 1914.

20. See Marchand, *American Peace Movement*, 290–291; Weinstein, *Decline of Social-*

ism, 122-123; Shannon, *Socialist Party of America*, 82 and 86-87; and Milton Cantor, "The Radical Confrontation with Foreign Policy: War and Revolution, 1914-1920," in Alfred F. Young, *Dissent: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism* (DeKalb, Ill., 1968), 223-224. The foregoing text is Hillquit's verbatim summary of the final manifesto as approved by the party, printed in his autobiography, *Loose Leaves from a Busy Life* (New York, 1934), 160. For the earlier "Proposed Manifesto," see *American Socialist* (the party's official periodical), Dec. 26, 1914.

21. Cantor argues that left-wing analyses published in the *Masses* and the *International Socialist Review*—which alternately stressed commercial competition, militarism, feudalism versus capitalism, and autocracy versus democracy in their interpretations of the war—"scarcely differed from that of the reformers" ("Radical Confrontation with Foreign Policy," 225-226).

22. Hillquit, *Loose Leaves*, 161; Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism*, 124. Hillquit and others also claimed as much for the clause on no forcible annexations. However, this principle had previously been advanced not only by the WPP, but also by the Union of Democratic Control as early as November 1914 and by Wilson, privately, in his conversations with Brougham and Axson.

23. See Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism*, 124. Salvatore, *Debs*, 275; and Hillquit, *Loose Leaves*, 161.

24. The foregoing is based on Hillquit, *Loose Leaves*, 161-162; Maurer's autobiography, *It Can Be Done* (New York, 1938), 215-216; and "Wilson Receives Socialists," in *Appeal to Reason* (Feb. 5, 1916). Maurer also records a subsequent session that took place one month later and notes that Wilson delayed his next appointment to give Maurer more time. On his first visit to the White House on August 25, 1915, Mexico was the main topic (*It Can Be Done*, 212-213 and 216-217). See also Walter Lanfersick (Executive Secretary of the Socialist party) to Wilson, Jan. 15, 1916, *PWW*, XXXV, 487.

25. For an excellent analysis of the different views of Root, Butler, and Taft, see Herman, *Eleven Against War*, 25-43 and 55-77.

26. The standard study is Ruhl J. Bartlett, *The League to Enforce Peace* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1944); an important documentary source is John H. Latane (ed.), *The Development of the League of Nations Idea: Documents and Correspondence of Theodore Marburg*, 2 vols. (New York, 1932).

27. Named for James Bryce, the former Ambassador to the United States, the Group had put together a small, privately circulated pamphlet, "Proposals for the Avoidance of War," in February 1915. The proposals were laid before the organizers of the League to Enforce Peace on March 30, 1915. For details, see Henry R. Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1952), 16-23, and George W. Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914-1919* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1978), 7-9 and 18-19; see also Robbins, *Abolition of War*, 49-50; Leon E. Boothe, "Anglo-American Pro-League Groups Lead Wilson, 1915-1918," *Mid-America*, LI (April 1969), 93-95; and Latane, *Development of the League of Nations Idea*, I, vii-viii.

28. See Bartlett, *League to Enforce Peace*, 40-41, for the complete text.

29. For details about the LEP's various activities, see *ibid.*, 48-62, and Kuehl, *Seeking World Order*, 214-216. See also Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 11-13.

30. Press conferences, June 8 and 22, 1915, *PWW*, XXXIII, 369 and 435-436, respectively.

31. For example, when A. Lawrence Lowell sent Wilson copies of the LEP proposals, he explained that he was doing so "in such a way as not to request any expression of

opinion." Lowell to Wilson, June 30, 1915; and Wilson to Lowell, July 5, 1915, *ibid.*, 459 and 476, respectively.

32. Quoted in Marchand, *American Peace Movement*, 157 (the LEP's italics).

33. Although he never joined the LEP, Root was perhaps the paragon of conservative internationalism; the best study of his life is Richard W. Leopold, *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition* (Boston, 1954). See also Herman, *Eleven Against War*, 24-33, and 64-65.

34. *New York Times*, Oct. 16, 1914; H.J.R. 372, *Congressional Record*, 63d Cong., 2d sess., 16,694 and 16,745-47.

35. Annual message, Dec. 8, 1914, *PWW*, XXXII, 421-423; see also Link, *Struggle for Neutrality*, 137-143. In 1914, the total number of active military and naval personnel of the United States stood at approximately 164,000; the country ranked eighth among the great powers, after Italy and Japan, each of which had roughly twice that number in their respective armed forces. The United States placed third, however, in warship tonnage, after Great Britain and Germany. (Wright, *Study of War*, 670-671.)

36. See Austrian Naval Attaché to Vienna, Dec. 23, 1913, in Robert C. Walton (ed.), *Over There: European Reaction to America in World War I* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971), 7-8. See also Spring Rice to Grey, May 11, 1914, commenting on the socialist influence on the Wilson administration and Secretary Daniels' proposal to have officers and enlisted men "mess" together. (F.O. 371/2153/7893, PRO, printed in *ibid.*, 5-6).

37. Sullivan, *Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925* (New York, 1932), V, 120, n. 5., cited in Cooper, *Warrior and the Priest*, 288.

38. See James Morgan Read, *Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919* (New Haven, Conn., 1941), 201-209.

39. For an analysis, see John A. Thompson, *Reformers and War, American Progressive Publicists and the First World War* (Cambridge and New York, 1987), 129-133; and Link, *Struggle for Neutrality*, 39, 41, and 375-379. The most exhaustive study on all aspects of the event is Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, *The Lusitania Disaster: An Episode in Modern Warfare and Diplomacy* (New York and London, 1975).

40. Address in Philadelphia to Newly Naturalized Citizens, May 10, 1915, *PWW*, XXXIII, 149.

41. Wilson to Galt, Aug. 19, 1915, *ibid.*, XXXIV, 261; see also 257-259.

42. For the Arabic crisis, see Link, *Struggle for Neutrality*, 560-587 and 645-681; and *Confusions and Crises*, 55-100.

43. *New York Evening Post*, Sept. 2, 1915. See also Michael Wreszin, *Oswald Garrison Villard, Pacifist at War* (Bloomington, Ind., 1965), 49-53. On Bryan's resignation and its effect, see Link, *Struggle for Neutrality*, 410-455; for the first round of the complicated negotiations between Wilson and the German foreign office, see *ibid.*, 383-409.

44. Quoted in "Colonel Roosevelt's New Crusade," in *Literary Digest*, LII (June 3, 1916), 1618.

45. For contemporary accounts, see "Labor's Dread of Preparedness," in *ibid.* (April 8, 1916), 957-958; and "A Huge Preparedness Parade" and "Doubling Our Regular Army," *ibid.*, May 27, pp. 1,518-21. See also J. Garry Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement* (Lexington, Ky., 1972); Michael Pearlman, *To Make Democracy Safe for America: Patricians and Preparedness in the Progressive Era* (Urbana, Ill., 1984); John Whiteclay Chambers II, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York, 1987), 73-124; and John Patrick Finnegan, *Against the Specter of the Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness* (Westport, Conn., 1974).

46. Quoted in John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography* (New York, 1953), 315.

47. For background and details, see Link, *Struggle for Neutrality*, 137–143 and 588–593; and *Confusions and Crises*, 15–54 and 327–341. See also Wilson's address on preparedness to the Manhattan Club, Nov. 4, 1915, and his message to Congress, Dec. 7, 1915, *PWW*, XXXV, 168–169 and 297–306.

48. For instance, Lodge wrote to Roosevelt the following on August 5, 1915: "Wilson evidently has come to the conclusion that there is a rising popular feeling for preparedness, and, seeing votes in it, is prepared to take it up. Last winter he did everything he could to stop any improvement in the Army and Navy." (Quoted in Link, *Struggle for Neutrality*, 592.) Taft's views on Wilson's motivations were similar, as he conveyed them to Mabel T. Boardman, Nov. 8, 1915, Taft Papers, Library of Congress. See also Roosevelt to Lodge, Feb. 4, 1916, *LTR*, VIII, 1,011–1,014.

49. Quoted in *Appeal to Reason*, Jan. 15, 1916.

50. Jane Addams and others to Wilson, Oct. 29, 1915, *PWW*, XXXV, 135–136. For Wilson's troubled response, see his letter to Addams, Nov. 2, 1915, *ibid.*, 158. For a similar exchange, see Villard to Wilson, Oct. 30, 1915; and Wilson to Villard, Nov. 2, 1915, *ibid.*, 141–143 and 157, respectively.

51. For details on the founding and activities of the AUAM, see Blanche Wiesen Cook, "Woodrow Wilson and the Antimilitarists, 1914–1917" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins, 1970); Marchand, *American Peace Movement*, 223–248; Donald Johnson, *The Challenge to American Freedoms; World War I and the Rise of the American Civil Liberties Union* (Lexington, Ky., 1963), 1–9; Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice*, 22–25; and his "World War I and the Liberal Pacifists," 1922–26.

52. For a discussion of the Democratic opposition, see Cooper, *Vanity of Power*, 86–98.

53. See Lillian Wald, *Windows on Henry Street* (Boston, 1934), 289, 290, 293, and 302–304; Wald to Wilson, April 21, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 524–525; Johnson, *Challenge to American Freedoms*, 5–7; Thompson, *Reformers and War*, 128 and 135–138; Thorburn, "A Progressive and the First World War," 110–112; for an excellent contemporary account, see "Swinging Around the Circle," *Survey*, XXXVI (April 22, 1916), 95–96.

54. Quoted in Shannon, *Socialist Party of America*, 89; see also Ginger, *Bending Cross*, 347–351.

55. See, for example, Reed, "At the Throat of the Republic," *Masses*, VIII, no. 2 (July 1916), 7–9; see also Rosenstone, *Romantic Revolutionary*, 244. For a sampling of socialist antipreparedness views, see *Appeal to Reason*, Nov. 27 and Dec. 11, 1915; Jan. 8, Feb. 19, and March 11, 1916.

56. See, as representative, the following articles in the *New Republic*: "Are We Militarists?" II (March 20, 1915), 166–167; "'Preparedness' for What?" III (June 26, 1915), 188; "The Plattsburgh Idea," IV (Oct. 9, 1915), 248–250; "Preparedness—A Trojan Horse," V (Nov. 6, 1915), 6–7; "The Newer Nationalism," V (Jan. 26, 1916), 319–321. See also Charles Forcey, *The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann and the Progressive Era, 1900–1925* (New York, 1961), 234–250; Levy, *Herbert Croly of the New Republic*, 224–227; Thompson, "American Progressive Publicists and the First World War," 376–378; and Laura Smith Porter, "The Development of an Internationalist Foreign Policy: *The New Republic* and American Neutrality, 1914–1917," unpublished manuscript in the possession of the author.

57. William Allen White, *The Autobiography of William Allen White* (New York, 1946), 513.

58. See, all in the *New Republic*: "The End of Isolationism," I (Nov. 7, 1914), 9–10; "Pacifism vs. Passivism," I (December 12, 1914), 6–7; two articles under the same title, "A League of Peace," II, (March 20, 1915), 167–169, and III (June 26, 1915), 190–191. See also

Forcey, *Crossroads of Liberalism*, 221–234; Levy, *Herbert Croly*, 218–224; and Steel, *Walter Lippmann*, 88–94.

59. Christopher Lasch, *The New Radicalism in America: The Intellectual as a Social Type, 1889–1963* (New York, 1965), 184; see also 168–188.

60. On House's relationship with Croly and Lippmann, see Levy, *Herbert Croly*, 244–247 and 255; Steel, *Walter Lippmann*, 63 and 113; and Lasch, *New Radicalism*, 220–221.

61. The following account is based primarily upon "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," May 8, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 634–648, from the shorthand notes by Charles L. Swem, White House stenographer; but this transcript should be supplemented by the account in Max Eastman, "The Masses at the White House," *Masses*, VIII (July 1916), 16–17, and by a partial account in the *New York Times*, May 9, 1916.

62. A Memorial to the President presented by the AUAM, ca. May 8, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 632–633.

63. A Colloquy, *ibid.*, 641.

64. *Ibid.*, 642 and 643.

65. *Ibid.*, 644 and 645.

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Ibid.*, 645–646.

68. Eastman's opinion was not exaggerated. Describing Wilson's preparedness speech to the Manhattan Club, William Allen White wrote, "I never saw an unhappier face; it was dour. He scarcely spoke to those at his right and left. The gay quips and facile persiflage . . . were missing" (*Autobiography of William Allen White*, 513).

69. Max Eastman, "The Masses at the White House," *Masses*, VIII (July 1916), 16. See also Eastman, *Enjoyment of Living*, 544–547; William L. O'Neill, *The Last Romantic; a Life of Max Eastman* (New York, 1978), 60–61; and Wald, *Windows on Henry Street*, 302–304.

70. In mid-1915, the *New Republic* sold around 15,000 copies per issue. After 1916, when rumors of the editors' close ties to the Wilson administration spread, circulation increased dramatically between 1917 and 1920, but was never over 45,000. Eastman's publication, even after it was forced to close down in late 1917 and reopen in early 1918 under the title *The Liberator*, sold some 60,000 copies per monthly issue. See Levy, *Herbert Croly*, 255; and O'Neill, *Last Romantic*, 75.

71. Lutzker, "Jane Addams," 43.

72. For instance, as early as the summer of 1915, E. D. Morel, secretary of the UDC, had issued a dramatic appeal on the front page of the *New York Tribune's* Sunday feature section (July 4, 1915), entitled "Save the World—An Englishman to Wilson."

73. The foregoing account is based on two memoranda by Lochner (both dated Nov. 12, 1915), printed in *PWW*, XXXV, 195–200.

74. See Link, *Confusion and Crises*, 101–111.

75. Both letters are quoted in *ibid.*, 102 and 103–104.

76. Wilson to House, Dec. 24, 1915, *PWW*, XXXV, 387–388; see also Bernstorff to Bethmann Hollweg, Nov. 23, 1915, *ibid.*, 240–243.

77. Wilson to Axson, Feb. 24, 1915, *ibid.*, IV, 287.

78. A comment to the AUAM at the White House, May 8, 1916, *ibid.*, XXVI, 644–645.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. Bryan to Wilson, May 19, 1915, *PWW*, XXXIII, 220–221; see also Wilson to Bryan, May 20, 1915, *ibid.*, 223.

2. Wilson to Lansing, Oct. 27, 1915, *ibid.*, XXXV, 113-114. The Lansing-Naón draft is printed as an enclosure with Lansing to Wilson, Nov. 11, 1915, *ibid.*, 188-189. For details about these developments, see Knock, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the League of Nations," 168-172.
3. Address to the Pan-American Scientific Congress, Jan. 6, 1916, *PWW*, XXXV, 444-446.
4. *New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1915; *New Republic*, Jan. 15, 1916, 265. For additional comment, see the *Washington Post*, Jan. 7, 1916, and *Literary Digest*, LII, Jan. 8, 1916, 51-53, and Jan. 29, 1916, 216-217.
5. "Mr. Wilson's Policy and the Pact of Peace," *London Daily News and Leader*, Feb. 26, 1916, clipping enclosed with House to Wilson, March 15, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 321-322.
6. House diary, Feb. 10, 11, and 22, 1916, HP, CtY.
7. According to House, Grey "enthused over the idea" and wrote out the statement he would make in Parliament—that "any agreement that was to the advantage of the American States was also to the advantage of the British Colonies in America." (*ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1916.)
8. See Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 41; and his *Wilson; Revolution, War, and Peace*, 37.
9. For the text, see House to Wilson, Feb. 15, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 180, n. 2. See also David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, 6 vols. (Boston, 1933-1937), II, 137-139. Wilson added the "probablys" later, as explained below.
10. See House diary, May 3, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 601-602; and House to Wilson, June 18, 1916, WP, DLC.
11. See Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 27-30; John Milton Cooper, Jr., "The British Response to the House-Grey Memorandum: New Evidence and New Questions," *Journal of American History*, LIX (March 1973), 958-971; and Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 127-141.
12. For details, see Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 222-255.
13. See House to Grey, April 6, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 421; and House diary, April 6, 1916, *ibid.*, 421-426. For details on the new problems with Chile, see Knock, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the League of Nations," 186-188.
14. Grey to House, March 23, 1916, printed as Enclosure III with House to Wilson April 8, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 445.
15. Grey to House March 24 and April 8, 1916, printed as Enclosures I and II with Wilson to House, April 8, 1916, *ibid.*, 443-444; and Grey to House, April 7, 1916, enclosure with House to Wilson, April 19, 1916, *ibid.*, 511-512.
16. Wilson's note to Germany, dated April 12, 1916, is printed as an enclosure with Wilson to Lansing, April 17, 1916, in *ibid.*, 491-496. See also an explanatory address to Congress, on April 19, 1916, *ibid.*, 506-510. For a detailed discussion, see Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 256-279.
17. See, for instance, "The Opportunity for Peace," *Springfield Republican*, May 9, 1916; and Simeon Strunsky, "Post: Impressions," *New York Evening Post*, May 13, 1916. See also Wilson to House, May 9, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 3.
18. Wilson and House made only minor changes in the document on May 3 and discussed the appropriate time for Grey to announce Great Britain's accord. The draft that was sent to the embassies of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, dated May 3, is printed in *PWW*, XXXVI, 595-596; the administration's emendations are in italics. See also House diary, May 3, *ibid.*, 596-597, 600, and 601-602; and Knock, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the League of Nations," 190-192.
19. House to Grey, May 10, 1916, enclosure with Wilson to House, May 9, 1916,

- PWW*, XXXVII, 6-7; see also House to Wilson, May 7, 1916; and Wilson to House, with enclosure, May 8, 1916, both in *ibid.*, XXXVI, 631-632 and 652-653, respectively; and House to Grey, May 11, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVII, 21.
20. Grey to House, May 12, 1916, printed as an enclosure with House to Wilson, May 14, 1916, *ibid.*, 42-44.
21. *ibid.* See also House Diary, May 13, 1916, HP, CtY.
22. Wilson to House, May 16, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 57-58.
23. See Taft to Wilson, April 11; and Wilson to Taft, April 14, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVI, 458-459 and 481, respectively; and Taft to Wilson, May 9; and Wilson to Taft, May 18, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVII, 6 and 69, respectively.
24. See (all in *PWW*, XXXVII), a memorandum by Ray Stannard Baker of a conversation with Wilson on May 5, 1916, pp. 36-37; Tumulty to Wilson, May 16, 1916, pp. 58-59; Wilson to Tumulty, May 17 and 19, 1916, pp. 62 and 76; Hamilton Holt to Wilson, May 11, 1916, printed as an enclosure with Tumulty to Wilson, May 19, 1916, p. 75; two letters from House to Wilson on May 19, 1916, pp. 76-77; Lansing to Wilson, May 25, 1916, pp. 106-108; Wilson to Lansing, May 25, 1916, pp. 108-109. See also Baker, *WWLL*, VI, 217-219.
25. See House to Wilson, May 9, 17, 19, and 21, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 6-7, 64, 78, n.1, and 88-91, respectively; see also a Memorandum, May 24, 1916; and House diary, May 24, 1916, *ibid.*, 102 and 103-104, respectively.
26. Lodge never joined the LEP, but maintained regular contact with its leadership, most of whom, of course, were prominent Republicans. In his speech the Senator said, in part: "I do not believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances he meant for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace." See Baker, *WWLL*, VI, 219-220, and Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 238-239.
27. An address in Washington to the League to Enforce Peace, May 27, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 113-116.
28. See House to Wilson, May 28, 1916, *ibid.*, 117; Lippmann to Henry Hollis, May 29, 1916, printed as an enclosure with Wilson to Hollis, June 7, 1916, *ibid.*, 166; Harry A. Garfield (president of Williams College) to Wilson, May 30, 1916, *ibid.*, 130; Holt to Wilson, May 29, 1916, *ibid.*, 120; *New Republic*, VII (June 3, 1916), 102-104. See also three editorials by Holt, "The President on the Enforcement of Peace," "A Declaration of Interdependence," and "The League to Enforce Peace," all in *Independent*, LXXXVI (June 5, 1916), 357-358. For a general survey of American press opinion, see "The President's Peace Plan" in *Literary Digest* LII (June 10, 1916), 1,683-85.
29. The *St. Louis Republic*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, LII (June 10, 1916), 1,684.
30. *New York Tribune*, May 29, 1916.
31. *Outlook*, CXIII (June 7, 1916), 303-304. For additional critical comment, see, in particular, the *New York Sun* and the *Pittsburgh Gazette-Times*, May 29, 1916; as well as the *Literary Digest* survey cited above.
32. Quoted in Swartz, *Union of Democratic Control*, 131.
33. Gardiner, "What Does America Stand For?" *London Daily News*, June 17, 1916, synopsis enclosed with House to Wilson, June 18, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 265-266; Plunkett to House, June 7, 1916, printed as an enclosure with House to Wilson, June 25, 1916, *ibid.*, 295-296.
34. Courtney, quoted in Swartz, *Union of Democratic Control*, 132; House to Wilson, June 25 and 27, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 294-295 and 311, respectively.
35. Bryce to House, June 8, 1916, printed as an enclosure with House to Wilson, June 23, 1916, *ibid.*, 289. For additional comment of a similar nature, see "If America Backs the Bill!" and "A Disentangling Alliance," both in the *London Nation*, XIX (June 3, 1916),

276-278; "The League of Peace," *Manchester Guardian*, May 31, 1916; and Norman Angell's "Mr. Wilson's Contribution," *War and Peace*, III (June 1916), 136-138.

36. See, for instance, *New York Tribune's* front-page report, May 28, 1916.

37. Jusserand to Aristide Briand, June 1, 1916, reporting a conversation with House on May 31, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 136; for the French press response, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 27; and *Literary Digest*, June 10, 1916, 1,685.

38. *Literary Digest*, June 10, 1916, p. 1,685.

39. Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 28-32.

40. Lord Cromer to the Editor, *London Times*, May 29, 1916. Wilson's comment, "With its causes and objects we are not concerned," worried friends of the administration as well. See (all in *PWW*, XXXVII) Plunkett to House, May 29, 1916, pp. 137-138; Page to Wilson, June 1, 1916, pp. 143-147; Bryce to House, June 8, 1916, printed as an enclosure with Wilson to House, June 23, 1916, pp. 289-290; Bryce to House, June 12, 1916, and Gardiner to House, June 15, 1916, printed as enclosures with House to Wilson, June 27, 1916, pp. 311-313. See also Grey to House, June 28, 1916, printed as an enclosure with House to Wilson, July 12, 1916, pp. 411-413; and a Memorandum by Walter Hines Page, ca. Sept. 23, 1916, WP, DLC.

41. For a detailed discussion of these mixed views, see Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 33-39.

42. See Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 32-35.

43. Grey to House, May 29, 1916, printed as an enclosure with House to Wilson, May 31, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 131-132.

44. Wilson to House, July 2, 1916, *ibid.*, 345.

45. For a discussion of these events and their impact, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 13-15 and 65-80.

46. House to Grey, July 15, 1916, printed as an enclosure with House to Wilson, July 14, *PWW*, XXXVII, 422-424; Grey to House, Aug. 28, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVIII, 89-92 (emphasis added).

47. Fletcher to House, June 15, 1916, printed as an enclosure with House to Wilson, June 16, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVII, 238-239, and Fletcher to Lansing, June 16, 1916, enclosure with Lansing to Wilson, June 17, 1916, *ibid.*, 241-244. See also F. L. Polk to the American embassy at Santiago, May 29, 1916, *ibid.*, 122; and Wilson to Lansing, June 21, 1916, *ibid.*, 271.

House had brought in Fletcher to preside over the negotiations in late March. (See House to Wilson, March 31, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVI, 398, and Wilson to Lansing, April 3, 1916, *ibid.*, 402-403). Fletcher, from the vantage point of Santiago, had provided the State Department with information about Chile's attitude toward the Pact since 1914. For an account of his role until the time of his appointment as Ambassador to Mexico, see Fletcher's handwritten notes, "The Negotiations of the Pan American Treaty—Confidential Memorandum," April 19, 1915; and Fletcher to Lansing, Nov. 1, 1915 ("President's Plan"), in the Fletcher Papers, DLC.

48. See Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 205-206; and Friedrich Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus, New Mexico," *American Historical Review*, LXXXIII (February 1978), 101-130.

49. See Calhoun, *Power and Principle*, 51-67.

50. For a detailed account of these events, see Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 195-221 and 280-313; Smith, *United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico*, 43-70; and Gilderhus, *Diplomacy and Revolution*, 32-52.

51. See Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 311-314.

52. See N. D. Baker to Wilson, June 24, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 291, enclosing a news

report from the *New York World*, June 24, 1916. See also Marchand, *American Peace Movement and Social Reform*, 243-244.

53. See the *New York World* and the *New York Times*, June 26, 1916; and *Survey*, XXXVI (July 8, 1916), 379-380.

54. See Addams and others, June 27, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 308, and Wilson to Addams, June 28, 1916, *ibid.*, 316.

55. See remarks to the New York Press Club, June 30, 1916, *ibid.*, 333-334, and a report in the *New York World*, July 1, 1916.

56. See, for instance, Lillian Wald's interpretation in *Window on Henry Street*, 289-298; and Marchand, *American Peace Movement and Social Reform*, 243-244.

57. See Lansing to Wilson, June 21, 1916, State Department Records, Record Group 59, 812.00/18533A, National Archives (hereinafter cited as DNA); and Fletcher to House, June 24, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 292-293.

58. Quoted in "Latin America's View of Mexico," *Literary Digest*, LIII, July 15, 1916, p. 121.

59. Naón to Fletcher, June 27, 1916, enclosure with Fletcher to House, July 10, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 398-400.

60. See Fletcher to House, Aug. 9, 1916, with enclosure, Fletcher to Lansing, Aug. 9, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVIII, 17-19; and Polk to House, Aug. 8, 1916, Polk Papers, CtY. See also Knock, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the League of Nations," 194-197, for documents pertaining to the administration's attempt to revive the Pact.

61. Remarks to Mexican editors, June 7, 1918, *PWW*, XLVIII, 258.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. House to Wilson, May 29, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 121.

2. Plunkett to House, June 7, 1916, printed as an enclosure with House to Wilson, June 25, 1916, *ibid.*, 294-296; Loreburn to House, June 13, 1916, enclosure with House to Wilson, July 3, 1916, *ibid.*, 351-352; Buxton to House, Aug. 19, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVIII, 54 (House notes in his diary that he showed this letter to Wilson on Sept. 24, *ibid.*, 258); and Buxton to Franklin K. Lane (Secretary of the Interior), July 5, 1916, enclosure with Lane to Wilson, *ibid.*, XXXVII, 370-372.

3. See Draft of the National Democratic Platform of 1916, ca. June 10, 1916, *ibid.*, 190-201 (for the two planks under discussion, 194-196); and Wilson to House, July 2, 1916, *ibid.*, 345.

4. Pinchot to Norman Hapgood, ca. Jan. 29, 1916, printed as an enclosure with Hapgood to Tumulty, Feb. 2, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 22-23. Pinchot added that the nomination would "pull a strong oar for Wilson" in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North and South Dakota; see also "Brandeis," *La Follette's Magazine*, VII (February 1916), 2.

5. Taft to G. J. Karger, Jan. 31, 1916, Taft Papers, DLC; Alpheus T. Mason, *Brandeis: A Free Man's Life* (New York, 1946), 470-493; and "Mr. Justice Brandeis," *Literary Digest*, LII (June 17, 1916), 1768, which surveys editorial opinion and the opposition movement.

6. See Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 357-362.

7. The appellation is from the title of an article in the *Literary Digest*, LIII (July 29, 1916), 240-241. Newton D. Baker had brought Clarke to Wilson's attention. See Baker to Wilson, July 10, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 397-398; and Wilson to House, July 23, 1916, *ibid.*, 466-467.

8. The foregoing quotations are taken from "Another Supreme Court Radical," in the *Literary Digest*, cited above.
9. Wilson to Clarke, July 18, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVII, 431. See also Wilson to Norman Hapgood, July 20, 1916, in which Wilson states: "I hope and believe that progressives of all sorts will have reason to approve of my nomination of Mr. Clarke" (*ibid.*, 446).
10. Taft to J. Markham, Oct. 21, 1916, Taft Papers, quoted in Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 141.
11. For an extended analysis, see Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, 284-303 and 320-344; and Cooper, *Warrior and the Priest*, 248-250.
12. Roosevelt to White, Nov. 7, 1914, *LTR*, VIII, 836 and 839. See also *Autobiography of William Allen White*, 512-527.
13. See "Farm Loan Act Under Way," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Aug. 26, 1916), 445-446; and Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 345-350, for a detailed discussion.
14. Roosevelt, quoted in "Colonel Roosevelt's New Crusade," *Literary Digest*, LII (June 3, 1916), 1,618; Wood to E. M. House, April 17, 1916, quoted in Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 332.
15. Maurer, quoted in "Why Labor Is Against Preparedness," *Masses*, VIII (May 1916) 6; Bailey, quoted in Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 61.
16. For the evolution and culmination of the revenue struggle, see Link, *Confusions and Crises*, 60-65.
17. For the Republican and Socialist party platforms, see Porter and Johnson, *National Party Platforms*, 204-211; see also "A Comparison of the Chicago Platforms," *Literary Digest* LIII (June 17, 1916), 1,762-1,763.
18. The Brooklyn *Eagle* is quoted in "The President and the Mill-Child," *Literary Digest*, LIII (August 5, 1916), 290; for background on the movement for the child labor bill, see Allen F. Davis, *Spearheads for Reform*, 123-147; for specifics on the Keating-Owen and Kern-McGillcuddy bills and reaction to them, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 39-40 and 56-60. See also Wilson's remarks upon signing the Child Labor bill, Sept. 1, *PWW*, XXXVIII, 123-124.
19. An address in Atlantic City to the National American Woman Suffrage Association, September 8, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVIII, 162-163.
20. Dedication address at the American Federation of Labor Building, July 4, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVII, 355.
21. For a full account, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 83-92.
22. Charles W. Eliot to J. P. Tumulty, Sept. 11, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVIII, 167.
23. Address to a Joint Session of Congress, Aug. 29, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVIII, 97 and 98.
24. See the *New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1916; "Political Effects of the Labor Victory," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Sept. 16, 1916), 651 (see also 652-653 for a survey of editorial opinion); and Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 103, from which Hughes' statement at Beverly is quoted.
25. See "The Political Effects of the Labor Victory," *Literary Digest*, LIII (September 16, 1916), 651; and the *New Republic*, VIII (Sept. 9, 1916), 100.
26. On Benson's campaign, see Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism*, 106; "Socialism's Stake in the War," *Literary Digest*, LII (March 25, 1916), 807; and "The Case for Benson," *New Republic*, VIII (Oct. 7, 1916), 243-245.
27. Max Eastman, quoted in the *New York Times*, Oct. 16, 1916, and reprinted in Eastman, "Sect or Class," *Masses*, IX (December 1916); the *Weekly People*, quoted in "Paying for the Railroad Men's Victory," *Literary Digest*, LIII (September 9, 1916), 592.
28. Interview in the *Davenport News* (Iowa), ca. October 1916, quoted in Philip S. Foner (ed.), *Mother Jones Speaks; Collected Speeches and Writings* (New York, 1983), 523.

29. Frank Bohn, "The Reelection of Wilson," *Masses*, IX (January 1917), 15.
30. They included Lincoln Steffans, George Creel, Frederick C. Howe, Ben Lindsey, John Dewey, Jane Addams, Amos Pinchot, Norman Thomas, Bainbridge Colby, Edward P. Costigan, and Matthew Hale. For a complete listing, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 124-125.
31. *New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1916.
32. Addams to Arthur Kellogg, Oct. 25, 1916, quoted in Clark A. Chambers, *Paul U. Kellogg and the Survey: Voices for Social Welfare and Social Justice* (Minneapolis, 1971), 55. On October 17 Wilson wrote to Addams the following: "I cannot deny myself the pleasure of telling you how proud I am and how much strengthened I feel like I should have your approval and support" (*PWW*, XXXVIII, 460). See also the *New York Times*, October 15, 1916.
33. See Gus Meyers, "Why Idealists Quit the Socialist Party," the *Nation*, CIV (Feb. 15, 1917), 118-120; and Reed to the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of America, Oct. 13, 1916, in Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism in America*, 105-106; see also Shannon, *Socialist Party of America*, 92-93.
34. Interviews in the *Evansville Times* (Illinois), Sept. 4, 1916; and the *Davenport News*, ca. October 1916, in Foner, *Mother Jones Speaks*, 521 and 523.
35. Bohn, "The Relection of Wilson," *Masses*, IX (January 1917), 15-16; Eastman, "Sect or Class," *ibid.*, (December 1916); see also Eastman, "To Socialist Party Critics," *ibid.*, (Feb. 1917), 24.
36. See "A Presidential Straw Vote of Union Labor," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Oct. 7, 1916), 871-874 and 919-922.
37. *ibid.*, p. 872.
38. Quoted in Cantor, "Radical Confrontation with Foreign Policy," in Young (ed.), *Dissent* (previously cited), 227.
39. Eastman, "An Issue at Last," *Masses*, VIII (August 1916), 10 (my emphasis).
40. A Speech in Long Branch, New Jersey, Accepting the Presidential Nomination, Sept. 2, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVIII, 126-139, quotations from 131-132, 135, and 136.
41. Address in Omaha, Oct. 5, 1916, *ibid.*, 346, 347, and 348.
42. An address at Indianapolis, Oct. 12, 1916, *ibid.*, 414, 415, 416-417, and 418.
43. Campaign Address at Shadow Lawn, Oct. 14, 1916, *ibid.*, 437.
44. An Address at Chicago to Nonpartisan Women, Oct. 19, 1916, *ibid.*, 484 and 488.
45. A Luncheon Address to Women in Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 1916, *ibid.*, 531.
46. A Nonpartisan Address in Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 1916, *ibid.*, 541 and 542.
47. Address at Madison Square Garden, Nov. 2, 1916, *ibid.*, 599, 600, and 601.
48. Final Campaign Address, Nov. 4, 1916, *ibid.*, 611-615.
49. House to Grey, July 15, 1916, *ibid.*, XXXVII, 423.
50. *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 1916, and reprinted in the *Masses*, IX (December 1916).
51. See, for instance, Levy, *Herbert Croly of the New Republic*, 242-243; Forcey, *Crossroads of Liberalism*, 258-259; and Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 129-130, in which foreign policy and Wilson's internationalism—the subjects to which Croly devoted about half of his famous, lengthy editorial—are never mentioned.
52. See Croly, "The Two Parties in 1916," *New Republic*, VIII (Oct. 21, 1916), 289 and 290; and *ibid.*, (Oct. 28, 1916), 1.
53. W. H. Taft to Horace D. Taft, Jan. 8, 1917, quoted in Henry F. Pringle, *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft*, 2 vols. (New York, 1939), II, 931.
54. See Widener, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy*, 226-231 and 235-241.
55. Lodge to Roosevelt, June 14, 1916, quoted in Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 142.

56. See Latane (ed.), *The Development of the League of Nations Idea*, I, 138; Bartlett, *League to Enforce Peace*, 56-60; and Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 240-243. A plank entitled "Foreign Relations" included the following sentence: "We believe in the pacific settlement of international disputes, and favor the establishment of a world court for that purpose" (Porter and Johnson, *National Party Platforms*, 204).

57. The major study on Hughes is Merlo J. Pusey's Pulitzer Prize-winning *Charles Evans Hughes*, 2 vols. (New York, 1951).

58. Roosevelt to W. A. Wadsworth, June 23, 1916, *LTR*, VIII, 1078; White, quoted in "How the Progressives Voted," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Nov. 25, 1916), 1,393.

59. See "How Labor Voted," *Literary Digest* (Nov. 25, 1916), 1,391; "Hughes and Wilson on the Eight-Hour Law," *ibid.* (Oct. 7, 1916), 875-877; "Political Reports from 3,000 Communities," *ibid.* (Oct. 28, 1916), 1114; see also Walter Lippmann, "The Puzzle of Hughes," *New Republic*, VIII (September 30, 1916), 210-213.

60. See "The Hughes-Roosevelt Alliance," *Literary Digest*, LIII (July 8, 1916), 56-57; "He Kept Us Out of War," *ibid.* (Oct. 14, 1916), 933-935; and Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 110-112.

61. Lodge to Roosevelt, July 15, 1916, quoted in Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 243.

62. Taft to C. Cobb, July 19, 1916, Taft Papers, DLC.

63. The analysis which follows is based on election statistics as compiled in Petersen, *Statistical History of the American Presidential Elections*, 78-82.

64. See Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 127 and 161-163.

65. See Lunardini and Knock, "Woodrow Wilson and Woman Suffrage," 563-65.

66. The California vote went as follows: Wilson, 466,200; Hughes, 462,394; Benson, 43,259 (as contrasted to Debs' 79,201). It is interesting to note that, despite the increase in California's turnout (because woman suffrage was now in effect), the Socialist popular vote came to only 4.33 per cent, whereas in 1912 it reached 11.76 per cent.

67. The vote went as follows: North Dakota—Wilson, 55,206; Hughes, 53,471; Benson, none recorded (vs. Debs' 6,966 in 1912); New Hampshire—Wilson, 43,779; Hughes, 43,723; Benson, 1,318 (vs. Debs' 1,980); Washington—Wilson, 183,388; Hughes, 167,244; Benson, 22,800 (vs. Debs' 40,134).

68. "Why Wilson Won," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Nov. 18, 1916), 1,315; see also 1,312-1,314. In 1912, Debs had won nearly 90,000 votes in Ohio; whereas in 1916, Benson won about 38,000; Wilson won approximately 604,000 votes to Hughes' 515,000. The Missouri vote went as follows: Wilson, 398,000; Hughes, 369,000; Benson, 14,000 (vs. 28,000 for Debs in 1912).

69. Walling, "Socialists for Wilson," *Masses*, IX (January 1917), 24; the *New York Evening Star* assessment is carried in "How Labor Voted," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Nov. 25, 1916), 1,391.

70. Hopkins to Wilson, Nov. 14, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVIII, 642.

71. Minnesota voted as follows: Wilson, 179,152; Hughes, 179,544; Benson, 20,117 (vs. 27,505 for Debs in 1912). For the turnout in Minneapolis, see "Why Wilson Won," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Nov. 18, 1916), 1,314.

72. See the *New York Times*, Nov. 10, 1916; "The Two Parties After the Election," *New Republic*, IX (Nov. 18, 1916), 63-64; and "How the Progressives Voted," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Nov. 25, 1916), 1,392-1,393.

73. Eastman, "To Socialist Party Critics," *Masses*, IX (February 1917), 24. Despite the decline in the presidential vote, most Socialist party members did not despair. Meyer London was re-elected to Congress, and Grant Miller of Nevada, with thirty per cent of the vote in a three-way race, barely missed winning a seat in the U.S. Senate. Several major cities, including Milwaukee and Minneapolis, elected Socialist mayors. See Weinstein, *De-*

cline of Socialism in America, 106-108, and "How Labor Voted," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Nov. 24, 1916), 1,391.

74. J. A. H. Hopkins to Wilson, with Enclosure (Hopkins to Vance McCormick), both dated Nov. 14, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVIII, 642-643. In response, Wilson agreed that "the fundamental [question] in the next four years" was "How can what has already been accomplished be given unbroken continuity by the use and combination of existing elements?" (Wilson to Hopkins, Nov. 16, 1916, *ibid.*, 663).

75. See Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*; Swartz, *Union of Democratic Control*; and Lawrence W. Martin, *Peace Without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals* (New Haven, Conn., 1958).

76. Pinchot, "What the Election Means," *Masses*, IX (January 1917), 18 and 19.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. Gardiner, "America and the Future," *London Daily News and Leader*, Nov. 18, 1916. See also "The Allies Greet the President," *Literary Digest*, LIII (December 16, 1916), 1,589-1,590.

2. See the *New York Times*, Nov. 10, 1916; and "Opening a Way to Peace," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Nov. 25, 1916), 1,398.

3. "Germany and the League of Peace," *New Republic*, IX (Nov. 18, 1916), 60.

4. See "Opening a Way to Peace" and "Germany's Restive Socialists," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Nov. 25, 1916), 1,398 and 1,399.

5. For details on these developments, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 165-175 and 184-196.

6. See the *New York Times*, Sept. 29, 1916; and Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 41-42.

7. House diary, Nov. 14, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVIII, 645-647.

8. Unpublished Prolegomenon to a Peace Note, ca. Nov. 25, 1916, *PWW*, XL, 67-68, and 70.

9. See Draft of a Peace Note, ca. Nov. 25, 1916, *ibid.*, 71-74.

10. House diary, Nov. 26 and 28, 1916, printed in *ibid.*, 85, 96; and Nov. 30 and Dec. 7, 1916, HP, CtY; House to Wilson, with enclosure, Dec. 7, 1916, *PWW*, XL, 185-186.

11. Wilson to House, Dec. 8, 1916, *ibid.*, 189. In September, Wilson had also obtained retaliatory legislation to combat the British blacklist. In October, the British had secretly conducted an investigation that revealed that Wilson, by mid-1917, would be "in a position, if he wishes, to dictate his own terms to us." Wilson of course did not know the extent to which the Allies were dependent upon American money and material. On these matters, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 178-184 and 200-206.

12. Lansing to Wilson, Dec. 10, 1916, *ibid.*, 209. See also "What Will the President Do?" Lansing diary, Dec. 3, 1916, Lansing Papers, DLC.

13. Undated typescript in WP, DLC, probably conveyed by John P. Gavit. See Gavit to Wilson, with enclosure, Dec. 2, 1916, *PWW*, XL, 124-125; and Trevelyan to Wilson, Nov. 23, 1916, enclosure with House to Wilson, Dec. 6, 1916, *ibid.*, 178-180. Trevelyan's article was published in the *Survey*, XXXVII (Dec. 9, 1916), 261-262.

14. Wilson to House, Dec. 8, 1916, *ibid.*, 189.

15. See Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 42-43.

16. Bethmann dispatched his formal peace note to Washington and other neutral governments on December 12, and requested that it be transmitted to the Allied powers. The note stated that the German people had proved their invincibility in the field, but

that they did not seek a punitive victory. Rather, they desired to meet their enemies at the conference table and restore the peace. Should the Allies ignore the call, they, the Allies, would be responsible for the consequences. For details, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 212–214.

17. For the complete text, see an Appeal for a Statement of War Aims, *PWW*, XL, 273–276.

18. *Congressional Record*, Senate, 64th Cong., 2nd sess., Dec. 21, 1916, p. 635 (S. Res. 296).

19. *Ibid.*, Jan. 3, 1917, p. 795.

20. *Ibid.*, 794 and 797; see also *ibid.*, Jan. 4, 1917, 830–833.

21. *Ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1917, pp. 883–886 and 897. See also the *New York Times*, Dec. 22, 1916 and Jan. 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1917; Paul Ritter (Swiss Ambassador to the United States) to Arthur Hoffman, Jan. 12, 1917, *PWW*, XL, 460–462. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 248–255; and, for an analysis of other critics' views of the peace note, Cooper, *Vanity of Power*, 133–146.

22. See, for instance, Harry Garfield to Wilson, and W. J. Bryan to Wilson, both Dec. 21, 1916, *PWW*, XL, 314; the Swiss Federal Council to the White House, Dec. 23, 1916, *ibid.*, 325–326; and "Peace Without Victory," and "The Note As Americanism," *New Republic*, IX (December 30, 1916), 201–202 and 228–231, respectively. For a survey of press opinion, see "The President As Peace Pilot," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Dec. 30, 1916), 1,694–1,695.

23. Page to Lansing, Dec. 22, 1916, *PWW*, XL, 319–320. See also Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 227–231.

24. *Ibid.*, 233–237.

25. For analysis of the response of the Allied governments to Bethmann's peace note, along with a survey of American press opinion, see "The Allies Ask Restitution, Reparation, Security," *Literary Digest*, LIII (Dec. 30, 1916), 1,691–1,693.

26. Lansing diary, Dec. 3, 1916, Lansing Papers, DLC.

27. *New York Times*, Dec. 22, 1916.

28. See *ibid.*; House diary, Jan. 11, 1916, *PWW*, XL, 445–456; and Wilson to Lansing, Dec. 21, 1916, *ibid.*, 307.

29. See J. J. Jusserand to the Foreign Ministry, Dec. 20, 21, and 23, 1916, *Telegrammes Washington*, Vol. 46, pp. 97–98, 99–100, and 101, respectively, French Foreign Ministry Archives (hereafter, FFM-Ar); and Spring Rice to the Foreign Office, Dec. 21, 1916, F.O. 371/2805, pp. 496–497, PRO. See also the lengthy annotation to Wilson to Lansing, Dec. 21, 1916, *PWW*, XL, 307–311.

30. Link, *Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War and Peace*, 57.

31. The joint note is printed as Ambassador Sharp to the Secretary of State, Jan. 10, 1917, in *FR-WWS*, 1917, I, 5–9. For the minutes of the meetings in which Lansing's suggestions were discussed, see "Conference du 26 Decembre 1916 . . ." and "Conference du 28 Decembre 1916 . . ." in *Guerre, 1914–1918*, Vol. 990, pp. 84–94 and 132–139, FFM-Ar. Sterling Kernek, in "The British Government's Reactions to President Wilson's 'Peace' Note of December 1916," *Historical Journal*, XIII (December 1970), 721–766, argues that Lansing's actions had little practical effect on the joint Allied note.

32. For these developments, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 249–250.

33. House diary, Jan. 3, 11 and 12, 1917, *PWW*, XL, 403–404, 445–446, and 462–463.

34. *New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1917.

35. For the complete text, see Address to the Senate, Jan. 22, 1917, *PWW*, XL, 533–539.

36. *New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1917.

37. Quoted in Cooper, *Vanity of Power*, 156–157. Privately, Taft told an associate that

Wilson had endorsed the league principle "in such a way as to embarrass me, because I don't agree with much of what he says in respect to the kind of peace that ought to be achieved . . . [and] I don't think a just peace can be attained without the victory of the Allies." (Taft to W. Murray Crane, Jan. 23, 1917, quoted in Pringle, *Life and Times of William Howard Taft*, II, 934.)

38. *New York Times*, Jan. 23 and 29, 1917.

39. *New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1917. The *Times'* coverage of the speech and the reactions to it is excellent. See also, Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 270, n. 162, for a compilation of newspaper citations.

40. See House to Wilson, Jan. 22, 1917, *PWW*, XL, 539, and Croly to Wilson, Jan. 23, 1917, *ibid.*, 559. Wilson wrote to Croly that his letter gave him "the deepest gratification" and noted that a recent *New Republic* editorial ("Peace Without Victory," Vol. IX, Dec. 23, 1916, pp. 201–202) had "served to clarify and strengthen my thought not a little" (Wilson to Croly, Jan. 25, *PWW*, XLI, 13). In fact, however, Wilson's address and the *New Republic* article bore very little substantive resemblance to each other. See also *New Republic* editorial on Wilson's address, "America Speaks," Jan. 27, 1917, pp. 340–342; and Levy, *Herbert Croly*, 229–232.

41. Wald *et al.* (for the AUAM) to Wilson, Jan. 24, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 7–8.

42. Eastman, "Revolutionary Progress," *Masses*, IX (April 1917), 5. For other interesting responses, see Andrew Carnegie to Wilson, Jan. 23, 1917, *PWW*, XL, 560; and W. J. Bryan to Wilson, Jan. 26, 1917, *ibid.*, XLI, 29.

43. For a wide-ranging survey of British and German responses, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 272–277.

44. Wilson to Gavitt, Jan. 29, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 55; see also House diary, Jan. 11, 1917, *ibid.*, XL, 445.

45. The quotations are from Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 159–160 and 161. See also Swartz, *Union of Democratic Control*, 136–137; and Francis Johnson (secretary of the Independent Labour party) to Wilson, Jan. 6, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 36; Cleveland Dodge to Wilson, Jan. 24, 1917, *ibid.*, 6–7; and Noel Buxton to House, Feb. 8, 1917, HP, CTY.

46. Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 272. All of the foregoing developments were widely reported and commented on in the American press; see, for example, the *New York Times*, Jan. 27, 1917.

47. Wilson to House, Jan. 24, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 3 (Wilson's emphasis).

48. Germany's terms, which could not be construed as anything less than terms of conquest by the Allies, included the restitution of French-occupied Alsace and all German colonies; establishment of a buffer state between Germany and Russia; the return of French territories now occupied by Germany, but with compensation to Germany; restoration of Belgium; indemnities for losses incurred by German citizens; commercial agreements to insure Germany's economic well-being; and freedom of the seas. See Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York, 1967, English trans.), *passim*.

49. See House diary, Feb. 1, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 86–89; and Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 290–302. For an account of the vicissitudes of armed neutrality and Wilson's last peace drive, see *ibid.*, 340–359 and 314–325, respectively.

50. On the Zimmermann Note, see Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 342–346, 353–359, and 433–436; on the sinkings, 347, 350, 351, and 396–397.

51. F. K. Lane to G. W. Lane, April 1, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 517.

52. *Outlook*, CXV (March 14, 1917), 452. For a review of pro-war sentiment in most of the American press by mid- to late March, see "A 'State of War' with Germany," *Literary Digest*, LIV (March 31, 1917), 881–882.

53. "In Defense of the Atlantic World," *New Republic*, X (Feb. 17, 1917), 59–61; see

also "Justification," *ibid.*, (Feb. 10, 1917), 36-38. (Walter Lippmann had written both editorials.) For an extended discussion, see Forcey, *Crossroads of Liberalism*, 273-276; and Steel, *Walter Lippmann*, 110-111.

54. See Kellogg, "The Fighting Issue," *Survey*, XXXVII (Feb. 17, 1917), 572-577, for the complete text.

55. See Marchand, *American Peace Movement*, 249-253; Chambers, *Paul U. Kellogg and the Survey*, 58-61; and Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 416-417. See also the *New York Times*, Feb. 2, 5, and 13, and March 28 and 29, 1917, for particularly interesting coverage of the anti-interventionists' activities.

56. "A Visit to the President," *Friends' Intelligencer*, LXXIV (March 10, 1917), 147-148, printed in *PWW*, XLI, 302-304; an address to the President by Max Eastman, Feb. 28, 1917, *ibid.*, 305-308; *New York Evening Post*, Feb. 28, 1917.

57. See Chatfield, "World War I and the Liberal Pacifists," 1924; Ginger, *Bending Cross*, 360-361; Marchand, *American Peace Movement*, 252; *New York Times*, March 24, 1917; and Wald to J. P. Tumulty, Feb. 8, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 167.

58. See Link, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 409-415; and Woodrow Wilson: *Revolution, War and Peace*, 68-71. For a different interpretation, see Cooper, *Warrior and the Priest*, 318-323.

59. The message was conveyed by Page to Lansing on Feb. 11 (printed in *PWW*, XLI, 210-214).

60. A Memorandum by Norman Angell, ca. Nov. 20, 1916, *PWW*, XL, 10-19. Wilson kept this document in his personal files.

61. Trevelyan, "Open Letter to Americans," cited above; Noel Buxton, quoted in W. H. Buckler to House, Feb. 23, 1917, enclosure with House to Wilson, March 9, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 373-375.

62. Lippmann to Wilson, with enclosure, March 11, 1917, *ibid.*, 388-389. See also, Steel, *Walter Lippmann*, 111-112.

63. Addams, *Peace and Bread in Time of War*, 63-64.

64. Robert Bridges, *The Spirit of Man* (London, 1916), i-ii and iii-iv; see also, Paul Fussell, *The Great War in Modern Memory* (New York, 1975), 10-13, for a discussion of Bridges' volume.

65. An Address in Omaha, Oct. 5, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVIII, 348.

66. An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, April 2, 1917, *ibid.*, XLI, 519-527.

67. "The Great Decision," *New Republic*, X (April 7, 1917), 279-280.

68. Max Eastman, *Enjoyment of Living* (New York, 1948), 586.

-Notes to Chapter 8

1. *Congressional Record*, Senate, 64th Cong., 2nd sess., Jan. 23, 1917, p. 1808. Sherman spoke on January 24 (*ibid.*, 1,884).

2. See Senate Res. 329 and McCumber's speech of February 1 in *ibid.*, 1,950 and 2,361-2,364, respectively.

3. *Ibid.*, 2,364-2,370; see also 2,370-2,373.

4. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 256-258.

5. Lodge to Lowell, Jan. 30, 1917, quoted in *ibid.*, 258. See also Lodge to Taft, Jan. 23, 1917, quoted in *ibid.*, 258, n. 134.

6. Quoted in Ralph Stone, *The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations* (Lexington, Ky., 1970), 14. Borah had also invoked the tradition of "no alliances, no leagues, no entanglements" in his objections to the "Peace Without Victory" address, on February 7. "What this passion-torn world needs and will need are not more leagues and alliances,

but a great untrammelled, courageous neutral power, representing not bias, not prejudice, not hate, not conflict, but order and law and justice." (See *Congressional Record*, 64th Cong., 2nd sess., Feb. 7, 1917, p. 2,749.)

7. Wilson to C. H. Dodge, Jan. 25, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 11.

8. See Croly to Wilson, Jan. 23, 1917, *ibid.*, XL, 559; and Wilson to Croly, Jan. 25, 1917, *ibid.*, XLI, 13.

9. *New Republic*, X (Feb. 3, 1917), 1-2.

10. Lochner memorandum of an interview with Wilson, Feb. 1, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 91.

11. Remarks at a press conference, Jan. 30, 1917, *ibid.*, 64.

12. Wilson to Filene, Jan. 30, 1917, *ibid.*, 68.

13. "Bases of Peace," Enclosure II, with Wilson to Lansing, Feb. 9, 1917, *ibid.*, 173-174. See also Wilson's draft of this document, Enclosure I, in Wilson to Lansing, Feb. 8, 1917, *ibid.*, 160-161.

14. J. J. Jusserand to the French Foreign Ministry, March 7, 1917, *ibid.*, 356-357; F. L. Polk to Jusserand, Aug. 3, 1917, *ibid.*, XLIII, 360.

15. Memorandum by William E. Rappard of an interview with Wilson, Nov. 1, 1917, *ibid.*, XLIV, 488.

16. See Lippmann, *The Stakes of Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1917), xxii; and Lippmann to Wilson, Jan. 3, 1917, WP, DLC; and Wilson to Lippmann, Feb. 3, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 113.

17. Jusserand to the Foreign Ministry, March 7, 1917, *ibid.*, 356-357.

18. See, for example, Theodore Marburg to Wilson, March 5, 1918; and Wilson to Marburg, March 8, 1917, *ibid.*, XLVI, 549 and 572, respectively; Marburg to Wilson, May 3, 1918; and Wilson to Marburg, May 6, 1918, *ibid.*, XLVII, 507-508 and 535, respectively; A. Lawrence Lowell to Wilson, July 10, 1918; and Wilson to Lowell, July 11, 1918, *ibid.*, XLVIII, 586 and 590-591, respectively.

19. Wilson to B. D. Gibson, May 5, 1917, *ibid.*, XLII, 221.

20. Wilson to House, March 20, 1918, *ibid.*, XLVII, 85-86; House diary, June 1, 1918, HP, CtY.

21. House diary, Apr. 11, 1918, *PWW*, XLVII, 324. For an appreciation of the range of House's work with the LEP, see House to Wilson, Feb. 19, 1917, *ibid.*, XVI, 250-251; House to Wilson, March 8, 1918, *ibid.*, XLVI, 574-575; House to Wilson, March 21, 1918 (with enclosures from Lowell and Robert Cecil, *ibid.*, XLVII, 101-104; House diary, April 11 and 12, May 14, July 27, and Aug. 25, 1917; Jan. 3, March 7, June 24, July 22, and Sept. 21, 1918, HP, CtY.

22. For details, see Bartlett, *League to Enforce Peace*, 88-91.

23. Lasch, *New Radicalism in America*, 202.

24. "A War Program for Liberals," *New Republic*, X (March 31, 1917), 249-250. See also Noble, "New Republic and the Idea of Progress," 395-398; Forcey, *Crossroads of Liberalism*, 276-281; and Levy, *Herbert Croly*, 249-250.

25. Lippmann to J. G. Phelps Stokes, May 1, 1917, quoted in Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism in America*, 132.

26. Croly to Willard Straight, n.d., quoted in Levy, *Herbert Croly*, 249.

27. Allen F. Davis, "Welfare, Reform, and World War I," *American Quarterly*, XIX (Fall 1967), 516-533, and reprinted under the title "The Flowering of Progressivism," in Arthur S. Link (ed.), *The Impact of World War I* (New York, 1969). See also Ronald Shaffer, *America in the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State* (New York, 1991).

28. See Robert D. Cuff, *The War Industries Board: Business-Government Relations During World War I* (Baltimore, 1973); see also William E. Leuchtenburg's "The New Deal and the Analogue of War," in John Braeman (ed.), *Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America* (Columbus, Ohio, 1964), 88-144.

29. See David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York, 1980), 253-257, for a discussion; and Grenville Macfarland to Wilson, Dec. 11, 1917, *PWW*, XLV, 271.
30. For a discussion, see Kennedy, *Over Here*, 98-113. (Lodge is quoted on 109.)
31. Howe, quoted in Thompson, *Reformers and War*, 214.
32. See, Kennedy, *Over Here*, 257-272; Davis, "Welfare, Reform, and World War I," *passim*; see also Robert H. Ferrell, *Woodrow Wilson and World War I* (New York, 1985), 91-97 and 114-117.
33. Seward Livermore's *Politics Is Adjourned: Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 1916-1918* (Seattle, 1968 ed.) was the first study to provide an accurate appraisal of the war Congress of 1916-18 and Wilson's relationship with it.
34. Baker Notebook (15), Jan. 21, 1918, pp. 60-61, quoted in Thompson, *Reformers and War*, 216.
35. See H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, *Opponents of War, 1917-1918* (Madison, Wisc., 1957), 5-8; and Kennedy, *Over Here*, 20-24.
36. Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism in America*, 125-129; and Shannon, *Socialist Party of America*, 93-101.
37. See Wald, *Windows on Henry Street*, 308-311; Johnson, *Challenge to American Freedoms*, 14-25; Chambers, *Paul U. Kellogg and the Survey*, 62-63; Marchand, *American Peace Movement*, 253-259; and Chatfield, "World War I and the Liberal Pacifists," 1, 925-34.
38. See Shannon, *Socialist Party of America*, 99-104 and Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism in America*, 129-133.
39. Reported in the *New York Times*, June 2, 1917.
40. Myers, quoted in Shannon, *Socialist Party of America*, 100.
41. Walling to W. B. Wilson, May 2, 1917, printed as an enclosure with W. B. Wilson to the President, May 3, 1917, *PWW*, XLII, 197-198.
42. Quoted in John L. Heaton, *Cobb of "The World"*, (New York, 1924), 270.
43. An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, April 2, 1917, *PWW*, XLI, 526.
44. Flag Day Address, June 14, 1917, *ibid.*, XLII, 504.
45. The definitive study is Stephen Vaughn, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980); for Creel's own account, see his *How We Advertised the War* (New York, 1920).
46. See Peterson and Fite, *Opponents of War*, 194-207.
47. *Ibid.*, 53-56; and Kennedy, *Over Here*, 263-264.
48. Peterson and Fite, *Opponents of War*, 57-59.
49. Paul L. Murphy, *World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States* (New York, 1979), 164-166.
50. *Ibid.*, 196-197, 92-93, and 102-112. For a truly classic contemporary account of some of the foregoing and other incidents, see John Reed, "One Solid Month of Liberty," *Masses*, IX (September 1917), 5-6.
51. Wald *et al.* to Wilson, April 14, 1917, *PWW*, XLII, 119; see also Wald, *Windows on Henry Street*, 308-310.
52. Wald to Wilson, April 13, 1917, Wald Papers, New York Public Library, reel 1.
53. For a discussion, see Harry N. Scheiber, *The Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties, 1917-1921* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960), 11-28.
54. See *ibid.*, 17-20; and Murphy, *World War I and the Origins of Civil Liberties*, 76-79.
55. See House diary, Feb. 11, 1918, *PWW*, XLVI, 327; Burlleson to Wilson, Aug. 8, 1917, *ibid.*, XLIII, 395; and George P. West, "A Talk with Mr. Burlleson," *New York Public*, XX (Oct. 12, 1917), 985-987, excerpt in *PWW*, XLIV, 470.

56. *New York Times*, Oct. 10, 1917, quoted in Scheiber, *Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties*, 33.
57. Sinclair to Wilson, Oct. 30, 1917, *PWW*, XLIV, 469-470.
58. For a general discussions, see Shannon, *American Socialist Party*, 110-114; Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism*, 143-145; and Scheiber, *Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties*; 29-41.
59. Eastman, Pinchot, and Reed, to Wilson, July 12, 1917, *PWW*, XLIII, 165.
60. Wilson to Tumulty, July 14, 1917, *ibid.*, 176; Wilson to Burlleson, July 13, 1917, *ibid.*, 164, enclosing the letter from Eastman, Pinchot, and Reed. See also Wilson to Pinchot, July 13, 1917, *ibid.*, 164; and Pinchot to Tumulty, July 14, 1917, *ibid.*, 175-176. See also "What Happened to the August Masses," *Masses* IX (September 1917), 3; and *New York Times*, July 22, 1917.
61. Burlleson to Wilson, July 16, 1917, *PWW*, XLIII, 188.
62. Eastman to Wilson, Sept. 8, 1917, *ibid.*, XLIV, 169-172. Judge Learned Hand granted a preliminary injunction against the postal service on November 2, 1917. See *New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1917.
63. Wilson to Eastman, Sept. 18, 1917, *PWW*, XLIV, 210-211.
64. Wilson to Burlleson, Sept. 4, 1917, *ibid.*, 147.
65. The *Milwaukee Leader* case, in particular, sparked protests to Wilson from Villard, Mayor Daniel Hoan of Milwaukee, and Grenville McFarland, as well as demands from such newspapers as the *Springfield Republican* that Burlleson be relieved of his powers of censorship. See Villard to Tumulty, Sept. 27, 1917, *PWW*, XLIV, 271-273; Hoan to the White House, Oct. 8, 1917, *ibid.*, 338-340; McFarland to Wilson, Oct. 12, 1917, *ibid.*, 366; and "The Washington Censors," *Springfield Republican*, Oct. 9, 1917, which Wilson sent to Burlleson, Oct. 10, 1917, *PWW*, XLIV, 358.
66. House to Wilson, Oct. 17, 1917, *PWW*, XLIV, 393.
67. Lippmann to House, Oct. 17, 1917, enclosure with House to Wilson, Oct. 17, 1917, *ibid.* (House had encouraged Lippmann to formulate his thoughts on the problem so that he could forward them to Wilson.)
68. Wilson to Croly, Oct. 22, 1917, *ibid.*, 420; in reply to Croly to Wilson, Oct. 19, 1917, *ibid.*, 408-410.
69. Wilson to Burlleson, Oct. 18, 1917, *ibid.*, 396-397.
70. Sinclair to Wilson, Oct. 30, 1917, *ibid.*, 467-472.
71. Spargo to Wilson, Nov. 1, 1917, *ibid.*, 491-492.
72. See, for example, "Bases of Peace," ca. Feb. 9, 1917, *ibid.*, XLI, 1974; and Wilson to House, March 22, 1918, *ibid.*, XLVII, 105.
73. The principal studies on Allied wartime relations include: Wilton B. Fowler, *British American Relations, 1917-1918: The Role of Sir William Wiseman* (Princeton, N.J., 1969); Seth P. Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton, N.J., 1961); as well as the works, previously cited, by Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*; Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*; Martin, *Peace Without Victory*; and the most recent of such contributions, Gardner, *Safe for Democracy* (especially chaps. 6-10).
74. House to Wilson, April 22, 1917, *PWW*, XLII, 120.
75. These included the Treaty of London, which awarded to Italy portions of Turkey, the South Tyrol, and the Trentino; the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which provided for British and French dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire; and yet another treaty, which promised Constantinople to Russia. See Balfour to Wilson, May 18, 1917, with enclosures, *ibid.*, 327-328 (and WP, DLC for the treaties themselves); Wilson to Balfour, May 19, 1917, *PWW*, XLII, 346; and Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations*, 8-14.
76. Wilson to House, July 21, 1917, *PWW*, XLIII, 238 (Wilson's emphasis).

77. For additional background, see George F. Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), 16–26; and Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 167–168. For a comprehensive study on American reaction to the Russian Revolution, see Christopher Lasch, *The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1962).

78. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 78–80; Gardner, *Safe for Democracy*, 133–135.

79. See the *New Republic*, XI (May 19, 1917), 62 and 65–67. (Tumulty sent a copy of this piece to Wilson on May 21; see *PWW*, XLII, 360–363.)

80. Dated May 29, the signers of the UDC letter included Norman Angell, J. A. Hobson, E. D. Morel, Charles Trevelyan, and J. Ramsay MacDonald. Colonel House withheld it from Wilson until June 28 because he, House, did not agree “altogether” with its purpose. See MacDonald *et al.* to Wilson, May 29, 1917, *ibid.*, 420–422; and House diary, June 28, 1917, HP, CtY.

81. See the Flag Day address, June 14, 1917, *PWW*, XLII, 498–504.

82. For the reaction of the British radicals, see Martin, *Peace Without Victory*, 136–137.

83. See Lansing to Wilson, Aug. 13, 1917, with enclosure, *PWW*, XLIII, 438–439; Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 229–236.

84. Wilson to House, Aug. 23, 1917, *PWW*, XLIV, 33.

85. For the complete text, see Wilson to Walter Hines Page, Aug. 27, 1917, with enclosure, *ibid.*, 57–59.

86. For the response of the British radicals, see Martin, *Peace Without Victory*, 144–145.

87. *Appeal to Reason*, Sept. 8, 1917.

88. Eastman to Wilson, Sept. 8, 1917, *PWW*, XLIV, 170; see also Sinclair to Wilson, Oct. 22, 1917, *ibid.*, 468.

89. This staff included George Louis Beer, Isaiah Bowman, Walter Lippmann, David Hunter Miller, Samuel Eliot Morison, Charles Seymour, James T. Shotwell, and Sidney Mezes (House's brother-in-law) as chairman. The definitive study is Lawrence E. Gelfand, *The Inquiry: American Preparation for Peace, 1917–1919* (New Haven, Conn., 1963).

90. See House diary, Oct. 13 and 24, 1917, *PWW*, XLIV, 378–379 and 437–439. The main purpose of this conference was to establish badly needed economic, military, and strategic coordination between the United States and the Allies.

91. For these events, see Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War*, 71–84 and 92–93; Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 245–266 and 278–280; and Gardner, *Safe for Democracy*, 148–150. The most exhaustive study is E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, 3 vols. (London, 1953).

92. See House to Wilson, Nov. 30, 1917; Wilson to House, Dec. 1, 1917; and House to Wilson, Dec. 2, 1917, *PWW*, XLV, 166, 176, and 184, respectively; and House diary, Nov. 16, 21, and 30, and Dec. 1, 1917, HP, CtY.

93. See Annual Message on the State of the Union, Dec. 4, 1917, *PWW*, XLV, 194–202.

94. See Martin, *Peace Without Victory*, 154–155.

95. See Peabody to Wilson, Dec. 4, 1917, *PWW*, XLV, 203–204; Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, Dec. 5, 1917; *New York American*, Dec. 6, 1917.

96. Kopelin to Wilson, Dec. 4, 1917, *PWW*, XLV, 203; and *Appeal to Reason*, Dec. 15, 1917.

97. See Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 295–298. It is important to note that Joffe's Six Points did not include disarmament or a league of nations; thus, the Bolshevik peace program was not as comprehensive as Wilson's.

98. House diary, Dec. 18, 1917, *PWW*, XLV, 323–324.

99. See Memorandum by Sidney Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann, “The Present Situation: The War Aims and Peace Terms It Suggests,” ca. Dec. 22, 1917, in *ibid.*, 459–475; for a discussion of The Inquiry's work, see Gelfand, *The Inquiry*, 134–153; and Steel, *Walter Lippmann*, 133–134.

100. See House diary, Jan. 9, 1917, *PWW*, XLV, 550–559; First Versions of the Fourteen Points, Jan. 5, 1917, *ibid.*, 476–485; Wilson's shorthand draft and typescript of the draft, Jan. 6, 1917, *ibid.*, 493–518; and the final draft, Jan. 7, 1917, *ibid.*, 519–531.

101. See Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 315–323; and Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 54–57.

102. See Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 57–61; Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 323–328; and David R. Woodward, “The Origins and Intent of David Lloyd George's January 5 War Aims Speech,” *Historian*, XXIV (November 1971), 22–39.

103. House diary, Jan. 9, 1918, *PWW*, XLV, 556–557.

104. An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, Jan. 8, 1918, *ibid.*, 534–539.

105. *New York Herald Tribune*, Jan. 9, 1918.

106. A frequent point of departure for the interpretation that Wilson was hostile from the start toward the Bolsheviks is Robert Lansing. Wilson's views are often erroneously assimilated with those of Lansing. Yet, when it came to Russia, as in so many other matters, Wilson virtually ignored the advice of his Secretary of State. Moreover, Wilson complained to House on several occasions about the company that Lansing kept—“society folk and reactionaries”; every time that he, Wilson, put out a statement, “Lansing followed it up with a conservative construction.” See House diary, Sept. 9, 1917, *ibid.*, XLIV, 176; and Sept. 27, 1918, *ibid.*, LI, 144.

107. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 373.

108. N. D. Baker to Wilson, with enclosure, Jan. 15, 1918, *PWW*, XLV, 594–595; Jusserand to Stephen Pichon, Jan. 9, 1918, *ibid.*, 550; see also Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 383–387.

109. See Swartz, *Union of Democratic Control*, 183–139. The *London Times* and the *Star* are quoted in the *New York Times*, Jan. 10, 1918. Balfour's made his comment in a speech at Edinburgh on January 10, summarized in *ibid.*, Jan. 11, 1918. Lloyd George's sentiments were conveyed in Sir Eric Drummond to Spring Rice, Jan. 12, 1918, *PWW*, XLV, 577–578. For additional commentary, see Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations*, 30–32; and Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 387–388.

110. The *New York Times*, Jan. 9, 1918, contains excellent coverage of congressional reaction.

111. *ibid.*, Jan. 11, 1918; *Independent*, XCIII (Jan. 19, 1918), 89–92. For a survey of press opinion, see *Literary Digest*, LVI (Jan. 19, 1918), 11–14.

112. Wald to Wilson, Jan. 8, 1918, *PWW*, XLV, 541–542; Addams to Wilson, Jan. 14, 1918, *ibid.*, 586; Spargo to Wilson, Jan. 8, 1918, *ibid.*, 542. See also Bryan to Wilson, Jan. 15, 1917, *ibid.*, 599.

113. “A World's Peace,” *Liberator*, I (March 1918), 10.

114. *Appeal to Reason*, Jan. 12 and May 25, 1918.

115. Debs is quoted in Weinstein, *Decline of Socialism*, 119 (see also 164–166); Jones in *Mother Jones Speaks*, 296; London in *Appeal to Reason*, May 25, 1918.

116. “Wilson and the World's Future,” *Liberator*, I (May 1918), 19 and 21.

117. Randolph S. Bourne, *War and the Intellectual: Collected Essays, 1915–1919*, edited by Carl Resek (New York, 1964), 57. See also Kennedy, *Over Here*, 51–52.

Notes to Chapter 13

1. For these untoward events, see Grayson diary, Feb. 19 and 23, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 207 and 229, respectively.
2. T. W. Gregory to Wilson, Jan. 14, 1919, *ibid.*, LIV, 58, and Wilson to Taft, Feb. 26, 1919, *ibid.*, LV, 281–282; see also Bartlett, *League to Enforce Peace*, 118–121.
3. Statement by the Great Lakes Congress of the LEP, Feb. 10, 1919, copy in WP, DLC; see also W. H. Short to Wilson, Feb. 9, 1919, reporting on the Atlantic Congress of the LEP, and Wilson to Short, Feb. 13, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 37–38 and 186.
4. See, for example, Joint Resolution of the Wisconsin legislature, copy in Merlin Hull to Wilson, Feb. 13, 1919, *ibid.*, 158; F. H. Lynch to Wilson, Jan. 25, 1919, *ibid.*, LIV, 277; and T. E. Burton to Wilson, Feb. 24, 1919, WP, DLC.
5. See McAdoo to Wilson, Feb. 17, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 205; Baker memo to Wilson, March 6, 1919, *ibid.*, 449–450; “Will the Peace League Prevent War?” *Literary Digest*, LX (March 1, 1919), 11–13, for a summary of opinion; *New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1919; *New York Sun*, Feb. 15, 1919. See also *New York Tribune*, Feb. 15 and 18, 1919; *New York World*, Feb. 15, 1919; and *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, Feb. 24, 1919.
6. As Wilson wrote to Edward Bok, Feb. 27, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 303.
7. Since the 1950s, most writers on the subject—Link, Mayer, Stone, Levin, Widenor, Ferrell, and Ambrosius, to name a few—have dismissed “isolationism” as a serious factor. The major exceptions are Adler’s *The Isolationist Impulse* (New York, 1957) and John Chalmers Vinson’s *Referendum for Isolation: Defeat of Article Ten of the League of Nations Covenant* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961).
8. See *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 3rd sess. (Feb. 27, 1919), 4,414–4,418 (emphasis added).
9. Quoted in Cooper, *Warrior and the Priest*, 333.
10. Roosevelt to Balfour, Dec. 10, 1918, *LTR*, VIII, 1,415.
11. Roosevelt to his physician, quoted in Harbaugh, *Power and Responsibility*, 486.
12. Quoted in Cooper, *Warrior and the Priest*, 334. See also Ralph Stout (ed.) *Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star*, 188–196, 277–281, and 292–295.
13. Quoted in Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 295.
14. For a discussion, see Cooper, *Warrior and the Priest*, 332–335; and Harbaugh’s moving account of TR’s last days in *Power and Responsibility*, 479–490.
15. Quoted in Wreszin, *Oswald Garrison Villard*, 110.
16. For the “Knox Resolution,” see Stone, *Irreconcilables*, 44–46; for other preliminary criticism in the Senate, 24–51.
17. *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., Dec. 21, 1918, pp. 723–728 and 972–972 (quotation on 727).
18. Lodge to Bryce, Jan. 16, 1918, Bryce papers, Vol. 7, Bodleian Library.
19. *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., Dec. 21, 1918, 728.
20. See Wilson to Tumulty, Feb. 14, 1919; and House diary, Feb. 14, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 184 and 194, respectively.
21. See, for example, Ambrosius, *Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition*, 82–83; Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 307–308; Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace*, 197–198; see also *New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1919.
22. See Wilson to Tumulty, Feb. 20, 21, 22 (2), and 23, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 218–219, 222, 225, 226, 231, respectively. See also Tumulty to Wilson, Jan. 6, 1919, *ibid.*, LIII, 625–626; Wilson to Tumulty, Feb. 14, 1919, and House to Wilson, Feb. 20, 1919, *ibid.*, LV, 185 and 221.

23. See Tumulty to Wilson, Jan. 18, 21 and 22, 1919, *ibid.*, 205–206, 223, and 226, respectively.
24. Address in Boston, Feb. 24, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 238–245.
25. See Stone, *Irreconcilables*, 55–58.
26. Taft to Karger, Feb. 22, 1919, quoted in Pringle, *Taft*, II, 943.
27. Stone’s *Irreconcilables* (60–61 and 63) is the exception to the rule, although my sources and interpretation are different. (Wilson’s subsequent conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on August 19, 1919, is often characterized as momentous; but by then his physical capacities were rapidly dwindling and his performance was erratic.)
28. Borah declined to accept Wilson’s invitation to the White House. For his speech on the Covenant, see the *New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1919.
29. The foregoing is based on a lengthy story in the *New York Times*, Feb. 27, 1919, printed in *PWW*, LV, 268–276.
30. Grayson diary, Feb. 26, 1919, *ibid.*, 267; *New York Times*, Feb. 27, 1919.
31. House diary, March 14, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 499 (emphasis added). Wilson called it “your dinner” because the idea for it came from House.
32. Brandegee, to *New York Sun*, Feb. 28, 1919, quoted in Stone, *Irreconcilables*, 63.
33. Quoted in the *New York Times*, Feb. 27, 1919.
34. Hapgood to House, Jan. 23, 1919, HP, CrY.
35. *New Republic*, XVIII (Feb. 22, 1919), 100–102; see also the *Survey*, XLI (Feb. 22, 1919), 724–726. For the exception, see Oswald Garrison Villard’s editorial, “The Net Result,” in the *Nation*, CVIII (Feb. 22, 1919), 268.
36. *Appeal to Reason*, March 1, 1919.
37. Robert Morss Lovett, “The Covenant—and After,” *Dial*, LXVI (March 8, 1919), 219.
38. “Memorandum by Paul Kellogg,” ca. April 1918, quoted in Thompson, *Reformers and War*, 197.
39. Report by Norman Hapgood and Stephen Duggan to the LFNA executive committee, March 4, 1919, quoted in Helbich, “American Liberals in the League of Nations Controversy,” 579.
40. The standard study is Robert F. Murray, *The Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920* (Minneapolis, 1955). For Wilson’s personal knowledge of most of these incidents, see D. F. Malone to Wilson, Feb. 28, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 337–338 (on the Nearing case); T. W. Gregory to Wilson Nov. 9, 1918 *ibid.*, LIII, 12–13 (on Baldwin); Charles W. Ervin (editor of the *Call*) to Wilson, Feb. 1, 1919, *ibid.*, LIV, 430; and Wilson to Burleson, Feb. 28, 1919, *ibid.*, LV, 327. See also “Bolsheviki in the United States,” *Literary Digest*, LX (Feb. 22, 1919), 11–13; Scott Nearing, *The Making of a Radical: A Political Autobiography* (New York, 1972), 115–120; Hanson is quoted in the *Dial*, LXVI (March 22, 1919), 311; Poindexter’s and Reed’s statements are reported in the *New York Times*, Feb. 13 and 23, 1919.
41. There is no published monograph on the subject, but see Ernest Ray Closser’s excellent “Some Day a Silent Guard: Political Prisoners and the Amnesty Issue in post-World War I America,” senior thesis, Princeton University, 1984.
42. *Dial*, LXV (Nov. 30, 1919), 497–498.
43. *New Republic*, XVII (Jan. 4 and 18, 1919), 282 and 343; see also *Dial*, LXVI (Jan. 11, 1919), 6.
44. Gavit to Wilson, Feb. 24, 1919, enclosure with Tumulty to Wilson, Feb. 25, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 255.
45. Sayre to Wilson, March 1, 1919, *ibid.*, 365–366.

46. Memorandum by Baker, March 6, 1919, *ibid.*, 450.
47. Malone to Wilson, Feb. 28, 1919, *ibid.*, 337-338.
48. "Mr. President, We Demand Peace and Democracy at Home as Well as Abroad," *Appeal to Reason*, March 1, 1919; see also (*ibid.*) "Public Opinion for Amnesty, As Reflected in Liberal Press."
49. Wilson to Burleson, Feb. 28, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 327.
50. See, all in *PWW*, Wilson to Tumulty, Feb. 25, 1919, with enclosure, 254-255; Gregory to Tumulty, March 1, 1919, p. 344; Tumulty to Wilson, March 1, 1919, with two enclosures from Gregory to Wilson, March 1, 1919, pp. 344-347.
51. Wilson to Sayre, March 3, 1919, *ibid.*, 395.
52. Lodge to Beveridge, Feb. 18, 1919, quoted in Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 313. Lodge repeated this message time and again to his colleagues (*ibid.*, 301, 302, 308, 310).
53. Lodge to Beveridge, Feb. 18, 1919, and Coolidge to Lodge, Feb. 22, 1919, quoted in *ibid.*, 308. For the Boston reception, see the *New York Times*, Feb. 25, 1919.
54. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 309.
55. Remarks to Members of the Democratic National Committee, Feb. 28, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 309.
56. For a discussion of the reconstruction commission, see Kennedy, *Over Here*, 248-250.
57. On these subjects, see Tumulty to Wilson, Jan. 30 and Feb. 6, 1919, *PWW*, LIV, 390-393 and 520-521; W. D. Hines to Wilson, Feb. 24 and 25, 1919, *ibid.*, LV, 246-250 and 257-258; McAdoo to Wilson, Feb. 25, 1919, with enclosure, *ibid.*, 258-261; W. B. Wilson to Wilson, Feb. 26, 1919, *ibid.*, 291-292. See also Wilson's address to a conference of governors and mayors, March 3, 1919, *ibid.*, 389-390; and Stanley Shapiro, "The Twilight of Reform: Advanced Progressives After the Armistice," *Historian*, XXXIII (May 1971), 349-364.
58. Beveridge to Lodge, Jan. 28, 1919, quoted in Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 301.
59. Quoted in Ambrosius, *Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition*, 105.
60. *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., 4,520-4,528.
61. Remarks to the Democratic National Committee, Feb. 28, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 323.
62. Lodge to Bryce, March 4, 1919, Bryce Papers, Vol. 7, Bodleian Library.
63. *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., 4,974 (emphasis added). For further discussion, see Stone, *Irreconcilables*, 70-74, and Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 315-316.
64. For Taft's address, see the *New York Times*, March 5, 1919.
65. For a survey, see "The Kind of League the Republicans Want," *Literary Digest*, LX (March 15, 1919), 13-16.
66. See Barclay to Balfour, March 9, 10, and 16, 1919; and Reading to Balfour and Lloyd George, March 17 and 20, 1919, in F.O. files 800 and 608 (09533), nos. 222 and 244, PRO.
67. "The Covenant—and After," *Dial*, LXVI (March 8, 1919), 219-220; see also unsigned editorial, *ibid.*, March 22, 1919, pp. 309-310.
68. See "Agitation for a League of Nations without Criticism," *New Republic*, XVIII (March 15, 1919), 200-202; *New York Call*, March 28, 1919; Lippmann, *New Republic* (Supplement), XVIII (March 22, 1919), 10 and 11. See also William Hard, "Article Ten of the League," in *ibid.*, 237-240. (It will be recalled that Wilson's Second Paris Draft contained a provision on minorities that he had been forced to drop.)
69. Wilson to Breckinridge Long, Feb. 26, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 279.
70. Memorandum by Baker, March 6, 1919, and Baker diary, March 8, 1919, *ibid.*, 451 and 463-464.
71. Address at the Metropolitan Opera House, March 4, 1919, *ibid.*, 413-421. For the description of Wilson's appearance, see Baker's diary, March 8, 1919, *ibid.*, 463.

72. *Nation*, CVIII (March 15, 1919), 382.
73. Remarks to members of the Democratic National Committee, Feb. 28, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 313.

Notes to Chapter 14

1. Baker diary, April 3, 1919, *PWW*, LVI, 577 and 578.
2. Edith Bolling Wilson, *My Memoir* (Indianapolis and New York, 1938), 245-246; see also Grayson diary, March 13, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 487-488; about the break with House, see Floto, *Colonel House in Paris*, 164-170; and Weinstein, *Woodrow Wilson*, 347-348.
3. Wilson's statement is printed in note 1 to Baker diary, March 15, 1919, *PWW*, LV, 531; see also Tumulty to Wilson, March 13, 1919, *ibid.*, 493.
4. Cecil diary, March 16, 1919, *ibid.*, 539; Hitchcock to Wilson, March 4, 1919, *ibid.*, 437; see also T. J. Walsh to Wilson, Feb. 25; and Wilson to Walsh, Feb. 26, 1919, *ibid.*, 262-263 and 280; and Grayson diary and House diary, March 16, 1919, *ibid.*, 538 and 539.
5. Taft to Wilson, March 18, 1919, *ibid.*, LVI, 83; and McCumber to Wilson, March 13, 1919, *ibid.*, LV, 491-492.
6. The Miller diary, March 18, 1919, printed in *ibid.*, LVI, 75-81, gives the most complete account of the meeting; but see, also on that date, Cecil diary and House diary, *ibid.*, 81-83.
7. See Miller, *Drafting the Covenant*, I, 322-353 and 390-418; and II, 336-360.
8. These conditions were embodied in Lloyd George's famous "Fountainbleau Memorandum," drafted March 22-24 and sent to both Wilson and Clemenceau on March 25, 1919; it is printed in *PWW*, LVI, 259-270. For a detailed discussion, see Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 156-161. (The Council of Ten had been reduced in size to the so-called Big Four on the previous day.)
9. See Mantoux's Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Four, March 25, 1919 (11 A.M.) *PWW*, LVI, 249-250.
10. Cecil to Balfour, March 27, 1919, F.O. 800, 215, 09533, PRO.
11. See Cecil to Lloyd George, April 10, 1919, F.O. 800, 216, 09533, PRO; and Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 161-162.
12. See Article XXI, printed in *PWW*, LVIII, 195; Oscar Straus to Wilson, April 17 and Wilson to Straus, April 18, 1919, *ibid.*, LVII, 445 and 469. Miller, *Drafting the Covenant*, I, 442-450 and 453-461, provides the fullest documentary coverage.
13. See House diary and Lansing memo, both March 28, 1919, *PWW*, LVI, 349 and 351; and Mantoux's Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Four, March 28, 1919 (4 P.M.), *ibid.*, 360-371; see also Clemenceau to Wilson, March 17, 1919, with memorandum, March 17, 1919, *ibid.*, 9-14.
14. The description of Wilson is in Baker diary, April 3, 1919, *ibid.*, 577. For details, see Ambrosius, *Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition*, 108-113; Louis A. R. Yates, *United States and French Security* (New York, 1957), 44-50; and Walworth, *Wilson and His Peacemakers*, pp. 322-328. See also Mantoux's Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Four, April 9, 1919 (3:30 P.M.), *PWW*, LVII, 161-164. The French security treaty was never ratified.
15. *PWW*, LVII, 163-164.
16. For a discussion, see Schmitz, "Woodrow Wilson and the Liberal Peace," 29-44; and Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of the Peacemaking*, 112-139.
17. See Miller, *Drafting the Covenant*, I, 461-466 and II, 387-394; House diary, April 12, 1919, *PWW*, LVII, 285; Baker diary, March 8, 1919 (Wilson quotation), *ibid.*, LV, 464;